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ABSTRACT 
 
The public policy towards minimum resale price maintenance (‘RPM’), or vertical price 
fixing, namely the practice whereby a manufacturer stipulates a retail price floor below 
which its products are not to be resold, has traditionally been one of the most contentious 
antitrust issues on both sides of the Atlantic. Economic theory suggests that RPM is 
capable of producing ambivalent welfare consequences, thus obscuring the intellectual 
debate as to the optimal antitrust response to the practice. This normative uncertainty is 
best reflected in the divergent approach taken to RPM under the relevant laws of the 
United States and the European Union, arguably the world’s two most mature antitrust 
jurisdictions. In 2007, in its seminal Leegin judgment, the United States Supreme Court 
abolished the century-old per se ban on vertical price fixing. At the same time, under the 
European Commission’s recent Guidelines on Vertical Restraints price floors remain 
subject to a quasi-conclusive presumption of illegality. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine whether a more consistent approach through the relaxation of the European 
Commission’s blanket prohibition on price floors would be feasible and, in effect, 
desirable. Based on insights from new institutional economics, it will be argued that RPM 
may on certain occasions be a substitute – however imperfect – for vertical integration, 
where a merger would be prohibitively costly for the parties, in which case the hierarchical 
form of organisation will have to be replaced by a hybrid governance structure. Under 
certain circumstances, a fixed retail profit margin may enhance the self-enforcing range of 
long-term partnerships governed by relational norms, as well as the manufacturer’s control 
over distribution by reducing substantially the transaction costs associated with monitoring 
dealer performance. At the same time, however, the analysis will take into account the 
various objections to the practice, most notably the horizontal collusion theory, in order to 
argue that the approach to RPM should in principle be cautious. The discussion will 
culminate in the proposal for a new, workable analytical framework for the substantive 
assessment of vertical price fixing under EU competition law, which will be based on a – 
genuinely – rebuttable presumption of anti-competitive object under Article 101(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
Restricted dealing is one of the most contentious antitrust issues in the European 
Union (‘EU’), and its treatment under Article 101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’) is consistently received with a great deal of skepticism, due to 
the allegedly formalistic approach taken to certain types of vertical restraints by the 
European Commission and Courts. 
 Article 101(1) declares as incompatible with the internal market ‘all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market’. In its 
seminal decision in Consten and Grundig, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’ or ‘Court of Justice’) confirmed that the prohibition covers not only agreements 
between competitors, but also restrictive agreements between undertakings operating at 
successive levels of the production and distribution chain.
1
 
 Economic and legal literature typically classifies the various types of vertical 
restraints in two broad categories, depending on whether they are designed to influence the 
resale price of the goods or services in question, or limit the distributor’s freedom of action 
with regard to issues other than price. Vertical price restraints, which are also referred to as 
resale price maintenance (‘RPM’), may take two forms. Minimum RPM is the practice 
whereby the manufacturer stipulates a price floor below which its products are not to be 
resold. Inversely, under maximum RPM distributors undertake to refrain from selling the 
manufacturer’s products at a price which exceeds a given price ceiling. As far as vertical 
non-price restraints are concerned, typical examples include single branding, exclusive or 
selective distribution, and tying. 
                                                          
1
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten Sarl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
[1966] ECR 299, 339. 
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 While restrictions of intrabrand competition are generally regarded as pro-
competitive and may – in the absence of market power in the upstream and downstream 
markets – benefit from the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation,2 minimum RPM and 
absolute territorial protection are consistently treated as restrictions of competition by 
object under Article 101(1), and as hardcore restraints under Article 101(3). However, by 
contrast to the prohibition against absolute territorial protection which has received much 
attention from antitrust scholars in the fifty years following Consten and Grundig, the 
treatment of minimum RPM under EU competition law has been subject to limited 
examination. 
 The law on RPM has been no less controversial on the other side of the Atlantic, as 
for almost a century US courts had been treating vertical price fixing as per se illegal on 
the basis of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr Miles.3 In response to reactions by 
manufacturers and retailers in an economy which had barely started to recover from the 
Great Depression, the enactment of the Fair Trade Acts gave the opportunity to individual 
States to legalise RPM under their domestic antitrust regimes. In the second half of the 
twentieth century proponents of the Chicago School of thought enriched the intellectual 
debate by suggesting various pro-competitive justifications for the use of RPM and called 
for the adoption of the rule of reason standard at a federal level. This came only in 2007 in 
the Leegin case,
4
 where the US Supreme Court, convinced that the economic effects of the 
practice were ambivalent, held that RPM did not warrant per se treatment. 
 In the aftermath of Leegin, the European Commission’s revised Vertical Guidelines 
acknowledged for the first time that vertical price fixing may on certain occasions have an 
efficiency-enhancing potential, and may be exempted on an individual basis under Article 
101(3).
5
 Nevertheless, the normative value of this observation – if any – appears to be 
limited. Wijckmans and Tuytschaever’s brief statement is illustrative: ‘there can be no 
misunderstanding that vertical price fixing remains as much of a hard core restriction under 
Regulation 330/2010 as it used to be under Regulation 2790/99’.6    
                                                          
2
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
[2010] OJ L102/1. 
3
 Dr Miles Medical Co v John D Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373 (1911). 
4
 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007). 
5
 Commission Notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C130/1, para 225. 
6
 F Wijckmans and F Tuytschaever, Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011), p 140. 
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 Naturally, distributorship agreements are not the only business method for the 
broadest possible dissemination of goods and services. Manufacturers who seek to make 
their products available to consumers may avoid the appointment of intermediaries simply 
by integrating vertically into the wholesale and retail stages. An undertaking that wishes to 
integrate vertically may do so either through internal expansion, for example by setting up 
a subsidiary entrusted with the distribution of its products in the retail market, or through a 
vertical merger with an existing firm, already active at a successive stage of the production 
and distribution chain.   
In its Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the European Commission not only 
concedes that ‘non-horizontal [namely vertical and conglomerate] mergers are generally 
less likely to significantly impede effective competition than horizontal mergers’,7 but also 
acknowledges their substantial efficiency-enhancing potential.
8
 At the same time, the 
‘single economic entity’ doctrine, as formulated by the case law of the European Courts, 
and most notably the Viho case,
9
 prescribes that the constituent parts of a vertically 
integrated firm, although having separate legal personalities, are considered as a single 
economic entity. A significant implication of the doctrine is that any arrangements between 
a parent company and its subsidiaries do not constitute ‘agreements’ within the meaning of 
Article 101 TFEU, but are instead perceived as an internal allocation of tasks. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Objectives 
 
Economic theory suggests that RPM is capable of producing ambivalent effects. 
Price floors are inimical to consumer welfare particularly when they are implemented in 
concentrated markets in order to facilitate horizontal collusion, or as exclusionary 
mechanisms. On the other hand, antitrust scholars have suggested compelling pro-
competitive justifications mostly associated with the manufacturer’s desire to enhance its 
                                                          
7
 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C265/6, para 11. 
8
 Ibid, para 13. 
9
 Case T-102/92, Viho Europe BV v Commission [1995] ECR II-17 and, on appeal, Case C-73/95P, Viho 
Europe BV v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457. 
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control over distribution.
10
 Despite the plethora of materials on RPM, the actual effects of 
the practice remain unknown, allowing no safe inferences as to the optimal antitrust 
response to the practice: otherwise insightful formal models demonstrate the likely impact 
of RPM upon the assumption of its implementation in extremely tight oligopolistic 
markets, while empirical evidence is scarce and at times not particularly enlightening. 
The stringent approach to RPM is in tension with the immunity conferred upon 
intra-enterprise arrangements. This normative inconsistency, which is essentially a 
manifestation of inefficient legal reductionism, introduces an economic anomaly that is 
difficult to reconcile with the understanding of markets and hierarchies as alternative 
organisational structures, the choice of which is contingent upon the firms’ desire to 
economise on transaction costs. In an attempt to shape a legislative framework for the 
assessment of vertical restraints, the Commission appears to have based the prohibition of 
RPM upon the assumption that any loss in allocative efficiency is the result of restrictive 
agreements between independent undertakings.  
This thesis intends to identify the reasons for, as well as the particular elements of, 
this tension. It will be shown that RPM may on certain occasions be a substitute – however 
imperfect – for vertical integration, where a merger would be prohibitively costly for the 
parties. It will be argued that the boundaries of the firm are in reality not as sharp as 
competition law assumes, and that the single economic entity doctrine is only half a step 
towards the right direction. Vertical integration into distribution may be achieved not only 
by the transfer of ownership title in assets or shares, by also by contract. In light of this 
assumption, it will be submitted that, on certain occasions, RPM may ensure the 
enforceability of long-term relational contracts, which present attributes comparable to 
those of full vertical integration, thus generating similar transactional efficiencies. After 
having dealt with these normative issues, a new workable analytical framework for the 
substantive assessment of price floors under Article 101 TFEU will be suggested. In 
shaping this framework, which will be based on a rebuttable presumption of illegality, all 
pro- and anti-competitive theories associated with the practice will be taken into 
consideration. 
                                                          
10
 See, eg, LG Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’ [1960] 3 JL & Econ 86; JR Gould and 
LE Preston, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Retail Outlets’ [1965] 32 Economica 302; R Deneckere, HP 
Marvel and J Peck, ‘Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance’ [1996] 111 QJ Econ 
885; B Klein and KM Murphy, ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’ [1988] 31 JL & 
Econ 265. 
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 This analysis will also acknowledge that the US Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Leegin, which put an end to the century-long per se treatment of the practice, has received 
considerable criticism, not unlike Dr Miles. Nevertheless, adversaries of the Leegin dictum 
do not typically assert that the effects of RPM are so demonstrably harmful that merit per 
se treatment; instead their concerns are more associated with how administrable a full-
blown rule of reason analysis will be in practice.
11
 The reason for these concerns may be 
traced in Judge Posner’s frequently cited quote that ‘in practice, [the rule of reason] is little 
more than a euphemism for nonliability’.12      
 This study will not disregard the theories of harm associated with RPM. The 
horizontal collusion theory was the intellectual basis for the Supreme Court’s per se 
treatment of the practice introduced in Dr Miles, and has recently been confirmed by 
significant contributions by prominent antitrust economists.
13
 Nevertheless, and despite 
their contribution to our understanding of the effects of RPM, these theories are not firmly 
supported by empirical evidence. It is characteristic that the only recent empirical study 
confirming that industry-wide price floors can be unambiguously anti-competitive is a 
paper on the effects of the French Galland Act,
14
 which introduced a ban on discounts 
below the price quoted on the invoice produced by the wholesaler at the time of delivery. 
Although the efficiency considerations were comparable to those associated with RPM, the 
outcomes of the study are not particularly useful for public policy purposes: exogenously 
imposed vertical restraints are generally not driven by the typical efficiency-enhancing 
justifications, and have been proven to be far more detrimental to consumer welfare than 
those imposed voluntarily be manufacturers.
15
 
 At the same time, new theories have emerged which note the potentially harmful 
exclusionary effects of RPM, both in the upstream and the downstream markets.
16
 The 
                                                          
11
 See, eg, BM Brunell, ‘Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in Action’ [2007] 52 
Antitrust Bull 475; JB Kirkwood, ‘Rethinking Antitrust Policy toward RPM’ [2010] 55 Antitrust Bull 423; 
Jones Harbour P and Price LA, ‘RPM and the Rule of Reason: Ready or Not, Here We Come?’ [2010] 55 
Antitrust Bull 225. 
12
 RA Posner, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision’ 
[1977-1978] 45 U Chi L Rev 1, 14. 
13
 B Jullien and P Rey, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion’ [2007] 38 Rand J Econ 983; P Rey and T 
Vergé, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Interlocking Relationships’ [2010] 58 J Ind Econ 928. 
14
 P Biscourp, X Boutin and T Vergé, ‘The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices: Evidence from the Loi 
Galland’ [2013] 123 Econ L 1279. 
15
 F Lafontaine and M Slade, ‘Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public 
Policy’ in P Buccirossi (ed), Handbook of Antitrust Economics (The MIT Press 2008). 
16
 I Paldor, ‘RPM as An Exclusionary Practice’ [2010] 55 Antitrust Bull 309; J Asker and H Bar-Isaac, 
‘Raising Retailers’ Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals’ [2014] 104 Am Econ Rev 672. 
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soundness of these theories is supported also by credible empirical studies.
17
 The use of 
RPM as a foreclosure mechanism is particularly exacerbated in light of the recent trends in 
retailing and the emergence of online retailing as an alternative, cost-effective distribution 
format.  
 Furthermore, it cannot escape one’s attention that the timing was also unfortunate: 
Leegin was decided in the midst of a revolutionary process of emergence and expansion of 
electronic commerce (‘e-commerce’).18 This coincidence has put into question the validity 
of the free rider argument, which has traditionally been the most oft-cited pro-competitive 
justification for vertical price fixing. More specifically, the occurrence and prevalence of 
free riding in the e-marketplace are juxtaposed against the ability of RPM to impede inter-
type competition, namely competition between different distribution formats,
19
 thus 
depriving online outlets of their competitive advantages. 
 Our understanding of antitrust law is typically guided by insights from neoclassical 
economics, and public policy judgments are stereotypically believed to be based on the 
effects of multi-lateral agreements or unilateral conduct by dominant firms on allocative 
and productive efficiency. In an authoritative study on EU competition policy, Odudu 
argues that the bifurcation of Article 101 TFEU under paragraphs 1 and 3 corresponds to 
two different substantive criteria, an allocative and a productive/dynamic efficiency 
inquiry, respectively.
20
  
Oliver Williamson, whose pioneering work on new institutional economics has 
enhanced our understanding of the contribution of transactions costs in the structural and 
behavioural choices of economic actors is critical of the neoclassical preoccupation with 
allocative efficiency considerations ‘to the neglect of organizational efficiency, in which 
discrete structural alternatives were brought under scrutiny’.21 Indeed, antitrust analysis 
typically overlooks the contribution of transaction cost analysis, which attempts to justify 
                                                          
17
 E Giovannetti and L Magazzini, ‘Resale Price Maintenance: An Empirical Analysis of UK Firms’ 
Compliance’ [2013] 123 Econ J F582. 
18
 See, eg, M Lao, ‘Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider Issues’ [2010] 55 
Antitrust Bull 473; Note, ‘Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in Circumstance”: The Internet and Resale Price 
Maintenance’ [2007-2008] 121 Harv L Rev 1600; P Jones Harbour and LA Price, supra n 11; GT Gundlach, 
JP Cannon and KC Manning, ‘Free Riding and Resale Price Maintenance: Insights from Marketing Research 
and Practice’ [2010] 55 Antitrust Bull 381; RD Blair and JS Haynes, ‘The Plight of Online Retailers in the 
Aftermath of Leegin: An Economic Analysis’ [2010] 55 Antitrust Bull 245; WS Comanor, ‘Leegin and Its 
Progeny: Implications for Internet Commerce’ [2013] 58 Antitrust Bull 107. 
19
 See JC Palamountain Jr, The Politics of Distribution (Harvard University Press 1955). 
20
 O Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford University Press 
2006). 
21
 OE Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press 1996), p 100. 
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the choice of specific contractual clauses in the market context on the basis of the influence 
exercised on the parties by uncertainty, complexity and specificity.
22
 Naturally, this 
conception is not to be interpreted as suggesting that what is efficient for the parties is also 
desirable from a public policy perspective. However, as Almarin Philips noted in one of 
the first studies to apply transaction cost analysis in antitrust, ‘an investigation of private 
motives may illuminate social consequences’.23 
The theory of new institutional economics is based on three pillars: transaction 
costs, contracts and property rights. As Ménard explains:  
Transaction costs provide an explanation to the existence of alternative modes of 
organization as well as tools for understanding the characteristics of these 
arrangements. Contracts represent a focal point in [new institutional economics] 
because of their role in relaxing the constraints of bounded rationality, fixing 
schemes of references for future actions, and checking on opportunistic behavior. 
Lastly, relatively well-defined property rights, and institutions for implementing 
them, form a prerequisite for making the transfer of rights possible and the tradeoff 
among arrangements meaningful. Property rights thus affect contractual hazards 
and embed transactions into specific institutional environments’.24   
To the very best of my knowledge, the only study which has attempted to interpret 
the application of the bifurcated Article 101 through the lens of new institutional 
economics has been produced by Professor Lianos, who asserts that  
[t]he bifurcation of Article [101] corresponds to the two dominant concepts of the 
limits of the firm, Article 101(1) accommodates the conception of the firm under 
the new institutional economics as essentially a governance structure and it makes 
possible the consideration of transactional efficiency gains. ... Article [101](3) 
incorporates the neoclassical conception of the firm as a production function.
25
 
Lianos concentrates his analysis of the antitrust implications of the integration of 
new institutional economics in the enforcement logic of Article 101 for franchising and 
                                                          
22
 F Lafontaine and ME Slade, ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Vertical Market Restrictions – Evidence’ 
[2010] 55 Antitrust Bull 587, 590. 
23
 A Phillips, ‘Schwinn Rules and the “New Economics” of Vertical Relations’ [1975] 44 Antitrust LJ 573, 
577. 
24
 C Ménard, ‘A New Institutional Approach to Organization’ in C Ménard and M Shirley (eds), Handbook 
of New Institutional Economics (Springer 2005), p 282. 
25
 I Lianos, ‘Commercial Agency Agreements, Vertical Restraints, and the Limits of Article 81(1) EC: 
Between Hierarchies and Networks’ [2007] 3 J Comp L & Econ 625, 671. 
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selective distribution, and asserts that vertical restraints are excluded from the scope of the 
prohibition insofar as they are designed to establish a hybrid form of organisation which 
lies in the middle of an organisational continuum with markets and hierarchies as it polar 
extremes. Hybrids are defined by Ménard as ‘forms of inter-firm collaboration in which 
property rights remain distinct while joint decisions are made, requiring specific modes of 
coordination’,26 and vertical restraints may indeed enhance their self-enforcement range by 
serving as ex ante incentive alignment mechanisms in situation where the commercial 
interests of the manufacturer are in tension with those of the distributors. 
While reliance on transaction cost analysis is indeed enlightening with regard to our 
understanding of the public policy towards franchising and selective distribution under EU 
competition law, it is nonetheless inconsistent with the treatment of other vertical 
restraints, such as exclusive distribution and RPM. Particularly with regard to RPM, which 
is the subject-matter of this thesis, it appears that the blanket prohibition of the practice is 
rather to be understood through the lens of neoclassical economics primarily as a 
conclusive presumption of allocative inefficiency, and possibly also as a result of the 
integrationist concerns to which it may give rise.  
The aim if this thesis is to provide answers to three questions. The first is whether 
there is the possibility within the current framework of EU competition law to introduce a 
more relaxed approach to vertical price fixing, influenced by Leegin’s rule of reason and 
based on a common understanding of the substantive economics. This question will be 
answered in the affirmative: it will be shown that, although competition law enforcement 
with regard to vertical restraints in general, and RPM in particular, has traditionally been 
driven by a combination of economic and integrationist objectives, the Commission, in its 
recent Vertical Guidelines, has made noteworthy concessions to its traditional rigid 
adherence to the single market imperative in an attempt to accommodate a more effects-
based approach by declaring its intention to uphold even agreements that confer outright 
absolute territorial protection, where their aim is to promote interbrand competition.
27
 The 
current approach, which singles out RPM as the most stringently treated vertical restraint 
on the basis of an conclusive presumption of illegality under Article 101(1), is rather at 
odds with the overall spirit of the Guidelines. 
The second question which I will attempt to answer in this thesis will concentrate 
on what the optimal antitrust policy towards RPM within the context of Article 101 TFEU 
                                                          
26
 C Ménard, supra n 24, p 294. 
27
 See Vertical Guidelines, paras 60-61. 
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is. Taking into consideration all pro-competitive justifications and theories of harm as 
suggested by economists, as well as empirical evidence from antitrust litigation and 
scientific publications, I will conclude that, as a general matter, a policy reform is 
warranted. However, although not always supported by credible empirical studies, anti-
competitive theories remain compelling and advocate against a radical change in the status 
of RPM as a ‘by-object’ restriction of competition under Article 101(1) and a ‘hardcore’ 
restraint under Article 101(3). Instead, I will argue that the most appropriate normative 
approach would consist in a rebuttable presumption of illegality. In that regard, the CJEU’s 
recent decision in Cartes Bancaires is particularly enlightening in advising undertakings 
on how such a presumption may be rebutted by means of an abridged effects analysis.
28
 
The third main issue to be dealt with is how this approach can take shape within the 
current normative framework of EU competition law; in other words, which of the two 
paragraphs of the bifurcated Article 101 TFEU is more appropriate for the suggested 
substantive assessment of an RPM scheme. Building on contributions by new institutional 
economics and Professor Lianos’ insight, it will be argued that Article 101(1) provides the 
most appropriate framework for this purpose. It will be argued that the pro-competitive 
effects of RPM coincide with the specific attributes of full vertical integration: 
internalisation of horizontal externalities in markets where free riding occurs, prevention of 
ex post opportunistic behaviour where idiosyncratic investments have been made, 
elimination of double moral hazard and, generally, centralisation of the manufacturer’s 
control over distribution. In light of transaction cost economics, pro-competitive RPM is to 
be understood as a substitute of hierarchical authority, particularly where it is implemented 
as a monitoring mechanism of dealer compliance with the rules of long-term distribution 
contracts governed by relational norms.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
 In order for the research questions outlined in the previous section to be addressed, 
a combination of comprehensive understanding of the law and economics of vertical price 
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fixing is required. A black-letter law approach will be used for the review of the American 
and European case law on RPM. A more theoretical analysis, legal, economic and 
historical, will be used for the interpretation of the competition laws of the EU and the US 
and their application to agreements fixing minimum retail prices. 
 In addition, the comparative methodology is of central importance for the current 
research. The thesis will investigate methodically the evolution of the public policy 
towards RPM in the US and the EU, in order to conclude whether the adoption of a 
relatively more lenient approach to RPM, inspired by Leegin’s rule of reason, is feasible 
under Article 101 TFEU. This comparative approach, however, also has a historical 
dimension: the purpose of the research is also to shed light on the different legal and 
economic environments that shaped the antitrust response to RPM in the two jurisdictions. 
The research will demonstrate the influence exercised by the arguably more mature 
American antirust experience on the competition law provisions introduced in the Treaty of 
Rome, as well as on their application to RPM in particular. It will be shown that the 
existence of different objectives pursued by the respective antitrust regimes could justify a 
differentiated, more stringent treatment of RPM under the European competition rules. 
However, it will be argued that the Commission’s current policy priorities, as outlined in 
the recent Vertical Guidelines, appear to curtail the influence of the ‘single market 
imperative’ on EU competition policy, by placing subtle, yet obvious, emphasis on 
economic efficiency considerations.  
 Economic analysis will be of paramount importance. Vertical price fixing will be 
analysed not only through the lens of neoclassical economics, which focuses exclusively 
on price and output, but also from the perspective of new institutional economics. New 
institutional economics traces its origins in Ronald Coase’s seminal paper ‘The Nature of 
the Firm’,29 which explains the reasons for the emergence of the firm as an organisational 
structure and explores how its boundaries are defined, but has been further elaborated by 
the work of Oliver Williamson, who applied transaction cost analysis to interpret the 
interactions between economic units in light of economic actors’ bounded rationality and 
their propensity for opportunistic behaviour.
30
 By contrast to neoclassical economics, 
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which regards the firm as a production function, new institutional economics approaches it 
as a governance mechanism. Where the use of the market is more appealing with a view to 
economising on transaction costs, this governance mechanism may be replicated by means 
of vertical restraints, implemented with ‘the purpose and effect of infusing order into a 
transaction where the interests of the system and the interests of the part are otherwise in 
conflict’.31 
 
 
4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
 The first Chapter of this thesis will explore the origins of the prohibition against 
vertical price fixing, both in the US and the EU. The chapter will start by examining the 
RPM cases decided by English courts at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. English courts 
were the first to be faced with a considerable body of RPM litigation and, in adjudicating 
the relevant cases, they appear to have prioritised freedom of contract over freedom of 
trade. The Sherman Act was designed by US Congress as a common law statute and, 
although economic considerations – the horizontal collusion theory in particular – partially 
influenced the Dr Miles dictum, the Supreme Court nevertheless did not sever the ties with 
the common law precedent, relying also on the ancient common law doctrine against 
restraint on alienation. The chapter will follow the evolution of US case law on RPM by 
presenting the most influential Supreme Court decisions until Monsanto and Business 
Electronics, the two last landmark cases of the per se era. Although a vertical non-price 
case, Sylvania will also be discussed as a milestone of Sherman Act litigation: in Sylvania 
the Supreme Court not only started eroding the per se rule for vertical restraints, but also 
heralded a new era of effects-based analysis in antitrust with far reaching implications 
which went beyond the narrow field of vertical restraints. The non-economic 
considerations that proved to be controversial in the Leegin case, namely the majority’s 
decision to depart from the principle of stare decisis will also be presented. Then the focus 
will shift to EU competition law. The chapter will analyse the influence of the US 
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experience on the shaping of the European competition rules in general and the public 
policy towards RPM under Article 101 TFEU in particular. The stringent treatment of 
RPM in the EU will also be partially attributed to the single market imperative. It will be 
argued, however, that currently RPM is singled out as the most harshly treated vertical 
restraint, something which cannot be adequately explained by any integrationist objectives. 
Consequently, assuming an agreement on substantive economics, the question as to 
whether the adoption of a less rigid approach to RPM through the adaptation of the Leegin 
rule to the legal framework of Article 101 TFEU will be answered in the affirmative.       
 Chapter 2 will focus on the economics of distribution. After discussing the pro- and 
anti-competitive theories associated with RPM, the chapter will explore the nature of the 
firm, and look into the EU law of merger control with regard to vertical concentrations. It 
will be argued that, from the perspective of new institutional economics, vertical 
integration merely constitutes a paradigm. Against this background, and regardless of 
whether vertical integration is achieved through ownership – namely by merger – or by 
contractual means – namely long-term transactions reinforced with vertical restraints – the 
principle of organisational neutrality advocates for a more consistent treatment where a 
vertical merger, on the one hand, and price floors, on the other, are intended to economise 
on transaction costs associated with the centralisation of the manufacturer’s control over 
the distribution chain. 
 Chapter 3 will explore the horizontal collusion objection to RPM, arguably the 
most prominent theory of harm associated with price floors. The analysis will stress the 
relevance of the source of the restraint to the competitive assessment thereof: as 
demonstrated by Professor Comanor,
32
 and acknowledged subsequently by the majority in 
Leegin, price floors imposed at the behest of a powerful retailer or a number of retailers 
possessing substantial monopoly power are more likely to bring about a decrease in output, 
thus posing a greater threat for consumer welfare. Some relevant cases from the other side 
of the Atlantic, both older and more recent will also be discussed. Following the 
presentation of the Chicago school criticism of the cartel theory, the welfare implications 
of the emergence and expansion of online retailing will be examined. It will be argued that 
the e-marketplace is a far cry from being the manifestation of ‘friction-free capitalism’ that 
pioneers in computer sciences had foreseen. Examples of restrictive practices specific to 
the online environment, such as Internet minimum advertised price policies (‘iMAP’), dual 
pricing, and across platform parity agreements (‘APPAs’) will also be presented to show 
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how price rigidity in the online context may be reinforced. The chapter will conclude by 
acknowledging that the horizontal collusion theory is indeed compelling and indicates that 
a more cautious approach to RPM is warranted. However, it will also be argued that there 
are yet hardly any empirical studies demonstrating that price floors may be 
‘unambiguously anti-competitive’, and those that are available are of questionable 
credibility. Against this background, and taking into account the pro-competitive theories 
discussed in the previous chapter, it will be argued that the optimal antitrust policy would 
be based on a rebuttable presumption of illegality. 
 Chapter 4 will investigate the concept of the agreement, focusing on the distinction 
between collusive and single conduct for antitrust purposes. The single economic entity 
will be discussed, along with the concept of vertical collusion in the EU and the US. The 
chapter will also present the classical, neoclassical and relational contract law theories, as 
developed by the pioneering scholarship of Ian Macneil. These theories are symmetrical to 
the three organisational forms accepted by new institutional economics, namely markets, 
hybrids, and hierarchies, respectively. Then the focus will be on the concept of commercial 
agency, and the analysis will follow the intellectual debate as to its nature as a hybrid or a 
hierarchy. The chapter will conclude by comparing RPM to two other forms of vertical 
integration by contract, selective and exclusive distribution. Following an examination of 
their competitive effects, it will be recognised that they are likely to be less restrictive than 
price floors, but at the same time it will be argued that they do not always represent 
interchangeable forms of restricted dealing.           
 Chapter 5 will discuss the application of Article 101 TFEU to RPM by the 
Commission, and will review the references for preliminary ruling decided by the Court of 
Justice. A few more recent decisions from the German and French competition authorities 
will also be presented. Then, the focus will shift to US antitrust law. The Supreme Court’s 
judgment in Leegin will be examined in more detail, as well as the almost automatic 
reaction of the US Congress and state legislatures. It will be shown that Leegin’s rule of 
reason remains a mystery as to its form and the way it will be applied, as lower courts have 
not yet provided us with a fully developed body of RPM litigation. 
 Chapter 6 will criticise the current treatment of RPM under EU competition law, 
taking into account the contribution both of neoclassical economics and new institutional 
economics to our understanding of the bifurcation of Article 101 TFEU. More importantly, 
a new analytical framework for the substantive assessment of vertical price fixing will be 
14 
 
suggested. The suggested framework will be based on the traditional classification of RPM 
as a restriction of competition by object under Article 101(1) and a hardcore restraint under 
Article 101(3). However, it will be argued that the correct approach is the replacement of 
the current quasi-conclusive presumption of illegality by a rebuttable presumption of anti-
competitive object under Article 101(1). The parties should remain free to rebut the 
presumption in situations where the long-term contract entered into between them is 
governed by relational norms and involves the obligation of the members of the 
distribution system to undertake significant sunk investments. In such cases, the enlarged 
profit margin is likely to serve as an ex ante incentive alignment mechanism designed to 
limit the possibility of post-contractual opportunism while allowing the manufacturer to 
economise on the costs of monitoring the network. Under these circumstances, selective 
distribution may not be a reliable alternative, because in itself it is unable to protect the 
system from the opportunism of its own members.    
 The conclusion will summarise the discussion and outline the finding of this 
analysis.
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Chapter 1 
The Origins of the Prohibition against Resale Price Maintenance 
 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the early stages in the evolution of the 
public policy towards vertical price fixing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 
101 TFEU, by investigating the non-economic considerations behind the prohibition. In the 
first instance, the chapter will explore the application of the common law doctrine against 
restraints of trade to RPM by English courts. Emphasis will be placed on the links between 
the per se treatment under US antitrust law and the common law tradition, given that the 
Sherman Act was effectively designed as a common law statute. Then, the examination of 
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s case law will observe the passage to a more 
economics-based approach following Sylvania, which effectively heralded the erosion of 
the rigid per se rule in the field of vertical restraints by severing the ties of antitrust 
enforcement with the common law precedent.   
 The focus of the chapter will then shift to the examination of the ban on RPM under 
Article 101 TFEU. Following the investigation of the influence exerted by the American 
antitrust tradition in the shaping of EU competition law, it will be seen that the Treaty of 
Rome came into force at a time when the antitrust response to RPM under the national 
legal orders of various European states was characterised by a remarkable inconsistency, 
ranging from unequivocal permissiveness to utter hostility. In addition to underlining the 
undisputable influence of a considerably more mature jurisdiction, it will be argued that 
another credible justification for the blanket prohibition introduced by the Treaty was of a 
non-economic nature, being associated with the EU single market imperative promoted by 
the constitutional framework of the EU Treaties. The chapter will conclude by observing 
that, despite the initial contribution of integrationist considerations to the stringent public 
policy towards RPM, the current treatment of the practice should be understood primarily 
through the lens of economic analysis, in light the recent Vertical Guidelines and the case 
law of the CJEU.         
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1.1. The Treatment of RPM under English Common Law 
 
The first considerable body of RPM litigation was developed under English 
common law. The first relevant case was Elliman Sons & Co v Carrington & Son Ltd
1
 
decided in 1901. Elliman was a company active in the production of embrocation for 
horses and cattle and sold its products to the wholesalers on the condition that the latter 
were not to resell the goods below a specified price. The wholesalers also undertook to 
procure a similar signed agreement from every retailer which they supplied. The defendant 
company failed to enter into a price fixing agreement with a specific retailer, which 
eventually sold the goods for less than the stipulated price. Elliman then filed a lawsuit, 
claiming the damages that it suffered as a result of Carrington’s failure to comply with its 
contractual obligations. The defendant argued that the agreement in question was 
unenforceable as it constituted an obvious restraint of trade, since its object was ‘to prevent 
the sale of this article to the public at a fair price regulated in the ordinary way by the laws 
of supply and demand’.2 
The court, however, disagreed, and upheld the price fixing agreement. According to 
Kekewich J, ‘[i]t is said that it is in restraint of trade. In one sense it is, but it is just as 
much and no more in restraint of trade for Ellimans to say that they will not sell at all … 
[W]hat is restraint of trade as regards Carrington & Son is really the liberty of trade as 
regards Ellimans’.3 Similarly, the Judge rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
agreement was against public policy: 
It is said that the contract is against public policy; but that phrase merely embodies, 
for the present purpose, the great principle of restraint of trade, and to say that it is 
to prevent Messrs. Elliman from exercising their own discretion seems to me to be 
applying a well-settled principle of law to facts to which it cannot have any 
possible application.
4
    
Two years later, in Taddy & Co v Sterious & Co,
5
 the court dealt with the question 
enforceability of a vertical price fixing agreement upon subsequent purchasers. At issue 
was whether a price-cutting retailer could be sued for breach of contract, even though it 
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had not entered into any form of agreement, either directly or indirectly, with the 
manufacturer, but had instead purchased the goods from a wholesaler. The defendant 
claimed inter alia that the price fixing scheme was in restraint of trade, and that Elliman 
was inconsistent with earlier case law.
6
 The court, nevertheless, held that the crucial issue 
was whether there was indeed a contract that could be held to be binding upon the retailer, 
and focused instead on the conceptual distinction between agents and independent 
distributors. This was the main question to be answered, since ‘[i]f there was a breach of 
contract, the plaintiffs could no doubt sue’.7 
Subsequently, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and Motor Co,
8
 the 
enforceability of vertical price fixing agreements was confirmed. The question at issue in 
this case was whether the stipulated payment in case of breach of contract on the part of 
the dealer was a ‘penalty’ or ‘liquidated damages’. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of 
tyres and had entered into an agreement with the defendant by virtue of which the latter 
would not sell Dunlop products to any private customers or co-operative society at prices 
lower that those stipulated by the manufacturer. In case the distributor failed to comply 
with this arrangement, it would be liable to pay liquidated damages to Dunlop for every 
unit sold in breach of the agreement. The Privy Council held that, due to the uncertain 
nature of the damage caused and the fact that it could not be accurately sustained, the 
payment was to be regarded as liquidated damages, having been stipulated as a ‘pre-
estimate of the appellants probable or possible injuries in due performance of the 
contract’.9   
The tolerant approach taken under English common law to RPM continued in the 
late 1920s, at a time when the harsh treatment thereof under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
was already established – and further refined, through the Colgate exception.10 In 1928, in 
Palmolive Company (of England), Limited v Freedman,
11
 the Court of Appeal reiterated 
that an agreement fixing the wholesale price of toilet soaps was not in general restraint of 
trade. Lord Hanworth MR, stressed the importance of a larger profit margin in view of ‘the 
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necessary expenses either of the wholesaler or the retailer in conducting business, 
especially in relation to an article that has still to establish itself firmly in the market’.12 
Besides, His Lordship continued, the product in question is ‘only one of many proprietary 
soaps and ... in the keen competition between them ... to speak of extortion from the public 
with regard to it is a little better than absurdity’.13 
Furthermore, Lawrence LJ, in his own concurring opinion, seemed to grasp the 
significance of market power in the finding of anti-competitive vertical price fixing, since, 
as he pointed out, ‘it is not as if the plaintiffs had acquired control of the whole or of a 
substantial part of the output of some indispensable commodity ... and were endeavouring 
to force the members of the public to pay higher prices for goods which they were 
practically compelled to purchase’.14 His Lordship further argued that it is generally not 
expected that parties to such agreements fix unreasonable prices, since this would be 
detrimental to their commercial interests in the context of a competitive market.
15
 In light 
of these assumptions, the court found for the plaintiff and upheld the RPM arrangement.  
The aforementioned cases show beyond any doubt that the main concern of English 
courts when applying the doctrine against restraints of trade was not the promotion of 
undistorted competition. It would instead be more accurate to conclude that, towards the 
end of the 19th and in the first decades of the 20th century, common law prioritised 
freedom of contract over freedom of trade. This was also confirmed most emphatically by 
Watson, LJ in the landmark Nordenfelt case: ‘it must not be forgotten that the community 
has a material interest in maintaining the rules of fair dealing between man and man. It 
suffers far greater injury from the infraction of these rules than from contracts in restraint 
of trade’.16  
This approach to restrictive covenants was in fact the result of a more general lack 
of interest in the protection of the competitive order, which characterised the British 
industry at the turn of the century. The way in which the courts construed the definition of 
‘reasonableness’ and applied the rule of reason test proposed in Nordenfelt, which required 
that restraints on trade be reasonable with regard to the interest both of the contracting 
parties and the public, showed that competition was not regarded as a matter of public 
policy. The basic implication of this attitude was the rule that, unless they were obviously 
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illegal, all contracts were in principle enforceable.
17
 At the same time however, it was clear 
that contract law could not be relied upon for the protection of effective competition: 
common law had adopted an extremely tolerant view towards not only RPM, but also even 
towards hardcore cartels, such as those upheld unanimously by the House of Lords in 
Mogul Steamship
18
 and by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Australia v Adelaide 
Steamship Co.
19
    
 
  
1.2. The Common Law Tradition and US Antitrust Law 
  
1.2.1. Dr Miles and the Per Se Ban on RPM 
The examination of the development of the common law doctrine against restraints 
of trade in the previous paragraphs was deemed necessary for two main reasons. First, 
because the Sherman Act was promulgated as a common law statute, based on a set of 
established concepts and intended to be interpreted flexibly. Senator John Sherman 
himself, in a speech before the Senate, stated that the bill ‘does not announce a new 
principle of law, but applies old and well-recognized principles of the common law to the 
complicated jurisdiction of our Senate and Federal Government’.20 Second, because it 
demonstrates the extent to which the subsequent application of the Sherman Act to RPM 
agreements deviated from its legal background and moved towards a more economics-
based approach.  
 Vertical price fixing initially encountered the permissive attitude of American 
courts.
21
 Thorelli observes that, prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, no such 
schemes had been held unlawful.
22
 In Fowle v Park,
23
 for example, a case decided the 
previous year, the US Supreme Court dealt with an exclusive distribution agreement 
concerning a patented medicine. The agreement provided that the parties shall enjoy a 
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monopoly of the sale of the medicine, each within a defined region in the United States, 
and stipulated a specific price below which the medicine should not be sold. In upholding 
the restrictive clauses, the Court confirmed that they were reasonable and, therefore, 
lawful:    
The vendors were entitled to sell to the best advantage, and in so doing to exercise 
the right to preclude themselves from entering into competition with those who 
purchased, and to prevent competition between purchasers, and the purchasers were 
entitled to such protection as was reasonably necessary for their benefit.
24
   
 The next RPM case that reached the Supreme Court, and the first under the new 
Act, was the seminal Dr Miles Medical Co v Park & Sons Co.
25
 The plaintiff, a 
manufacturer of proprietary medicines prepared on the basis of secret processes, had 
established an extensive distribution network in the context of which it was fixing the 
resale prices of both its wholesalers and retailers. Dr Miles brought a lawsuit against a 
discount retail druggist, arguing that the latter’s pricing strategy resulted in the medicines 
being sold as ‘loss leaders’: systematic price-cutting was injurious to its business, having 
an adverse impact on the reputation of and, ultimately, demand for the medicines. At issue 
was essentially the distributor’s practice of seeking to obtain the medicines at discounted 
prices by inducing certain contracting parties to violate the restrictions imposed by the 
manufacturer. The lawsuit brought by Dr Miles was therefore alleging malicious 
interference with a contract between two parties,
26
 and thus essentially concerned an 
infringement not of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but of business tort law.
27
 The plaintiff 
argued that, since a manufacturer was under no obligation either to produce or to sell its 
products, it followed that it should be free to stipulate the retail prices. 
 
1.2.1.1. Majority Opinion 
In rejecting the complainant’s assertions, the US Supreme Court held that an 
agreement fixing the resale price of the products in question amounted to a restraint of 
trade, and was thus void and unenforceable both at common law and under Section 1 of the 
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Sherman Act. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court’s argumentation – ‘an 
overstuffed cookbook of common-law recipes to mediate tensions between competition 
and property rhetorics’ –28 was essentially based on two elements: the common law 
doctrine against restraints on alienation, and the ability of RPM to bolster collusion in the 
downstream market. 
The Court’s starting point in deciding the case was, surprisingly, not the 
competition concerns raised by price fixing agreements, which only came into play later in 
the judgment. In fact, throughout the decision there is hardly any reference to the Sherman 
Act as the statutory framework.
29
 Instead, the Court placed more emphasis on the issue of 
Dr Miles’ property rights in the products concerned. Mr Justice Hughes, writing for the 
majority, took the view that that the imposition by the manufacturer of any sort of 
restrictions upon purchasers constituted an illegal restraint upon alienation. In essence, the 
Court’s rationale was based on Judge Lurton’s opinion in John D Park & Sons v 
Hartman,
30
 an earlier RPM case in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
delivered the first relevant decision ‘to rest unabashedly upon alienation principles’:31  
[t]he right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general 
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded 
as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic 
in such things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in the alienation of 
articles, things, chattels, except when a very special kind of property is involved, 
such as a slave or an heirloom, have been generally held void. ‘If a man’, says Lord 
Coke, in Coke on Littleton, section 360, ‘be possessed… of a horse or of any other 
chattel, real or personal, and give or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon 
condition that a donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because 
the whole interest and property is out of him, so as he hath no possibility of a 
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reverter, and it is against trade and traffic and bargaining and contracting between 
man and man.’.32 
By invoking the doctrine against restraints on alienation, Justice Hughes’ analysis was 
essentially premised on the assumption that vertical price fixing restricts competition 
insofar as it constitutes an unlawful interference with a third party’s property rights. In 
other words, according to Hughes’ interpretation, the restrictive nature of RPM derives 
from the act of determining the price of someone else’s property. This is a right that 
nobody other than the property owner himself may exercise.
33
 
 Justice Hughes justified the Court’s willingness to embrace Judge Lurton’s opinion 
and prohibit the vertical price fixing agreement at hand based on the rule against restraints 
on alienation stating that ‘[w]ith respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier 
doctrine of the common law has been substantially modified in adaptation to modern 
conditions’.34 Inevitably, however, the Court’s reliance on an ancient doctrine for the 
purposes of condemning a modern business practice led an American scholar to observe 
that ‘[i]t does seem possible that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have contributed 
legal conceptions growing out of new types of business which make it inappropriate for 
Justices Lurton and Hughes to base their sweeping overthrow of contemporary commercial 
policies on judicial views of the reign of Queen Elizabeth’.35 In other words, and contrary 
to Hughes’ assertion, the Court’s argumentation failed to consider that the evolution of 
commercial practices also requires the respective adjustment of the law to the needs of the 
contemporary business environment.
36
     
Antitrust considerations came into play only after it was established that the 
manufacturer had retained no property rights in the medicines. The Court then cited the 
rule formulated by Lord McNaghten in the leading English case of Nordenfelt v Maxim 
Nordenfelt Co, according to which, in order for a restrain to be upheld, it must be found to 
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be reasonable with regard to the interest of both the contracting parties and the public.
37
 Mr 
Justice Hughes stressed the importance of the compatibility of a restrictive agreement with 
public policy when applying Lord McNaghten’s test: ‘agreements or combinations 
between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing 
of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void. They are not saved by the 
advantages which the participants expect to derive from the enhanced price to the 
consumer’.38 
 According to Justice Hughes, a vertical price fixing agreement imposed by the 
manufacturer upon its dealers is in no way different from a horizontal collusive 
arrangement in the downstream market. Besides, in both cases it is the dealers that benefit 
from an increase in the price of the products concerned, and not the manufacturer: ‘the 
complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers 
themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, 
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other’.39 Any increased profits 
resulting from the downstream firms’ compliance with the stipulated prices would only 
benefit them and not the manufacturer. But even if we assume, Hughes continued, that the 
agreement could be in any way beneficial also for the manufacturer, this still would not be 
sufficient to justify its detrimental effect upon consumers, namely the increase in the resale 
prices. Based on these considerations, the agreement was declared ‘injurious to the public 
interest and void’.40  
Professor Hay asserts that the Court's rationale in Dr Miles suggested a general rule 
which went beyond the mere condemnation of RPM, and proscribed any vertical restraints, 
irrespective of their form, which produce effects equivalent to those of horizontal 
collusion.
41
 The horizontal collusion objection to RPM will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 3.  
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1.2.1.2. Dissenting Opinion  
In a powerful dissent, Mr Justice Holmes pointed out that the majority’s primary 
mistake was that their conclusion was ‘reached by extending a certain conception of public 
policy to a new sphere’: assuming, for instance, that the right of an artist to impose a 
minimum resale price upon the purchaser of one of his creations would generally be 
accepted, it would be normal for a similar restraint on the alienation of a manufacturer’s 
products to be upheld.
42
 It would be wrong to suggest that the application of the doctrine is 
dependent upon the quantity of the articles that constitute the object of a certain contract.  
The basic antitrust concern raised by the agreement was that it operated in the 
context of a network of similar arrangements which were perceived as having ‘the object 
of fixing a general market price’. In Justice Holmes’ view, however, the manufacturer 
could achieve the very same result merely by appointing the downstream firms as agents, 
rather than independent retailers, thus retaining title to the goods until they reached end 
users.
43
 Having implicitly argued that a price-maintaining manufacturer should be 
considered as ‘acting within his right’, Holmes took the position that ‘the most enlightened 
judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the 
ground for interference is very clear’.44 In his view, the contribution of intrabrand 
competition to the establishment of a ‘fair price’ had been exaggerated; instead what could 
ensure such a fair price was ‘the competition of conflicting desires’45 or, in microeconomic 
terms, the elasticity of demand.
46
 In light of interbrand rivalry, the manufacturer was by 
assumption in a better position to determine its policy in the most efficient way possible; 
therefore ‘[w]e must assume its retail price to be reasonable’.47   
The antitrust implications of the rule against inalienability reveal that in Dr Miles 
the Supreme Court, by placing more emphasis on form than substance, prioritised the 
protection of the dealer’s freedom to compete with its rivals over the promotion of the 
competitive process; and in order for this freedom to be exercised effectively, the dealer’s 
property rights must be left unrestricted following the transfer of title in the goods.
48
 It is 
important to note at this point that this rule does not introduce an outright ban on all 
restraints on alienation. Its application presupposes a separate assessment of the 
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reasonableness of the restriction in question: the interests of the property owner should be 
balanced against the purpose for which the inalienability of that property was imposed.
49
 It 
is, for example, common for courts to enforce restraints on the alienation of land, where 
these restraints are held reasonable with regard both to the contracting parties and to the 
public. One such case is the restriction imposed on the purchaser of land not to use it in a 
way that would impede the vendor’s use of the adjoining land.50  
In fact such restrictions constitute servitudes, namely limitations on the use of 
property which are imposed upon transfer of title and have been recognised and upheld at 
common law since the seminal Tulk v Moxhay case, in which restrictive covenants that run 
with the land were declared enforceable in equity.
51
 In a study published in 1928, Professor 
Chafee examined whether similar servitudes may be created on chattels and argued that 
property law may have to be adapted to the complexities of present-day business, given 
that  
the strictly legal situation corresponds inadequately with the practical situation. 
Actually, the manufacturer by his advertising and other commercial devices has 
brought the consumers into a direct relation with himself. He is trying to make 
them buy his product, and they think of themselves as buying his product. Legally, 
it ceased to be owned by him some time before it reaches them, for he is separated 
from them by a succession of sales through wholesalers and retailers.
52
  
According to Chafee, any transfers of title are incidental, and irrelevant to any loss 
in consumer welfare resulting from the elimination of price competition between dealers. 
Irrespective of the dealers’ classification as either resellers or agents, any restrictions 
(servitudes) running with the goods along the distribution chain are designed to facilitate 
control over their transfer from the manufacturer to consumers. Chafee, therefore, 
questions the applicability of the inalienability rule to vertical relationships in general, 
where ‘the alienation is seen to be of a limited character’.53 
The rule against restraints on alienation was subsequently invoked by the Supreme 
Court in Schwinn, a case involving both territorial and customer restrictions.
54
 In declaring 
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the per se illegality of vertical non-price restraints, the Court reiterated its reliance on 
property law principles. The Court’s opinion was delivered by Mr Justice Fortas who, 
citing Dr Miles as an authority, noted that  
it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine 
areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has 
parted with dominion over it… to allow this freedom… would violate the ancient 
rule against restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity of outlets and 
limitation of territory further than prudence permits.
55
   
The Court, nevertheless, conceded that any territorial and customer restraints imposed by a 
manufacturer which retained ownership and risk were to be assessed under the rule of 
reason.
56
 
The Supreme Court eventually severed the ties of antitrust enforcement with 
property logic in its Sylvania decision, which re-introduced the rule of reason analysis for 
vertical non-price restraints.
57
 In overruling Schwinn, the Court endorsed Mr Justice 
Stewart’s dissenting comment regarding the applicability of the inalienability rule to 
restrictive agreements: ‘the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is 
irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional 
restraints in the American economy today’.58 Despite substantially undermining the Dr 
Miles rationale, the Court hesitated to extend the rule of reason standard to all types of 
vertical restraints, and approved the per se illegality of RPM arguing that there are 
‘significant differences that could easily justify different treatment’.59 More specifically, 
the Court’s attempt to draw a distinction between RPM and market division was based on 
two arguments: the ability of price restrictions to facilitate collusion, and the recent repeal 
of the Fair-Trade Acts by the Congress.
60
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1.2.2. Restraints of Trade and the Sherman Act: The Interpretation of an Old Rule and a 
New Statute  
The interpretation of the Sherman Act and its links to the common law tradition 
presented a challenge for the American courts in the first years after the promulgation of 
the statute. More specifically, in the early Section 1 cases the courts focused on whether 
the Act constituted a mere codification of the common law doctrine against restraints of 
trade or whether it aimed, as its very wording dictated, at the prohibition of every 
restrictive arrangement. The latter was the interpretation favoured by the US Supreme 
Court in the Trans-Missouri case.
61
 The period of antitrust ‘literalism’ initiated by Mr 
Justice Peckham’s opinion in Trans-Missouri was brought to an end by the teleological 
construction later embraced by Judge William Howard Taft who, sitting on the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reconsidered the influence of the common law tradition on 
the interpretation and application of the Sherman Act in the Addyston Pipe case.
62
        
The case involved six manufacturers of cast-iron pipes who had formed an 
association with the purpose of rigging bids for the sale of pipes (mainly to municipalities) 
in various designated territories in the United States. Certain territories were assigned to a 
specific manufacturer which was protected from all competition from the others, whereas 
in other territories, a committee set up by the cartelists was awarding the bid to the 
manufacturer that agreed to pay the highest bonus to the treasury of the association. The 
Government filed a lawsuit against the manufacturers, but the district court found for the 
defendants holding that, although the arrangement at hand did in fact restrict competition, 
it did not violate Section 1 as it only had an indirect effect on interstate commerce.
63
 
On appeal the decision was reversed. The defendants attempted to establish that the 
arrangement did not fall within the scope of the Sherman Act and not only claimed that the 
fixed prices were reasonable, but also produced affidavits whereby their customers 
essentially confirmed that these prices were in fact satisfactory. Judge Taft, however, 
rejected the defendants’ assertions as to the reasonableness of the restraints in question and 
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delivered an acclaimed opinion which has been described as ‘at least as important as some 
of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court’.64 Firstly, he observed that all types of 
restraints which had been traditionally upheld under common law were merely ancillary to 
an otherwise legitimate contract, and were also necessary for the protection of the interests 
of the contracting parties.
65
 As long as it was established that a restriction attached to a 
lawful contract was ‘necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate 
fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by 
the other party’, that restriction would be regarded by the courts as enforceable;66 for the 
purpose of such clauses is not to reduce competition, but to secure ‘the seller against an 
increase of competition of his own creating’.67 Regarding the case at hand ‘[t]here is ... no 
main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is permitted, and by which its 
reasonableness is measured, but the sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the 
competition which it has always been the policy of the common law to foster’.68   
Eventually, Judge Taft overruled the district court’s decision, and his reasoning was upheld 
unanimously by the Supreme Court.
69
 
 Judge Taft, therefore, re-established the links between the Sherman Act and the 
common law tradition and rejected Justice Peckham’s opinion that Section 1 went beyond 
common law in that in prohibited every contract in restraint of trade. However, Taft’s 
analysis undermines the Supreme Court’s decision in Dr Miles. It was seen in the previous 
section that under English common law vertical price fixing was not only lawful, but also 
enforceable. The enforceability of RPM clauses was established in the Elliman case in 
1901, whereas in Dunlop v New Garage it was only the nature of the stipulated payment 
for breach of contract that was disputed, and not the enforceability of the RPM clause 
itself. In was not until after the first half of the 20
th
 century – and only through state 
legislation – that this rule was repealed in England.  
Professor Bork approaches the interrelation between the two decisions through a 
different lens. It is noteworthy, he observes, that Justice Hughes ‘failed to ask whether the 
manufacturer’s interest in eliminating competition between its distributors could be related 
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to a valid main purpose capable of legitimating the contracts’. In other words, Hughes 
ignored the ‘ancillary restraints’ doctrine formulated in Addyston Pipe, despite the clear 
indication that it was also applicable to vertical restraints.
70
 At least in principle, there was 
room for an inquiry into the possible ancillary nature of the RPM scheme at issue, in view 
of the ‘loss leadership’ concerns put forward by Dr Miles. Peritz, on the other hand, 
maintains that the Court’s focus on the question of property rights implied a tacit rejection 
of the applicability of the doctrine to the case at hand. Since the title in the goods had been 
transferred to the dealers, the manufacturer retained no property rights to which the 
restraint was attached; the restraint was, therefore, primary and not ancillary.
71
 In essence, 
Dr. Miles introduced a much broader prohibition than the common law precedent, 
disputing the reasonableness of RPM schemes altogether, and effectively prohibiting every 
agreement fixing minimum resale prices.
72
 
 Of course, one cannot fail to observe that, when listing the restrictive provisions 
that had traditionally been upheld by English courts as ancillary to legitimate contracts, 
Judge Taft omitted to include RPM as one of them. Indeed, according to Taft’s research, 
covenants in partial restraint of trade are generally upheld as valid when they are 
agreements (1) by the seller of property or business not to compete with the buyer 
in such a way as to derogate from the value of the property or business sold; (2) by 
a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner pending the 
partnership not to do anything to interfere, by competition or otherwise, with the 
business of the firm; (4) by the buyer of property not to use the same in competition 
with the business retained by the seller; and (5) by an assistant, servant, or agent 
not to compete with his master or employer after the expiration of his time of 
service.
73
 
The first thing to note is that Judge Taft himself admitted that the above list of permissible 
restraints was not exhaustive: ‘[i]t would be stating it too strongly to say that these five 
classes of covenants in restraint of trade include all of those upheld as valid at the common 
law’.74 But in reality, the explanation for the exclusion of vertical price fixing from this list 
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is fairly simple: the leading Elliman case, in which RPM was upheld as lawful at common 
law was only decided three years after Taft delivered his opinion in Addyston Pipe.  
This late appearance of RPM cases before English courts is by no means surprising. 
Vertical price fixing, by contrast to all other restrictive covenants dealt with at common 
law, is a fairly recent commercial practice. It was virtually unheard of prior to the last 
quarter of the 19th century, and it emerged in the context of a broader restructuring of the 
distributive patterns throughout the British industry. The new methods of distribution, 
which included the emergence of retail outlets suitable to stock large quantities of mass-
produced goods, were introduced in response to the increased consumer demands and the 
overall improved living standards of the British society brought about by the wealth 
created by the Industrial Revolution.
75
 It was a period of fierce price competition at the 
retail level, during which the newly established large-scale outlets were able to benefit 
from their cost advantages in order to offer more attractive prices to consumers. In addition 
to their substantial cost-savings as a result of economies of scale and scope, large retailers 
also relied on innovative methods of marketing, such as advertising and branding of 
merchandise: although mostly undertaken by manufacturers, these new techniques also 
simplified and facilitated retail trade by reducing the need for specialised personnel, 
whereas they also contributed to the further expansion of large outlets, which eventually 
were transformed into ‘universal providers’. But as competition was driving prices lower, 
the smaller retailers’ profit margins were getting tighter. It was therefore under these 
economic conditions that RPM appeared at the turn of the century; at the request of small-
scale outlets, manufacturers – which were otherwise willing to grant discounts to large 
purchasers – began to stipulate the resale prices of their goods in order to improve the 
competitive position and ensure the survival of their less competitive rivals.
76
 
Consequently, the emergence and expansion of RPM schemes as a response to the needs of 
a very specific class of dealers who saw their interests threatened by the new trends in the 
distribution of goods in the wake of the consumer society explains the lack of any common 
law precedent on vertical price fixing prior to Addyston Pipe. 
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1.3. RPM under Section 1 of the Sherman Act – The ‘Per Se’ Era 
 
1.3.1. General 
 The Dr Miles judgment
77
 was in its essence the result of an unlikely combination of 
economic and non-economic considerations. While the contribution of ancient common 
law principles to the shaping of the public policy towards RPM in the US has probably 
been exaggerated by subsequent commentators – as the dealer cartel theory invoked by the 
Court reflected an exceptionally likely scenario –78 there is no doubt that the freedom of 
contract was one of the two fundamental intellectual bases for the decision. As was 
discussed earlier, the Court’s decision has been criticised for placing disproportionate 
emphasis on the non-competition effects of RPM – which is particularly evident in the 
property logic underpinning the judgment – on the basis that they do not provide a sound 
theoretical support for per se treatment.
79
 As will be seen in Chapter 3, however, the rule of 
per se illegality against price floors is to be understood in light of its horizontal effects.  
Nevertheless, the legacy of Dr Miles survived for almost a century, having been 
consistently confirmed by subsequent decisions, even though its application was restricted. 
It was not until 2007 in Leegin
80
 that the Supreme Court adopted the rule of reason for the 
appraisal of RPM agreement overruling the per se ban established by Dr Miles. It also put 
an end to what has been described as a ‘schizophrenic legal regime’,81 established by the 
latter decision in conjunction with the Court’s subsequent ruling in United States v Colgate 
& Co.
82
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1.3.2. The ‘Per Se’ Era in the Aftermath of Dr Miles – From Colgate to Business 
Electronics 
Consistent with the logic behind Dr Miles, in 1926 in United States v General 
Electric Co
83
 the Supreme Court reiterated its adherence to the property logic underpinning 
its earlier decision. At issue in General Electric, according to Judge Taft, was ‘the question 
whether the sales are by the company through its agents to the consumer, or are in fact by 
the company to the so-called agents at the time of consignment’.84 In introducing the 
consignment exception, the Court held that the per se ban on RPM does not apply to 
agreements whereby the manufacturer, instead of transferring title in the goods to a 
reseller, merely disposes of its articles to consumers through agents. Satisfied that the 
manufacturer retained ownership of the goods concerned, the Court recognised the 
manufacturer’s right to stipulate the prices to be charged by the consignees for its products 
holding that the antitrust laws had not been violated.
85
 
However, the first significant erosion of Dr Miles had already been introduced 
seven years earlier in United States v Colgate & Co.
86
 Colgate was alleged to have been 
coercing its distributors to adhere to fixed resale prices by threatening that it would cease 
supplying them if they failed to do so. Based on the district court’s finding that there had 
been no agreement between the parties, and thus Section 1 had not been violated, the 
Supreme Court stated that 
[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not 
restrict the long recognised right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties 
with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the 
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.
87
  
In other words, the Court took the position that a manufacturer’s refusal to deal with a 
price-cutter did not warrant antitrust intervention: it merely constituted an exercise of an 
individual economic actor’s right independently to choose its customers. It has thus been 
argued that the rationale behind the Colgate doctrine was the recognition of an 
independent, substantive right by virtue of which the manufacturer was immune from 
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antitrust liability, even where the requirements set by the Dr Miles precedent were 
satisfied.
88
 The Colgate doctrine was subsequently narrowed by a line of decisions, which 
resulted in a strong debate between commentators with regard to its applicability.
89
 
In United States v Parke, Davis & Co,
90
 the most notable of its decisions that 
limited the scope of the Colgate doctrine, the Supreme Court construed the concept of 
‘unlawful combination’ broadly, holding that in order for a violation of Section 1 to be 
established, no showing of explicit or tacit contractual arrangement is required. Instead, the 
existence of such a combination may also be substantiated where ‘the producer secures 
adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to 
a customer who will not observe his announced policy.
91
 On the basis of this assumption 
the Court established a test according to which ‘when the manufacturer's actions … go 
beyond mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs 
other means which effect adherence to his resale prices … he has put together a 
combination in violation of the Sherman Act’.92 The main implication of Parke, Davis & 
Co is that manufacturers were prohibited from applying coercive means in order to enforce 
retailer compliance with RPM schemes. Four years later, in Simpson
93
 – perhaps unfairly 
described as ‘one of the most dishonest opinions of all time in a field with many serious 
contenders’94 – the Court reinforced the per se ban on RPM by effectively overruling the 
consignment exception established in General Electric almost forty years earlier.
95
 
The following two RPM cases, Monsanto
96
 and Business Electronics,
97
 were 
discussed in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Sylvania98 which 
established the rule of reason standard for the treatment of vertical territorial restraints, 
thus creating an artificial normative inconsistency corresponding to the price/non-price 
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dichotomy.
99
 Interestingly, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief inviting 
the Monsanto Court to reconsider the per se illegality of RPM.
100
 At issue in Monsanto was 
whether an unlawful vertical price fixing conspiracy could be inferred from termination 
following competitor complaints. Mr Justice Powell, delivering the Court’s unanimous 
opinion, acknowledged the efficiency-enhancing potential of vertical restraints, and took 
the position that, in order for a violation of Section 1 to be substantiated, ‘there must be 
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated 
distributors were acting independently’.101 More specifically, the plaintiff should 
demonstrate that the manufacturer and its distributors ‘had a conscious commitment to a 
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective’.102 In addition to reviving the 
Colgate doctrine, the Court’s decision is noteworthy in that, despite confirming the per se 
treatment of RPM, it nonetheless recognised that the economic effects of all types of 
vertical restraints are ‘in many, but not all, cases similar or identical’.103 The scope of the 
per se rule was narrowed even further in Business Electronics, where the Court held that an 
arrangement between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a discounting retailer does 
not warrant per se treatment ‘unless it includes some agreement on price and price 
levels’.104 Acknowledging the potential of price floors to facilitate and enforce 
cartelisation, Mr Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the Court, justified the 
majority’s conclusion arguing that a cartel’s inherent instability implied that, in the 
absence of such an agreement on specific prices, the cartelists retained their incentive to 
cheat.
105
   
 
1.3.3. The Fair-Trade Acts 
 The legal framework shaped by Dr Miles was not unanimously well-received by 
industry. Two classes of economic actors, in particular, saw the ban on vertical price fixing 
as a direct threat to their commercial interests. On the one hand, RPM was valuable to 
manufacturers which, concerned with the impact of price-cutting on consumer demand for 
their products, sought either to maintain their brand image or to prevent low-cost dealers 
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from taking a free ride on their full-service rivals’ sales efforts. In addition, small 
independent retailers also favoured RPM schemes, which allowed them to compete more 
effectively against large-scale chain stores.
106
 Rising concerns over the growth of large 
retail chains and discount outlets had inspired a ‘rhetoric of fairness and competition on 
equal terms’, which was further complemented by the theory on the potentially adverse 
effects of ‘ruinous competition’ on both business and consumers.107   
 In response to the industry’s political pressure, in 1931 the state of California 
promulgated the first statute effectively legalising RPM agreements and, within the next 
five years, thirteen other states followed suit.
108
 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Old 
Dearborn decision which upheld the constitutionality of the fair-trade acts,
109
 their number 
increased to forty-two. Against this background, the Congress passed the Miller-Tydings 
Amendment to the Antitrust Laws in 1937.
110
 Under the Miller-Tydings Amendment, the 
prescription of minimum prices for the resale of trademarked, branded or identified 
products was declared lawful when applied to intrastate transactions, on the condition that 
it was also authorised by the relevant laws of the state concerned. In the Schwegmann 
case,
111
 the Supreme Court construed the exemption introduced by the Miller-Tydings Act 
as limited to RPM agreements entered into on a consensual basis,
112
 and quashed a 
Louisiana statute which provided for the enforceability of the relevant clauses not only 
against parties to a contract, but also against non-signers. The Congress responded the 
following year by promulgating the McGuire Act, which amended Section 5(a) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, and extended the scope of the fair-trade exemption to 
cover both signer and non-signer clauses affecting interstate commerce.
113
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 The Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts were eventually repealed by the Consumer 
Goods Pricing Act of 1975,
114
 by which time almost half of the states had already 
abolished fair trade.
115
 However, for a period of almost four decades, the Fair-Trade Acts 
created a legal environment most favourable towards RPM, which provided valuable 
empirical evidence regarding the occurrence of the practice. On the basis of estimates by 
several researchers, Overstreet observed that, even in the fair-trade era, vertical price fixing 
schemes were scarce: ‘no more than one percent of manufacturers, accounting for no more 
than ten percent of consumer goods purchases, ever employed RPM in any single year in 
the US’.116 Overstreet’s statement was subsequently quoted by Mr Justice Kennedy in 
Leegin, in support of the Supreme Court’s decision to overrule the per se ban on RPM.117  
 
1.3.4. The Turning Point – The Supreme Court’s Sylvania Decision 
The rule of reason standard for all vertical non-price restraints was finally 
established in Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc,
118
 arguably one of the landmark 
antitrust decisions of the US Supreme Court which overruled the short-lived per se 
treatment introduced in Schwinn.
119
 Sylvania was a manufacturer of television sets with 
insignificant market power (no more than 2 percent). Initially, it was selling its products to 
wholesale distributors who, in turn, were reselling them to various retailers. In order to 
improve its market position following a decline in its market share to the aforementioned 
levels, Sylvania switched to a selective distribution system and began selling its television 
sets directly to a group of selected retailers, each of whom, according to the new marketing 
strategy, was required to sell only from a specified location. Eventually, the strategy bore 
fruit and, three years following its adoption, Sylvania’s market share rose to 5 percent. 
 Even though Sylvania retained sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in 
a specific area – thus no exclusive territories were created – Continental, a very successful 
franchised retailer in San Francisco, objected to Sylvania’s decision to appoint a second 
retailer in the same city. In addition, Sylvania rejected Continental’s request to open a store 
in Sacramento, which was already served by the local dealers. After Continental cancelled 
a large order and placed it with one of Sylvania’s competitors, Sylvania terminated the 
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franchise agreement and Continental filed a claim alleging that the manufacturer’s policy 
was restricting intrabrand competition and was, therefore, violating Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The district court, interpreting Schwinn strictly, ruled in favour of the 
plaintiff; but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that an analysis 
under the rule of reason would be more appropriate, since the restrictions imposed by 
Sylvania had limited potential for anti-competitive effects and, thus, the case was 
sufficiently distinguishable from Schwinn.  
 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this distinction, on the ground that 
both cases involved clauses which limited the ability of the retailer to dispose of the 
contract goods as he desired.
120
 It then stressed the complex market impact of vertical 
restraints which is associated with ‘their potential for a simultaneous reduction of 
intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition’.121 In a famous – and 
fiercely criticised – footnote, however, the Court distinguished the antitrust response to 
vertical price restraints and justified the stringent treatment thereof on the basis of their 
ability to facilitate horizontal collusion, as well as on the recent repeal of the Fair Trade 
Acts by the Congress.
122
  
The Court naturally acknowledged that the location clauses at issue restricted 
competition between retailers; at the same time, however, they presented significant 
‘redeeming virtues’ capable of offsetting this reduction of intrabrand competition ‘by 
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his 
product’.123 Among the efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical non-price restraints, as 
cited by Mr Justice Powell, were the facilitation of new entry, the provision of product-
specific promotional services, and the elimination of the free rider problem.
124
 In light of 
these assumptions, the Court overruled the per se rule established in Schwinn, relying on its 
famous dictum in the earlier Northern Pacific case:
125
 ‘there has been no showing in this 
case ... that vertical restrictions have or are likely to have a “pernicious effect on 
competition”, or that they “lack ... any redeeming virtue”’.126 Heralding the turn towards a 
more economic approach to restricted dealing, Justice Powell concluded by noting that any 
departure from the rule of reason, as the prevailing analytical standard under Section 1, 
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should be justifiable on the grounds of demonstrable economic effect and not the result of 
‘formalistic line drawing’.127 
Undoubtedly, the most significant contribution of Sylvania was that, along with 
upholding a practice that generated substantial efficiencies, it signalled the Court’s 
departure from the formalistic treatment of vertical non-price restrictions by introducing a 
genuine effect-based approach. However, the decision had more far-reaching implications, 
decisively influencing the development of antitrust jurisprudence in general. For example, 
the impact of Sylvania on the public policy towards RPM is apparent in the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decisions in Monsanto and Business Electronics, which substantially 
limited the scope of the per se prohibition. Notwithstanding the criticism as to the actual 
relevance of the Sylvania rhetoric to the adjudication of these cases,
128
 there can be no 
misunderstanding that these judgments were delivered by Justices familiar with the pro-
competitive justifications for restricted dealing, which are generally applicable both to 
price and non-price restraints. It is, however, noteworthy that in Business Electronics, Mr 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, relied on Sylvania in endorsing the cartel theory as 
providing support for the stricter normative response to RPM.
129
  
It has been pointed out that the impact of Sylvania extended beyond the field of 
vertical restraints, influencing also the antitrust response to various types of horizontal 
arrangements. More specifically, the Supreme Court in NCAA
130
 and Indiana Federation of 
Dentists
131
 followed the rationale of Sylvania to establish that ‘horizontal restraints may be 
deemed reasonable if they enable a consortium of producers to more effectively 
differentiate their product from those of others’.132 As a general proposition, Sylvania is a 
turning point in antitrust adjudication under Section 1. Although not involving an RPM 
agreement, the decision undoubtedly paved the way – initially – for the gradual erosion of 
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the per se rule against vertical price fixing and – ultimately – for Leegin, which is premised 
both implicitly and explicitly upon the same intellectual basis. 
 
1.3.5. Non-Economic Considerations in Leegin: Stare Decisis and the Rule of Reason   
 In Leegin,
133
 the Supreme Court completed the economics revolution in antitrust 
jurisprudence by endorsing the rule of reason as the appropriate standard for the 
substantive assessment of all types of vertical restraints. Since the efficiency-enhancing 
potential of RPM was generally acknowledged in economic theory, the Court took the 
position that the ‘doctrinal underpinnings’ of Dr Miles had been undermined, thus 
warranting the abolition of the judicial precedent.
134
  
 That said, non-economic considerations played more than just a marginal part in 
the adjudication of Leegin. The disagreement between the opinion of the majority and that 
of the dissenting Justices in this five-to-four decision concentrated inter alia on the issue of 
stare decisis, namely the law of precedent. In the words of the Supreme Court, stare 
decisis ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the perceived integrity 
of the judicial process’.135 In pursuit of judicial predictability, stare decisis may 
occasionally favour consistency over soundness, reflecting ‘a policy judgment that in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled that it be settled 
right’.136 
 As has already been seen earlier in this chapter,
137
 the Sherman Act was not 
intended to go beyond the mere codification of well established common law principles. 
This was also evident in the early judicial practice following the promulgation of the Act. 
In introducing flexibility in the interpretation of the otherwise rigid language of Section 1, 
Judge Taft’s celebrated opinion in Addyston Pipe relied exclusively on the scholarly 
examination of English common law precedent.
138
 In that sense, the Sherman Act was by 
its very inception designed to evolve in parallel with common law, under the influence of 
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contemporary intellectual developments.
139
 Delivering the opinion of the majority in 
Leegin, Mr Justice Kennedy acknowledged that antitrust law was not intended to be 
codified in a static statutory instrument:  
From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law 
statute. Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater 
experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ 
evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions. The case-by-case 
adjudication contemplated by the rule of reason has implemented this common-law 
approach.
140
 
The dissenting opinion delivered by Mr Justice Breyer largely consisted in a 
critique of the majority’s decision to depart from stare decisis. In Breyer’s view, the 
majority’s deviation for such a well established principle as the per se ban on vertical price 
fixing was unwarranted. The case at hand involved the interpretation of a statute, and stare 
decisis had typically been applied more rigidly in statutory than constitutional cases.
141
 At 
the same time, while it was not uncommon for the Court to overrule an erroneous decision 
delivered ‘only a reasonably short time ago’, particularly if the dispute was of a 
constitutional nature, overruling a statutory case which had been decided almost a century 
ago and had been repeatedly reaffirmed ever since was unprecedented.
142
 Even under 
antitrust law, similar previous cases, such as State Oil Co v Khan and Sylvania, which 
abolished the per se illegality of maximum RPM and vertical non-price restraints, 
respectively, overruled judicial precedents which stood for not nearly as long as Dr 
Miles.
143
 Finally, Breyer noted that Leegin was in reality at odds with the typical common 
law ‘gradualism’: ‘Common-law courts rarely overruled well-established earlier rules 
outright. Rather, they would over time issue decisions that gradually eroded the scope and 
effect of the rule in question, which might eventually lead the courts to put the rule to 
rest’.144 
Despite Mr Justice Breyer’s fervent dissent, the Court decided in favour of the 
departure from stare decisis by overruling Dr Miles. As a general proposition, the reason 
for the Court’s traditional hesitation to apply the principle to statutory cases appears to be 
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the understanding that Congress is capable of exercising its legislative power in order to 
quash by statutory means any judicial interpretation of the law which is considered as 
erroneous.
145
 So far, with regard to the lawmakers’ response to Leegin, any such attempts 
have failed and the bills brought by Senator Herb Kohl proposing the statutory re-
introduction of the per se ban on RPM through the promulgation of the Discount Pricing 
Consumer Protection Act have died in subcommittees.
146
      
 
 
1.4. The Law against RPM in Europe – Origins, Legislation and Judicial Practice 
 
1.4.1. Competition Law Crosses the Atlantic  
 If the per se illegality of RPM in the United States was a result of a broad 
interpretation of the common law rule against restraints on trade by the Supreme Court, the 
origins of the hostility against vertical price fixing in the European area are much more 
obscure. As was seen in the previous section, English common law traditionally upheld 
contracts fixing resale prices as lawful and enforceable. The British legislator initially 
hesitated to impose a general ban on RPM agreements and limited the scope of the 
prohibition under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 only to networks of agreements 
entered into between more than one competing suppliers and their dealers. Vertical price 
fixing agreements were eventually outlawed altogether by the Resale Prices Act 1964. 
 It was, however, in Germany where the first piece of legislation effectively 
introducing an outright prohibition on all RPM agreements was enacted. In the zones 
occupied by the allied forces following Germany’s defeat in World War II, the Allied 
Decartelisation Laws of the American and British Zone of Control of 12 February 1947 
constituted an attempt to protect free competition in a country under reconstruction.
147
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Although not the first statute intended to protect the competitive process,
148
 it was 
interpreted by the Bronson Memorandum of June 21, 1948 as declaring illegal all types of 
price fixing agreements, both horizontal and vertical. The influence of the US antitrust 
experience was obvious: the Americans ‘simply transplanted’ the per se ban on RPM 
already developed in Dr. Miles into the legal order of the occupied territories.
149
 The 
American influence, nevertheless, went beyond the mere drafting of the statutes; in 
practice, German courts even invoked American authorities when construing and applying 
the decartelisation laws.
150
 
 At this point it should be noted that Gerber rejects the assumption that competition 
laws in continental Europe have been a blind imitation of the Sherman Act. On the 
contrary, he argues, European antitrust legislation has been a product of the insight of 
European economic and political thinkers – most notably the ordoliberals of the Freiburg 
School – and has been developed as a response to the challenges facing the economies of 
the industrialised European states throughout the late 19th and the first half of the 20th 
century.
151
 Djelic, on the other hand, disagrees and regards the transfer of the American 
antitrust tradition to the European legal order as part of a broader plan of the United States, 
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which had just come out of World War II in a position of geopolitical and economic 
superiority, to reshape the European industry and modernise the pattern of trade using the 
American model as a point of reference. In this context,  
[i]n the period following 1945, there were two main paths for the transfer to Europe 
of the American antitrust tradition and oligopolistic understanding of competition. 
One was through Germany and the American Military Occupation Government in 
that country played there a significant role. The other was through the emerging 
European institutions.
152
 
 Djelic further argues that it was under American pressure that the first competition 
rules with a cross-border dimension were introduced by the Treaty on the European Coal 
and Steel Community (hereinafter ‘ECSC Treaty’) in 1951.153 Whether this is true or not, it 
is in any event not surprising that the founding members of the ECSC relied on a group of 
American experts for the drafting of the respective provisions. The most prominent among 
them was Robert Bowie, formerly a professor of antitrust law at Harvard, who was at the 
time working as a legal counsel to the US High Commission for Germany. Bowie, who 
had also been involved in the drafting of the German anti-cartel legislation, was assisted in 
this task by antitrust specialists based in Washington who, unofficially, reviewed and gave 
their feedback on the draft provisions. These deliberations culminated in the introduction 
of Articles 65
154
 and 66 into the ECSC Treaty: the former outlawed collusive agreements, 
while the latter set the framework for merger control and prohibited the abuse by ‘public or 
private enterprises’ of their dominant position on the market. These provisions, in addition 
to their historical significance as the first step towards the creation of a European 
competition regime, also served as the basis for the drafting of Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community.
155
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1.4.2. The Antitrust Treatment of RPM in Europe – National Competition Laws prior to 
the Treaty of Rome 
 By the time of the enactment of the Treaty of Rome only half of the founding 
Member States – Germany, France and the Netherlands – had already adopted some form 
of antitrust legislation. Similarly, reasonably effective competition statutes had been 
introduced in the United Kingdom and Sweden. The following paragraphs will underline 
the remarkable differences in the normative response to vertical price fixing in these 
jurisdictions, and will reveal the absence of a consistent pattern in the treatment of the 
practice under national competition laws. A more thorough presentation and analysis of the 
antitrust treatment of RPM under the competition statutes of a number of European 
jurisdictions will be outlined in the Appendix of this thesis. 
 In Germany, the main legal instrument was the Law against Restraints of 
Competition of 27 July 1957 (hereinafter ‘GWB’),156 which remains, as amended, the 
normative framework for the legal treatment of anti-competitive conduct in Germany to the 
present day. Section 15 of the GWB, as originally enacted, declared void and 
unenforceable any agreements restricting a party’s freedom to determine its own prices or 
terms in contracts concluded with third parties. The rigidity of the prohibition against RPM 
was nevertheless mitigated by Section 16 which, by way of derogation, excluded from the 
scope of the prohibition any agreements fixing the resale prices of branded goods, as well 
as RPM schemes in the book publishing sector. Section 16(4) stipulated that, in order for 
RPM agreements concerning branded goods to become effective, they should be registered 
with the newly-established competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel 
Office). It was not until 1973 that a blanket prohibition on RPM was introduced by a new 
law amending the GWB.
157
 
 The French Ordinance No. 45-1483 (hereinafter ‘the Price Ordinance’),158 as 
amended by Decree No. 53-704,
159
 dealt with RPM in Article 37 thereof. Article 37(4) of 
the Price Ordinance prohibited price fixing agreements entered into by an individual 
manufacturer or distributor, as well as by professional associations, but also provided that 
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exemptions could be granted, for a limited period of time only, in the case of RPM 
agreements having as their subject matter innovative goods or services, or products 
exploited under the exclusive rights of patent, licence or registered design, or requiring 
specifications such as guarantee of quality, or an initial advertising campaign. Despite the 
availability of exemptions, the treatment of RPM effectively amounted to a ‘per se’ 
prohibition. It should be noted, however, that the rationale behind the stringent treatment of 
RPM under the Price Ordinance did not appear to be premised on efficiency 
considerations. Instead, the primary objectives of the French lawmakers were the 
protection of large-scale retailers, as well as the fight against inflationary pressures which 
were prevalent across Europe in the first post-war years.
160
 
 In the Netherlands, the Economic Competition Law of 1956
161
 did not initially deal 
with vertical price fixing agreements. The ban on vertical price fixing was introduced for 
the first time in 1964, but it concerned exclusively collective RPM, namely agreements 
where ‘the supplier of the products is not free to determine prices independently of third 
parties’.162 Later that year, the prohibition was extended to individual RPM agreements 
involving durable consumer goods such as radios, television sets, cars, cameras and 
household appliances. A general prohibition on all vertical price fixing schemes was 
eventually adopted in 1991, in the context of broader reforms in the Dutch antitrust policy. 
 At the same time, two later entrants, the United Kingdom and Sweden, had also 
promulgated antitrust legislation which expressly addressed the issue of vertical price 
fixing. In the United Kingdom, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956 drew a distinction 
between individual RPM, on the one hand, and the collective enforcement of resale price 
conditions, on the other: while recognising the individual manufacturer’s freedom to 
maintain and enforce the price at which its products were to be sold,
163
 the 1956 Act 
declared unlawful any collaboration among two or more competing manufacturers 
regarding the enforcement of the fixed resale prices.
164
 The general prohibition on vertical 
price fixing was introduced into the British legal order by the Resale Prices Act 1964, 
which accordingly abolished the distinction between individual and collective RPM. 
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 At the same time, the public policy towards vertical price fixing in Sweden was 
particularly harsh. Under the Swedish Law against Restraints of Competition of 1953, 
RPM, along with collusive tendering, were the only two restrictive practices which were 
expressly prohibited and treated as ‘per se’ illegal, while they were also subject to criminal 
sanctions. RPM was in fact treated as an ordinary crime and was prosecuted in the regular 
criminal courts by the public prosecutor, following a recommendation by the Competition 
Ombudsman.
165
 
 
1.4.3. RPM and the ‘Effect on Trade’ Criterion of Article 101(1) TFEU 
In order to be caught by Article 101(1), a restrictive agreement must be capable of 
having an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. The standard test developed 
by the CJEU requires that ‘it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of 
probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in 
question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of 
trade between Member States’.166 According to the Commission, the effect on trade 
requirement is an autonomous, jurisdictional criterion which must be assessed separately in 
each case.
167
 In Hugin, the CJEU held that this requirement is to be construed in light of 
the specific objectives pursued by EU law: 
The interpretation and application of the condition relating to effects on trade 
between Member States contained in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty must be 
based on the purpose of that condition which is to define, in the context of the law 
governing competition, the boundary between the areas respectively covered by 
Community law and the law of the Member States. Thus Community law covers 
any agreement or any practice which is capable of constituting a threat to freedom 
of trade between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of 
the objectives of a single market between the Member States, in particular by 
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partitioning the national markets or by affecting the structure of competition within 
the common market.
168
 
Within the constitutional framework of the EU Treaties, in other words, the 
jurisdictional criterion is effectively reinforced with a substantive value. The ‘effect on 
trade’ criterion of Article 101(1) does not imply that only agreements which restrict trade 
between Member States fall within the scope of the provision. In Consten and Grundig, the 
CJEU held that ‘the fact that an agreement encourages an increase, even a large one, in the 
volume of trade between States is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that the 
agreement may “affect” such trade in the abovementioned manner’.169 
In various cases involving vertical price fixing arrangements,
170
 the Commission 
found that the RPM clauses under investigation affected inter-State trade by exercising 
influence on the patterns of trade flows between the Member States concerned. These 
findings were subsequently incorporated in the Commission’s Guidelines on the effect on 
trade concept.
171
 The fact that the agreements under scrutiny frequently also provided for 
the prohibition of parallel imports lead the Commission to the conclusion that the 
combined restraints were intended to reinforce each other, thus contributing to the 
partitioning of the internal market.
172
 
In an early study on EU competition law, Deringer drew attention to the likelihood 
that RPM agreements involving goods distributed in several Member States may indirectly 
affect inter-State trade by creating artificial barriers between the States concerned. This 
may be the result of price differentials between the affected States, namely in cases where 
‘the resale price in these States is not fixed or is not fixed at the same (comparable) 
level’.173 According to the Guidelines on the effect on trade concept, however, similar 
concerns are raised by agreements implemented in a single Member State: 
Agreements involving RPM may also affect patterns of trade in much the same way 
as horizontal cartels. To the extent that the price resulting from RPM is higher than 
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that prevailing in other Member States this price level is only sustainable if imports 
from other Member States can be controlled.
174
 
That said, it should also be noted that neither version of the Commission’s Vertical 
Guidelines reveals that RPM is in any way perceived as a potential – even indirect – threat 
to market integration. The lists of possible adverse effects of RPM, as laid down in 
paragraphs 112 and 224 of the Commission’s 2000175 and 2010 Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints, respectively, make no reference to RPM as a means to achieve the 
fragmentation of the internal market. There is, however, no doubt that, in making the 
competitive assessment of vertical restraints under Article 101(1), the Commission will 
take into consideration not only their welfare effects, but also their compatibility with the 
‘single market imperative’. The current Vertical Guidelines reiterate the relevance of EU 
competition law – and particularly its application to vertical restraints – to market 
integration as a policy priority: ‘[a]ssessing vertical restraints is also important in the 
context of the wider objective of achieving an integrated internal market … Companies 
should not be allowed to recreate private barriers between Member States where State 
barriers have been successfully abolished’.176 Paragraph 100 of the Guidelines further 
includes the ‘creation of obstacles to market integration’ in the list of the likely negative 
effects of vertical restraints. 
This idea is also consistent with the objectives pursued under the constitutional 
framework outlined in the EU Treaties. The Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’), in 
Article 3(3), provides that the Union shall establish an internal market, based on a ‘highly 
competitive social market economy’. Similarly, by virtue of Article 3(b) TFEU the Union 
reserves exclusive competence for the purposes of establishing ‘the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market’. These provisions underline the broad 
objectives that EU competition law is designed to pursue, its application being premised on 
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the integration of both economic and non-economic considerations.
177
 Naturally, this 
applies also to the substantive analysis of vertical restraints in general, including RPM. 
 
 
1.5. Conclusion: Is Convergence Possible and How? 
 
 This chapter explored the origins of the prohibition against RPM both in the US 
and the EU and investigated the links of the per se treatment of RPM under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act with the English common law tradition. It was shown that, although in Dr 
Miles the Supreme Court signalled the departure of US antitrust law from the English 
courts’ tendency to prioritise freedom of contract over freedom of trade in the field of 
vertical restraints, it nonetheless partially relied on an obsolete common law principle, the 
doctrine against restraints on alienation, in order to prohibit a practice with ambivalent 
welfare consequences.  
The previous paragraphs also attempted to explain the traditionally and consistently 
harsh treatment of vertical price fixing under Article 101 TFEU, the only obvious 
precedent of which were the legal traditions of the founding Member States. The review of 
the national laws with respect to RPM schemes as in force at the time of the enactment of 
the Treaty of Rome revealed an impressive inconsistency in the treatment of vertical price 
fixing, which ranged from unequivocal permissiveness to utter condemnation – this harsh 
approach having been endorsed by the French and Swedish legislators. But, more 
importantly, it demonstrated that the rationale behind the treatment of RPM was based on 
the different economic, social, and, occasionally, political conditions which were prevalent 
in each jurisdiction during the first post-war years. It thus confirmed Thorelli’s observation 
that ‘[r]egulation of resale price maintenance, incidentally, is a marvellous example of how 
crucial it is to view the law in relation to its particular task environment instead of making 
the rather sterile formal comparisons which are all too usual in this field’.178 
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 This analysis leads to the reasonable conclusion that the prohibition of vertical 
price fixing under Article 101 TFEU was not influenced by the legal traditions of the 
individual Member States. Instead, it is submitted here that the current normative approach 
to RPM was developed on the basis of two factors: the first factor is of constitutional 
nature; the second is economic – or at least relevant to the understanding of substantive 
economics by the authorities of a more mature antitrust jurisdiction. First, the prohibition 
against RPM appears to have been developed in response to the very specific challenges 
facing the newly-established European Economic Community. Artificial price differentials 
have the ability indirectly to compartmentalise the internal market by diverting the trade 
flows away from the channels of distribution that would be used in the absence of price 
restraints. As will be shown in Chapter 5 below, it is interesting that, in a number of cases, 
the Commission found that price floors and export bans had been combined with the 
purpose of reinforcing each other.    
At the same time, one cannot help observing the decisive influence exercised by the 
American model of per se prohibition as suggested in Dr. Miles. The previous paragraphs 
demonstrated not only the intellectual interactions between European officials and 
American scholars during the drafting of the Treaty of Paris, but also presented the direct 
involvement of the American forces in transplanting US antitrust law and principles into 
the legal order of the occupied West Germany in the first post-war years. Which of the two 
factors, the single market imperative or the American influence and the legacy of Dr Miles, 
played a more decisive role in the shaping of the blanket prohibition against RPM under 
Article 101 TFEU is unclear, and any attempt to answer this question would enter the 
sphere of academic speculation.  
The recent Vertical Guidelines, however, frustrate the above analysis and obscure 
the rationale behind the ban on RPM, at least with regard to the ‘single market imperative’. 
In what essentially constitutes a step away from the Commission’s rigid adherence to the 
single market imperative, paragraph 61 of the Guidelines concedes that a prohibition on 
passive sales may qualify as an ancillary restraint and escape the application of Article 
101(1) altogether. In order for an agreement conferring absolute territorial protection to be 
eligible for the ancillary restraints defence, three conditions must be met. First, the 
beneficiary of the prohibition on both active and passive sales must be a distributor which 
is the first to sell a new brand or the first to sell an existing brand on a new market. Second, 
absolute territorial protection must be necessary for the distributor to recoup substantial 
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sunk investments. Finally, the duration of the agreement must not exceed the first two 
years that the distributor is selling the contract good or services. 
Since the Commission has been willing to relax, under certain circumstances, its 
stringent approach to absolute territorial protection, which axiomatically leads to market 
partitioning, it can be safely assumed that the influence of the single market imperative on 
the public policy towards vertical restraints which may only indirectly produce the same 
effect – such as RPM – is decreasing. In the aftermath of Leegin, Jones observed that, by 
contrast to US antitrust law, the evolution of which has been facilitated by the Sherman 
Act’s link with the common law, in Europe ‘it is not clear that there has been, or could be, 
such a fundamental shift in objectives’, particularly in light of the broad goals pursued 
under EU competition law, which go beyond the mere promotion of consumer welfare.
179
 
However, having been expressed prior to the publication of the revised Vertical 
Guidelines in 2010, Jones’ opinion appears to be outdated. The Commission’s departure 
from its rigid adherence to the single market imperative in cases where export bans may 
facilitate new entry demonstrates that this ‘shift in objectives’ may be less problematic 
than initially thought – in fact it has already occurred: the fact that RPM has been 
effectively singled out as the most harshly treated vertical restraint has obviously nothing 
to do with the single market imperative, but should rather be understood as the natural 
result of a presumption of net anti-competitive effects. This is of course not to be 
interpreted as suggesting that integrationist goals are now out of the picture. It does, 
however, reveal the Commission’s intention to subject even agreements that demonstrably 
fragment the internal market to the intuitive proportionality test of Article 101(1), where 
their likely effect is to promote interbrand competition.  
At the same time, it is unclear whether the Commission’s view is also shared by the 
Court of Justice. In GlaxoSmithKline v Commission, the Court reaffirmed that the scope of 
Article 101 extends beyond the mere promotion of consumer welfare: 
First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only those agreements 
which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an anti-competitive 
object. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other 
competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not 
only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the 
market and, in so doing, competition as such. Consequently, for a finding that an 
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agreement has an anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers 
be deprived of the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or 
price.
180
   
However, and in sharp contrast with the Commission’s approach, in Pedro IV, 
decided the same year as GlaxoSmithKline, and the last RPM case to have been dealt with 
by the CJEU so far, the Court also took the position that no presumptions against RPM 
exist under Article 101(1):  
although the fixing of a retail price constitutes a restriction of competition expressly 
provided for in Article [101(1)(a) TFEU], it causes that agreement to be caught by 
the prohibition set out in that provision only where all the other conditions for 
applying that provision are met, that is to say, that the object or effect of the 
agreement is perceptibly to restrict competition within the common market and that 
it is capable of affecting trade between Member States.
181
  
This lack of any presumptions of illegality concerns not only the net competitive effects of 
the RPM scheme at issue, but by all means also its likely effect on trade between Member 
States. It should also be stressed that the CJEU requires that, in order for an agreement 
fixing minimum resale prices to fall within the scope of the prohibition, all conditions laid 
down in Article 101(1) must be satisfied. The Court’s view thus stands for another, more 
important proposition: welfare-positive or at least welfare-neutral RPM – in any event 
RPM that does not have the object or effect of restricting competition perceptibly – will 
escape the prohibition even if it is capable of affecting trade between Member States, thus 
indirectly resulting in market partitioning. Naturally, this argument does not work vice 
versa: despite its substantive value, the ‘effect on trade’ requirement is first and foremost a 
jurisdictional criterion. This entails that, where the RPM agreement at issue is not shown to 
be capable of affecting trade between Member States, its object or effect will not be 
appraised under Article 101(1) since, in such a case, EU competition law will not be 
applicable.  
It is important to note that the normative implications of the CJEU’s decision in 
Pedro IV are still obscure, not only because the Court has not yet had the opportunity to 
apply these criteria to a subsequent RPM case, but also because the rationale behind the 
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judgment has neither been incorporated in the Commission’s 2010 Vertical Guidelines, nor 
has it been relied upon by national competition authorities and courts, which condemn 
vertical price fixing as a ‘by-object’ and hardcore restraint. The Court’s position is, 
however, interesting to the extent that it appears to be favouring a more effects-based 
approach to RPM, while implicitly leaving the door open for the possibility that price 
floors may even escape the application of Article 101(1) altogether.   
It follows from the foregoing analysis that both the Commission’s stringent 
approach to RPM, as defined in the recent Vertical Guidelines, and the CJEU’s more 
favourable treatment outlined in Pedro IV, although diametrically different in their 
essence, prioritise the net competitive effects of the practice over any integrationist 
concerns, thus having economic considerations as their common denominator. 
Accordingly, the thesis will proceed upon the assumption that the substantive assessment 
of vertical price fixing under the current regime, as outlined by the Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation and the accompanying Vertical Guidelines, is based for the most 
part on economic considerations. 
Given this – subtle but genuine – step away from the traditional adherence to the 
single market imperative, and insofar as a general consensus on the substantive economics 
can be assumed, it is submitted here that the convergence of the public policy towards 
vertical price fixing in the two jurisdictions is indeed feasible. One last issue to be resolved 
is how this convergence may occur. It is rather clear that the adoption of a rule of reason 
approach under EU competition law is both unwarranted and impossible. Unwarranted, 
because, as will be shown later in this thesis, the strong anti-competitive potential of price 
floors require a cautions treatment which would be better served by a – genuinely – 
rebuttable presumption of illegality.
182
 Impossible, because the normative framework of 
EU competition law is notably different from that of the Sherman Act. 
The analytical dichotomy between the rule of per se illegality and the rule of reason 
standard does not apply to Article 101 TFEU. In Métropole, the General Court 
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categorically rejected the existence of a rule of reason under EU competition law, and 
stressed that any substantive assessment consisting in the balancing of any alleged pro- and 
anti-competitive effects can be carried out only in the context of Article 101(3).
183
 
Furthermore, the same Court has noted in Matra Hachette that under EU competition law 
all types of restrictive arrangements are potentially eligible to benefit from an individual 
exemption: ‘in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent 
of its effects on a given market cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid 
down in Article [101](3) of the Treaty are satisfied’.184  
However, as Jones points out, the differences in the approach taken to RPM under 
EU competition law and US antitrust law prior to Leegin are merely theoretical, as in 
practice price floors are essentially subject to the same stringent rule.
185
 Chapter 6 below 
will examine the current treatment of price floors under Article 101 TFEU and conclude 
that is premised on a conclusive presumption of allocative inefficiency. As has already 
been argued earlier in this chapter, this presumption may be attributed to the influence of 
the US experience, since the European Commission has not to date engaged in a full-blown 
assessment of the competitive effects of an RPM scheme under scrutiny. This influence is 
particularly evident in the Commission’s earlier official documents, such as the explicit 
reference of the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints to ‘per se’ illegality of price floors 
under Article 101(1),
186
 or the preceding Vertical Guidelines, which, in citing the theories 
of harm associated with vertical price fixing, focus exclusively on the horizontal collusion 
theory, partially in line with the rationale behind Dr Miles.
187
 These similarities will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 below, in the context of the investigation into the 
relationship between the horizontal effects of RPM and the per se rule.
188
 Also, the 
presumption against RPM could, until recently, be explained by the single market 
imperative underpinning a great many Commission decisions and being at the epicentre of 
the EU public policy towards vertical restraints, at least until the publication of the 2010 
Vertical Guidelines. 
Moreover, the evolution of EU competition law and policy is not bound by the 
doctrine of stare decisis, but is instead shaped freely under the guidance of the Court of 
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Justice or on the basis of the Commission’s enforcement priorities as outlined in soft law 
instruments, such as the Vertical Guidelines.
189
 The following chapters will argue in favour 
of a moderate reform of the policy towards RPM in the EU, through the adaptation of the 
Leegin rule to the European legal order: while retaining the ‘by-object’ and ‘hardcore’ 
status of the practice, it will be demonstrated that sound antitrust policy requires the 
adoption of a rebuttable presumption of illegality under Article 101(1). 
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Chapter 2  
The Economics of Distribution 
 
 
2.1. The Economics of Minimum RPM 
 
 As a general proposition, a rational manufacturer would be more likely to 
encourage price competition between its dealers, rather than undermine it by means of 
RPM.
1
 Fierce intrabrand competition will lead to a gradual reduction of distribution costs, 
namely of the difference between the price charged by the manufacturer to the dealer and 
that charged by the latter to the consumer. This reduction in distribution costs will in turn 
result in lower retail prices and, accordingly, in increased demand for the particular brand.  
 In light of this assumption, many different explanations have been suggested as to 
why a manufacturer would limit competition among its dealers by resorting to vertical 
price fixing. The following two paragraphs shall examine the justifications for RPM 
agreements as put forward by commentators and/or by the courts. First, the focus will be 
on RPM as a means of actually stimulating interbrand competition, and then will follow 
the presentation of the anti-competitive concerns raised by such agreements. For 
simplicity’s sake, during the presentation of the different arguments a two-stage 
distribution system is assumed, in which the manufacturer sells its products directly to the 
retailer, which in turn will resell them to the end user. 
 
2.1.1. Pro-competitive Effects of RPM 
 Ever since the 1960s, antitrust economists have been arguing that restrictions of 
intrabrand competition may be indispensible for the enhancement of interbrand 
competition. In the case of price restraints, it has been stated that ‘by enhancing the pricing 
power of the retailer, the manufacturer induces the retailer to engage in activities that 
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stimulate demand’.2 Commentators have put forward several arguments to justify the 
precompetitive effects of vertical price fixing. 
 
2.1.1.1. The ‘Free Rider’ Argument 
 The most prominent justification for RPM is the ‘free rider’ argument suggested by 
Telser in a seminal article published in 1960.
3
 Telser argued that sales at the retail level 
depend on both the product’s price and the product-specific services provided by the 
retailer. Customers value the additional services, but, given the chance, they would rather 
buy the product at a lower price. In the absence of RPM, retailers offering those special 
services would inevitably charge more than those who do not, due to the higher costs that 
the former incur. As a result, it is highly likely that a customer will be convinced to 
purchase a certain product by taking advantage of the pre-sales services provided by one 
retailer, but will eventually buy the product at a lower price from a competing dealer that 
offers no such services. In that way, a dealer takes a free ride on the ‘full-service’ 
competitor’s promotional efforts. Accordingly, fewer or no dealers will provide pre-sale 
services, which in turn will cause a reduction in the sales. 
 
2.1.1.1.1. Objections to the Free Rider Argument  
Notwithstanding the fact that the free rider explanation remains the main argument 
in favour of RPM it has been criticised, primarily on the basis of its limited applicability. 
Telser himself concedes that the provision of sales-specific services is essential only where 
consumers are unaware of the specific attributes of the product in question. In due course, 
consumers’ valuation of services attached to established goods that are subject to repeated 
purchases decreases. Consequently distributors will refrain from providing those special 
services that are deemed redundant, but will continue to rely on RPM in order to realise 
supra-competitive profits, unless the manufacturer abandons its pricing policy.
4
 Professors 
Klein and Murphy further argue that, in reality, RPM does not necessarily offer a solution 
to the ‘free-rider’ problem. The retailers’ commitment to observe the fixed prices may not 
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prevent aspiring free-riders from bundling the product with services valued by consumers, 
but not by the manufacturer, such as promotional offers of tied accessories.
5
  
A third objection to the ‘free rider’ argument is based on the assumption that not all 
consumers place the same value on special services: the manufacturer’s decision to fix the 
retail price of its goods depends on the importance attached to such services by the 
‘marginal’ consumers, namely the consumers whose reservation prices are nearly the same 
as the product’s original price, and are therefore more sensitive to any fluctuations thereof. 
However, in order to assess the restraint’s overall effect on consumer welfare, one must 
also take into account the response of a separate class which consists of those customers 
who have a clear preference for a given manufacturer’s product and are thus rather 
insensitive to price increases. Having all necessary information regarding the product in 
question, infra-marginal customers are unlikely to take advantage of the available product 
specific services due to the time cost associated with their consumption. As the provision 
of services is designed to reflect the preferences of only the marginal consumers, 
inefficient outcomes may arise where the level of services offered is either too low or too 
high by reference to the value attributed to them by all customers, both marginal and infra-
marginal. On the basis of this analysis, Comanor rejects the Chicagoan assumption that 
vertical restraints serve the interests of both the manufacturer and consumers.
6
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Finally, a significant drawback of Telser’s insight is that it appears to be applicable 
to a relatively limited range of goods; in certain markets there is practically no scope for 
the provision of special services. Professor Pitofski, a proponent of the per se ban on RPM, 
relying on empirical evidence from antitrust litigation before US courts, is wondering: 
‘think for a moment about the product areas in which resale price maintenance has 
appeared – boxed candy, pet foods, jeans, vitamins, hair shampoo, knit shirts, men’s 
underwear. What are the services we are talking about in these cases?’.7 
 
2.1.1.2. The ‘Quality Certification’ Argument   
 In an attempt to explain the application of fixed resale prices to categories of 
products that do not require specific tangible pre-sale services, Marvel and McCafferty 
have developed an alternative theory, according to which RPM may be justified by the 
manufacturer’s desire to ‘purchase’ certification of the quality and style of its products.8 
By deciding to stock a particular product, a reputable retailer attests that this product meets 
certain qualitative standards which are in conformity with the retailer’s own reputation. 
This kind of indirect ‘quality certification’ may also be subject to free riding. More 
specifically, given that product branding guarantees across-the-board consistency in the 
quality of branded goods, in the absence of RPM less established outlets will be able to 
expand their market shares through price cuts, to the detriment of their high-quality 
competitors. Consequently, not only will the level of quality certification decline, but also 
a number of high-quality retailers will be forced to exit the market.
9
 It is important to note 
that the common characteristic of both the free rider rationale and the quality certification 
                                                          
7
 R Pitofski, ‘Why Dr. Miles Was Right’ [1984] 8 Regulation 27, 29. It is important to note that, as will be 
subsequently argued in more detail, the objections to the free rider argument have been gaining momentum in 
the last few years in the light of the expansion of e-commerce; see infra ch 3. 
8
 HP Marvel and S McCafferty, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification’ [1984] 15 Rand J Econ 
346. In an article published at roughly the same time, Goldberg offered a similar explanation for RPM, 
asserting that a retailer essentially rents out its brand name to the manufacturer. In order for the reputable 
retailer to be encouraged to endorse the manufacturer’s products, the latter finds recourse to RPM as a means 
to compensate indirectly the dealer through the increased difference between the retail and the wholesale 
price; see VP Goldberg, ‘The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing and the Economics of Retailing 
Services’ [1984-1985] 79 Nw U L Rev 736, 744-745. 
9
 HP Marvel and S McCafferty, supra n 8, 354-355. The authors concede, however, that RPM ‘will be most 
likely for goods that are purchased sporadically or for those goods characterized by rapidly deteriorating 
quality information’; ibid, 355. 
60 
 
argument is that they are premised upon the fundamental assumption that it is not 
economically feasible for a manufacturer to contract on the services directly.
10
 
 
2.1.1.3. RPM and Demand Uncertainty 
 An alternative theory has been subsequently suggested by Deneckere et al, who 
contend that a manufacturer may have an incentive to fix the retail prices for its products in 
the face of demand uncertainty.
11
 More specifically, particularly where the goods 
concerned are perishable and are facing highly variable demand, in the absence of RPM 
discount retailers will be able to sell their stock even when demand is low. At the same 
time, their high price rivals, likely to incur the costs of unsold inventory, will be induced to 
limit their future orders for the manufacturer’s products. Taking into account that, where 
price competition in the downstream market remains unrestrained retailers set their prices 
and purchase inventories prior to the arrival of consumers, when both high and low 
demand are equally likely, this assumption appears to be credible. Deneckere et al argue 
that a uniform pricing strategy will result in consumers choosing retailers ‘so as to equate 
the ratio of sales to inventory across firms. That is, where there is excess supply, the 
probability of any unit being sold is the same for all firms’.12 The authors thus assert that 
RPM will increase total welfare where it is designed to encourage additional inventory 
holding, and take the position that it could serve as an alternative to vertical integration.
13
    
Moreover, an additional justification is that RPM facilitates resale density, 
especially with regard to relatively inexpensive goods, or goods which are frequently 
bought on impulse.
14
 With regard to these categories of products, a manufacturer may find 
it profitable to ensure the widespread availability of its products sold not exclusively from 
large retail outlets, but also from easily accessible convenience stores. However, large-
scale retailers are generally capable of undercutting their smaller rivals by fully exploiting 
the available economies of scale. Economic theory suggests that not all consumers have the 
same willingness to search more in order to spot the lower price. As a result, the 
                                                          
10
 J Lipczynski, JOS Wilson and J Goddard, Industrial Organization: Competition, Strategy and Policy (4th 
edn, Pearson 2013), p 606. 
11
 R Deneckere, HP Marvel and J Peck, ‘Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance’ 
[1996] 111 QJ Econ 885; see also HP Marvel, supra n 5, 73-77.  
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 R Deneckere, HP Marvel and J Peck, supra n 11 890-891. 
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 Ibid, 911. 
14
 See H Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice, (4th edn, West 
2011), p 503; BS Yamey, The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance (Pitman 1954), pp 49-52; JR Gould 
and LE Preston, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Retail Outlets’ [1965] 32 Economica 302. 
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convenience stores will lose those consumers who would travel longer in order to profit 
from a better price, and will find it unprofitable to stock the manufacturer’s products. Thus, 
by fixing the resale price of such goods, the manufacturer can ensure a wider availability 
for its products. The same applies to products which are subject to impulse purchases, to 
the extent that the manufacturer’s return on additional sales outweighs the loss in consumer 
welfare caused by the increase in retail prices.
15
 
 
2.1.1.4. RPM and New Entry 
Finally, RPM can be used as a very effective tool by a new firm which attempts to 
penetrate a market or by an existing player that seeks to launch a new product. It is 
generally not very likely that a retailer will take the risk to stock either the products of 
unknown brands or novel goods consumer demand for which is still uncertain. This 
uncertainty represents a distribution cost which may discourage the potential dealer from 
undertaking any relationship-specific investments associated with its decision to stock the 
product, unless it is afforded the possibility to recoup the relevant costs.
16
 A larger profit 
margin, guaranteed by means of price floors, may serve as an inducement for the retailer to 
include in its inventory products the success of which is rather uncertain, or to concentrate 
its sales efforts ‘during the introductory period of expanding demand’.17 
 
2.1.2. Objections to RPM 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned pro-competitive hypotheses, it must be 
recognised that the consistently stringent treatment of vertical price fixing under Article 
101 TFEU and the almost century-long application of the per se rule under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act,
18
 are by no means arbitrary. In justifying the Commission’s hostility towards 
the practice, the recent Guidelines on Vertical Restraints mention seven ways in which 
RPM may restrict competition. In particular, RPM may (i) facilitate collusion in the 
upstream market; (ii) facilitate collusion between dealers; (iii) generally soften competition 
between manufacturers and/or between retailers; (iv) bring about an increase in the price of 
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 BS Yamey, supra n 14, p 50. 
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 H Hovenkamp, supra n 14, p 503. 
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 Commission Notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C130/1 (hereinafter ‘2010 Vertical 
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the products concerned; (v) prevent the manufacturer from lowering the price charged to 
subsequent distributors; (vi) result in the foreclosure of smaller rivals, when employed by a 
manufacturer with market power; and (vii) reduce dynamism and innovation at the 
distribution level.
19
 
 
2.1.2.1. The Cartel Objection   
 In order for a cartel to be successful, three general conditions must be cumulatively 
met: first, the members must be able to reach an understanding and align their behaviour; 
second, they must monitor the other members’ compliance with the rules of the cartel; and, 
finally, they must punish any deviations from the common policy.
20
 The enforcement of 
the collusive agreement is of particular importance, as economic theory suggests that 
cartels are inherently unstable. Given that any deviations from the rules of the cartel are 
generally expected to be profitable for its members, all cartelists have the incentive to 
cheat by undercutting the fixed price, with the purpose of expanding their market share. 
The cartel members therefore need to be able to police each other’s conduct, and RPM may 
be employed as a facilitating mechanism designed to prevent the erosion of the collusive 
equilibrium.  
 This assumption appears to be equally relevant to cartels operating on either stage 
of the production and distribution chain. The reason why colluding dealers would rather 
induce the supplier to impose a minimum or fixed resale price is that the latter is in a better 
position to enforce the cartel agreement. It is by all means easier for the supplier to 
supervise the dealers’ conduct and observe any deviations from the agreed upon price, 
since the supplier deals with each one of them separately. It has been argued,
21
 however, 
that vertical price fixing cannot be regarded as a dealer collusion facilitator for one very 
important reason: cartels in the downstream markets (and especially at the retailer level) 
are by their very nature unstable. Factors such as the large number of market participants, 
low barriers to entry, high levels of outlet differentiation, and strong non-price 
competition, all of which are inherent in the retail market irrespective of the existence of 
RPM, render retailer cartels particularly difficult to organise and police. Additionally, as 
the objective of a retailer cartel is the restriction of output, it is not clear why a 
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manufacturer would acquiesce to the implementation of an agreement that is obviously 
contrary to its own interests, unless of course the colluding dealers possess an 
overwhelming degree of monopsony power. But even in that case, the cartel would likely 
induce the manufacturer to integrate vertically, encourage new entry in the downstream 
market, or simply report the unlawful agreements to the enforcement agencies.
22
     
 Similarly, in the case of a manufacturer cartel vertical price fixing may be aimed at 
discouraging the cartel members from undermining the success of the collusive agreement 
by charging discounted prices. By contrast to sales made to dealers, which are ‘generally 
large, secret, and individually negotiated ... [r]etail prices ... are generally public, relatively 
standardised at particular locations, and individually small’,23 while any discounts are 
made known through advertising. In light of this assumption, price cuts in breach of the 
cartel agreement are expected to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower retail 
prices, which are generally highly visible. Where RPM is enforced collectively by all 
cartelists, so the argument runs, the price rigidity in the downstream market will prevent 
aspiring cheaters from offering secret discounts, since these will have no effect other than 
providing retailers with higher profit margins.  
This objection to RPM, however, is not unambiguous either. First of all, the mere 
fact that the (uniform) prices are made public entails that, at the same time, it is easier for 
enforcement agencies to detect the collusion: an industry-wide pattern of pricing policy is 
likely also to attract close scrutiny by the competition authorities. Second, vertical price 
fixing appears to be redundant as a cartel facilitating mechanism where the goods 
concerned are sold through multi-brand outlets. The retailer can be expected to report 
immediately to the colluding manufacturers any secret price reductions offered by a 
cheating member, in an attempt to obtain matching discounts.
24
 Third, the retailer may 
frustrate the RPM scheme by indirectly passing on to customers any price cuts in the form 
of special terms that have the same effect as discounts, such as more favourable credit 
terms or concessions on tied products. In other words, the cheating manufacturer may 
benefit from the provision of increased point-of-sale, product-specific services, which are 
more difficult to detect than lower retail prices.
25
 Although the manufacturer cartel 
objection is not unfounded, it is clear from the foregoing analysis that, in defiance of RPM, 
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 See RH Bork, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division’ (Part II) 
[1965-1966] 75 Yale LJ 373, 405-410. 
23
 SI Ornstein, supra n 21, 453. 
24
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manufacturers appear to have both the incentive and the ability to engage in secret price 
cutting. 
 
2.1.2.2. RPM and Tacit Collusion 
Economic theory suggests that price floors may be enforced with the purpose to 
sustain a collusive equilibrium even in the absence of explicit concertation between 
competitors. Shaffer argues that RPM is likely to be employed by manufacturers 
competing for access to shelf space at the retail level.
26
 He asserts, however, that the 
practice may also be implemented as a mechanism designed to facilitate oligopolistic 
coordination, in which case it may give rise to significant anti-competitive effects.
27
 In 
particular, the impact of RPM on retail profit margins appears to be greater where only 
some of the available brands are price maintained: in a downstream duopoly the retailer 
that opts for the price maintained brand behaves as the price leader, while its uncommitted 
rival acts as a price follower. The result will be a Stackelberg game which will cause retail 
prices to increase and consumer welfare to decline.
28
 It is noteworthy however that, in 
relation to a perfectly competitive downstream market, not only are the welfare effects 
brought about by the strategic use of RPM considerably less adverse compared to the loss 
in allocative efficiency generated by a retailer cartel, but also price floors appear to 
produce greater surplus than slotting allowances.
29
 Interestingly, Shaffer suggests that 
where both retailers decide to carry price maintained brands, and in the absence of fixed 
fees, the outcome would be equivalent to a situation where neither RPM nor fixed fees 
were employed.
30
 
 The view that RPM may be implemented with the purpose of facilitating tacit 
collusion is also supported by Rey and Vergé, who argue that vertical price fixing is likely 
to soften or even eliminate interbrand competition in situations of ‘interlocking 
relationships’ – or ‘double common agency’ – namely where the same competing dealers 
carry the goods of more than one upstream rivals.
31
 Rey and Vergé start from the 
proposition that, where the goods of competing manufacturers are carried by a downstream 
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monopolist, the former may eliminate interbrand competition simply by selling at cost 
while charging a fixed fee, thus transforming ‘a rival manufacturer into a residual claimant 
on the sales of both brands’.32 In this case, both manufacturers will have an incentive to 
protect the retailer’s monopoly rents. If, however, by hypothesis the manufacturers supply 
a competitive downstream market where retailer margins are squeezed as a result of 
intrabrand competition, the same outcome may be achieved through a combination of RPM 
with two-part tariffs. It is interesting to note that, according to the analysis, other types of 
vertical restraints do not replicate the same mechanism; accordingly, the authors favour the 
continuation of a more ‘cautious’ approach towards vertical price fixing in comparison to 
non-price restraints.
33
 
 
2.1.2.3. RPM as an Exclusionary Mechanism 
Despite arguably being the most oft-cited, the horizontal collusion theory is by all 
means not the only objection associated with the use of vertical price fixing. Both the 
Commission, in its recent Vertical Guidelines,
34
 and the US Supreme Court in Leegin
35
 
have endorsed the possibility that RPM may be implemented by a manufacturer enjoying 
substantial market power with the purpose of foreclosing the access of smaller rivals to the 
downstream market, or in order to raise barriers to new entry. However, while being an 
intuitively compelling argument, it has received limited attention by antitrust scholars.
36
 
Bork deals with the foreclosure objection to RPM in nothing more than an extensive 
footnote. He argues that, insofar as entry into retailing is easy, vertical price fixing is not 
likely to result in the exclusion of manufacturers from the downstream market. Particularly 
problematic is the fact that, in order to foreclose their rivals, price-maintaining 
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manufacturers need to combine RPM with exclusive dealing clauses. As it can be safely 
assumed that a – smaller or larger – fraction of the total number of manufacturers will not 
be able to appoint all of the industry’s retailers as exclusive dealers, and that RPM will 
make entry into retailing more attractive for discounting dealers the foreclosure theory of 
RPM loses much of its credibility.
37
 
In a recent article, Paldor takes the position that a dominant manufacturer may 
indeed use RPM as a ‘rent-shifting device’, in an attempt to induce retailer exclusivity.38 
The upstream monopolist, so the argument runs, has the incentive to exclude any actual or 
potential competitors in order to avoid the erosion of any rents available in a given 
industry, which would be the obvious consequence of new entry. By affording retailers a 
greater profit margin by means of RPM, the manufacturer seeks to align its commercial 
interests with those of its dealers. While retailers would be expected to favour a 
competitive – and perhaps even more so a duopolistic – over a monopolistic upstream 
market, the existence of excess rents under conditions of monopoly, along with the 
prospect of sharing these rents with the manufacturer, is likely to sustain the former’s 
interest in preserving the upstream monopoly.
39
 That said, Paldor concedes that his 
analysis is applicable only to markets which are dominated by one incumbent player. In 
oligopolistic or competitive markets, coordination between manufacturers regarding the 
division of costs associated with rent-shifting will be rather problematic. At the same time, 
the greater the number of firms that are active in the upstream market, the smaller the loss 
in their share of the available rents caused by new entry.
40
 
The idea that price floors may be implemented by an upstream incumbent as a rent-
sharing mechanism for exclusionary purposes has been subsequently confirmed by Asker 
and Bar-Isaac, who present a formal equilibrium foundation in support of this theory.
41
 The 
authors demonstrate that the incumbent manufacturer may prevent its retailers from 
accommodating a possible new entrant simply by charging a wholesale price equal to its 
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marginal cost and setting a retail price at the monopoly level. The retail margin afforded in 
this way will ensure the maximisation of the rent transfer.
42
 
 
2.1.2.4. Anti-Competitive RPM through the Lens of Behavioural Economics 
 Finally, in an article published in the aftermath of the US Supreme Court’s decision 
in Leegin, Tor and Rinner suggest an alternative explanation for RPM on the basis of the 
behavioural analysis of the practice.
43
 In challenging the validity of the rationality 
assumption in neoclassical economics, the authors argue that real-world manufacturers are 
loss-averse, insofar as they demonstrate the tendency to find ‘the pain associated with the 
negative prospect of a potential loss … far stronger than the pleasure of the positive 
prospect of a comparable gain’.44 As boundedly rational decision makers, they are prone to 
favouring the preservation of the current status quo (‘status quo bias’), thus overestimating 
the expected harm from price-cutting.
45
 Consequently, even in the absence of any credible 
pro-competitive justifications, manufacturers may be inclined to use RPM excessively and 
inefficiently, as they perceive it as the most appropriate method for the prevention of price-
cutting and the protection of their interests.
46
 Based on Tor and Rinner’s insight, Van den 
Bergh asserts that behavioural analysis may provide a legitimate theoretical justification 
for the stringent treatment of RPM under Article 101 TFEU. However, he dismisses 
exclusive reliance on behavioural economics for the substantive assessment of RPM, 
arguing that, unless combined with neoclassical theories, the behavioural approach may 
increase the likelihood of false positives by extending the scope of the prohibition even to 
efficiency-enhancing RPM schemes.
47
 
 
 
2.2. Theories on the Nature of the Firm 
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2.2.1. Neoclassical Theory 
Under the neoclassical theory, the firm was viewed as a profit-maximising 
production unit operating on the free market or under state regulation.
48
 Neoclassical 
economists focus on the price system rather than on the nature of the firm as a distinct 
economic entity.
49
 In this framework, a firm maximises its profits when its marginal 
revenue, namely the additional revenue obtained for every additional unit of output 
produced, equals its marginal cost, in other words the additional cost incurred for the 
production of one additional unit of output (MR=MC). This theory recognises three main 
reasons for the existence of the firm: a) relatively large number of specialised employees; 
b) wider use of capital goods; and c) economies of scale.
50
 
 Nevertheless, the neoclassical theory does not explore the internal organisation of 
production within a firm; it rather approaches the firm as a ‘black box’, the size and 
boundaries whereof are more or less obscure. Accordingly, it does not attempt to explain 
why firms merge, or why one firm decides to split itself into two smaller firms. Similarly, 
it does not take into account the conflicting interests between employers and employees. 
Despite its shortcomings, the neoclassical theory has survived for well over one hundred 
years.
51
  
 
2.2.2. Coasian Theory 
 In his 1937 article ‘The Nature of the Firm’,52 Ronald Coase suggested a different 
approach to the concept of the firm, through the introduction of the principles of 
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transaction cost economics.
53
 The importance of this seminal paper lies, in particular, in the 
fact that ‘it offered an entirely different way of looking at the reasons for the existence of 
the firm as an economic entity, and for explaining the scope of what the firm does’.54 
Coase drew a clear distinction between the market and the firm, and regarded them as 
alternative methods of coordinating production.
55
 According to Coase, firms emerge 
because the use of the price mechanism (namely the market)
56
 is costly. More specifically, 
he identified three types of relevant marketing costs: a) cost for the discovery of the 
relevant prices, b) costs related to the negotiation and conclusion of transactions, and c) 
cost of concluding a long-term contract where it is difficult for the ‘factor of production’ to 
foresee the course of conduct that the other contracting party will follow in the future; thus, 
the respective costs raise because of the entrepreneur’s need to provide for the various 
contingencies that are likely to emerge during the term of the contract, in which case 
information and bargaining costs have to be incurred repeatedly.
57
  
 Coase suggested that firms come into existence specifically in order for the 
aforementioned marketing costs to be saved: it is the internalisation of production in the 
context of a firm
58
 that minimises the costs that would otherwise be required for the use of 
the market. In particular, the direction of resources by an authority, in other words the 
power relationship within a firm, is regarded as a substitute for the price mechanism, which 
is superseded.
59
 Thus, instead of a certain number of contracts that would have to be 
concluded on the market, the factor of production will have to enter into only one, 
establishing a relationship of hierarchical control, and setting limits to the power of the 
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entrepreneur.
60
 Put differently, the organisation of a firm is similar to the relationship 
between employer and employee.
61
 
 Apart from identifying the reasons for the emergence of firms, Coase’s work has 
one additional implication: it suggested that the costs of bargaining may simultaneously 
explain the firm’s size. Obviously, the more the transactions conducted within a firm, the 
larger that firm is. However, given that internal organisation is also costly
62
, the firm will 
expand until the point where the costs of in-house transactions equal the costs of doing 
business on the open market. The definition of the boundaries of the firm is a major 
contribution of Coase’s insight, since the issue had not been addressed previously by the 
neoclassical paradigm.
63
 
 Thirty-five years after the publication of ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Professors 
Alchian and Demsetz
64
 challenged Coase’s understanding of the firm as an entity 
completely distinct from the framework in which it operates. In fact, they considered the 
firm as having ‘no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the 
slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people’.65 Alchian and 
Demsetz compare the relationship between an employer and an employee to that between a 
grocer and his customer. The relationship between two independent contractors, such as 
the latter, is based not on a formal contract, but on the continuous repetition of similar 
transactions, nevertheless it cannot be claimed that the grocer is the customer’s employee. 
Giving a specific order to an employee is, according to Alchian and Demsetz, in no way 
different from telling a grocer to sell one or the other good. In both cases, the sanctions for 
the employee or the grocer’s failure to comply with the obligations that derive from the 
respective agreements are identical: they will be either fired or sued. The grocer, in 
particular, will be ‘fired’ in the sense that the customer will start shopping from another 
grocer.
66
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 Thus, after having concluded that ‘[l]ong-term contracts between employer and 
employee are not the essence of the organization we call a firm’,67 Alchian and Demsetz 
pointed out that internal organisation has instead been developed as a solution to the 
problem of shirking: given that the firm involves a team productive process, careful 
monitoring of each team member’s performance is essential for the enhancement of 
productivity. However, since monitoring is itself costly, and since individualised market 
competition cannot exercise sufficient control, individual team members have the incentive 
to relax and shirk.
68
 The appointment of a specialised monitor is, therefore, required. In 
order for the monitor to perform his tasks efficiently and not shirk himself, he will be 
granted residual claimant status. The rights assigned to the monitor also include the power 
to alter team membership, to renegotiate the terms of any contract individually, and to sell 
those rights, and they define the essence of the firm as ‘a contractual structure subject to 
continuous renegotiation with the central agent’,69 as well as the monitor’s role as the 
firm’s owner.70       
 
2.2.3. The ‘Nexus-of-Contracts’ Theory  
 The Alchian-Demsetz understanding of the firm as a structure both the internal and 
external relationships whereof are governed by contract was subsequently carried further 
by the ‘nexus-of-contracts’ theory on the nature of the firm, which drew a distinction 
between ownership and control. The nexus-of-contracts theory was initially formulated by 
Professors Jensen and Meckling,
71
 who objected to the emphasis placed by Alchian and 
Demsetz on the concept of team production; in their view,  
[c]ontractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with 
suppliers, customers, creditors, etc… [since the] private organization or firm is 
simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting 
relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual 
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claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals.
72
  
 The basic implication of Jensen and Meckling’s insight is, therefore, that there is no 
actual distinction between the transactions carried out within a firm and those concluded 
on the market; instead, all these transactions form a single ‘continuum of types of 
contractual relations’.73 By contrast to Coase’s theory, the nexus-of-contracts conception 
does not recognise management hierarchy as a significant feature of the notion of the firm. 
Subsequently, Eisenberg approached the nexus-of-contracts conception as meaning that 
‘the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements made within a framework of 
mandatory legal rules, just as many other reciprocal arrangements, like contracts, trusts, 
and marriages, are made within a framework of mandatory legal rules’.74 This theory has 
proved to be very influential, but has, at the same time, been subject to fierce criticism, 
mainly due to its inability to explain the firm’s size; in essence, its implication that 
contractual continuity frustrates the definition of the firm’s boundaries is in contrast with 
the general perception of the firm’s structure.75 
 
2.2.4. The Transaction Cost Argument 
 The significance of transaction cost savings (first suggested by Coase) was further 
elaborated by Oliver Williamson.
76
 By contrast to the neoclassical theory, Williamson 
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regards the firm as a ‘governance structure’77 and not a production function. Accordingly, 
account should be taken of the firm’s organisational features, in order for its boundaries to 
be defined.
78
 Williamson further assumes that there are two behavioural factors
79
 which 
urge a firm to select internal organisation over market transactions. The first is bounded 
rationality, namely the fact that individuals are ‘intendedly rational, but only limited so’;80 
the actors’ bounded rationality makes the drafting of complete contracts impossible.81 
Thus, the main advantage of the centralisation of information in the form of hierarchical 
control is that the collection of information as well as the decision-making process will be 
assigned to ‘one or few individuals who have superior information processing capabilities 
and exceptional oratorical and decision-making skills’.82 This will in turn result in both 
considerable cost savings and in the increased likelihood that the correct decision will be 
reached by the central coordinator.  
The second behavioural assumption on which transaction cost economics places 
great emphasis is related to the concept of opportunism. Williamson defines opportunism 
as the ‘deep condition of self-interest seeking that contemplates guile’.83 Parties to a 
transaction may act opportunistically either ex ante, through the asymmetrical disclosure of 
information during the negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement, or ex post, during 
the execution or renewal of the contract.
84
 Williamson, therefore, suggests that internal 
organisation can result in more effective productivity evaluations, as well as in a more 
sophisticated conflict resolution mechanism, since the firm has the ability to settle any 
internal conflicts without recourse to fiat (as opposed to intra-organisational settlements). 
The importance of this mechanism lies in the fact that it keeps the conduct of the various 
divisions of the corporate entity under control and, at the same time, sets the standards for 
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admission to the integrated firm. In that way, both ex post and ex ante opportunistic 
behaviour is prevented.
85
             
 
2.2.5. The Property Rights Argument 
 An alternative theory suggested by Oliver Hart
86
 is that the firm should be regarded 
as a set of property rights or, put differently, of the assets that it owns. Even though the 
starting point for Hart’s approach is the transaction cost theory developed by Coase and 
Williamson, it focuses mainly on the firm’s physical (non-human) assets. Hart criticises the 
Coasean approach to the organization of the firm as a relationship of hierarchical control 
(similar to an employer-employee relationship) in that it failed to establish the source of 
the employer’s authority. In the absence of physical assets, Hart argues, it is difficult to 
define authority in the context of a firm. Instead it is the ‘control over nonhuman assets 
[that] leads to control over human assets’.87 
 According to Hart, the importance of the ownership of assets lies in the fact that it 
provides a solution to the problem of contract incompleteness: in the absence of 
contractual terms specifying any possible aspect of the usage of a physical asset, the owner 
of this asset has residual control rights over that asset, in the sense that he has the right to 
take decisions regarding all usages thereof.
88
 Based on this assumption, Grossman and Hart 
define vertical integration as ‘the purchase of the assets of a supplier (or of a purchaser) for 
the purpose of acquiring the residual rights of control’.89 
 
 
2.3. The Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration 
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2.3.1. Pro-Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration 
 
2.3.1.1. Pro-Competitive Effects in Non-Competitive Markets 
Every firm which enjoys market power has the tendency to restrict its output and 
thus raise its prices above the competitive level (namely above its marginal cost) and up to 
the point where its marginal revenue (MR)
90
 equals the firm’s marginal costs (MC). A 
monopolist, being the only seller in a specific market, has the ability to raise prices 
effectively, since its own output equals the market-wide output.
91
 The result (the ‘social 
cost’ of monopoly) is the so-called ‘deadweight loss’: consumers who would be willing to 
buy product A at a competitive price, decide to switch to their second-best option, product 
B, as long as the latter is available in a competitive market. The inefficiency of this 
outcome lies in the fact that customers are urged to ‘engage in an alternative transaction 
that produces less social value than would their first choice’.92    
The aforementioned problem is aggravated in the cases of ‘successive monopolies’. 
A successive monopoly occurs when firms operating in the successive stages of production 
and distribution both enjoy monopoly power.
93
 This social welfare loss is aggravated, 
where a firm operating in a subsequent stage of the production chain has the power to 
further limit output and charge its own profit-maximizing price. This is the case where the 
downstream firm is itself a monopolist: the latter will inevitably attempt to charge its own 
profit-maximising price by equating its own marginal cost (namely the price charged by 
the manufacturer)
94
 and marginal revenue. In addition to the problem of ‘deadweight loss’ 
however, this practice will entail losses for the upstream monopolist because of the further 
decreased demand for its products.
95
 One solution to the ‘double marginalisation’ problem 
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would be the internalisation of this externality
96
 through a vertical merger: by integrating 
with the downstream monopolist, the manufacturer achieves both desirable results: it limits 
the social cost of monopoly and enhances allocative efficiency, while, simultaneously, 
avoiding any undesired reduction in the demand for its products. 
 
2.3.1.2. Pro-Competitive Effects in Competitive Markets 
  
2.3.1.2.1. The Principal-Agent Problem and the Problem of Adverse Selection 
 One of the basic features of a perfectly competitive market is that all participants, 
namely both buyers and sellers, enjoy unlimited access to all sorts of information about the 
market.
97
 Nevertheless, even in markets which are close to the model of perfect 
competition, it is not always the case that the information available to the independent 
dealer is also available to its supplier. This informational asymmetry is termed in the 
jargon of microeconomics as the ‘principal-agent problem’.98 The principal-agent problem, 
being related to the notion of opportunism and the costs thereof, is inherent in virtually 
every vertical relationship and, more specifically, arises when the agent focuses on the 
attainment of goals other than those of the principal.
99
  
 The principal-agent problem is merely a form of moral hazard, the concept whereof 
refers to ‘the form of postcontractual opportunism that arises because actions that have 
efficiency consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may 
choose to pursue his or her private interests at others’ expense’,100 and may also emerge in 
the context of an agency relationship.
101
 Originally, the term moral hazard derives from the 
insurance industry and it refers to any changes in the insured individual’s behaviour that 
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would give him the right to larger claims from the insurance company.
102
 Essentially, 
moral hazard is caused because of one party’s difficulty to monitor the other’s compliance 
with its contractual obligations.   
 A second problem directly associated to the aforementioned information 
asymmetry is that of ‘adverse selection’.103 In the context of any given transaction, any of 
the parties can be better informed that the other. From the buyer’s perspective, the example 
of the insurance industry can demonstrate this asymmetry.
104
 In the case of medical 
insurance, the level of the premium does not usually correspond to the risk of each 
purchaser. Since it is not easy for the insurance company to distinguish between consumers 
who have a higher risk of getting sick and those with a lower risk, it cannot price-
discriminate against these two different classes of consumers, based on their respective 
needs. Thus, the insurance company is only left with the option of charging a uniform 
average premium to all applicants. However, in the long run, consumers with a lower risk 
of getting sick will eventually realise that the premium they pay is rather high in proportion 
to their likelihood of getting sick; as a result, they will cease purchasing insurance. 
Simultaneously, the high-risk consumers will regard the premium as a bargain and will 
keep buying at the same lower price. Accordingly, the insurance company will be left only 
with high-risk consumers and less profits. Similarly, in the context of an agency 
relationship the principal may not be in a position to confirm the agent’s ability and/or 
willingness to act in his own best interest, thus leaving space for opportunistic behaviour 
by the latter.
105
   
 Inversely, in certain cases the seller might be better informed about a product than 
the buyer, in which case the latter will be the one affected by adverse selection. In a 
seminal article published in 1970,
106
 economist George Akerlof used the example of the 
market for used cars (also known as ‘lemons’) to illustrate informational asymmetry from 
the buyer’s standpoint.107 By contrast to the car dealer, who has all the information 
available about the car’s condition, a potential buyer of a used car is not familiar with the 
car’s quality at the moment of purchase; he thus assumes that he has fifty percent 
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possibility to buy a good used car or a bad one, or, alternatively, that the car is of average 
quality. As a result, the buyer would prefer to pay the average price and hope that he will 
get a good used car, rather than pay a higher price and end up with a ‘lemon’. This 
tendency of the purchasers to overvalue the bad used cars will drive good cars out of the 
market and, once the consumers realise that, the overall price for used cars will be further 
lowered. 
 In the context of a distribution network, the problem of informational asymmetry 
can also lead to adverse selection by both parties to a distribution agreement, depending on 
which of them has direct access to essential information. The manufacturer, for example, 
cannot always predict the potential demand that a specific product could have in a new 
market. Unaware of the popularity of his product, the supplier will charge an average price 
for both high-demand and low-demand markets. Accordingly, dealers operating in a low-
demand market will eventually drop out of the distribution network, which will in turn 
accommodate exclusively high-demand areas.  
The problem of adverse selection could also be approached from the distributor’s 
perspective. Assume that two competitors operating on the upstream market are bidding 
for a distributor of their products in a certain geographical area. Assume further that one of 
the manufacturers produces a product of higher quality than the other, and yet it is 
impossible for the dealer to distinguish between the two – since the relevant information is 
only available to the suppliers – until he becomes part of one or the other distribution 
network. In such a case, the average price that the distributor will be willing to pay will be 
too high for the low-quality merchandise and too low for the high-quality merchandise. As 
in the case of ‘lemons’, the market will eventually be dominated by the bad products.108    
Instead, a firm integrated vertically in both stages of the distribution chain would 
have access to vital information which would allow it to organise its strategy more 
accurately. Through the centralisation of control, any such information will be 
disseminated to every stage of the production and distribution chain; at the same time, the 
previously conflicting interests will converge and adverse selection will be eliminated.     
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2.3.1.2.2. Post-Contractual Opportunism and the Hold-up Problem 
 It is often the case that, in the context of any relationship between firms operating 
at different stages of the distribution chain, either the upstream or the downstream firm 
might be required to make an investment which is specific to that particular contractual 
agreement. It is therefore likely that the firm which undertakes such an investment finds 
itself at a disadvantage, since the other party will have the ability to exploit its position by 
threatening to drop out of the agreement, unless a new arrangement, on more favourable 
terms, is concluded. The investing party’s dependence upon the proper completion of the 
initial contract gives rise to the ‘hold-up problem’.109 The hold-up problem is a 
consequence of the problems of contractual incompleteness and ex post opportunism, and 
vertical integration has been suggested as a means to reduce the costs of monitoring the 
likely post-contractual opportunistic behaviour of the parties. 
 Two terms from microeconomic theory are relevant here: rents and quasi-rents. A 
rent is the difference between the extra profits made by a firm and the minimum amount 
which would induce that firm to enter into a particular contractual agreement. By contrast, 
the concept of quasi-rents refers to a firm’s profits in excess of the minimum amount that 
would prevent the firm from dropping out of a contract.
110
 It is the existence of positive 
quasi-rents that renders the transactor vulnerable to opportunism.
111
 
 According to Bishop et al, an investment must meet three requirements in order to 
lead to a hold-up problem. The investment (i) should be used for the exclusive purposes of 
the relationship in question; (ii) it should represent a sunk cost; and (iii) the prevention of 
opportunistic behaviour should be ‘impossible or excessively expensive’. The hold-up 
problem is also more likely to emerge in the case of long-term investments, where 
recoupment requires more time, or where the investments undertaken by both parties are 
asymmetric, namely where the parties to the transaction are not equally dependent on each 
other.
112
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2.3.1.2.3. General Transaction Cost Savings 
 As Coase first pointed out, using the market is itself costly. A firm would, 
therefore, wish to internalise any transactions that would otherwise be concluded in the 
form of a contractual agreement, at a considerably higher cost, especially bearing in mind 
that all such agreements involve transaction costs, regardless of whether moral hazard 
occurs or not.
113
 Milgrom and Roberts distinguish between two different types of 
transaction costs, on the basis of whether they are associated with the coordination or the 
motivation of the various divisions of the organisational structure. More specifically, 
coordination costs include the costs of transmitting information through the different stages 
of the production or distribution chain, as well as any costs of maladaptation resulting from 
the availability of insufficient information. Motivation costs, on the other hand, may arise 
either from informational asymmetries or from imperfect commitment.
114
  
In light of these assumptions, vertical integration can, for example, minimise any 
costs related to the search for qualified contracting partners. In that case, any manufacturer 
who seeks to enter into a distribution agreement will not only incur the post-contractual 
costs for monitoring the dealer’s compliance with the terms of the agreement, but also any 
costs required for investigating the qualifications of its prospective dealers in the first 
place.
115
 In addition to ‘search costs’, any costs related to the drawing up of contracts, as 
well as to their enforcement through litigation could be saved through the centralisation of 
control in the form of a unified corporate entity. Finally, the free rider problem provides a 
typical example of motivation costs incurred by the manufacturer where its retailers have 
the incentive to provide a suboptimal amount of sales-specific services.
116
 It goes without 
saying that this minimisation of transaction costs could lead to pricing efficiencies to the 
consumer’s benefit, since it will reflect in ‘lower marginal costs and/or lower fixed 
costs’.117 
 
                                                          
113
 Ibid, p 72. 
114
 See P Milgrom and J Roberts, supra n 100, pp 29-30. 
115
 ACM Chen and KN Hylton, supra n 95, 586-587. 
116
 WK Viscusi, JE Harrington, Jr and JM Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (4th edn, The MIT 
Press 2005), p 238. 
117
 S Bishop, A Lofaro, F Rosati and J Young, supra n 112, p 72. 
81 
 
2.3.2. Anti-competitive Effects of Vertical Integration 
 Economic theory suggests that vertical mergers may also produce significant anti-
competitive effects, which are typically classified as either ‘non-coordinated’ or 
‘coordinated’. This assumption has also been endorsed by the European Commission and 
incorporated in its Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
118
 The following paragraphs will 
examine the relevant theories.  
 
2.3.2.1. Non-Coordinated Effects – The Foreclosure Theory 
The main objection to vertical mergers is related to the foreclosure of actual or 
potential competitors on either the upstream or the downstream market. More specifically, 
foreclosure occurs when the access of competitors to the market is restricted or eliminated 
as a result of a vertical merger.
119
 Three main anti-competitive effects of foreclosure have 
been identified: (i) leveraging of monopoly power from the input to the output market, or 
vice versa; (ii) raising barriers to new entry; and (iii) facilitation of co-ordination in 
oligopolistic markets.
120
 Nevertheless, in order for such foreclosure to raise competitive 
concerns, the main requirement is that, consequently, the price charged to consumers is 
increased. Absent an increase in the price of the output, the merger can be regarded as 
resulting in a mere ‘realignment of supply relationships’121 among the relevant markets.122 
It should be stressed at this point that this price increase can occur only where one of the 
merging firms enjoys substantial market power (it is ‘a monopolist or something close’, 
according to Hovenkamp).
123
 In any other case, the merged entity’s rival will merely have 
to enter into new contracts, restructuring the supply pattern in that particular industry. 
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 Foreclosure can be further distinguished in two more specific categories: input 
foreclosure and customer foreclosure. Input foreclosure refers to a situation whereby the 
upstream division of the merged entity restricts the access of downstream competitors to 
substantial inputs (products or services) that would be available to them absent the merger. 
Accordingly, a rival’s costs are likely to rise. On the other hand, customer foreclosure is 
related to the refusal of the downstream branch of the merged entity to purchase from an 
upstream competitor, in which case the latter will find itself in competitive disadvantage, 
due to a reduction in its revenues. 
 
2.3.2.1.1. Input foreclosure 
Input foreclosure can appear in two forms and it occurs where the upstream branch 
of the post-merger firm either (i) ceases supplying its downstream competitors altogether, 
or (ii) does so at a higher price. It can thus be either ‘complete’ or ‘partial’, respectively.124   
The main anti-competitive concern raised by input foreclosure is that, due to the 
restricted access of downstream rivals to products or services that used to be available prior 
to the merger, the rivals’ costs are likely to rise, since it will be ‘harder for them to obtain 
supplies of the input under similar prices and conditions as absent the merger’.125 The 
higher costs incurred by the downstream rivals shall force them to reduce their own output 
and, accordingly, to raise the prices charged in this market. In such a case, the merged firm 
may have the opportunity to exploit its market power in the downstream market either 
unilaterally or by forcing its downstream rivals – who are already in a competitive 
disadvantage due to their higher costs – to coordinate their conduct on that market 
(coordinated effects of vertical mergers).
126
 In addition, foreclosure may facilitate collusion 
through the reduction of the number of players in the relevant market.
127
 A third potential 
adverse effect of input foreclosure is that it can be used to prevent new entry, enabling the 
upstream division of the post-merger firm to maintain its market power.
128
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In order for a vertical merger to raise anti-competitive concerns, the upstream firm 
should enjoy market power in the relevant market.
129
 In the absence of market power, the 
downstream rivals who are excluded from the supply of a specific input post-merger will 
realign their strategy by searching for alternative sources of supply, namely by entering 
into contractual relationships with competitors of the merged entity in the upstream 
market. In such a case, rivals’ costs are not likely to rise, unless the competing suppliers 
‘do not have the ability or incentive to expand output at current prices and if alternative 
inputs are imperfect substitutes’.130 Another factor which should also be taken into account 
is the structure of the market for inputs: even in the absence of a monopolist in the 
upstream market, input prices might increase in cases where the market is conducive to 
collusive conduct. A close scrutiny of the market in question is therefore required. 
The merged entity can benefit from the foreclosure of its competitors in two ways. 
On the one hand, the additional sales to customers who were formerly being supplied by 
the now foreclosed rivals of the integrated firm will result in an increase in the firm’s retail 
profit margin, which will be proportionate to the increase in the demand for its products. 
However, this exclusion of rivals is in itself insufficient to support a claim of competitive 
harm. On the other hand, the reduced competition in the downstream market might allow 
the market participants profitably to raise their prices, in which case the merger will give 
rise to competitive harm.
131
 
 
2.3.2.1.2. Customer foreclosure 
Customer foreclosure occurs when, as a result of a merger, the downstream branch 
of a vertically integrated firm is no longer accessible for competing input suppliers, the 
customer base of which is thus restricted.
132
 Where the downstream division of the merged 
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entity is sufficiently large, the upstream rival may incur higher production costs and, due to 
its limited ability to compete, may eventually be forced to exit the market (especially 
where economies of scale and scope are important).
133
 By contrast to input foreclosure, the 
main benefit of customer foreclosure for the merged firm is the reduction of rivals’ 
revenues. Customer foreclosure can have a double negative effect on competition. First, 
the restriction of the number of players in the upstream market may give the excluding 
firm the opportunity to raise its prices above the competitive level, either unilaterally or 
through coordination with the remaining competitors. Second, prices in the market for 
outputs are also likely to rise accordingly. 
In order for the foreclosure strategy to give rise to anti-competitive concerns, the 
input suppliers affected by it should account for a substantial part of the upstream industry. 
If the revenue decreases resulting from the vertical mergers affect only a small fraction of 
the suppliers, and simultaneously the non-foreclosed players are capable of expanding their 
output, then the competitive pressure exercised by the latter may prevent the increase of 
prices in the upstream market.  
 
2.3.2.1.3. Brown Shoe and Chicago School Criticism of the Foreclosure Theory 
The treatment of vertical mergers under US antitrust law has gone through various 
fluctuations throughout the years. At first, vertical mergers were not even considered as 
falling within the scope of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the wording whereof implied that 
it was only applicable to mergers and acquisitions between direct competitors. As a result 
vertical integration was challenged in only a limited number of cases.
134
 It was not until 
1950 that the Clayton Act was amended in order to apply to vertical and conglomerate 
mergers as well. Subsequently, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Brown Shoe,135 which 
condemned the acquisition by a shoe manufacturer of a firm operating in the shoe retailing 
industry, gave rise to severe criticism particularly by Chicago School scholars. For the first 
time in Brown Shoe Section 7 was applied both to the horizontal and vertical aspects of a 
merger; nevertheless, it was the Court’s approach to the vertical effects of the acquisition 
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that attracted the attention of antitrust law scholars. The case concerned the merger 
between two already integrated firms, one of which was mostly active in the upstream 
market for the production of shoes, and the other in shoe retailing. The decision was met 
with severe scepticism as overly protectionist and received only limited support.
136
 
The Brown Shoe Company, Inc was an already vertically integrated corporation, 
being the fourth largest manufacturer and the third largest retailer of shoes in the United 
States. In 1956, Brown Shoe acquired another already vertically integrated firm, GR 
Kinney Company, Inc, the country’s twelfth largest shoe manufacturer with a market share 
of 0.5 percent, and, at the same time, seventh largest retailer, operating more than 350 
retail outlets. At the time of the merger, Kinney, notwithstanding its small market share – 
which did not exceed 1.2 percent of total retail sales by dollar volume (or 1.6 percent of 
total pairage) – was the largest ‘family-style’ shoe store chain in the United States. 
Kinney’s upstream branch supplied 20 percent of the shoes sold in Kinney’s outlets, and, 
before the merger, Kinney did not purchase any shoes from Brown. This changed post-
merger and, as a result, Brown eventually covered 7.9 percent of Kinney’s requirements, 
becoming the largest outside supplier of shoes to Kinney’s downstream operations.137    
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the merger infringed 
Section 7. As a matter of methodology, the Court relied on the examination of the 
legislative history of the Clayton Act and sought to investigate the objectives pursued 
through the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act by the Congress. Perhaps this was the 
reason why the Court practically disregarded any economic justifications and based its 
reasoning on facts related to the structure of the merging entities and – to a lesser extent – 
the structure of the affected markets.
138
 Therefore, Chief Justice Warren pointed out that 
the main concern of the Congress when deciding on the amendment of Section 7 was the 
danger to the American economy resulting from ‘the rising tide of economic 
concentration’, which would accordingly, threaten the maintenance of local control over 
industry and the protection of small businesses.
139
  
In arguing that the foreclosure of even a small percentage of the market could bring 
a vertical merger under the scope of Section 7, the Supreme Court reasoned that: 
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[t]he primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrangement tying a customer to a 
supplier is that, by foreclosing the competitors of either party from a segment of the 
market otherwise open to them, the arrangement may act as a ‘clog to competition’ 
... which deprive[s] ... rivals of a fair opportunity to compete.
140
 
The Court further stated that, in cases like the one under consideration, where the 
portion of the market foreclosed to competitors amounted to neither monopoly nor de 
minimis proportions, other relevant factors should be taken into account. These factors 
were of a historical or economic nature, and included the examination of the nature and 
purpose of the arrangement,
141
 as well as the possible existence of a trend toward 
concentration through vertical integration in the specific industry.
142
 In the case of Brown 
Shoe, the Court acknowledged that there was indeed a recent trend toward concentration, 
as large shoe manufacturers had been acquiring retail outlets; in view of this recent 
tendency, it was assumed that Brown’s objective was to force the sale of its shoes through 
Kinney’s stores.143 Arguably, the merger in question could not possibly have the result of 
creating a monopoly. The Court’s main concern was rather a tendency toward oligopoly in 
the industry through increased consolidation; according to its reasoning, the merger seems 
to have been condemned ‘on the ground that other businesses in the industry are also 
growing’.144 In other words, by focusing on the trend toward concentration as the most 
important factor for the appraisal of a vertical merger, the Court essentially accepted that 
the examination of market shares is relevant only within the context of a specific industry: 
even mergers which would result in only limited foreclosure would be prohibited if they 
were part of a widespread consolidation.   
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown Shoe, the Court of Appeals for 
the 6th Circuit in a subsequent case identified the six factors to be considered when the 
compatibility of a vertical merger with Section 7 is being assessed: 
(1) foreclosing of the competitors of either party from a segment of the market 
otherwise open to them; (2) the ‘nature and purpose’ of the vertical arrangement; 
(3) actual and reasonable likely adverse effects upon local industries and small 
businesses; (4) the level and trend of concentration in the market shares of 
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participating companies, including any trend towards domination by a few leaders; 
(5) the existence of a trend towards vertical integration and consolidation in 
previously independent industries; and (6) the ease with which potential entrants 
may readily overcome barriers to full entry and compete effectively with existing 
companies.
145
  
The Court’s decision was based on the foreclosure theory, and this approach was 
incorporated into the 1968 Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice.
146
 In addition, 
the decision introduced the ‘incipiency doctrine’ in the field of vertical mergers: even 
though the risk of foreclosure after a merger is low, the court may block the concentration 
if it maintains that evidence shows that a market-wide trend towards vertical integration 
might eventually result in high levels of concentration in the industry in question.
147
 
Nevertheless, prominent commentators objected to this, arguing that vertical integration is 
merely a means employed by firms to increase efficiency. A monopolist, they stressed, 
cannot exploit a vertical merger in order to leverage its market power into a separate level 
of the distribution chain. A vertically integrated firm which monopolises more than one 
levels shall have only a single monopoly profit, since it will be unable to charge a separate 
profit-maximizing for every single level separately. A rational hypothetical manufacturer 
who holds a monopoly in the upstream market shall not allow its downstream subsidiary to 
restrict output further, since then the resulting price will be higher than its own profit-
maximising level.
148
 It has thus been argued that a monopolist lacks the incentive to 
acquire an additional vertically related monopoly. 
Bork is rather explicit: ‘foreclosure theory is not merely wrong, it is irrelevant … 
Foreclosure theory is like a conjuring stick: it causes you to look at the wrong level of the 
industry’.149 He argues that the problem with a firm’s foreclosure strategy does not lie in 
the exclusion of its rivals at a vertically related level, but rather in the establishment of the 
monopoly; once the monopoly is established, the vertically integrated firm has no reason to 
foreclose any competitors. In a hypothetical example whereby a manufacturer acquires all 
firms operating at the retailing level, potential anti-competitive effects will be caused not 
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by the series of vertical mergers itself, but rather by the horizontal concentration of 
retailers under a common ownership.
150
  
It has also been argued that the acquisition by an upstream monopolist of all its 
distributors is not always profitable. The barriers to new entry resulting from the former’s 
foreclosure strategy will not prevent new firms from entering the upstream market, but will 
merely delay their entry. Provided that the only purpose of the excluding firm is to 
eliminate competition, this delay is likely to be costly for it, since not only will it 
eventually incur higher distribution costs, but also it is unlikely that it will benefit from any 
net economies of integration: if such economies existed the firm would have integrated 
already.
151
 That is to say, a monopolist’s decision to integrate only with the purpose of 
restricting competition at a vertically related level would simply be unreasonable. 
 
2.3.2.2. Coordinated Effects 
 In addition to the foreclosure theory, vertical mergers may also give rise to 
coordinated effects by facilitating competitors in coordinating their conduct without having 
to enter into an agreement. In other words, a vertical merger may encourage tacit 
coordination in markets susceptible to collusive outcomes. Kokkoris and Shelanski regard 
coordinated effects as the necessary result of market foreclosure, as they are more likely to 
emerge where the vertical merger has brought about a high degree of concentration, which 
could sustain a collectively dominant position held by the remaining firms.
152
 
 Nocke and White identify two counteracting effects of vertical mergers which may 
influence the likelihood of coordination in the upstream market. The ‘outlets effect’ of 
vertical integration arises because the downstream division of an integrated firm will 
always prefer to purchase its input from the upstream branch at marginal cost, rather than 
from any other supplier that deviates from existing collusion and sells at a price which 
guarantees positive profits. Consequently, the reduced profitability of deviation is in turn 
expected to deter cheating. The ‘punishment effect’, on the other hand, ensures that a 
vertically integrated firm will have an increased incentive to deviate from the collusive 
agreement. The reason is that the merged entity’s profits in the noncooperative equilibrium 
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at both stages are greater than the respective profits of a non-integrated upstream 
competitor. In the event of cheating, therefore, the integrated entity can be expected to 
suffer less from retaliation than the independent firm.
153
 It follows that the merged entity’s 
decision to coordinate or deviate will be taken on the basis of a balancing between the 
outlets and punishment effects.       
Furthermore, it has been argued that vertical mergers may soften price competition 
by facilitating the exchange of sensitive commercial information between competing 
suppliers.
154
 The downstream division of a vertically integrated firm is in a position to 
disclose to the upstream division accurate information on the prices offered by independent 
suppliers.
155
 Coordination may also be facilitated where the merger consists in the 
acquisition of a ‘maverick’, namely a firm which has the incentive to compete aggressively 
in defiance of the coordinated outcome.  
 
 
2.4. The Antitrust Response to Vertical Integration by Ownership: EU Merger 
Control 
 
The statutory framework for the competitive assessment of mergers under EU 
competition law is provided by Regulation 139/2004.
156
 The European Union Merger 
Regulation (hereinafter ‘EUMR’) is supplemented by the Implementing Regulation 
802/2004,
157
 as well as by various Commission Notices which provide clarifications and 
guidance with regard to the application of the EUMR.
158
 The EUMR is applicable to any 
concentrations with a ‘Community dimension’,159 namely to concentrations that give rise 
to structural changes the impact of which goes beyond the national borders of any one 
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Member State.
160
 The Community dimension of a specific concentration is decided on the 
basis of the turnover of the merging parties.
161
  
The European Commission is the institution entrusted with the enforcement of the 
EUMR. The Regulation stipulates that any concentration that falls within its scope be 
notified to the Commission prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the 
agreement, the announcement of the bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
162
 In 
case the parties fail, either intentionally or negligently, to comply with the requirement for 
prior notification, Article 14(2)(a) confer to the Commission the power to impose fines not 
exceeding 10 percent of their aggregate turnover.  
A merger can have horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate effects, and in all these 
cases the legality test applied by the Commission is set out in Article 2(3) of the EUMR: 
‘[a] concentration which would significantly impede effective competition in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market’.163 It is 
only vertical mergers, namely mergers between undertakings that operate at successive 
stages of the same production or distribution chain, that fall within the scope of this thesis. 
It should be noted however that it is extremely rare that a specific case will give rise 
exclusively to vertical concerns; on the contrary, vertical effects usually result from 
concentrations involving actual or potential competitors, in addition to the horizontal 
effects of such mergers. Finally, conglomerate mergers are unlikely to have any 
detrimental effects on competition, as they involve undertakings that are in a relationship 
which is neither horizontal nor vertical, and for this reason are rarely scrutinised by the 
Commission. It is only where the merging parties are active in closely related markets that 
the merger might raise anti-competitive concerns.
164
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The Commission acknowledges that vertical (as well as conglomerate) mergers are 
essentially less likely to impede effective competition; non-horizontal mergers do not 
result in the restriction of direct competition between firms operating in the same relevant 
market, whereas, on the other hand, they also provide a wider scope for efficiencies in 
comparison to horizontal mergers, for example lower prices, increased output and lower 
transaction costs.
165
 An impediment to effective competition could, nevertheless, arise 
from a vertical merger that results in non-coordinated (in the form of foreclosure) or 
coordinated effects (where the nature of competition is transformed as a result of the 
merger in such a way that it is easier for the undertakings to coordinate their conduct with 
the purpose of harming competition).
166
 
According to the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it is only where the merged 
entity enjoys a significant degree of power in at least one of the markets that a non-
horizontal merger can in fact impede effective competition. In assessing the merged 
entity’s market power, the Commission relies on two factors: (i) market shares, and (ii) 
concentration levels, whether the concerns raised are of non-coordinated or coordinated 
nature. More specifically, the Commission is not likely to treat the merger as harmful 
where, in each of the affected markets, the market share of the merged entity is below 30 
percent and the post-merger HHI
167
 is below 2,000.
168
 
However, even in cases where the market shares or the concentration levels are 
below these thresholds, the Commission might initiate an extensive investigation, provided 
that certain special circumstances are present: (i) the merger involves a company that is 
likely to expand significantly in the near future; (ii) there are significant cross-
shareholdings or cross-directorships among the market participants; (iii) one of the 
merging parties is a so-called ‘maverick’ firm, namely an undertaking with a high 
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likelihood of disrupting coordinated conduct; or (iv) there are indications of past or 
ongoing coordination or facilitating practices.
169
 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion: Is There Room for a ‘Unified’ Framework for RPM and Vertical 
Mergers? 
 
 The foregoing analysis examined the pro- and anti-competitive effects of RPM and 
vertical integration as two alternative forms of vertical control, and presented the various 
economic justifications for the adoption of each. It was seen that both RPM implemented 
in the context of market transactions and hierarchical organisation may produce 
comparable efficiencies, by enhancing the manufacturer’s control over distribution where 
they are designed as solutions to the problem of post-contractual opportunism or with the 
purpose to remedy any emerging externalities, such as free riding. It can thus be concluded 
that, from an organisational perspective, RPM may be employed as a strategic alternative – 
albeit imperfect – to complete vertical integration, where the latter is not economically 
feasible and the market mechanism appears to constitute a less costly vehicle for product 
distribution. 
 That said, there are admittedly two main obstacles to the adoption of a truly 
‘unified’ framework for the analysis of vertical mergers and RPM. First, from an economic 
perspective, vertical mergers and RPM, although having similar pro-competitive 
justifications, representing alternative forms of vertical control, nonetheless give rise to 
different theories of harm – or, to be more precise, the same theories of harm do not apply 
with equal force to both cases. The Commission, in its Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
recognises that vertical mergers may bring about non-coordinated and coordinated anti-
competitive effects. However, a review of merger decisions involving parties operating at 
successive stages of the production or distribution chain shows that the Commission has 
never so far expressed any concerns with regard to a potential collusive behaviour or tacit 
coordination between the players in a market that would be more concentrated as a result 
of a merger. This is evident in a series of vertical mergers which raised serious competition 
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concerns, but were eventually cleared subject to conditions,
170
 as well as in 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol,
171
 so far the only vertical merger blocked by the Commission. 
 The fact that evidence of possible coordinated effects has not yet been relied upon 
by the Commission for the competitive appraisal of vertical mergers is not particularly 
surprising in light of the limited theoretical support for this argument. Contrary to the 
foreclosure theory, economic literature has not dealt extensively with the coordinated 
effects of vertical integration. Against this background, in a relatively recent study, 
Schwalbe and Zimmer downplay the contribution of vertical mergers to the creation or 
stabilisation of inter-firm coordination, and suggest that ‘[f]rom an economic point of 
view, it would seem advisable not to base the assessment of a vertical merger on possible 
coordinated effects, since they are extremely difficult to predict’.172 
 The foreclosure theory is also applicable to RPM. Vertical price fixing is likely to 
result in the foreclosure of smaller firms active in the downstream market when applied at 
the behest of a dominant retailer or a group of retailers who collectively possess substantial 
monopsony power with a purpose to exclude smaller price-cutting rivals. However, retailer 
foreclosure raises problems of inference, as it is equally consistent both with pro- and anti-
competitive theories.
173
 At the same time, the recent years have witnessed the evolution of 
a significant body of literature confirming the foreclosure effects of price floors in the 
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upstream market, when employed by an incumbent manufacturer.
174
 However, the 
horizontal collusion theory remains the most prominent objection to RPM, and was the 
reason for the adoption of the rule of per se illegality in Dr Miles. The ability of RPM to 
facilitate cartelisation in the upstream and downstream market and to soften price 
competition in general will be examined in more detail in the following chapter. Suffice it 
to say at this stage, however, that the horizontal collusion story is a particularly compelling 
theory of harm, which advocates a more cautious approach to RPM in general.  
 The second obstacle to a truly unified framework is of procedural nature. While the 
competitive appraisal of mergers in the EU is based on a system of ex ante control, 
following the enactment of Regulation 1/2003, the substantive assessment of agreements 
between undertakings – including, of course, RPM – is carried out exclusively ex post, 
taking the form of a retributive approach. There are, however, very good reasons 
advocating against change in the current regime. The Modernisation Regulation put an end 
to a system which provided for the possibility both of ex ante and of ex post scrutiny of 
inter-firm cooperation: according to Article 4(1) of Regulation 17/62, then in force, the 
parties to agreements falling within the scope of Article 101(1) were required to notify 
them to the Commission in order to benefit from an individual exemption under Article 
101(3). 
 The preceding regime, however, was based on the illusion that members to a 
demonstrably anti-competitive agreement would have any incentive to notify it to the 
Commission. Plainly put, the prior notification system under Regulation 17/62 turned out 
to be a burden both for the Commission and for undertakings. In the first year of its 
application, more than 34,500 agreements
175
 seeking negative clearance or exemption 
under Articles 2 and 4(1) of the said Regulation were notified,
176
 and, unsurprisingly, most 
of them did not raise any particular concerns.
177
 Consequently, Recital 3 of Regulation 
1/2003 announces that the purpose of modernisation was essentially to replace a system 
which ‘[prevented] the Commission from concentrating its resources on curbing the most 
serious infringements’.  
In addition to the futility of such a system of ex ante enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU from a point of view of administrative efficiency, there are also substantial 
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differences in the costs incurred by undertakings for the purposes of reversing a transaction 
that warrants antitrust intervention which also justify the different policies. By assumption, 
the transaction costs involved in the reversal of a concentration are disproportionately large 
compared to those incurred by undertakings switching from an anti-competitive agreement 
to a less restrictive alternative. It follows that, also from the parties’ perspective, ex ante 
control is imperative in the case of a merger, but essentially meaningless in the case of 
restrictive agreements. 
Regardless of the difficulties in shaping a genuinely ‘unified’ analytical framework 
for the competitive appraisal of RPM and vertical mergers, however, it is submitted here 
that there is still the need for a more consistent antitrust response to the different methods 
of distribution. On the basis of Ronald Coase’s pioneering scholarship, developed further 
by subsequent studies on new institutional economics, it has been demonstrated that the 
boundaries of a firm are determined in light of potential transaction cost savings. However, 
these boundaries are not as sharp as Coase appears to suggest: new institutional economics 
suggest that markets and hierarchies are the polar extremes of an organisational continuum, 
in the middle of which are hybrid forms of organisation, frequently referred to as 
‘networks’. Networks are organisational mechanisms governing inter-firm transactions, in 
the context of which long-term coordination is facilitated through relational norms implicit 
in the interactions between the parties.   
On the basis of these assumptions, from an economic perspective, contract and 
ownership may be regarded as two alternative forms of vertical integration, as the 
requirements of stability and flexibility in contemporary commercial practice obscure the 
boundaries of the firm. Building on the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that 
manufacturer-imposed RPM, along with other forms of vertical restraints, may be 
implemented with the purpose of ensuring the sustainability of a long-term relational 
contract by enhancing control over distribution. More specifically, price floors may 
enhance the self-enforcing range of contractual relations. Thus, in light of the principle of 
organisational neutrality, a relative consistency in the treatment of RPM and vertical 
mergers under EU competition law is warranted. 
Unlike the neoclassical economic theory, which views the firm as a production 
function, its purpose under new institutional economics is that of a governance structure. In 
this sense, the firm is only one of a number of alternative ways of organising relationships 
among economic units which are aimed at taking advantage of the division of labour, 
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economising on bounded rationality and providing safeguards against contractual 
hazards.
178
  It follows that the concept of organisational neutrality is associated with new 
institutional economics, which regards vertical integration as merely a ‘paradigm’: an 
organisational framework applicable with equal force to situations where a firm owns or 
contracts with a successive stage of the distribution chain.
179
    
In view of the adverse effects of the practice, however, the steps taken to this 
direction must be cautious, and not go beyond the availability of a burden-shifting 
analytical framework. Accordingly, it will be argued that the optimal means for the 
attainment of this consistency will be a careful reform of the current regime, to the extent 
that it affords parties to a prima facie anti-competitive RPM agreement the opportunity to 
rebut the presumption of illegality associated with their classification as ‘by-object’ 
restrictions under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
                                                          
178
 C Ménard, ‘A New Institutional Approach to Organization’ in C Ménard and M Shirley (eds), Handbook 
of New Institutional Economics (Springer 2005), p 282. 
179
 OE Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics’ in C Ménard and M Shirley (eds), Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics (Springer 2005), pp 52-54. 
97 
 
Chapter 3 
Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Collusion: Price Rigidity in the 
Offline and Online Context 
 
 
3.1. RPM as a Collusion Facilitating Mechanism 
 The links between the public policy towards RPM and the English common law 
tradition were outlined in a previous chapter.
1
 It was seen that the rationale behind the US 
Supreme Court’s hostility towards the maintenance of minimum retail price levels, as 
demonstrated by the per se treatment established in Dr Miles
2
 was partly – yet 
disproportionately so – premised on the ancient doctrine against restraints on alienation. 
The following analysis will concentrate on economic considerations behind the Dr Miles 
dictum, and in particular in the contribution of RPM to the facilitation of horizontal 
collusion in both the upstream and the downstream market. 
 The horizontal collusion objection to vertical price fixing has been traditionally the 
most oft-cited theory of harm associated with price floors. Although, as was seen in the 
previous chapter, the theory is generally applicable both to the upstream and the 
downstream market, in Dr Miles the Supreme Court found that the RPM scheme at issue 
was designed to reinforce a dealer cartel. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that 
the only parties that could possibly benefit from the maintained retail prices were the 
dealers themselves. The reason put forward by the manufacturer for the implementation of 
this policy was to prevent department stores from marketing its products as ‘loss leaders’: 
announcements of sales at cut prices adversely affected the reputation of the medicines and 
discouraged retail druggists to stock them. In essence, therefore, Dr Miles argued that the 
price floors were intended to increase the density of its distribution network by inducing 
otherwise unwilling druggists to carry its products.
3
 However, Mr Justice Hughes was not 
convinced that a manufacturer would be interested in affording enlarged profits to retailers. 
Unable to understand how Dr Miles could possibly benefit from this policy, Hughes 
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concluded that any advantage from the maintained prices was primarily enjoyed by the 
druggists.
4
 And, in light of this assumption, he argued:      
If there be an advantage to the manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed retail 
prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is entitled to secure by 
agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what 
they sell. As to this, the complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical 
contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and 
endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, 
by agreement with each other. If the immediate advantage they would thus obtain 
would not be sufficient to sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior 
benefit to the complainant cannot be regarded as sufficient to support its system. 
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the 
destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public 
interest and void. They are not saved by the advantages which the participants 
expect to derive from the enhanced price to the consumer.
5
   
It is true that very frequently RPM is not entirely consistent with the 
manufacturer’s commercial interests, but is instead implemented at the behest of its 
distributors, who are occasionally likely to be adversely affected by aggressive competition 
in the downstream market.
6
 Traditionally, small-scale retailers have been among the most 
prominent adversaries of the prohibition against vertical price fixing. As was seen in 
Chapter 1, for example, the Fair Trade Acts were promulgated as a result of the lobbying 
activities of small independent retailers who saw their mark-ups being squeezed by the 
competitive pressure exercised by cost-effective retail chains and discount houses. 
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the American drug industry was heavily cartelised at 
the retail level, and the operation of the cartel was dependent upon an extensive network of 
RPM schemes designed to enforce the respective agreements. Against this background, 
Hovenkamp observes that ‘[t]he druggists’ cartel … accounts for a great deal of our current 
law of resale price maintenance’.7 In addition to its function as a monitoring mechanism, 
the cartelists’ reliance on RPM could also be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent the 
legal implications of entering into a horizontal collusive agreement, which would certainly 
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fall within the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as a conspiracy in restraint of trade. 
Having been consistently upheld as lawful and enforceable at common law,
8
 it is 
conceivable that a vertical price fixing scheme could be instigated by colluding dealers in 
an attempt indirectly to ensure the enforceability of what essentially was a naked 
horizontal price fixing agreement.
9
 
 
3.1.1. RPM and the Rule of Per Se Illegality 
An interesting aspect of Dr Miles is that, ostensibly, the decision had more far-
reaching legal implications than the Court envisaged or even intended. Hovenkamp 
observes that:  
[i]n Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court never distinguished between unenforceability 
and affirmative illegality of RPM agreements ... [A]lthough Dr. Miles could be read 
for the proposition that RPM agreements are not enforceable among the parties, it 
was in fact read for the much broader proposition that such agreements are 
affirmatively illegal under the Sherman Act.
10
 
In this sense, the Dr Miles dictum should be read and understood in conjunction 
with the Supreme Court’s later judgment in United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.11 
Although a horizontal case, Socony-Vacuum is a classic opinion and the first case in which 
the concept of ‘per se illegality’ was articulated. In the words of Mr Justice Douglas, 
‘[u]nder the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of 
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity ... is illegal per 
se’.12 
The per se rule is in its very essence an empirical rule. It has been developed 
inductively and applies to a limited category of restrictions of competition, which 
experience has shown to be so likely to produce adverse welfare consequences that a 
thorough competitive appraisal of their effects under the rule of reason would be redundant 
and, in fact, a waste of resources.
13
 Put differently, it is not inconsistent with, but instead 
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derives from judicial practice and experience with the application of the rule of reason.
14
 
The rationale behind the rule of per se illegality has been encapsulated in the famous 
opinion in Northern Pacific Railway: 
there are certain agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious effect 
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable, and therefore illegal, without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per 
se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by 
the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also 
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic 
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related 
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been 
unreasonable – an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.15  
The main benefits of the per se rule lie in the increased deterrent effect emerging 
from its application, and the reduction in the administrative costs incurred for the 
adjudication of cases which, on the basis of experience, are generally not expected to be 
socially beneficial and are thus unlikely to give rise to Type I errors. Put differently, 
antitrust enforcement favours the application of the rule of per se illegality where the anti-
competitive potential of a given restraint plus the administrative costs associated with the 
determination of the market context in which these effects are likely to arise ‘far outweigh’ 
any resulting benefits.
16
   
According to Mr Justice Stevens, per se rules are essentially tantamount to statutory 
presumptions. In his opinion in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, Stevens argued that ‘[t]he 
per se rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but 
the rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory commands’.17 
Put differently, the per se prohibition is not merely intended to facilitate administrative 
efficiency and convenience; it also reflects ‘a long-standing judgment that the prohibited 
practices by their nature have “a substantial potential for impact on competition”’.18 
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Since the notion of per se illegality represents the administration’s experience with 
the – almost invariably – anti-competitive effects of certain types of cooperation between 
competitors, it constitutes a ‘conclusive presumption of unreasonableness based on the 
character of the restraint’.19 The conclusive character of the presumption is based on the 
idea that any thorough investigation into the legal and economic context in which the 
agreement operates is redundant, since ‘no one has made a plausible argument that the 
action is competitive, and its anticompetitive potential seems fairly obvious’.20 
It follows that the per se illegality of vertical price fixing – never explicitly 
established in Dr Miles, but interpreted as such by subsequent case law – should be 
understood in light of its effects on horizontal price competition between distributors. This 
assumption is important to the extent that it also contributes, at least in part, to our 
understanding of the ban on RPM in the European legal order. In Chapter 1 above, it was 
argued that the American precedent, along with integrationist considerations, shaped the 
prohibition against RPM under Article 101 TFEU. The European Commission and Courts 
have not developed significant experience with the practice, as the substantive assessment 
of any RPM cases brought before them has been – at best – superficial.21 This fact is, of 
course, not sufficient in itself to prevent the development of analytical presumptions in the 
context of Article 101: the lack of domestic empirical evidence may be remedied by means 
of reliance on experience acquired through judicial practice in more mature foreign 
jurisdictions.
22
 This is evident in the language of the 2000 Vertical Guidelines, the first 
type of soft law instrument designed to clarify the European Commission’s enforcement 
priorities and specify the practical application of the EU competition rules with regard to 
vertical restraints.
23
 The 2000 Guidelines, in addition to not addressing the issue of pro-
competitive RPM, also focus exclusively on the horizontal effects of the practice 
disregarding any other theories of harm: 
There are two main negative effects of RPM on competition: (1) a reduction in 
intra-brand price competition, and (2) increased transparency on prices. In the case 
of fixed or minimum RPM, distributors can no longer compete on price for that 
brand, leading to a total elimination of intra-brand price competition. ... Increased 
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transparency on price and responsibility for price changes makes horizontal 
collusion between manufacturers or distributors easier, at least in concentrated 
markets. The reduction in intra-brand competition may, as it leads to less 
downward pressure on the price for the particular goods, have as an indirect effect a 
reduction of inter-brand competition.
24
 
Additionally, the Guidelines on the effect on trade concept reflect the idea that 
considerations related both to horizontal collusion and single market fragmentation are 
merged in the public policy towards vertical price fixing:  
Agreements involving RPM may also affect patterns of trade in much the same way 
as horizontal cartels. To the extent that the price resulting from RPM is higher than 
that prevailing in other Member States this price level is only sustainable if import 
from other Member States can be controlled.
25
 
Naturally, EU competition law does not provide for an equivalent of the rule of per se 
illegality, which in essence means that the European legal order does not recognise the 
concept of conclusive presumptions.
26
 Indeed, as the General Court confirmed in Matra-
Hachette, ‘in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent 
of its effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid 
down in Article [101](3) of the Treaty are satisfied’.27 Article 101(3) is therefore to be 
understood as providing a second line of defence for parties to an agreement which has 
been found to have as its object or effect the restriction of competition. Even in the context 
of the bifurcated Article 101 TFEU, however, the presumption against RPM is so strong, 
both in theory and in practice, and the potential for it to be rebutted so limited (in fact non-
existent), that the relevant prohibition is to be understood as amounting mutatis mutandis 
to a rule of ‘per se’ prohibition.28 
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3.1.2. Collusion in the Downstream Market – The Relevance of the Source of the Restraint   
Any objections associated with downstream cartels are applicable to RPM imposed 
at the behest of one or more dealers enjoying substantial monopsony power, irrespective of 
whether they are acting jointly or independently.
29
 Professor Comanor asserts that the 
economic consequences of vertical restraints – and, accordingly, their implications for 
antirust policy – are largely contingent upon the source of the restraint.30 Where the 
vertical restraint is implemented by the manufacturer in an attempt to induce its 
distributors to provide product-specific promotional services or to address possible free 
riding concerns (what Comanor refers to as the ‘positive economics’ of vertical restraints), 
it is likely to result in an expansion of output. Nevertheless, contrary to the Chicagoan 
assumption that output increases invariably promote consumer benefit, Comanor takes the 
position that manufacturer-imposed vertical restraints ‘do not lead automatically to 
conclusions regarding economic efficiency’ but should instead by assessed having regard 
to the context in which they are applied.
31
  
Where, on the other hand, the restraint is imposed at the behest of powerful dealers 
with significant bargaining power (the ‘second economics’ of vertical restraints), the 
resulting profit margins will be higher than would normally be required to remedy any free 
rider problems. The effect of the restraint would thus be similar to that of a horizontal 
collusive agreement, and would emerge irrespective of the existence of a cartel in the 
downstream market.
32
  
Comanor further critiques the proponents of the Chicago School on the basis of 
their tendency to perceive the retail market as invariably perfectly competitive. In his view, 
a retailer with the ability considerably to influence consumers’ purchasing decisions, may 
also have a significant impact on the pattern of consumer demand for the product in 
question. Under these circumstances, and even in the absence of collusion, the retailer will 
be in a position to exploit its leverage for rent-seeking purposes.
33
 Based on this analysis, 
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Comanor asserts that ‘[t]he second economics of vertical restraints provides a more valid 
account’ than the Chicagoan assumption, which is less consistent with real market 
conditions.
34
 
Comanor’s insight has also been endorsed by the US Supreme Court: in Leegin, Mr 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, placed emphasis on the ability of retailer-
induced RPM to produce inefficient outcomes, and stressed the relevance of the source of 
the restraint to its substantive assessment under the rule of reason standard.
35
 A number of 
notable cases brought before American courts may indeed have been consistent with 
theories of harm associated with dealer coercion. In Klor’s,36 for example, a retailer of 
radios, television sets and other household appliances, brought a lawsuit for treble damages 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act alleging a group boycott instigated by a considerably 
larger competing retailer. According to the applicant, its rival exploited its ‘monopolistic’ 
buyer power by coercing major manufacturers and wholesalers either to refrain from 
supplying Klor’s or to do so at discriminatory prices and highly unfavourable terms.37 
Although the case did not involve a vertical price fixing scheme, it is nonetheless 
indicative of a downstream dominant firm’s ability to exploit its leverage to the detriment 
of a smaller discounting rival.
38
  
In Business Electronics,
39
 the termination of a downstream discounter was the 
result of an ultimatum delivered by Hartwell, a competing Houston-based full-price 
retailer.
40
 The Supreme Court relied on the absence of an agreement on prices or price 
levels that would constitute an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade in order to quash 
the application of the per se rule by the district court. However, Mr Justice Stevens, writing 
for the dissent, argued that the degree of market power held by Hartwell allowed it to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
bargaining power of retailers, see also RL Steiner, ‘The Nature of Vertical Restraints’ [1985] 30 Antitrust 
Bull 143, 157-158 (‘If consumers are more disposed to switch brands within store than stores within brand, 
retailers dominate manufacturers. … As a concomitant, the upstream bargaining leverage that retailers can 
exert against manufacturers is negatively related to the brand’s popularity’). 
34
 Ibid, 1283. 
35
 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 897-898 (2007):  
The source of the restraint may also be an important consideration. If there is evidence retailers were 
the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a 
retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer. If, by contrast, a manufacturer adopted the 
policy independent of retailer pressure, the restraint is less likely to promote anticompetitive 
conduct. (citations omitted) 
36
 Klor’s, Inc v Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc, et al, 359 US 207 (1959). 
37
 Ibid, 209. 
38
 Hovenkamp, however, considers the termination at issues as a legitimate response to credible free rider 
concerns raised by Klor’s price-cutting activities, particularly in view of the fact that the provision of sales-
specific services is frequently warranted in the affected product market; H Hovenkamp, supra n 29, p 241. 
39
 Business Electronics Corp v Sharp Electronics Corp, 485 US 717 (1988). 
40
 Ibid, 721. 
105 
 
exercise coercion of a magnitude equivalent to that effected by an ultimatum by a greater 
number of dealers acting in concert.
41
 In his opinion, ‘[i]f two critical facts are present – a 
naked purpose to eliminate price competition as such and coercion of the manufacturer – 
the conflict with antitrust policy is manifest’.42 
Similarly, in the earlier Burlington case,
43
 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit dealt with the termination by Esprit of a no-frills clothing retailer, allegedly at the 
behest of a much larger high-end rival, Federated Department Stores. The termination 
occurred one month after a public announcement by Federated expressing its decision to 
stop dealing with manufacturers who would insist on selling current-season apparel to free 
riders. Esprit, on the other hand, argued that the maintenance of retail prices did not form 
part of its marketing strategy and that, in reality, it had retained discount retailers whose 
layouts met the specified standards, while having ceased to supply full-price outlets that 
failed to comply with these standards. The court, relying on Monsanto,
44
 found that the 
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the existence of an agreement between Federated and 
Esprit, and held that direct complaints were insufficient to substantiate a conspiracy for the 
purpose of the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
45
 
In a subsequent case brought by the Federal Trade Commission, Toys ‘R’ Us 
(‘TRU’), by far the largest toy retailer in the United States also enjoying substantial 
monopsony power, was alleged to have exerted pressure on toy manufacturers in an 
attempt to force them to cease supplying discounting ‘warehouse clubs’.46 In response to 
the latter’s success, TRU met individually with each of its suppliers and outlined a new 
policy of vertical agreements designed to eliminate the competitive threat posed by the 
warehouse clubs. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the Federal Trade 
Commission’s finding of a horizontal conspiracy among the toy manufacturers organised 
by TRU, which was found to be running ‘against their independent economic self-
interest’.47 This policy ultimately brought about a decline in the warehouse clubs’ share of 
toy sales in the United States.
48
 Judge Wood rejected the argument that the case at hand 
involved a series of separate vertical agreements:  
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That is a horizontal agreement. … [I]t has nothing to do with enhancing efficiencies 
of distribution from the manufacturer's point of view. The typical story of a 
legitimate vertical transaction would have the manufacturer going to TRU and 
asking it to be the exclusive carrier of the manufacturer's goods; in exchange for 
that exclusivity, the manufacturer would hope to receive more effective promotion 
of its goods, and TRU would have a large enough profit margin to do the job well. 
But not all manufacturers think that exclusive dealing arrangements will maximize 
their profits. Some think, and are entitled to think, that using the greatest number of 
retailers possible is a better strategy. These manufacturers were in effect being 
asked by TRU to reduce their output (especially of the popular toys), and as is 
classically true in such cartels, they were willing to do so only if TRU could protect 
them against cheaters.
49
 
The Court further dismissed the applicant’s assertion that its policy was justifiable in light 
of free riding concerns raised by the commercial activities of warehouse clubs: there was 
nothing to support the allegation that toy manufacturers were in any way interested in 
appointing full-service retailers for their distribution network. On the contrary, Judge 
Wood found that ‘[t]he manufacturers wanted a business strategy under which they 
distributed their toys to as many different kinds of outlets as would accept them … this was 
the distribution strategy that each one believed would maximize its individual output and 
profits’.50  
Finally, in a case decided in the aftermath of Leegin, a lower court in the US found 
that a powerful brick-and-mortar retailer of baby products had coerced various 
manufacturers into imposing minimum resale prices for their products, in an attempt to 
ensure immunity from Internet discounting.
51
 At the same time, the higher prices did not 
appear to be justified by an increase in sales-specific promotional efforts, as any relevant 
services would have been provided by the dominant retailer even in the absence of RPM.
52
 
Under these circumstances, the RPM scheme was likely to bring about a decline in output 
levels and a loss in consumer welfare.
53
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3.1.2.1. The Effects of RPM as Collusion-Facilitating Mechanism in the Downstream 
Market – Empirical Evidence  
An interesting analysis of the adverse effects of a possible industry-wide use of 
price floors, particularly if implemented in markets characterised by ‘interlocking 
relationships’, is provided by Biscourp et al on the basis of empirical evidence from the 
impact of the Galland Act (Loi Galland) on retail prices in France.
54
 Wholesale contracts 
negotiated between manufacturers and retailers typically provide for two categories of 
rebates: unconditional rebates granted upon delivery; and unconditional rebates which are 
contingent upon the quantity of contract goods ordered by the retailers and, consequently, 
do not appear on the relevant invoices issued at the time of delivery.
55
 Aimed at protecting 
small retailers’ mark-ups from the downward pressure on prices exerted by large-scale 
outlets, the Galland Act, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, proscribed the resale 
at a price below that quoted in the invoice produced at the time of delivery. In other words, 
as a result of being prevented from passing on to consumers any conditional rebates 
granted by the manufacturer, the retailers were afforded a greater profit margin. Pursuant 
to the Galland Act, the invoice price was effectively treated as a lawful retail price floor, 
thus giving rise to efficiency considerations comparable to those associated with industry-
wide RPM. 
 The empirical data collected by Biscourp et al are revealing. Before the 
promulgation of the Galland Act, prices were generally considerably lower in less 
concentrated areas. The Galland Act, however, resulted in a general softening of intrabrand 
competition, which is evidenced by a substantial reduction in the correlation between retail 
prices and market concentration. The decrease in the correlation coefficient was larger for 
hypermarkets, which are typically cost-effective and are accordingly expected to compete 
more aggressively than other types of stores.
56
 Similarly, in the aftermath of the Act, price 
dispersion of branded goods across stores was weakened,
57
 while an increased degree of 
price convergence was observed, which reflected the respective raise in the prices for 
branded products sold in formerly less expensive stores.
58
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3.1.3. Collusion in the Upstream Market 
The manufacturer cartel objection to RPM has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter. It is based on the simple assumption that monitoring retail prices is less 
burdensome than policing the cartelists’ wholesale prices. By observing the pattern of price 
fluctuations in the retail market, colluding manufacturers may be in a position to draw 
reasonably accurate inferences of adherence to or deviation from the common policy. 
Jullian and Rey confirm the conventional wisdom by assuming the occurrence of local 
shocks in retailing: in the absence of vertical price fixing, final prices are determined by 
the retailers’ information, which can otherwise be expected to be unavailable to a price-
maintaining manufacturer.
59
  
Price rigidity associated with RPM is generally socially undesirable where local 
shocks affect retail costs; in the event of shocks on demand, on the other hand, price 
rigidity is more likely to produce ambivalent welfare effects. This is particularly important, 
given that vertical price fixing may in reality encourage deviations where it restricts 
retailers’ ability to respond to local demand shocks. In such a case, the manufacturer would 
be rather inclined to abandon the restraint in an attempt to increase its profitability.
60
 With 
that in mind, Jullien and Rey suggest that, in order for RPM to be implemented by a 
manufacturer cartel as a facilitating mechanism, two requirements must be met: not only 
must price rigidity enhance the detectability of cheating, but also its inefficiency must be 
outweighed by the expected gains from collusion.
61
 The authors thus demonstrate that, in 
markets that are prone to cartelisation, RPM will reduce consumer welfare exactly because 
it will be adopted ‘only if it leads to a price increase large enough to compensate 
[manufacturers] for the loss in price flexibility’.62 
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3.2. Chicago School Criticism 
The premises of the cartel objection have been repudiated by the proponents of the 
Chicago School. In criticising the manufacturer cartel theory, Telser doubts the 
effectiveness of RPM as a facilitating mechanism where the colluding manufacturers’ 
products are sold through common outlets. The presence of RPM will not necessarily 
prevent a manufacturer from engaging in secret price-cutting in breach of the collusive 
agreement. Given that the retail prices are fixed, the resulting higher profit margin will 
induce the multi-brand retailer to single out the products of the manufacturer who offers a 
lower wholesale price, and to increase its brand-specific sales efforts.
63
 Bork alternatively 
suggests that the multi-brand retailer can be expected to report instantly any price cuts to 
the remaining cartelists in an attempt to obtain similar concessions.
64
 
 The manufacturer cartel theory is no less problematic where the cartelised goods 
are sold through exclusive outlets. A member of the cartel may frustrate the collusive 
arrangement by offering secret concessions designed to subsidise the provision of special 
terms and services by the retailer.
65
 Additionally, the cartel may have to adopt rules 
prohibiting its members from competing for existing dealers, or to agree upon specific 
market shares in order to prevent them from offering secret price cuts designed to attract 
new dealers.
66
 The combination of exclusive dealership with RPM may thus restrict, but 
not completely eliminate, a manufacturer's incentive to cheat. Where the only available 
evidence of cheating consists in increased brand-specific sales efforts, and not in easily 
detectable lower retail prices, the effectiveness of RPM in monitoring compliance with the 
cartel agreement is naturally limited. 
 It has also been suggested that RPM imposed in the absence of free-rideable 
services is too costly for a mechanism designed merely to discourage cheating. Given that 
different retail outlets incur different operational costs, an RPM scheme will set prices at a 
level which, for the sake of affording least efficient retailers a competitive return, will 
necessarily prevent their superior competitors from fully exploiting their efficiencies. In 
order for the loss in relative efficiency to be avoided, the manufacturers will have to not 
only impose different resale prices in an attempt to reconcile the diversity among retailers, 
but also to subject the stipulated prices to constant review in response to the changing 
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marketing conditions. This process is particularly problematic in markets characterised by 
a degree of product differentiation. It can be reasonably assumed, therefore, that the 
cartelists would be reluctant to set up such a complicated device only to police their 
arrangement.
67
    
Overstreet notes that ‘[t]he most popular, and historically possibly the most 
important, explanatory hypothesis for [RPM] is related to the existence of retailer 
collusion’.68 That said, the dealer cartel argument is by no means immune from criticism. 
The primary objection is that dealer cartels, although possible, are in reality infrequent due 
to particular attributes of retail trade. As downstream markets generally comprise a large 
number of participants and are characterised by relatively low barriers to entry, their 
cartelisation is notoriously problematic.
69
 Moreover, the dealers may enhance the 
effectiveness of their cartel only if they recruit ‘all or almost all’ manufacturers, in an 
attempt to prevent consumers from switching between different manufacturers' brands.
70
 
This, however, is attainable only upon condition that the upstream market is also prone to 
cartelisation.
71
 Consequently, the inherent difficulties in organising and administering 
dealer collusion not only undermine their stability, but further make it susceptible to 
prompt detection by enforcement authorities.
72
 
Partially distancing himself from the typical Chicagoan rubric which is premised on 
the assumption that cartelisation of the downstream market is inherently problematic, 
Posner takes the position that the essence of the problem with the dealer cartel objection to 
RPM is of an evidentiary nature: although the detection of dealer cooperation may indeed 
be easy, it is nonetheless difficult to determine whether the purpose of this cooperation is 
collusive or it constitutes legitimate concerted activity intended to overcome credible free 
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rider issues.
73
 Accordingly, Posner suggests a three-prong test for the substantive 
assessment of restricted dealing under the rule of reason standard, applicable both to price 
and non-price vertical restraints: 
1. Does the restriction embrace so large a fraction of the market as to make 
cartelization a plausible motivation for the restriction? If not, the restriction should 
be held lawful. 
2. If the restriction does embrace a sufficiently large fraction of the market to make 
cartelization a possible motivation, do dealers in the product in question provide 
any presale services? If not, the restriction should be deemed unlawful (An 
alternative would shift the burden of justification to the defendant at this point). 
3. If the answer to both of the previous questions is yes (large market share and 
presale services provided), did the manufacturer’s output increase or decrease after 
imposing the restriction? If his output increased, the burden would shift to the 
government of showing that it increased for reasons unrelated to the restriction. If 
output fell after imposition of the restriction, the restriction would be deemed 
unlawful, unless perhaps the defendant could prove the he intended by adopting the 
restriction to increase his output.
74
  
Nevertheless, recent trends in retailing undermine the typical Chicagoan 
assumption that the retail market is invariably competitive. As will be seen in the following 
section, online retailing, despite contributing to the promotion of consumer welfare in 
various ways, is frequently characterised by heavily concentrated markets, which may also 
be dominated by powerful outlets. Access to these markets is notoriously difficult, due to 
high entry costs, which are typically sunk. Following an investigation into the specific 
features of the e-marketplace, the implications of the emergence of Internet commerce for 
the antitrust response to price floors will be examined. 
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3.3. RPM and Online Retailing: Collusion in the Digital Environment 
 
3.3.1. The Welfare-Enhancing Effects of E-Commerce 
The constant expansion of the Internet as an alternative channel for the distribution 
of goods and services is the obvious consequence of its significant benefits for consumers. 
The first pro-competitive aspect of online commerce lies in the very fact that it represents a 
different retailing method: the e-marketplace operates parallel to the traditional brick-and-
mortar outlets, thus exercising substantial competitive constraints upon the latter. Prior to 
the emergence of e-commerce consumers were to a large extent ‘trapped’ within a single 
distribution channel. Inevitably, the costs related to the making of a purchase decision 
prevented them from carrying out a thorough market research by engaging in multi-
channel shopping.
75
 
E-commerce further stimulates price competition in various ways. As a general 
proposition, the total costs incurred by online retailers tend to be lower than the costs 
incurred by conventional outlets. This is due to the fact that the former are for the most part 
fixed, as opposed to the largely variable costs incurred by brick-and-mortar shops for the 
provision of sales-specific services.
76
 In the absence of collusion, these lower costs are 
expected to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, thus making the 
Internet a more appealing option, especially for price sensitive consumers.
77
 Additionally, 
the Internet makes price competition more prevalent by providing consumers with the 
opportunity to compare prices in an easier and effortless way. In the digital environment, 
distance between outlets is measured in mouse-clicks rather than kilometres, while access 
to these outlets is available 24/7, by contrast to the limited opening hours of traditional 
stores. Also, price comparison can be further facilitated by the various consumer-orientated 
websites which provide information about the best prices or the latest deals.  
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More specifically, online retailing increases the dispersion of information, thus 
minimising the consumers’ search costs.78 When faced with an array of alternative options 
in differentiated markets, a rational consumer’s choice is based on the perceived utility of 
each option. The decisive factor in the process of evaluating the utility of a potential 
purchase is the availability of information on the price and quality of each alternative, 
which may be acquired and compared only after the necessary search. Search, however, is 
costly and produces diminishing returns: a buyer will search until the marginal cost of 
search exceeds the marginal expected return.
79
 Bakos observes that sellers in differentiated 
markets may exploit high search costs in order to extract monopolistic profits. 
Accordingly, he takes the position that, in addition to enhancing allocative efficiency, e-
commerce is capable of preventing market breakdown and facilitating the emergence of 
new markets, in particular where search costs in the conventional brick-and-mortar 
framework would be prohibitively high.
80
 
Furthermore, online trade facilitates the manufacturers’ vertical integration into the 
downstream markets for the distribution of their products. More specifically, the Internet 
helps a manufacturer which seeks to put its goods in the marketplace minimise its 
transaction costs: by setting up a retail website, the manufacturer can save up on the costs 
it would otherwise incur if it wished either to enter into distribution agreements with third 
parties, or to integrate vertically through merger or internal expansion (namely through 
establishing its own subsidiaries or setting up its own physical outlets). Although 
disintermediation via the Internet is more likely to appeal to manufacturers possessing 
established brand names, it may also benefit small local manufacturers who do not have 
access to physical shelf space for their products.
81
 
The growth and constant expansion of e-commerce is thus the most representative 
manifestation of the applicability of the Schumpeterian understanding of the competitive 
process to retail trade: 
in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price 
competition] which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new 
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technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-
scale unit of control for instance) – competition which commands a decisive cost or 
quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs 
of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of 
competition is as much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in 
comparison with forcing a door, and so much more important that it becomes a 
matter of comparative indifference whether competition in the ordinary sense 
functions more or less promptly; the powerful lever that in the long run expands 
output and brings down prices is in any case made of other stuff.
82
  
 Building on this theory of ‘creative destruction’, Palamountain applied 
Schumpeter’s insight to the dynamic framework of competition between different methods 
of distribution by introducing the concept of ‘intertype competition’.83 Writing decades 
before the Internet revolution, Palamountain maintained that the ability of the then 
innovative channels of distribution to bring about an increase in consumer surplus went 
beyond their cost-effectiveness: supermarkets, chain stores, large-scale department stores 
and mail-order houses took advantage of substantial technological advances in various 
fields of human activity, such as transportation and communication, and drastically altered 
the structure of the downstream market effectively by eroding the territorial monopolies 
held by local merchants.
84
 And while this first stage in the historical evolution of intertype 
competition had already transformed retailing into what Judge Easterbrook has described 
as being ‘about as close to an atomistic market as you can get’,85 e-commerce has 
contributed to its further fragmentation by invigorating price competition in geographical 
territories which, due to their limited population, cannot sustain unconcentrated brick-and-
mortar retail markets.
86
 
 
3.3.2. RPM in the Online Context: Antitrust Implications 
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3.3.2.1. The Applicability of the Free Rider Argument in the E-Marketplace   
In light of the constant expansion of e-commerce, enforcement agencies on both 
sides of the Atlantic are likely to be faced with a considerable analytical problem, 
associated with the ability of the e-marketplace to exacerbate the free rider problem. 
Online retailers have the potential to engage in free riding, as they almost always offer 
lower prices than brick-and-mortar shops, and any price differentials usually reflect the 
lower costs incurred by online outlets offering promotional services the quality of which 
may occasionally be questionable, or at least inconsistent. Nevertheless, in the years 
following Leegin, various commentators have put the validity of the free-rider argument 
into question, suggesting that the evolution of e-commerce makes it more likely for RPM 
to be employed for anti-competitive purposes.
87
 It is not uncommon for consumers 
nowadays to visit a high street outlet in order to acquire the necessary information about a 
specific product, which they subsequently purchase online at a lower price. That said, it is 
obvious that the free rider rationale is applicable only in the case of products demand for 
which is contingent upon the provision of services that are deemed essential and are valued 
by consumers. Special pre-sales services such as technical support, elaborate showrooms 
or assistance by trained personnel is required for only a limited category of products. For a 
large number of consumer goods, however, physical access to the product is not a decisive 
factor for the purchase, as shoppers need only some basic information which may be 
readily available online. 
In its recent Vertical Guidelines, the European Commission implicitly accepts that 
vertical price fixing may stifle intertype competition, thus depriving consumers of the 
benefits of e-commerce. More specifically, the Commission envisages that ‘RPM may 
reduce dynamism and innovation at the distribution level. By preventing price competition 
between different distributors, RPM may prevent more efficient retailers from entering the 
market or acquiring sufficient scale with low prices’.88 Resale price floors, in other words, 
may restrict or even eliminate the ability of cost-effective outlets or distribution formats to 
pass on any cost advantages to end users in the form of lower retail prices. 
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In that regard, Lao argues that the significance of the free rider rationale has rather 
been overstated, since its applicability is limited to the fairly limited class of consumer 
goods ‘for which sensory experience is important to generate sales’.89 On the other hand, 
Lao continues, for many other products the Internet can in fact be a better source of pre-
sales services, providing more credible information than a salesperson in a conventional 
outlet.
90
 In these cases free riding may indeed occur, but in the opposite direction: it is in 
reality the traditional outlets that may take a free ride on the services provided by online 
retailers.
91
 This in essence constitutes a practical manifestation of the synergistic 
interaction between different distribution channels, which has been labelled ‘the research-
shopper phenomenon’.92 Furthermore, an additional consideration is that e-commerce may 
also frustrate the free rider argument by obscuring the line separating legitimate business 
behaviour from free riding. Assuming that online outlets offer lower prices than their full-
service conventional competitors, there is no evidence that the former aim at expanding 
their market share by taking a free ride on the brick-and-mortar retailers’ investments: they 
may merely be serving specific groups of customers who base their purchase habits on 
factors other than product price.
93
 This argument is consistent with empirical evidence 
according to which the vast majority of online shoppers are ‘goal-focused’ and place a 
great value on attributes such as ‘convenience and accessibility; selection; availability of 
information; and lack of sociality’ offered by the Internet, in other words features which 
provide them with ‘increased freedom and control’.94 
 
3.3.2.2. Price Rigidity in the E-Marketplace: A Far Cry from ‘Friction-Free Capitalism’   
In the face of the preceding analysis, it is well established nowadays that the 
correlation between the invigoration of intertype competition brought about by the Internet 
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and its contribution both to intrabrand and interbrand competition can very easily be 
overstated. The Internet appears to be falling short of living up to the expectations of 
pioneers in information technology, who saw in the incipient online retailing the 
framework for a ‘friction-free’ version of capitalism.95 Empirical studies show that the 
efficiency of the e-marketplace is to an extent restricted due to two factors. First, the 
consumers’ price sensitivity has apparently been exaggerated: online shoppers appear to be 
‘[p]rice rational but not price obsessive [and] they also have a strong inclination toward 
loyalty’.96 Put differently, online shoppers place greater value on their convenience than on 
product price; they would rather do business with a retailer whom they trust, even if this 
trust comes at a higher price.
97
 The second factor – which is in reality a consequence of the 
previous assumption – is that certain online markets present two very interesting attributes: 
they are highly concentrated and are dominated by a number of powerful retailers, which 
serve as the market leaders.
98
 Additionally, and contrary to conventional wisdom, barriers 
to entry in the e-marketplace are particularly high: entry costs are for the most part sunk, 
while the Internet shoppers’ attraction to reputation typically presents first movers with a 
substantial competitive advantage. The presence of strong virtual network effects may also 
increase market concentration and favour the creation of dominant positions.
99
  
In light of these assumptions and in view of online retailers’ ability to detect and 
respond immediately to any promotions offered by their competitors, the discounter’s 
ability to benefit from an enlarged market share is substantially limited. Additionally, it has 
been suggested that Internet sellers tend to match their rivals’ price changes in a way that 
their prices may also increase rather than only decrease, as would normally be expected in 
fiercely competitive markets.
100
  
 Finally, in challenging the conventional wisdom that the Internet invariably 
stimulates price competition, Lal and Sarvary suggest that, under certain circumstances, e-
commerce may encourage monopoly pricing with regard to products the purchase of which 
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is largely contingent upon physical experience.
101
 Product attributes, so the argument goes, 
may be distinguished in digital and non-digital. Digital are those attributes that can be 
effectively communicated online and are associated with the sensory inspection, whether 
visual or acoustic, of reasonably standardised products that are subject to repeated 
purchases. While digital attributes generally have a significant influence on consumer 
choice, certain items present additional characteristics ‘that can only be evaluated through 
physical inspection of the products’.102 In markets where non-digital product attributes are 
prevalent, e-commerce is likely to intensify brand loyalty. As search costs in these markets 
are higher, equalling the cost of taking the entire shopping trip,
103
 risk averse online 
shoppers will be less inclined to abandon the brand which they currently own and whose 
non-digital attributes they trust. As a result, not only will there be an increase in the prices 
of the goods concerned – since brand loyalty tends to curtail price sensitivity – but also 
consumer search will be reduced. 
 
3.3.2.3. A Modest Suggestion: The Effects of RPM Are Not Channel-Specific  
 As far as the policy reform introduced by Leegin is concerned, the Supreme Court’s 
timing could not have been more unfortunate: in addition to the criticism that such a 
controversial decision would have received anyway, the evolution of e-commerce certainly 
increased the concerns of the proponents of the per se ban on RPM as to its possible 
efficiency consequences in the online context. With the passage of time, however, the 
initial, almost automatic hostility towards Leegin’s rule of reason104 has been replaced by a 
more moderate approach. A recent report by the OECD on vertical restraints in the digital 
environment expressly downplays the contribution of price floors to the softening of 
interbrand competition on the basis of the very nature of e-commerce: 
regarding the classic arguments about RPM as a collusive mechanism, it is not clear 
that these would actually work in an on-line environment. There is already a lot of 
price transparency in this environment and thus vertical restraints cannot act as a 
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way to make it easier to enforce the collusive output of a cartel. Therefore there 
should be fewer reasons for concerns from RPMs in an online environment.
105
 
The argument is intuitive. The price transparency that is generally prevalent in the e-
marketplace allows upstream and downstream cartelists to have an accurate overview of 
any fluctuations in retail prices, thus adequately monitoring compliance with the collusive 
agreement. Plainly put, in light of the severe channel-specific competitive risks associated 
with e-commerce – availability of information on products and prices, high degree of 
market concentration, easy accumulation of market power – the competitive conditions in 
the e-marketplace are already unfavourable, even in the absence of RPM. Against this 
background, the argument that RPM could be of any added value as a facilitating 
mechanism designed to ensure the enforcement of a collusive equilibrium in the digital 
environment loses much of its credibility.
106
 
 The recent judicial experience from the other side of the Atlantic provides valuable 
support for this approach. In Jacobs v Tempur-Pedic,
107
 a case decided in the aftermath of 
Leegin, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt with an antitrust action brought 
by Mr and Mrs Jacobs against Tempur-Pedic North America (‘TPX’), a manufacturer of 
foam mattresses which sold its products through independent distributors, as well as 
through its own website. TPX had adopted a policy of minimum retail prices, which both 
the distributors and itself were observing. The plaintiffs alleged inter alia that TPX, 
through its dual distribution system, had effectively established a horizontal price fixing 
conspiracy with its dealers, having engaged in tacit collusion with the purpose of 
maintaining retail prices above the competitive level. The court, applying the Twombly 
standard which requires an antitrust plaintiff’s allegations to be plausible and not merely 
consistent with the conspiracy element of Section 1,
108
 dismissed the claim. 
Acknowledging that the provision of pre-sales services was essential for the effective 
distribution of the products concerned, the court observed that ‘TRX’s direct-distribution 
website acts as an “enforcement mechanism” to prevent distributors from raising prices’, 
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and took the view that the parties’ strict adherence to the set retail prices was equally 
consistent with rational independent economic activity.
109
 Accordingly, citing 
Matsushita,
110
 the court noted that Jacobs failed to provide evidence that tended to exclude 
the possibility that the defendants were acting independently, and found for the latter.
111
 
Besides, even if the allegations of tacit collusion were indeed plausible, pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s dictum in Brooke Group112 the plaintiff would still be required to 
substantiate that ‘TPX and its authorized distributors somehow signalled each other on 
how and when to maintain or adjust prices’.113    
Another aspect of the e-marketplace to be considered is that is provides members of 
a cartel with new, technologically advanced policing mechanisms, which, if not 
substantially weaken, at least put into question the relevance of the dealer cartel objection 
to online commerce. In the first criminal prosecution brought by the Department of Justice 
involving a price fixing scheme in the digital environment, Mr David Topkins, a former 
executive of an online seller of posters, prints and framed art, was charged with having 
conspired to fix the prices of posters sold online through the Amazon marketplace.
114
 More 
specifically, Mr Topkins had implemented pricing algorithms which allowed him and his 
co-conspirators to coordinate changes to their respective prices, while relying on an 
algorithm-based software to adhere to the agreed upon prices. Eventually, Mr Topkins 
entered into a plea bargain with the government.
115
 
 The case is by no means suitable for conclusive assumptions, but is instructive 
nonetheless. It involved a typical horizontal price fixing agreement entered into between 
competing retailers. In an attempt to police the cartel and consolidate the collusive 
equilibrium, the conspirators appointed an individual with reasonably advanced knowledge 
in computer science with the task to develop an algorithm which would notify them of any 
changes in their competitors’ prices. Let us now consider any other alternative facilitating 
mechanisms available to the colluding retailers. According to the dealer cartel objection to 
RPM, they would have to approach each of their suppliers and request that the latter 
enforces across-the-board retail price floors. As was explained in the previous chapter, 
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however, it is highly likely that some of the manufacturers would find the prospect of a 
restriction of output associated with the downstream cartel unprofitable, in which case they 
would have the incentive – and the means – to undermine the collusion. It is thus hardly a 
surprise that the online retailers opted for the former option. More importantly, it is self-
evident that such a monitoring device is potentially at the disposal of all aspiring cartelists, 
whether operating or merely advertising their products online: even assuming that the 
cartel theory was indeed plausible in the context of brick-and-mortar commerce, new 
technologies have effectively rendered RPM redundant as a facilitating mechanism. 
  
 
3.3.2.3.1. RPM in the E-Marketplace – Empirical Evidence 
According to recent empirical data from the former Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) 
in the United Kingdom, as compiled and analysed by Giovannetti and Magazzini, RPM 
may be used by vertically integrated incumbent retailers as an entry barrier against 
discounting online outlets.
116
 The authors observe that all complaints submitted to the OFT 
between 2007 and 2009 alleging illegal vertical price fixing were lodged by Internet 
retailers, involved the sale of durable goods – which do not normally give rise to serious 
free riding concerns – and implicated, for the most part, vertically integrated incumbent 
retailers. It is important to note that the vast majority (almost 70%) of complaints alleged 
the existence of a network of similar agreements in the same industry, which increases the 
likelihood that RPM was implemented for anti-competitive purposes.
117
 Following an 
initial warning letter by the OFT, just over half of the upstream firms cited a pro-
competitive justification for the imposed price floors, such as free rider considerations or 
the protection of brand image. A non-negligible 42.5% of them, however, replied that they 
employed RPM following complaints by downstream rivals, a finding which can be 
interpreted as confirming the foreclosure theory.
118
 The very low market shares of the 
allegedly price-maintaining upstream firms further strengthens the credibility of the 
assumption that the restraints were retailer-induced.
119
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 To summarise the foregoing analysis, e-commerce is a distribution format which 
may have a considerable contribution to the promotion of consumer welfare. This 
assumption, however, is not unambiguous: the Internet also presents significant channel-
specific risks which should not be underestimated. Additionally, the high barriers to entry 
in the e-marketplace severely undermine the Chicagoan criticism of the cartel objection to 
RPM, which is based inter alia on the assumption that entry into the downstream market is 
invariably easy. In any event, RPM has an obvious potential to eliminate intertype 
competition, which does not support the argument for a lenient public policy towards the 
practice: vertical price fixing should remain subject to a presumption of illegality. 
 There are very good reasons, however, why this presumption should be rebuttable 
even in the digital era. It needs to be reminded that all pro-competitive justifications for 
RPM – whether they involve the solution of the free rider problem, the provision of non-
free-rideable special services or the facilitation of new entry – are premised on the 
fundamental assumption that, on certain occasions, intrabrand price competition may be 
restricted, insofar as this restriction will result in an increase in welfare-enhancing non-
price competition. The fact that cost-effective Internet retailers may drive prices lower 
does not imply that their exclusion or the restriction of their ability to offer discounted 
prices should invariably be raising concerns. Instead, the parties should remain free to 
demonstrate that the nature of the products at hand warrants the restriction of online 
retailers’ pricing freedom. In cases where the requisite services may be provided more 
effectively by brick-and-mortar outlets, the presumption should be rebutted by a showing 
that RPM has been employed by the manufacturer as an indirect means of right-channeling 
consumers towards the distribution format that best serves the interests of both.      
 
 
3.4. Alternative Means of Reinforcing Price Rigidity on the Internet: Minimum 
Advertising Prices, Dual Pricing and Most Favoured Nation Clauses 
  
3.4.1. Types of ‘RPM Facilitating Conduct’ 
In a recent report on vertical restraints in the digital environment, the International 
Competition Network (‘ICN’) placed particular emphasis on a separate category of 
123 
 
restrictive practices, which were classified as ‘RPM facilitating conduct’.120 Among the 
types of RPM facilitating conduct, the ICN identified Internet minimum advertising prices 
(‘iMAP’) and dual pricing as raising substantial competition concerns. 
 
3.4.1.1. Internet Minimum Advertised Prices (‘iMAPs’) 
 Manufacturers implementing iMAP policies effectively prohibit their distributors 
from advertising the contract goods below a specified minimum price. Irrespective of 
whether they are applied in the digital environment or in the context of traditional brick-
and-mortar commerce, minimum advertised prices (‘MAP’) may present the enforcement 
agencies or courts with challenging analytical problems, as they generally ‘fall in a gray 
area between typical RPM and non-price advertising restrictions’.121 Despite 
acknowledging the ambivalent nature of MAP schemes, the ICN Report emphasises that 
the relevant clauses may indirectly amount to rigid price floors where consumers are 
unable individually to bargain for price discounts with the retailer.
122
 It follows that the 
substantial competition concerns raised by the implementation of MAP policies in the 
online context are relevant to the fact that similar price negotiations hardly ever occur in 
the e-marketplace.
123
 
 In its recent Vertical Guidelines, the European Commission does not deal 
specifically with MAP schemes. However, the Guidelines do clarify that the treatment of 
RPM as a hardcore restraint within the meaning of Regulation 330/2010 covers not only 
clear-cut vertical price fixing, but also any indirect means whereby RPM may be 
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achieved.
124
 In Hasselblad, the Commission found that a clause requiring distributors to 
cease any advertisements to which the manufacturer had notified its objections in writing 
was ‘tantamount to a right of post publication censorship ... [which] enables Hasselblad 
(GB) to prevent actively competing and price-cutting dealers ... from advertising their 
activities’.125 The Commission’s reasoning, which was upheld on appeal by the CJEU,126 is 
thus consistent with the understanding of restrictions in advertising as RPM facilitating 
mechanisms. 
The first relevant case was decided under the Resale Prices Act 1964, which 
introduced the general ban on RPM in the British legal order. In Comet Radiovision 
Services Ltd v Farnell-Tandberg Ltd and Others,
127
 the plaintiff, a discount retailer and 
wholesaler brought an action alleging that a number of suppliers of tape recorders and 
other hi-fi equipment had withheld their supplies in response to its decision to advertise its 
cut prices in the press. In rejecting the defendants’ argument that the arrangements at hand 
restricted the exercise of ‘pre-contractual practices’ and not the retailer’s freedom to 
determine the prices at which it negotiates its contracts, Goulding J took the position that 
any restraints on advertised prices were tantamount to unlawful vertical price fixing:  
‘The object of a dealer in advertising is to promote his sales, and to complain of 
advertising at cut prices is in my judgment complaint, though in a limited form, that 
the dealer is likely to sell at cut prices ... It follows that to withhold supplies on 
grounds of advertising at cut prices is one form of withholding supplies on the 
ground that the dealer is likely to sell at cut prices’.128 
 More recently, the former Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’), following an 
investigation into the mobility aids sector in the United Kingdom, adopted two 
infringement decisions under Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998. In the first of these 
cases, a manufacturer of mobility scooters, Roma Medical Aids Limited, was found to 
have entered into agreements with its network of retailers whereby the latter undertook to 
refrain from selling Roma-branded scooters online and advertising their prices online. As 
far as the prohibition of online price advertising was concerned, the OFT found that it had 
the ‘obvious consequence’ of restricting price competition: the ensuing reduction of price 
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transparency would inevitably limit the retailers’ incentives to engage in aggressive 
intrabrand price competition and result, in turn, in an increase in retail prices.
129
 
Additionally, the OFT took the view that the price advertisement prohibition was 
essentially designed to reinforce the ban on Internet sales.
130
 
 The second infringement decision in the market for mobility scooters involved a 
genuine iMAP policy implemented by Pride Mobility Products Limited (‘Pride’). More 
specifically, Pride had agreed with its dealers that any prices advertised online in respect of 
certain models of its scooters would not exceed the manufacturer’s recommended retail 
prices. According to the OFT, the arrangements at hand restricted competition by object. 
The iMAP scheme restricted the ability of price-cutting retailers to take advantage of the 
Internet as an alternative marketing format, while increasing consumers’ search costs by 
preventing them for shopping around for better deals.
131
 
 In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) applied Section 5 of 
the FTC Act to challenge the MAP agreements entered into individually by each of the five 
largest distributors of pre-recorded music, prohibiting retailers to advertise discounts in all 
advertising. The FTC decided that the MAP policies were to be assessed under the rule of 
reason standard, because the retailers retained their freedom to determine their own prices, 
insofar as they refrained from advertising any discounts, and price-cutting activities had 
indeed been observed. As there was insufficient evidence that the arrangements at hand 
contributed to the establishment of retail price floors, the Commissioners dismissed as 
inappropriate the per se rule which was applicable to RPM.
132
 That said, the MAP policies 
were deemed unlawful under the rule of reason. After having scrutinised the policies both 
individually and collectively, the FTC concluded that they had the effect of stabilising 
retail prices by reducing retailer incentives to sell at cut prices. At the same time, the 
schemes were found to constitute facilitating practices which increased the risk of 
horizontal collusion.
133
 These considerations were also premised on the structure of the 
relevant market, in which the aggregate market share of the distributors was approximately 
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85 percent.
134
 The companies concerned entered into separate settlement agreements with 
the FTC.
135
 
 Similarly, in Campbell v Austin Air Systems,
136
 a lower court decided that an iMAP 
policy constituted a non-price restraint and, as such, had to be scrutinised under the rule of 
reason, pursuant to Sylvania.
137
 Austin, a manufacturer of air cleaners, had required 
distributors active in the online context to observe its ‘Advertising Price Schedule’. The 
court held that the iMAP agreement was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, insofar as 
the dealers were allowed to sell Austin air cleaners at any price. In Kichler, however, a 
case decided only a few months before Leegin, a federal district court in New York held 
that the iMAP scheme at hand, whereby distributors could not advertise the defendant’s 
products online at a price lower than that stipulated by the latter, essentially constituted 
vertical price fixing.
138
 Although ostensibly the retailers remained free to determine their 
prices, the court, relying on the fact that the plaintiff was a pure play Internet outlet, took 
the view that for Internet shoppers, who were unable to carry out a thorough market 
research, the advertised price was the actual retail price.
139
 
 It is interesting to observe that the most high-profile MAP policies in the United 
States were implemented during the last stage in the evolution of the per se ban on RPM, at 
a time when the public policy towards price floors was governed by the Business 
Electronics dictum.
140
 Business Electronics made it particularly difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish the existence of per se illegal vertical price fixing relying on a price-cutting 
dealer’s termination, unless they substantiated the existence of ‘some agreement on price 
and price levels’.141 Against this background, it would not be unreasonable to infer that 
MAP schemes not involving an agreement on actual resale prices may have been employed 
for anti-competitive purposes as a surrogate for RPM in an attempt to avoid the rule of per 
se illegality applicable to the latter.
142
 It is also noteworthy that MAP policies may be one 
of the reasons that Maryland’s ‘Leegin repealer’, which restored the per se treatment of 
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RPM under the state’s Antitrust Act has not had the desired effect on prices.143 On the 
basis of empirical evidence from the video game industry, in which the use of price floors 
is frequent, Bailey and Leonard show that the ‘Leegin repealer’ has not exercised any 
downward pressure on prices, and suggest as a possible explanation that manufacturers 
have switched to alternative restrictions ‘such as minimum advertised pricing policies, that 
result in the manufacturer achieving the same retail pricing as minimum RPM’.144 
 
3.4.1.2. Dual Pricing    
 On the other hand, the understanding by the ICN of dual pricing as a price restraint 
is interesting, if not surprising. Dual pricing is the practice whereby a manufacturer sets a 
higher wholesale price for goods which are intended to be sold online. By contrast to 
iMAP schemes, the Commission’s recent Vertical Guidelines deal with dual pricing in the 
online context, implicitly taking the position that it constitutes a non-price restraint. More 
specifically, the Commission considers that ‘an agreement that the distributor shall pay a 
higher price for products intended to be resold by the distributor online than for products 
intended to be resold offline’ constitutes a restriction of passive sales for the purposes of 
the application of Article 101 TFEU.
145
 The idea that dual pricing is to be classified as a 
territorial restraint is also shared by the German Federal Cartel Office.
146
 Even in the 
context of traditional brick-and-mortar commerce the European Commission and Courts 
have on various occasions treated dual pricing systems as restrictions of competition by 
object, taking the position that they are tantamount to export bans as they reduce the 
distributors’ incentive to engage in parallel trade.147 
 While this approach is certainly consistent with the importance of e-commerce in 
the promotion of the single market imperative, it is nonetheless unclear why the ICN 
members chose to classify dual pricing as an RPM facilitating practice. Whether driven by 
an efficiency-enhancing objective or by an anti-competitive intent, all other vertical 
restraints have a – most frequently upward – effect on prices. In line with this conventional 
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wisdom, the purpose of dual pricing is to limit online retailers’ ability to compete 
effectively by taking advantage of any cost-efficiencies associated with the specific 
distribution format. In this sense, however, dual pricing is as much an RPM facilitating 
conduct as any other vertical restraint. In other words, there can be no misunderstanding 
that competitive conditions conducive to RPM may be shaped by the allocation of 
exclusive territories, whereby the distributor is granted the status of a territorial brand 
monopolist, or selective distribution, which may result in the outright exclusion of pure 
play Internet retailers from the network.
148
 
 Generally, dual pricing is treated more favourably under the current Vertical 
Guidelines than RPM. As a form of indirect prohibition of passive sales, dual pricing may 
benefit from the ancillary restraints defence, insofar as the parties substantiate that it was 
designed to assist a distributor to recoup suck investments undertaken to facilitate new 
entry, pursuant to paragraph 61 of the Guidelines. However, even if these requirements are 
not satisfied and the agreement is found to violate Article 101(1), undertakings have the 
opportunity to plead an efficiency defence under Article 101(3). Although restrictions of 
passive sales are typically classified as hardcore restraints and, as such, cannot benefit 
from the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation,
149
 under certain circumstances a dual 
pricing policy may nonetheless be found to satisfy the four requirements set out in Article 
101(3) TFEU on an individual basis. According to the Vertical Guidelines, dual pricing 
may survive a substantive assessment under this provision where ‘selling online leads to 
substantially higher costs for the manufacturer that offline sales’.150 As an example of a 
relevant situation, the Guidelines refer to the availability of post-sale home installation by 
the retailer, which is likely to be limited to offline transactions.
151
 
 
3.4.1.3. Most-Favoured-Nation (‘MFN’) Clauses and Across Platform Parity Agreements 
(‘APPA’) 
 A similar analysis is applicable to most favoured nation (‘MFN’) clauses in the 
online context. A manufacturer bound by an MFN clause undertakes to refrain from 
offering to third parties better terms than those agreed with the beneficiary. MFN clauses 
may produce substantial pro-competitive effects. They may provide a solution to the ‘hold-
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up problem’ by encouraging a reluctant downstream firm to undertake relationship-specific 
investments. Such investments might represent sunk costs and expose the buyer to ex post 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the supplier. Against this background, MFN clauses 
guarantee that the buyer will benefit from the best trading terms and conditions available. 
In addition, MFNs may contribute to a reduction of transaction costs associated with 
repeated price negotiations and the relevant market research.
152
 Finally, they may be 
designed to remedy demand uncertainty by preventing buyers from delaying their orders in 
anticipation of last-minute discounted prices.
153
 However, MFN policies also have a 
significant anti-competitive potential. For example, MFN is likely to result in market 
foreclosure and price increases, as it is likely to be imposed at the behest of powerful 
buyers with the purpose of raising their rivals’ costs. Additionally, MFN may facilitate 
tacit collusion in the upstream market by reducing each manufacturer’s incentive to reduce 
its wholesale prices.
154
      
As a general proposition, it must be noted that MFN clauses in and by themselves 
do not qualify as vertical price restraints and thus do not fall within the scope of Article 
4(a) of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. The Vertical Guidelines, although not 
engaging in an in-depth analysis of MFN policies, identify them as a facilitating 
mechanism for the reinforcement of price floors: ‘direct or indirect price fixing can be 
made more effective when combined with measures which may reduce the buyer’s 
incentive to lower the resale price, such as ... the supplier obliging the buyer to apply a 
most-favoured-customer clause’.155 However, the Guidelines clarify that any such 
supportive measures are not considered in themselves as being tantamount to RPM.
156
 This 
approach is sound; like dual pricing, MFN clauses do not impose any restrictions on the 
dealer’s ability to determine its own prices, despite the fact that their economic effect is to 
facilitate retail price rigidity.
157
 
A specific type of MFN clauses which has emerged alongside the expansion of e-
commerce has taken the form of the so-called ‘across platform parity’ agreements 
(‘APPAs’), also referred to as ‘retail MFN’. Under such an arrangement, a seller agrees 
with an online trade platform that the price charged on the latter will not exceed the prices 
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charged on its competitors. Online platforms are typical examples of two-sided markets, 
serving as intermediaries between two distinct groups of consumers: the suppliers and the 
end-users.
158
 In order to be granted access to the platform, sellers are usually required to 
pay either a one-off access fee or a commission on a per-transaction basis.
159
 Thus, retail 
MFN clauses directly affect the final retail prices, and not the fee which is payable by the 
supplier. Against this background, APPAs are closer to vertical price fixing than the pure 
MFN clauses examined earlier in that they are designed to govern the transactions between 
one of parties (the supplier) and end users rather that the commercial relationship between 
the parties themselves. Unlike RPM, however, an APPA does not limit the seller’s freedom 
to determine its prices, insofar as it refrains from making the contract goods available at 
lower prices on rival platforms.
160
 
The competition concerns raised by APPAs are generally comparable to those 
associated with retail price floors. Retail MFN clauses may be implemented by a dominant 
online platform in an attempt to foreclose entry. An APPA would prevent a new entrant 
from charging lower fees in order to attract sellers, who could in turn pass any cost-saving 
on to end users in the form of lower retail prices. Furthermore, APPAs may soften 
competition between platforms, by reducing their incentive to compete on the level of the 
transaction fees charged to the sellers. The resulting increase in the fees will entail higher 
prices for buyers. Similarly, an APPA may facilitate collusion between platforms which 
have entered into an agreement fixing the fees charged to sellers, by preventing any secret 
reduction to be reflected in lower final prices.
161
 According to a Report by the OECD, 
however, APPAs have greater anti-competitive potential than RPM, since the online 
platform may not only control the industry-wide minimum, but is also in a position to 
manipulate retail price levels by increasing its access fee or commission.
162
 The two most 
notable APPA cases concerned the markets of hotel online bookings and e-books. They 
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culminated in the adoption of an infringement decision by the German Federal Cartel 
Office,
163
 and a commitments decision by the European Commission,
164
 respectively. 
 
3.4.1.4. The Nature of ‘RPM Facilitating Conduct’ 
Unlike iMAP policies, which are generally – and correctly – treated as an indirect 
form of RPM, as they may reduce the incentive of online outlet to engage in aggressive 
price cutting thus serving as de facto price floors, from a strictly legal perspective neither 
dual pricing nor retail MFN clauses are considered as falling within the definition of RPM 
under EU competition law. In order for a restraint to be described as ‘hardcore’ within the 
meaning of Article 4(a) of Regulation 330/2010, it must involve ‘the restriction of the 
buyer’s ability to determine its sales price’, and the mere fact that dual pricing and APPA 
have the economic effect of reinforcing price rigidity in the e-marketplace is not sufficient 
to justify the application of that provision. As far as dual pricing is concerned, it is 
questionable whether the policy interferes with the retailer’s independent pricing strategy, 
which is a function of the wholesale price plus distribution costs. Even though the purpose 
of dual pricing is to limit the downward pressure exercised on retail prices by distribution 
cost savings thus enhancing price rigidity across distribution channels, the manipulation by 
the supplier of one of the variables (the wholesale price) – which is in any event out of the 
buyer’s control – cannot be said to amount to a direct or indirect restriction of the retailer’s 
independence, in accordance with the grammatical interpretation of Article 4(a). On the 
other hand, a broader teleological interpretation would be rather redundant since, as has 
already been seen, dual pricing is also considered as a hardcore restraint which falls within 
the scope of Article 4(b) of the Block Exemption Regulation. Accordingly, the normative 
implications of its classification as a price or non-price restraint are in any case trivial, and 
the relevant discussion is more an issue of semantics than public policy considerations. 
A different analysis applies to APPAs. As a general proposition, an APPA policy 
does indeed restrict the retailer’s freedom to determine its price to the extent that it allows 
the online platform, and not the retailer itself, to control the market-wide minimum price. 
That said, Article 4(a) specifically refers to the restriction of the ‘buyer’s’ ability to set 
retail prices. Article 1(1)(h) of the Block Exemption Regulation defines the buyer as ‘an 
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undertaking which, under an agreement falling within Article 101(1) of the Treaty, sells 
goods or services on behalf of another undertaking’. Although the relationship between an 
online platform and a retailer is also a relationship between a seller and a buyer, it is 
apparent that it is not of the nature covered by Article 4(a).  
In order for this point to be fully understood, it must be stressed that the 
commercial relationship between the platform and the seller does not involve transfer of 
title in the contract goods. Pursuant to the consignment exception introduced in the US 
Supreme Court’s General Electric decision,165 transfer of ownership was acknowledged as 
a constitutive element of unlawful RPM under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Similarly, in 
the European legal order, ownership of the goods is recognised as one of the criteria to be 
taken into consideration by the enforcement agency, when determining the allocation of 
risks between the principal and the agent in order to establish antitrust liability under 
Article 101(1) in vertical cases.
166
  
Against this backdrop, however, it is necessary to clarify that retail MFN is 
consistent neither with RPM nor with genuine agency. To the extent that these clauses are 
imposed at the behest of typically powerful online portals, which determine their conduct 
independently – and even in defiance – of the seller, it is clear that it is the former that 
influence the seller’s commercial strategy and not vice versa. In this sense, the status of the 
platform may not be considered as analogous to that of an auxiliary organ. Consequently, 
retail MFN clauses may fall within the scope of Article 101(1), unlike restraints contained 
in genuine agency agreements.
167
  
However, retail MFN may not be considered as tantamount to RPM not only from a 
legal, but also from an economic perspective. As a general proposition, the pro-competitive 
theories of vertical control by means of price floors concentrate on the ability of vertical 
price fixing to align the interests of the manufacturer with those of end users. This idea was 
also endorsed by the Leegin Court:  
In general, the interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to 
retailer profit margins. The difference between the price a manufacturer charges 
retailers and the price retailers charge consumers represents part of the 
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manufacturer's cost of distribution, which, like any other cost, the manufacturer 
usually desires to minimize. A manufacturer has no incentive to overcompensate 
retailers with unjustified margins. The retailers, not the manufacturer, gain from 
higher retail prices. The manufacturer often loses; interbrand competition reduces 
its competitiveness and market share because consumers will “substitute a different 
brand of the same product”. As a general matter, therefore, a single manufacturer 
will desire to set minimum resale prices only if the ‘increase in demand resulting 
from enhanced service ... will more than offset a negative impact on demand of a 
higher retail price’.168  
Thus, once the economic incentives of the manufacturer are removed from the equation, a 
totally separate welfare analysis of the effects of APPA is appropriate, which, however, 
falls outside the scope of this thesis. Although retail MFN raises particularly interesting 
theoretical challenges, this thesis focuses exclusively on sticto sensu vertical price fixing 
agreements, whether direct or indirect. It is thus submitted here that, for the reasons 
outlined above, APPAs do not constitute RPM for the purposes of the application of EU 
competition law, despite their impact on reinforcing price rigidity in the online context. 
 
 
3.5. Conclusion: A Compelling Theory, in Search for Empirical Support   
  
This chapter examined the horizontal collusion theory of RPM both in the offline 
and the online context. The argument that vertical price fixing may facilitate a collusive 
agreement in either the upstream or the downstream market is undoubtedly the most oft-
cited objection to vertical price fixing and has recently been reiterated in studies by Jullien 
and Rey
169
 and Rey and Vergé.
170
 These academic assertions, however, insightful though 
they may be, lack practical support from credible empirical evidence. This comes as no 
surprise; the controversy surrounding vertical price fixing would not be nearly as intense, I 
reckon, were it not for the remarkable inconsistency between theory and practice.  
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To the manufacturer cartel objection, Scherer and Ross – whose work stands out as 
one of the most sober and holistic accounts of the economic effects of RPM – respond that  
‘[a]lthough the logic is persuasive, there are few documented cases of the use of 
RPM to strengthen manufacturer cartels. Also, a quantitative analysis of U.S. 
manufacturing industries in which RPM was actively employed suggests that in 
most, concentration ratios were too low to believe that price-fixing conspiracies 
were likely to thrive’.171 
In addition, it should be reminded that the formal model presented by Jullien and 
Rey in support of this theory does not lead to unequivocal normative conclusions.
172
 The 
authors conclude that price floors do not always facilitate collusion; under specific 
circumstances they may even make it harder. More specifically, where the discount factor 
is too large, the manufacturers do not need RPM in order to sustain prices close to the 
monopoly level; inversely, where the discount factor is too low and RPM is implemented, 
the short-run gain from deviation will be higher and the long-run cost of defection 
lower.
173
 
Another point to consider is that these theoretical models assume publicly 
observable wholesale contracts.
174
 While full observability may indeed be possible in 
highly concentrated markets, it is still necessary to take into account the facts specific to 
the case at hand and the economic context in which the agreement operates in order to 
reach safe conclusions as to the impact of price floors on competition between 
manufacturers. It is, for example, conceivable that the commitment value of vertical 
restraints imposed to facilitate collusion, such as RPM, may be eliminated if manufacturers 
have the ability to draft non-linear wholesale contracts which are unobservable to rivals.
175
   
As far as collusion in the downstream market is concerned, the only ‘solid’ 
empirical evidence used to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of RPM is provided 
in the paper by Biscourp et al, in which the authors examine the impact of the Galland Act 
on retail prices in France. The Act effectively prohibited the resale of the contract goods to 
end users at a price lower than that quoted in the invoice produced at the time of delivery. 
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The paper essentially deals with a statute the effects of which may resemble those of 
industry-wide RPM in the event that all market participants had the incentive to impose 
price floors and, as such, is of exceptionally limited normative value: it only stands for the 
proposition that unequivocal legality of RPM is unwarranted. Other than this unambiguous 
assumption, I find it difficult to identify its contribution to the existing literature on vertical 
price fixing. The authors refrain from explaining why their findings are more consistent 
with the effects of RPM than, for example, those of an outright dealer cartel. Certainly 
collective enforcement of vertical price fixing is generally meaningful only as a facilitating 
mechanism for upstream or downstream cartels but, in equating an across-the-board 
statutory prohibition on rebates with the individual incentives of profit-maximising 
economic actors, the authors assume that competitors are both willing and able to collude 
under any circumstances, and that collusion is invariably profitable. 
The industry-wide implementation of RPM policies assumed by Biscourp et al is 
severely undermined by empirical evidence from the ‘Fair Trade’ era, which demonstrates 
beyond any doubt that, even in the face of a general leniency towards vertical price fixing, 
the practice is used only marginally by only a fraction of manufacturers. Overstreet 
estimates that fraction as representing ‘no more than one percent of manufacturers, 
accounting for no more than ten percent of consumer good purchases’,176 while Scherer 
and Ross, relying on a number of similar studies, note that, in their heyday, RPM policies 
covered a fraction of retail sales ‘variously estimated at from 4 to 10 percent’.177 Even 
nowadays, as will be argued later in this thesis,
178
 the body of federal antitrust litigation in 
the US almost a decade after Leegin is so limited that it can be concluded with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that the abolition of the per se ban on vertical price fixing has not led to 
a dramatic increase in the use of the relevant clauses. To the extent that, on the basis of 
empirical data, a more permissive policy towards RPM cannot be expected to produce as 
far reaching welfare consequences as an outright statutory prohibition of discounts, the 
implications of the study by Biscourp et al should be regarded as limited to the effects of 
the Galland Act and its conclusions should not be extended to RPM. 
There is another side to this however. The Galland Act was obviously an 
exogenous source of price floors and, as such, its effect cannot be fully consistent with the 
traditional pro-competitive theories of RPM, which are based on the assumption that price 
                                                          
176
 TR Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence (FTC Bureau of 
Economics Staff Report, Nov 1983), p 169. 
177
 FM Scherer and D Ross, supra n 171, p 549. 
178
 See infra s 5.3.  
136 
 
floors are imposed (voluntarily) by an independent manufacturer in an attempt to align its 
interests with those of consumers, thus also making the latter better off. In a paper 
summarising and assessing the existing body of empirical evidence on vertical restraints in 
general, including RPM, Lafontaine and Slade
179
 noted that price floors imposed 
voluntarily by manufacturers had a net positive effect on consumer welfare, thus 
confirming the traditional Chicagoan rubric that the interests of end users are congruent 
with manufacturer profits. What is indeed revealing about this study, however, is that 
vertical restraints imposed exogenously (namely through governmental intervention, as in 
the case of the Galland Act), the consumers were typically made worse off, as the 
consistent consequences of these exogenous restraints were ‘higher prices, higher costs 
shorter hours of operation, and lower consumption as well as lower upstream profits’.180   
To make this point even clearer, to the inconclusive and not particularly instructive 
assumptions of Biscourp et al one can juxtapose empirical evidence from actual RPM 
cases. In a paper published two years prior to the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision, Cooper 
et al reviewed the empirical literature on vertical restraints – including, of course, RPM – 
and vertical integration published between 1984 and 2005, and concluded that, not only did 
most relevant studies demonstrate that vertical restraints and vertical integration in general 
had produced efficiency-enhancing effects, but also that there were hardly any cases where 
forms of vertical control were found to be ‘unambiguously anticompetitive’.181 In fact, 
despite any theoretical academic assertions to the contrary, ‘virtually no studies can claim 
to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed 
competition’.182 The same conclusion is reached by O’Brien in a brief prepared for the 
Swedish Competition Authority: ‘[w]ith few exceptions, the literature does not support the 
view that these practices are used for anticompetitive reasons. The literature supports a 
fairly strong prior belief that these practices are unlikely to be anti-competitive in most 
cases’.183 
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Interestingly, even empirical evidence suggesting that a more relaxed normative 
approach to price floors may result in a loss in consumer welfare provides no support for 
the horizontal collusion story. In a recent study, MacKay and Smith, despite contending 
that ‘a more favorable legal environment for RPM’ is associated with net anti-competitive 
effects reflected in price increases and output decreases, nonetheless take the view that 
their analysis offers ‘little evidence for the broad applicability of any particular theory’, 
whether pro- or anti-competitive.
184
 More specifically, according to the authors the 
available data do not support the manufacturer collusion theory, and provide only ‘weak 
support’ for the downstream collusion theory.185 
At the same time, it appears that the price transparency which is prevalent in the e-
marketplace further undermines the horizontal collusion objection to RPM. In accordance 
with the OECD’s recent report on vertical restraints in the online context, and in light of 
the preceding analysis which demonstrated the existence of powerful Internet outlets which 
serve as market leaders, it is submitted here that that price rigidity in the digital 
environment is considerably more likely than initially thought, and in a number of markets 
it is conceivable that a possible implementation of specific price floors may be unlikely to 
be more effective in facilitating cartels or tacit coordination. Symmetrically to the 
reduction of consumer search costs, the Internet also contributes to a significant decrease in 
the cost of monitoring any deviations from the collusive agreement, thus essentially 
rendering RPM redundant as a policing mechanism. 
Additionally, the pro-competitive justifications for vertical price fixing apply with 
equal force across all distribution channels. The fact that online retailers may offer 
considerably lower prices does not necessarily imply that the stimulation of intrabrand 
price competition makes consumers invariably better off. In markets where non-price 
competition is prominent, the emergence of e-commerce has obviously not reduced the 
need for tangible product-specific promotional services. While the horizontal collusion 
theory reliably supports the argument for a more cautious approach to RPM, it is submitted 
here that sound antitrust policy should be based on a rebuttable presumption of illegality. 
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Chapter 4 
The Agreement Element in Vertical Relationships: Vertical Integration 
by Ownership and Contract 
 
 
Article 101(1) TFEU catches restrictive agreements between undertakings. On the 
basis of the ‘single economic entity’ doctrine, however, EU competition law is generally 
declared inapplicable to relations between legally distinct entities which form part of the 
same economic unit. The exclusion of intra-enterprise conspiracy from the ambit of 
antitrust has been traditionally attributed by the European Commission and Courts to the 
absence of an agreement between the constituent parts of an economic unit: in the context 
of a hierarchical form of organisation, any communication between these parts is regarded 
as an internal allocation of tasks. 
As has already been seen in Chapter 2, from the perspective of new institutional 
economics, vertical integration is understood as an organisational framework which may 
emerge not only from the ownership of successive stages of the distribution chain, but also 
through the contractual mechanism. The legal intellectual basis of this assumption can be 
found in the pioneering studies of Ian Macneil, who analysed the contract law systems that 
govern various forms of contractual relationships ranging from the discrete market 
exchange to internal organisation. At the same time, it has been argued that some types of 
intra-enterprise relations, such as commercial agency, are exempted from the scope of 
antitrust in the absence of a significant anti-competitive effect. 
This chapter will discuss the agreement element in vertical relationships. Following 
the examination of the ‘single economic entity’ doctrine and the analysis of the concept of 
vertical collusion in the EU and the US, this chapter will present Macneil’s influential 
tripartite classification of contract law systems in classical, neoclassical and relational 
contracting. Then, the analysis will follow the intellectual debate on the nature of 
commercial agency as a hierarchical or hybrid form of organisation. Finally, this chapter 
will look at two common forms of restricted dealing which are also tantamount to vertical 
integration by contract, but are treated more favourably than price floors under EU 
competition law: selective distribution and exclusive territories. 
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4.1. The ‘Single Economic Entity’ Doctrine 
 
4.1.1. The Agreement Requirement of Article 101 
 The scope of Article 101 covers anti-competitive agreements, however loosely 
defined, entered into between independent economic actors. Unilateral action that restricts 
competition can be dealt with under Article 102, and only upon condition that the 
undertaking concerned enjoys a sufficient degree of market power. This dichotomy is, 
nevertheless, anything but watertight: it fails to take into account the welfare consequences 
of coordination within the context of a single vertically integrated undertaking which does 
not hold a dominant position in the marketplace. The case law of the European Courts, far 
from having attempted to remedy the resulting lacuna, has instead upheld it as an 
established principle of EU competition law, under the veil of the ‘single economic entity’ 
doctrine. 
 As defined by the CJEU in Höfner and Elser, the term ‘undertaking’ refers to 
‘every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity 
and the way in which it is financed’.1 In its seminal Consten and Grundig decision, the 
CJEU had already stated that the applicability of Article 101 is limited to agreements 
between several undertakings; the coverage of the prohibition does not extend to the 
internal organisation of a single undertaking which integrates its own distribution network 
into its business structure.
2
 As the Court subsequently clarified, the concept of an 
‘undertaking’ may also refer to the grouping of several natural or legal persons into an 
economic unit for the purpose of the subject-matter of a certain agreement. The mere fact 
that these persons have integrated their economic activities in pursuit of their common 
interests entails that there is no competition among them to be restricted in the first place.
3
 
The Court has further held that the relationship between a parent company and its 
subsidiary does not fall within the ambit of the Article 101(1) prohibition, where the latter, 
                                                          
1
 Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21. 
2
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten Sarl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
[1966] ECR 299, 340. 
3
 Case 170/83, Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v Compact del Dott Ing Mario Andreoli & C Sas [1984] ECR 
2999, para 11. 
140 
 
despite having separate legal personality, does not enjoy real autonomy in determining its 
course of action in the market, and the agreement in effect merely constitutes an internal 
allocation of tasks within a single economic unit.
4
 
 The single economic entity doctrine was given its final shape in Viho v 
Commission.
5
 Parker Pen was a manufacturer of writing utensils, whose distribution policy 
required its subsidiaries to refrain from selling its products outside their allocated 
territories. Taking into account the subsidiaries’ lack of freedom of action vis-à-vis their 
parent, the General Court took the position that the market division scheme at hand 
escaped the prohibition of Article 101(1):  
where there is no agreement between economically independent entities, relations 
within an economic unit cannot amount to an agreement or concerted practice 
between undertakings which restricts competition within the meaning of Article 
[101](1) of the Treaty. Where, as in this case, the subsidiary, although having a 
separate legal personality, does not freely determine its conduct on the market but 
carries out the instructions given to it directly or indirectly by the parent company 
by which it is wholly controlled, Article [101](1) does not apply to the relationship 
between the subsidiary and the parent company with which it forms an economic 
unit.
6
  
On appeal, the CJEU endorsed the General Court’s rationale and upheld the decision.7 
 Roughly a decade earlier the US Supreme Court had held in Copperweld that a 
parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring in breach of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that their coordinated activity ‘must be viewed as that of 
a single enterprise’.8 The Court reasoned that a parent and a wholly-owned subsidiary have 
a ‘complete unity of interest’, and that adherence to their common purpose can be ensured 
at any time by the parent's full control over the latter.
9
 Hylton criticises this approach as 
artificial, arguing that the firm itself merely constitutes a potentially efficiency-enhancing 
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contract in restraint of trade, and justifies the Copperweld rule as an attempt by the Court 
to circumvent the rigidity of the per se prohibition.
10
 
 According to Advocate General Lenz, the rationale behind the application of the 
single economic entity doctrine to the relationship between a parent company and its 
subsidiary lies in the absence of ‘an agreement between two or more participants’; the 
latter’s distribution policy is determined unilaterally by the parent.11 The coordination 
between the various constituent parts of a firm is not the result of the separate – although 
integrated – legal entities’ joint intention to behave in the marketplace in a specific way, 
but is achieved instead through the exercise of control over human capital and tangible or 
intangible assets.
12
  
This point was further clarified by Advocate General Mischo who, in his opinion in 
the Stora case, examined the relevant case law of the CJEU and contended that the 
application by the Court of the single economic entity doctrine to the relationship between 
separate legal persons within a corporate group had not been contingent on the issue of 
decisive control exerted by a parent company over its subsidiary; the Court’s inquiry 
focused, instead, on whether an agreement between those entities was possible.
13
 The 
Advocate General observed that in Viho, for example, ‘there could be no question of an 
agreement or concerted practice between Parker Pen Limited and its subsidiaries’.14 The 
existence of authority and control, features inherent in the nature of the firm, entails that 
the subsidiary enjoys limited legal capacity, the scope of which only covers compliance 
with the instructions issued by the parent company and thus does not extend to the 
conclusion of agreements with the latter.
15
 The hierarchical power exercised within the 
framework of a firm accordingly falls outside the ambit of the prohibition exactly because 
it falls short of the ‘agreement’ element of Article 101(1), construed by the General Court 
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in the Bayer case as requiring ‘the existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two 
parties’.16  
 As pointed out by Advocate General Lenz in his opinion in Viho v Commission, 
‘Article [101] does not make the protection of competition an absolute requirement’. In 
order for a competitive restraint to fall within the ambit of the prohibition, it must be the 
result of collusive behaviour, which may take the form of ‘agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices’. In light 
of the very language of Article 101(1), a broad teleological interpretation of that provision 
is thus precluded.
17
 It follows that any loss in allocative efficiency caused by the internal 
allocation of tasks in the context of a non-dominant corporate group does not constitute a 
restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1). The reductionist 
construction of Article 101 by Advocate General Lenz is indicative of the substantial 
difference in the legal and the economic notions of collusion. Motta observes that  
[i]n economics, collusion is a situation where firms’ prices are higher than some 
competitive benchmark. A slightly different definition would label collusion as a 
situation where firms set prices which are close enough to monopoly prices. In any 
case, in economics collusion coincides with an outcome (high-enough price), and 
not with the specific form through which that outcome is attained.
18
 
 The formalistic adherence to the agreement requirement of Article 101 appears, at 
first sight, to be in line with the CJEU’s earlier ruling in Suiker Unie, where the protection 
of the undertakings’ economic autonomy was recognised as a fundamental objective in 
light of which the notion of collusion is to be understood. According to the CJEU, the 
protection of competition is premised on the principle that ‘each economic operator must 
determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market 
including the choice of persons and undertakings to which he makes offers or sells’.19 
Thus, by emphasising that the element of economic autonomy is of central importance to 
the application of Article 101, the Court in effect endorsed the ordoliberal understanding of 
competition as a process in which an economic actor’s freedom of contract remains 
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unrestricted.
20
 The normative implication of this interplay between antitrust and private 
law, as conceived by the Ordoliberals and endorsed under EU competition law, is that any 
restriction of an undertaking’s freedom of action, including its ability ‘to define and 
structure its distribution policy on its own terms’, constitutes a distortion of competition in 
breach of Article 101(1).
21
 
 However, the protection of the downstream undertaking’s economic autonomy does 
not provide an adequate explanation for the applicability of this formalistic approach to 
vertical relationships. In GlaxoSmithKline v Commission, the General Court implicitly 
conceded that the principle enunciated by the CJEU in Suiker Unie is not compatible with 
the obviously binding, and thus restrictive, character of vertical agreements.
22
 In 
emphasising the necessity for an effects-based treatment of vertical restraints, the Court 
took the position that a breach of Article 101(1) may be established only where an 
agreement entered into between undertakings operating at different stages of the 
production and distribution chain is, additionally, found to have an adverse impact on 
consumer welfare:  
as the objective of the Community competition rules is to prevent undertakings, by 
restricting competition between themselves or with third parties, from reducing the 
welfare of the final consumer of the products in question… it is still necessary to 
demonstrate that the limitation in question restricts competition, to the detriment of 
the final consumer.
23
          
 
4.1.1.1. Vertical Collusion in the EU 
The normative implications of the agreement element are further undermined by a 
series of early cases in which the CJEU inferred the existence of an anti-competitive 
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vertical agreement from the mere fact of the ongoing business relationship between a 
manufacturer and its distributors.
24
 
 In AEG-Telefunken,
25
 the CJEU rejected the argument that the exclusion of certain 
dealers from the selective distribution system operated by a manufacturer of consumer 
electronics constituted a unilateral act which fell outside the scope of Article 101(1). The 
dealers were excluded, despite satisfying the stipulated qualitative criteria, on the basis of 
their refusal to comply with the price maintenance scheme implemented by AEG. The 
Court held that the manufacturer’s conduct formed part of the contractual relations 
between the undertakings concerned, by virtue of which admission to the selective 
distribution network was conditional upon the dealers’ tacit or express acceptance of the 
pricing policy pursued by AEG.
26
 A similar approach was taken by the Court of Justice in 
Ford, a case concerning an automobile manufacturer’s refusal to supply right-hand-drive 
cars to its German distributors.
27
 In holding that the agreement requirement of Article 
101(1) had been met, the CJEU essentially took the position that the distributors’ 
acquiescence could be inferred from the mere fact that they did not terminate their business 
relationship with Ford AG. In the Court’s view, admission to Ford AG’s selective 
distribution network amounted to an implicit approval of the manufacturer’s future 
decisions.
28
 Finally, in Sandoz, the Court held that a supplier’s attempt to restrict parallel 
trade by systematically sending to its customers invoices bearing the words ‘export 
prohibited’ did not constitute unilateral conduct, but should instead be regarded as forming 
an integral part of the general commercial relations between Sandoz and its distributors, 
which were governed by a pre-existing agreement. According to the Court, the fact that the 
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distributors renewed their order placements without protest was sufficient for their 
acquiescence of the supplier’s policy to be substantiated.29 
 In the landmark Bayer case, the General Court adopted a more restrictive approach 
to the concept of agreement, which was premised on the subjective element of the parties’ 
‘joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way’.30 As defined by the 
Court, an agreement within the meaning of Article 101 corresponds to ‘the existence of a 
concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being 
unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties’ intention’.31 The 
Court further drew a distinction between genuinely unilateral measures, which lack the 
‘express or implied participation’ of another undertaking and are therefore immune from 
liability under Article 101(1), and measures which, despite appearing as having been 
adopted unilaterally by the manufacturer, receive at least the tacit acquiescence of the 
distributors thus satisfying the agreement requirement.
32
 On that basis, the Court 
maintained that the relevant case law precedents – which included the decisions of the 
Court of Justice in AEG-Telefunken, Ford and Sandoz – were sufficiently distinguishable 
from the case at hand, and confirmed accordingly that they fell within the latter category.
33
 
The decisive step towards the erosion of the principle established in these decisions was 
taken in Volkswagen II, where the General Court held that the existence of a concurrence 
of wills may be substantiated only by reference to a particular conduct, which has already 
been made known to the parties at the time of their acceptance.
34
 
 
4.1.1.2. Vertical Collusion in the US – The Colgate Doctrine    
 Burns argues that, unlike horizontal collusion, ‘the anticompetitive nature of the 
[vertical] arrangement is not linked to a finding of a common plan or unity of purpose 
between the firms. On the contrary ... an anticompetitive vertical arrangement is likely to 
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involve some coercion between the two levels of distribution’.35 By contrast to agreements 
between competitors, whereby cartelists exploit their jointly held market power by 
determining their profit-maximising price in much the same way as a monopolist,
36
 vertical 
arrangements do not create market power, but instead derive from the exercise of pre-
existing market power at either level of the production and distribution chain.
37
 It follows 
that the effects of vertical restraints, whether welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing, are 
produced irrespective of the existence of an ‘agreement’ – as the subjective element which 
constitutes the manifestation of the parties’ joint intention; a fortiori, the existence of an 
agreement, as opposed to unilateral action, is irrelevant to the characterisation of the 
vertical restraint at hand as either benign or harmful.
38
 Therefore the lawfulness of a 
vertical arrangement should be determined not on the basis of its form, but in light of the 
objectives pursued by the antitrust laws.
39
 
 This fundamental teleological assumption also highlights the analytical problems 
associated with the Colgate doctrine, as encapsulated in the US Supreme Court’s infamous 
opinion that  
‘[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not 
restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
private business freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with 
whom he will deal, and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances 
under which he will refuse to sell’.40 
Colgate stood for the proposition that a manufacturer’s refusal to supply a dealer 
who failed to observe resale prices announced in advance was not sufficient to establish the 
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existence of a common scheme, which would otherwise bring the arrangement within the 
ambit of Section 1. Instead, it was acknowledged as constituting an exercise of the 
manufacturer’s obvious right freely to select its distributors.41 As the Supreme Court noted 
in a subsequent case, ‘[i]f real competition is to continue, the right of the individual to 
exercise reasonable discretion in respect to his own business methods must be preserved’.42 
In the years following Colgate, the Court substantially narrowed the scope of the doctrine 
holding that unlawful agreements need not be express, but could also be implied from the 
course of dealing,
43
 and that a manufacturer could not go beyond the exercise of said right 
and undertake affirmative action in an attempt to enforce dealer compliance with the RPM 
policy.
44
 
 The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in United States v Parke, Davis & Co 
demonstrated the limits of the Colgate doctrine. In order to be eligible to benefit from the 
Colgate exception, the only enforcement mechanism available to a manufacturer that had 
adopted a ‘unilateral’ policy of price floors was the outright termination of non-complying 
dealers. As the Court noted  
an unlawful combination is not just such as arises from a price 
maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination is also organized if 
the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond 
his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his announced 
policy.
45
  
In this case, the manufacturer ‘went beyond’ the exercise of its right to announce retail 
prices in advance and secure compliance by terminating discounters. Instead, a finding of 
illegal combination in violation of the Sherman Act was based on two elements: the 
involvement of wholesalers, who were threatened with termination if they continued to 
supply price-cutters, and the fact that renewal of supplies was contingent upon the prior 
provision of assurances on the part of the retailers that they would observe the stipulated 
prices. 
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The most significant problem with the Colgate exception, noted by numerous 
antitrust scholars, was that the manufacturer’s ostensibly ‘unilateral’ refusal to deal in 
reality presented all the characteristics of an agreement, as defined in contract law.
46
 The 
prior announcement of the stipulated resale prices and their endorsement by the 
prospective distributors correspond to a typical example of offer and acceptance, as the 
constitutive elements of a legally enforceable contract. Inversely, the refusal to supply is 
clear evidence of the parties’ failure to reach an agreement. More importantly, however, 
from a welfare perspective Colgate was demonstrably irreconcilable with the rationale 
behind the Dr Miles precedent, as the Supreme Court conceded in United States v Parke, 
Davis & Co:  
True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a prohibited 
combination to suppress price competition if each customer, although induced to do 
so solely by a manufacturer’s announced policy, independently decides to observe 
specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not overruled, this result is tolerated 
...
47
 
This opinion reveals that the intellectual foundations of the Colgate doctrine were 
inherently problematic: the Court’s underpinning concern was not the promotion of 
consumer welfare, but instead the protection of the dealer’s freedom to determine 
independently its conduct in the marketplace.
48
 In other words, a vertical price fixing 
scheme would be upheld insofar as the dealer, in complying with the manufacturer’s 
prices, exercised its own discretion without being bound by a formal contract and the 
coercive enforcement mechanism which it entails.
49
 
The problem with the Colgate doctrine was not only that it failed adequately to 
address any anti-competitive concerns raised by price floors, effectively ignoring the 
horizontal collusion theory on which Dr Miles was based,
50
 but that it also limited the 
availability of efficiency-enhancing RPM to ‘those situations where it [was] least 
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valuable’.51 As will be argued later in this chapter, pro-competitive RPM may be employed 
by the manufacturer as a substitute for full-blown vertical integration where the latter is 
prohibitively costly. Price floors may therefore create a situation of a ‘network’ and 
enhance the self-enforcing range of long-term relational contracts. Networks, however, are 
characterised by three elements, power, influence and trust,
52
 which necessarily imply an 
increased level of cooperation between the various stages of the distribution chain, as well 
as the exercise of a certain degree of coercion. Colgate instead upheld RPM only where the 
organisational setting was weak enough to resemble the classical conception of the contract 
as a discrete transaction. 
 In Monsanto, the case involved the termination of a discounting distributor 
following complaints by numerous other members of the distribution network regarding its 
failure to comply with the manufacturer’s suggested prices.53 Relying on Colgate, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which 
held that the existence of unlawful RPM had been sufficiently established,
54
 noting that  
it is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufacturer, and 
concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing 
agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to per se treatment and 
treble damages ... If an inference of [an RPM] agreement may be drawn from 
highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines 
enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded.
55
 
In the Court’s view, termination in response to dealer complaints created an obvious 
problem of inference, since such complaints represent natural reactions to the activities of 
rivals. Instead, Monsanto stood for the proposition that, in order to establish an unlawful 
combination, the plaintiff was required to provide evidence that the manufacturer and the 
complaining distributors ‘had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to 
achieve and unlawful objective’.56 Under Colgate communications between manufacturers 
and distributors regarding retail prices were legitimate insofar as the parties were not 
prevented from making independent business decisions; consequently, despite the 
probative value of discount-related terminations, ‘[t]here must be evidence that tends to 
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exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting 
independently’.57 
 Furthermore, in a footnote the Court appeared to raise the standard of proof even 
higher, ostensibly requiring the express communication of the parties’ commitment to the 
fixed prices:  
The concept of ‘a meeting of minds’ or a ‘common scheme’ in a distributor-
termination case includes more than a showing that the distributor conformed to the 
suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that the 
distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought 
by the manufacturer.
58
 
At the same time, it may be deduced from the above statement and the references to a 
‘meeting of minds’ and a ‘common scheme’ that the Monsanto dictum did not 
acknowledge coercion as a constitutive element of a Section 1 violation in the case of 
RPM. Instead, Monsanto appears to suggest that the finding of an unlawful combination is 
contingent upon a showing of willing compliance rather that reluctant acquiescence 
following the implementation of coercive means. In this regard, the Court’s approach was 
particularly controversial and clearly in tension with earlier decisions.
59
 
 The last decision in this series of cases in which the Supreme Court placed 
emphasis on the conspiracy doctrine for the adjudication of vertical price fixing was 
Business Electronics.
60
 At issue in Business Electronics was the termination of a small-
scale retailer following an ultimatum delivered to the manufacturer by Hartwell, a 
powerful full-service rival. Although Hartwell had complained in the past about the 
terminated retailer’s price-cutting activities, there was nonetheless no evidence that the 
manufacturer ever attempted to enforce retail price floors. Accordingly, Justice Scalia, 
delivering the opinion of the majority, took the position that a ‘vertical restraint is not 
illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels’.61 In other words, 
in the Court’s view, in the absence of a specific provision designed to maintain specific 
price floors, the termination of a price-cutter would be considered as a non-price restraint 
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for the purposes of the application of Section 1, even if this termination is shown to be the 
result of an agreement between the manufacturer and a complaining distributor. This, 
according to Scalia, was consistent with the existence of a ‘presumption in favour of a rule-
of-reason standard’.62 To the plaintiff’s argument that in the past the Court had established 
the per se illegality of horizontal price fixing agreements without a showing that prices had 
been fixed, Scalia replied that there was no ‘notion of equivalence between the scope of 
horizontal per se illegality and that of vertical per se illegality’, as had already been 
demonstrated by the differentiated treatment of horizontal and vertical market sharing 
schemes.
63
 
 As Mr Justice Kennedy noted in his opinion in Leegin, even the strict standards 
established in Monsanto and Business Electronics did not fully guarantee that unilateral 
conduct would escape the Section 1 prohibition.
64
 In his view, this framework could result 
in inefficient outcomes, by forcing manufacturers to take unnecessary – and costly – 
precautions when discussing its pricing policy with members of its distribution network. 
Similarly, it could result in the termination without explanation of long-standing business 
partners for engaging in minor violations. In both cases, any additional costs would be 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
65
  
Although Leegin did not expressly overrule the Colgate doctrine, its relevance has 
been inevitably put into question. The two last seminal cases of the Colgate saga, 
Monsanto and Business Electronics, were decided in the aftermath of Sylvania,
66
 which 
drew a clear normative distinction between vertical price and non-price restraints, holding 
that the rule of per se illegality was only applicable to the former. Faced with a severe 
problem of inference stemming from the similar effects of these two forms of restricted 
dealing and from the identical reactions on the part of the manufacturer and the diligent 
dealers to price-cutting activities regardless of the nature of the restraint, the post-Sylvania 
decisions were characterised by the Court’s cautious effort to avoid subjecting non-price 
restrictions to an unwarranted per se prohibition. In the post-Leegin world, both price and 
non-price restraints are assessed under an ostensibly unified rule of reason standard. Until 
the nature of the reasonableness inquiry applicable to RPM has been clarified by lower 
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courts, the relevance of the Colgate doctrine, as refined by Monsanto and Business 
Electronics, will remain doubtful.
67
                             
      
4.1.2. The ‘Unity of Interests’ Criterion and the Boundaries of the Firm 
Having rejected the relevance of the agreement element to the interpretation of the 
single economic entity doctrine, it is necessary to consider an alternative basis for the 
inapplicability of Article 101 to the relationship between a parent company and its 
subsidiaries, namely the impossibility of competition between the constituent parts of an 
economic unit. It is submitted that antitrust intervention is unwarranted where the various 
legal entities which compound a corporate group are unable to engage in competition inter 
se, thus exercising a single competitive force on the marketplace.
68
 Building on the CJEU’s 
earlier decision in Hydrotherm,
69
 Advocate General Lenz opines that  
there can be no competition between the parent company and its subsidiaries. 
Independent, economic competitive measures by the subsidiaries are inconceivable 
where the parent company determines and controls their conduct completely, as it 
does here. Consequently, Article [101] is not applicable because there is no 
competition between the group companies which needs to be protected.
70
  
This contention is, nevertheless, equally debatable. Steiner suggests that 
manufacturers and distributors compete not only horizontally, but also vertically: given 
that undertakings operating at successive levels of trade are essentially producers of 
complimentary goods or services and negative cross-elasticity of demand allows them to 
increase their market share only to each other’s detriment, they should be regarded as 
engaging ‘in a form of vertical intrabrand competition’.71 Accordingly, the parties to a 
vertical agreement have the incentive to exert constraints on the exercise of each other’s 
market power.
72
 The main implication of the hierarchical control exercised within the 
framework of a firm, however, is the presumption that this incentive disappears as the 
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separate legal entities concentrate their efforts on the maximisation of the economic unit’s 
profits.
73
  
However, there is nothing to suggest that the protection of vertical intrabrand 
competition, as defined by Steiner, forms part of the objectives of EU competition policy. 
In fact, it is doubtful whether the Commission even embraces this two-dimensional 
understanding of competition. Article 2(4) of Regulation 330/2010, for example, declares 
the inapplicability of the block exemption to ‘vertical agreements entered into between 
competing undertakings’. From the language of this provision it can be inferred that the 
Commission perceives competition as an exclusively horizontal process. More importantly, 
according to the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, unlike horizontal mergers, vertical 
(and conglomerate) mergers ‘do not entail the loss of direct competition between the 
merging firms in the same relevant market’.74 Additionally, vertical mergers have no 
impact on the concentration levels in either the upstream or the downstream markets, 
which entails that any competition concerns that warrant closer scrutiny – most notably 
non-coordinated effects, namely input and customer foreclosure – may arise only where 
the merging undertakings already possess substantial market power, or in markets where 
vertical integration or the use of vertical restraints are widespread.
75
  
Finally, the categorical rejection of the possibility of competition between the 
constituent parts of a corporate group appears to be unfounded. In reality, a firm may 
encompass a variety of divergent economic interests, which reflect the different – and, 
occasionally, even conflicting – incentives of the individual legal entities and employees. 
Although hierarchical control undoubtedly reduces friction in the economic interactions 
between these divisions, the alleged unity of interests between a parent company and its 
subsidiary should not be used as a criterion for the definition of a firm’s boundaries, as it is 
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premised on the unrealistic assumption that these entities invariably have identical profit 
motives.
76
 
 
 
4.2. The Inconsistent Treatment of Vertical Restraints and Vertical Integration – 
RPM in Long-Term Contractual Relationships 
 
4.2.1. Vertical Integration as a Paradigm: Ownership and Contract 
Manufacturers impose vertical restraints in an attempt to prevent their dealers from 
engaging in what Williamson refers to as ‘subgoal pursuit’, namely the independent 
concentration of efforts to the promotion of individual profitability, which, although being 
consistent with the perfect competition paradigm, it may nonetheless jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the distribution system.
77
 In other words, restricted distribution is designed 
as a remedy for those very externalities that vertical integration seeks to internalise.
78
 And, 
inversely, any horizontal externalities associated with the provision of suboptimal pre-sales 
services – arguably the most frequently cited pro-competitive theory of restricted dealing – 
could be effectively controlled by a firm’s decision to integrate vertically.79  
Stone and Wright take the position that ‘[i]t is insufficient for antitrust purposes ... 
to describe a firm by its legal boundaries; instead, contracts can be viewed as firms 
themselves’. They suggest, accordingly, that the Section 1 prohibition should be 
inapplicable to all contractual relationships designed to centralise control in order to 
minimise transaction costs.
80
 The economic autonomy of successive stages of the 
production and distribution chain is irrelevant to transaction cost analysis, which applies 
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equally to market transactions as well as to a firm’s decision to integrate vertically.81 
However, it is important to note at this point that neither vertical mergers nor vertical 
restrictions of competition contribute to the complete elimination of transaction costs. 
Instead, it is the prospect of minimising the transaction costs incurred by a firm for the 
purchase or the development of a certain input that will influence its decision to either 
integrate vertically or use the contractual mechanism, respectively.
82
 
That markets and hierarchies are interchangeable organisational structures may be 
further understood in light of the definition of vertical integration provided by the theory of 
new institutional economics. Williamson advances a broad understanding of the concept:  
Vertical integration turns out to be a paradigm. Thus although many of the 
empirical tests and public policy applications have reference to the make-or-buy 
decision and vertical market restrictions, this same conceptual framework has 
application to contracting more generally. Specifically, the contractual relation 
between the firm and its ‘stakeholders’ – customers, suppliers, and workers along 
with financial investors – turn out to be variations on the theme set out in the 
simple contractual schema.
83
    
Interestingly, the Commission has already conceded that the centralisation of 
control by means of long-term contractual arrangements may amount to an acquisition of 
control within the meaning of the European Union Merger Regulation (‘EUMR’).84 In its 
Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice on mergers, the Commission endorses a broad 
understanding of control, which goes beyond the formalistic reliance on the existence of 
property rights over shares or assets to encompass purely economic relationships between 
undertakings operating at successive stages of the production and distribution chain. ‘In 
exceptional circumstances’, the Commission notes, ‘a situation of economic dependence 
may lead to control on a de facto basis where, for example, very important long-term 
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supply agreements or credits provided by suppliers or customers, coupled with structural 
links, confer decisive influence’.85 It is submitted that de facto control within the meaning 
of the Jurisdictional Notice may be asserted where substantial relationship-specific 
investments undertaken by either party to a contractual relationship give rise to hold-up 
problems.
86
  
As alternative methods of vertical integration, ownership and contract have cost-
effectiveness as their common denominator. That said, they also present substantial 
differences. First, unlike integration by contract, ownership guarantees the maximisation of 
control over the successive stages of distribution without recourse to the traditional 
contract law remedies. On the other hand, the threat of termination of a contractual 
relationship may have similar effects as hierarchical control. Second, while integration by 
contract offers parties a greater degree of flexibility, allowing them to adapt more 
effectively to changing marketing conditions, arrangements between independent 
economic actors are generally more volatile than the rigid relationships developed within a 
corporate group. At the same time, however, vertical agreements have the advantage of 
providing the parties with the ability to reach a consensus on the desired degree of 
flexibility and stability that will best serve their commercial interests. Third, despite any 
advantages of an economic or even political nature which are usually attributable to large 
size, diseconomies of scale may decrease a firm’s efficiency thus discouraging its 
expansion.
87
   
Kessler and Stern note that, in spite of their differences, ‘[c]ontractual 
arrangements aimed at coordinating the supply of materials or disposal of output frequently 
affect the contracting firms, as well as the rest of the industry, in much the same way as 
ownership of suppliers or outlets does’.88 Besides, Grossman and Hart take the position 
that both methods of vertical integration have a similar impact on the firm’s ability to 
monitor any changes in the incentive structures of the various stages of the distribution 
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chain.
89
 It follows that integration by contract should be regarded as nothing but an 
alternative form of vertical integration. 
Furthermore, a relevant Commission Notice has introduced a simplified procedure 
for the appraisal of concentrations which ‘do not raise competition concerns’, and may thus 
be declared compatible with the common market following the adoption of a short-form 
decision by the Commission.
90
 In order for a notified vertical merger to benefit from this 
presumption and trigger the application of the simplified procedure, two conditions must 
be cumulatively satisfied. First, where the concentration involves undertakings which are 
active in the same product and geographic market, their combined market share must be 
less than 20 percent; and second, the individual or combined market shares of all 
vertically-related parties to the concentration must be less than 30 percent.
91
 The latter 
criterion is equivalent (albeit not similar) to the market share threshold set out by Article 
3(1) of Regulation 330/2010. Given that vertical agreements containing any of the 
hardcore restrictions cited in Article 4 are explicitly excluded from the block exemption, 
suppliers who seek to benefit from the efficiency-enhancing effects of RPM can reasonably 
be expected to contemplate vertical integration as an alternative, in an attempt to avoid 
exposure to antitrust liability.
92
 Interestingly, in the aftermath of the seminal judgment of 
the CJEU in Consten and Grundig, the parties responded to antitrust intervention by 
integrating vertically into the successive stages of the distribution chain.
93
 
On various occasions, however, recourse to integration by ownership in lieu of 
RPM may give rise to inefficient outcomes, as was also acknowledged by the Leegin 
Court:  
depending on the type of product it sells, a manufacturer might be able to achieve 
the precompetitive benefits of resale price maintenance by integrating downstream 
and selling its products directly to consumers. Dr. Miles tilts the relative costs of 
vertical integration and vertical agreement by making the former more attractive 
based on the per se rule, not on real market conditions. This distortion might lead to 
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inefficient integration that would not otherwise take place, so that consumers must 
again suffer the consequences of the suboptimal distribution strategy. And 
integration, unlike vertical price restraints, eliminates all intrabrand competition.
94
  
A manufacturer may find it more profitable to remain unintegrated and set up a 
restricted distribution system where the transaction costs associated with hierarchical 
control, or even with vertical integration itself, are high, or where independent distributors 
are likely to perform their assigned tasks more effectively than the downstream division of 
a vertically-integrated firm.
95
 Where, for example, the price-maintained goods are sold at 
the retail stage and full exploitation of economies of scope is possible only for multi-brand 
retailers, it can be safely assumed that certain manufacturers will find it prohibitively 
costly to integrate vertically in order to ensure that end users are provided with the optimal 
amount of pre-sales services. Even in industries where the integration of production and 
distribution is indeed economically feasible, cost-effectiveness and the need for increased 
specialisation frequently require that manufacturer-owned outlets and independent retailers 
operate side-by-side in the downstream market, in the context of a dual distribution 
network.
96
 
 
4.2.2. Vertical Integration as a Paradigm: Insights from Contract Law Theory    
The fact that the ownership/contract dichotomy is not as sharp as assumed under 
EU competition law can be observed in many types of contemporary commercial 
transactions, and particularly in long-term distribution agreements. The obscure boundaries 
between markets and hierarchies have been the subject of intellectual scrutiny not only by 
economists, but also by contract law theorists. Prominent among the latter was Ian 
Macneil, whose insightful analysis was premised upon the distinction between discrete and 
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relational transactions.
97
 Macneil suggested a tripartite classification of contract law 
systems which reflects the respective stages in the evolution of the nature of contractual 
relationships.
98
 
Classical contract law is based on the assumption that transactions are entirely 
discrete: they are the result of the almost accidental interaction between total strangers and 
are independent of any past and future contextual inferences. The classical model is 
therefore designed to facilitate and encourage participation in transactions by enhancing 
discreteness, as well as presentiation,
99
 defined by Macneil as the ‘recognition that the 
course of the future is bound by present events, and that by those events the future has for 
many purposes been brought effectively into the present’.100 Classical contract law 
attempts to integrate discreteness and presentiation into transactions in various ways. More 
specifically, (i) classical contract law is indifferent to the identity of the parties to the 
transaction; (ii) it commodifies the subject matter of the contract; (iii) the substantive 
content of the transaction is inferred from a limited set of formal, rather than informal, 
elements; (iv) in the event of non-performance, the limited availability of remedies 
guarantees the predictability of any consequences brought about by the initial 
presentiation’s failure to materialise; (v) under classical contract law, the boundaries of the 
transaction are carefully delineated on the basis of ‘rigorous and precise’ rules; and, (vi) 
participation of third parties in the contractual relationship is discouraged.
101
    
Complete presentiation is, however, virtually impossible in the case of long-term 
contracts, which are inherently incomplete – and thus unstable – in response to the need for 
increased flexibility.
102
 More specifically, as gaps in contract planning naturally reduce 
predictability, the fundamental objective of enhanced presentiation under classical contract 
law is incompatible with the introduction of flexibility in long-term contracting.
103
 The 
neoclassical contract law system acknowledges the parties’ interest in preventing possible 
termination of the contractual relationship even in the event of internal conflict. 
Accordingly, neoclassical contract law partially rectifies the relevant shortcoming of the 
classical approach by providing the necessary processes and remedies which allow for the 
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adjustment of existing contractual relations to any subsequent changes in circumstances.
104
 
Nevertheless, the neoclassical system merely relaxes the classical objectives of 
discreteness and presentiation without fully renouncing them. In that sense, it does not 
introduce a radical departure from the classical pattern insofar as it requires ‘adherence to 
an overall structure founded on full consent at the time of initial contracting’.105 
In light of this assumption, the applicability of the classical and neoclassical models 
to contemporary economic transactions appears to have weakened substantially. Macneil 
observes that contractual relationships are distinguishable from discrete contract 
transactions in that they involve ‘whole person relations, relatively deep and extensive 
communication by a variety of modes, and significant elements of non-economic personal 
satisfaction’.106 Although both neoclassical and relational contract law relax the 
requirement for discreteness and presentiation, the point of reference of the latter approach 
is the entire relation, which remains the framework for contractual performance, and not 
merely the original agreement.
107
 In the context of ongoing, long-term commercial 
interactions, complexity and uncertainty prevent the parties from reaching agreements on 
specific performance standards. In other words, parties to a relational contract ‘are 
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations’.108  
While planning in discrete transactions focuses exclusively on the subject matter of 
the exchange, relational contracts differ to the extent that planning is at least equally 
concerned with the development of processes for conducting future exchanges and further 
planning.
109
 Furthermore, by contrast to discrete transactions which are fully binding on 
both parties, the need for flexibility in contractual relations allows for subsequent 
amendments to the initial planning, which may be either mutually agreed upon or imposed 
unilaterally.
110
 The recognition of the parties’ interdependence is an additional distinctive 
feature of relational contracts. This increased degree of interdependence reflects the 
complex character of contractual relations and is associated with the expectation of 
solidarity in future cooperation, as a result of the existence of a similarity of interests.
111
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In emphasising the role of interfirm relations as the focal point of contemporary 
exchange transactions, Macneil’s insightful scholarship supplements the contribution of 
transaction cost economics to the understanding of the blurred boundaries between markets 
and hierarchies. On the basis of a weakened adherence to discreteness and presentiation, 
the relational approach downplays the significance of the exchange – which under 
traditional contract law constitutes the quintessential element of the market-firm dichotomy 
– as the point of reference of any adjustment mechanisms that may be triggered in the face 
of conflict.
112
 Relational contract law thus provides the necessary legal theoretical 
framework for the mitigation of the conceptual tension between integration by contract and 
integration by ownership.
113
 
 
4.2.3. The Boundaries of the Firm: Markets, Hierarchies and Networks  
In a study on the economic implications of Macneil’s scholarship, Baker et al offer 
an alternative theory on the boundaries of the firm, suggesting that firms adopt that form of 
integration (ownership or contract) that best serves the relationship between the different 
levels of the chain.
114
 Professor William A Klein takes the relational theory a step forward: 
relying on the element of dependence between the two stages of the production and 
distribution chain, he suggests that, where either of the parties to a distributorship 
agreement is in practice ‘heavily dependent’ on the other, the two – otherwise separate – 
entities ‘can be thought of as parts of a single organization and their relationship 
analogized to a partnership’.115 Similarly, Orts uses the term ‘relational firms’ to refer to 
forms of organisation which, although superseding the traditional notion of market 
transactions, do not necessarily fit within the conventional boundaries of fully integrated 
entities.
116
 Relational firms, according to Orts, are the result of the ongoing relationship 
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between smaller firms which agree to act as a single entity and, as such, compete with each 
other in ‘organizational metamarkets’.117 
This understanding of contractual relationships corresponds to the notion of 
‘networks’, namely organisational structures which, due to the intense cooperation between 
the interacting firms, are placed in the middle of a continuum whose polar extremes are 
markets and hierarchies.
118
 According to Thorelli’s eloquent description of these 
interactions, 
[r]elationships, such as standing contracts, comprise streams of transactions or 
exchanges, which may or may not be directly tied in with any specific delivery of 
goods. Indeed, in the manyfold of transactions it would often be difficult to say 
where one leaves off and the next begins. Building networks involves expenditure 
of money and executive talent over many periods of time. It follows that resources 
spent on all aspects of networking other than everyday maintenance are to be 
regarded as strategic market investments.
119
  
Williamson, on the other hand, describes ‘hybrid’ organisational structures, in the context 
of which ‘the requisite adaptations to disturbances are neither predominantly autonomous 
nor bilateral, but require a mixture of each’.120 On the same intellectual basis, Areeda et al 
suggest the term ‘vertical integration by dependency or by contract’ to describe hybrid 
forms of organisational structure that combine features of both market contracting and 
hierarchical control:  
Sometimes it makes sense for firms to combine aspects of vertical integration and 
coordination by contract. The single firm might be organized into divisions where 
each division is a profit center responsible for maximizing its own profits and 
therefore dealing with other divisions at arm’s length, almost as if they were 
separate firms. On the other side, entirely separate firms may have very disparate 
bargaining strength or deal with each other through long-term contracts that may, 
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for example, allocate important decision rights to one to one of the firms so that 
their dealings resemble those within the integrated firm.
121
 
The most typical example of such a hybrid system is the franchise agreement, 
namely the agreement whereby a supplier (‘franchisor’) licenses to an independent 
downstream undertaking (‘franchisee’) intellectual property rights for the use and 
distribution of goods or services. The franchisee, who commonly pays royalties calculated 
on the basis of sales made, is also the recipient of commercial and technical assistance. The 
element that distinguishes franchising from other forms of distributorship agreements is the 
increased level of control exercised by the franchisor over the franchisee’s business 
strategy.
122
 In terms of their organisational structure, therefore, it could be argued that 
franchising is more closely related to vertical integration by ownership than other forms of 
distribution agreements. Under EU competition law, franchising is generally covered by 
the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation,
123
 while the Court of Justice has held that 
certain restraints contained in a franchise agreement may even escape the application of 
Article 101(1) insofar as they are necessary for the protection of the franchisor’s know-
how and for the maintenance of the reputation of the network.
124
 Nevertheless, clauses 
restricting the franchisee’s freedom to determine its prices are subject to the usual 
prohibition.
125
  
Rubin takes the position that the restrictions of competition imposed in the context 
of a franchise system do not warrant antitrust intervention. Even though franchising is 
associated with the use of the market mechanism, the high degree of integration into the 
franchisor’s operation has as a consequence that the franchisee’s economic independence 
is curtailed, to the extent that the latter’s status resembles that of an employee.126 More 
specifically, the emergence of franchise systems can be explained in light of the 
externalities attributed to the franchisees’ post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. In an 
attempt to prevent shirking that could have an adverse impact on the reputation of its 
trademark, the franchisor increases control over the franchise in order to ensure that certain 
quality standards are observed. Ongoing performance in the form of active monitoring is 
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desired not only by the franchisor, but also by diligent franchisees which also incur part of 
the costs in the event of quality deterioration caused by shirking.
127
 
 
4.2.4. RPM through the Lens of New Institutional Economics 
 Insights from the theory of new institutional economics are central to our 
understanding of the economic function of price floors. The most prominent explanation 
for RPM, Telser’s free rider argument, is – implicitly, yet inherently – premised on 
Coasean transaction cost analysis.
128
 As free riding represents a typical manifestation of 
opportunistic behaviour, the intellectual cornerstone of the free rider rationale is nothing 
other than the assumption that the costs of monitoring and policing dealer performance 
may be disproportionately costly, thus reducing the manufacturer’s incentive to contract 
directly on the requisite level of product-specific services.
129
 
 Subsequent studies have also relied on new institutional economics to justify the 
implementation of RPM in long-term vertical relationships, namely in the context of an 
organisational setting where the hierarchical structure has been superseded by the market 
mechanism. According to these theories, price floors employed in contractual relationships 
governed by relational norms may be designed to incentivise retailers to engage in the 
desired promotional activities, or as a remedy to market failures typically addressed by 
means of vertical integration.  
 
4.2.4.1. RPM as Ex Ante Incentive Alignment Mechanism      
Examined from a relational perspective, the manufacturer’s inability to draft an 
enforceable contract specifying the desired pre-sales services may be remedied by means 
of a private enforcement mechanism, in the context of which the manufacturer adequately 
compensates performing dealers, on the one hand, while relying on the threat of 
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termination of shirking dealers, on the other. Professors Klein and Murphy, while 
endorsing the basic premise of Telser’s argument – that promotional efforts may be subject 
to free riding – nevertheless criticise his theory on the basis of its failure to explain exactly 
how vertical restraints may induce the supply of the requisite level of product-specific 
services. In their view, the mere implementation of price floors does not reduce a retailer’s 
incentive to free ride, by engaging in promotional activities valued by consumers, but not 
by the manufacturer.
130
     
In addressing this shortcoming of Telser’s theory, Klein and Murphy note that a 
manufacturer may employ RPM in order to ensure dealer compensation – and, thus, dealer 
performance – by creating on a per unit basis a quasi-rent stream131 which exceeds any 
potential short-run shirking gains.
132
 The result is an ‘implicit contractual understanding’ 
whereby the dealer is compensated for any pre-sales services on the basis of its output 
which, in the absence of vertical integration, appears to be the appropriate measure of 
services provided, assuming that the manufacturer is not in a position to monitor either the 
level of services or the state of demand.
133
 
 
4.2.4.2. RPM and Double Moral Hazard 
Similarly, Romano takes the position that RPM (either minimum or maximum, 
depending on the parameters) may remedy any vertical externalities emerging in the 
context of a vertical relationship, where the decisions of both parties are subject to moral 
hazard.
134
 This is particularly the case where both the upstream and the downstream firms 
are in a position to affect demand by means of non-price choices, such as quality 
improvement and promotional activities, respectively. Double moral hazard may thus arise 
if these decisions are non-contractible, in which case they constitute variables chosen non-
cooperatively by each of the parties at a later stage. Against this background, vertical 
externalities are created where the wholesale price exceeds the upstream firm’s marginal 
cost, thus reducing the retailer’s incentives, and the wholesale price is lower than the final 
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price; in the latter situation it is the supplier’s incentive that is affected. According to 
Romano, price floors may solve these vertical externalities where quality and promotion 
are strategic complements: the increased promotional efforts resulting from RPM will 
enhance the marginal productivity of quality, thus inducing the manufacturer to improve 
the quality of the supplied good.
135
  
In light of the foregoing, RPM can be regarded as a strategic alternative to vertical 
integration by ownership, insofar as it is designed to encourage distributors to undertake 
relationship-specific investments for the provision of pre-sales services in the context of 
long-term distributorship agreements. Since it can be safely assumed that the 
disproportionately high costs associated with the measurement of dealer performance in 
court proceedings for breach of contractual obligations will prevent a manufacturer from 
drafting an initial distributorship contract explicitly requiring such investments, the 
subsequent addition of an RPM clause may be deemed appropriate as a means to induce 
dealers to engage in promotional activities that will stimulate demand for the 
manufacturer’s products. Such an adjustment is fully consistent with the relational model, 
particularly where distributors are faced with the threat of termination in the event of 
failure to observe the manufacturer’s pricing strategy.136 Thus, according to Butler and 
Baysinger, an agreement fixing resale prices is merely ‘a bilateral governance structure 
that should be interpreted through relational contracting law principles … RPM is a 
strategy through which a firm is able to expand its sphere of influence beyond its legal 
boundaries’.137 
 
 
4.3. Commercial Agency 
 
 An agent is defined by the European Commission’s Vertical Guidelines as a legal 
or physical person appointed by another person, usually referred to as ‘the principal’, with 
the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of the latter, which involve 
either the purchase of goods or services by the principal, or the sale of goods or services 
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supplied by it.
138
 As remuneration for its services, the agent typically receives either a 
salary or a commission on the contracts concluded. For the purposes of the application of 
Article 101 TFEU, the functions performed by the agent are considered as forming part of 
the principal’s activities, insofar as the agent  
does not bear any, or bears only insignificant, [financial or commercial] risks in 
relation to the contracts concluded and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal, in 
relation to market-specific investments for that field of activity, and in relation to 
other activities required by the principal to be undertaken on the same product 
market.
139
 
Where this requirement is met, the prohibition of Article 101(1) will be declared 
inapplicable, even if the agreement at issue contains clauses that are typically classified as 
hardcore restraints, including export bans and vertical price restraints. In the context of 
commercial agency, such restraints are deemed essential in light of the risks assumed by 
the principal, who accordingly needs to be in a position to determine the appropriate 
commercial strategy.
140
 
 The origins of the public policy towards commercial agency can be traced in the 
US Supreme Court's decision in General Electric.
141
 As was seen earlier,
142
 the 
‘consignment exception’ introduced in General Electric was effectively based on the 
property logic underpinning the earlier Dr Miles case. According to Mr Justice Taft, who 
delivered the opinion of the Court,  
there is nothing as a matter of principle or in the authorities which requires us to 
hold that genuine contracts of agency like those before us, however comprehensive 
as a mass or whole in their effect, are violations of the Anti-Trust Act. The owner 
of an article, patented or otherwise, is not violating the common law or the Anti-
Trust Act by seeking to dispose of his articles directly to the consumer and fixing 
the price by which his agents transfer the title from him directly to such 
consumer.
143
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 In Simpson v Union Oil Co, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the 
consignment exception by ruling that the determining factor when assessing the 
compatibility of a relevant agreement with Section 1 of the Sherman Act is the allocation 
of risks between the principal and the consignee.
144
 The case concerned an agreement 
between an oil refiner and its gasoline retailer whereby the former retained title to the 
consigned goods, while fixing the retail price to be observed by Simpson. In condemning 
the RPM scheme at issue, the Court noted that the risk of loss was entirely on Simpson, 
who bore personal liability and property damage insurance by reason of the contract goods, 
while also being responsible for all losses in the consigned gasoline in his possession. 
Simpson thus essentially operated as an independent businessman and, in that sense, 
formalistic reliance on the transfer of ownership requirement would allow potentially 
harmful arrangements to escape the antitrust laws merely by means of a ‘clever 
manipulation of words’.145 The fact that the price-maintained gasoline was distributed 
through a vast and established distribution network was an additional consideration:
146
 
according to Mr Justice Douglas, for the purposes of the application of the Section 1 
prohibition, a consignment agreement cannot amount to commercial agency where its 
ultimate effect is equivalent to a horizontal price fixing conspiracy.
147
 
 The European Commission outlined the public policy towards commercial agency 
for the first time in a relevant Notice published as early as 1962.
148
 While neither the 1962 
Notice nor the 2000 Vertical Guidelines
149
 left any doubts as to the constituent elements of 
commercial agency, significant controversy nonetheless emerged in that regard from the 
Commission and European Courts’ decision-making practice.150 In Pittsburgh Corning, the 
Commission, citing the judgment of the CJEU in Consten and Grundig
151
 as an authority, 
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refrained from examining any possible allocation of risks between the parties involved in 
the agreement and relied solely on degree of the agent’s economic dependence on the 
supplier. In that regard, the Commission took the position that the agent was not 
performing the functions of an auxiliary organ, nor was it integrated into the principal’s 
distribution system. Instead, the agent was simultaneously the subsidiary of other powerful 
undertakings and enjoyed in itself a degree of market power sufficient to allow it to deviate 
from the principal’s directions, while sales of its own products accounted for a substantial 
part of its turnover.
152
 The ‘integration criterion’ was further clarified in Vereniging 
Vlaamse Reisbureaus, where the Court of Justice held that agreements whereby travel 
agents in Belgium were obliged to observe the prices of tours stipulated by tour operators 
could not benefit from the immunity from antitrust liability conferred on commercial 
agency. In holding that the price fixing schemes at hand fell within the scope of Article 
101(1), the Court noted that travel agents could not qualify as auxiliary organs forming an 
integral part of a tour operator’s undertaking in light of the network of relationships 
between the upstream and downstream firms: each travel agent ‘sells travel organized by a 
large number of different tour operators and a tour operator sells travel through a very 
large number of agents’.153 
 In Mercedes-Benz, the Commission categorically rejected the assertion that the 
criterion of integration is relevant to the distinction between a commercial agent and an 
independent dealer.
154
 On appeal, however, the General Court drew a clear analogy 
between commercial agency and the single economic entity doctrine:  
In so far as application of Article [101 TFEU] is concerned, the question whether a 
principal and its agent or ‘commercial representative’ form a single economic unit, 
the agent being an auxiliary body forming part of the principal’s undertaking, is an 
important one for the purposes of establishing whether given conduct falls within 
the scope of that article.
155
  
Effectively transplanting the analytical framework associated with the single economic 
entity doctrine into the public policy towards commercial agency, the Court pointed out 
that immunity from antitrust liability is contingent upon a showing that the agent does not 
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determine independently its own conduct in the marketplace, but merely complies with the 
instructions given to it by the principal.
156
 The Court further emphasised that an additional 
relevant element is the exercise of authority over the agent’s marketing strategy.157  
 Eventually, in both editions of its Vertical Guidelines, the Commission appears to 
have dismissed the integration criterion, citing two only relevant factors which delineate 
the concept of agency: the agent’s function as an organ negotiating and/or concluding sale 
or purchase transactions on behalf of the principal, and the level of risks assumed by the 
agent in relation to the fulfilment of its duties. In effect, by conceding that it is irrelevant 
for the purposes of defining an agency agreement whether the agent acts for one or several 
principals,
158
 the Commission distances itself from the CJEU’s judgment in Vereniging 
Vlaamse Reisbureaus and implicitly rejects the criterion of economic dependence.
159
 
 In two subsequent decisions, however, the Court of Justice also embraced the 
criterion of risk allocation as the distinctive element of commercial agency. In CEEES, 
despite observing that the relationship between a principal and its agent may be 
indistinguishable from the interactions between the various constituent parts of an 
economic unit within the meaning of Article 101,
160
 the Court conceded that agents may 
lose their character as independent traders where do not bear any of the risks associated 
with the negotiation of contracts on behalf of the principal:
161
  
It follows that the decisive factor for the purposes of determining whether a service 
station operator is an independent economic operator is to be found in the 
agreement concluded with the principal and, in particular, in the clauses of that 
agreement, implied or express, relating to the assumption of the financial and 
commercial risks linked to sales of goods to third parties. ... [T]he question of risk 
must be analysed on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the real economic 
situation rather than the legal classification of the contractual relationship in 
national law.
162
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This approach was later re-iterated and confirmed by the Court in CEPSA.
163
      
 It is important to note that, unlike EU competition law, which is naturally 
concerned with the likely adverse effects of restricted dealing on trade between Member 
States, under US antitrust law the significance of the consignment-agency exception has 
been limited to the field of vertical price restraints.
164
 Whether the distinction between 
independent distributorship agreements and commercial agency for antitrust purposes can 
be defended on efficiency grounds is questionable. Theories of harm associated with the 
implementation of RPM schemes, such as the facilitation of manufacturer or dealer cartels, 
are equally applicable to agency relationships. Posner observes that, if Dr Miles is to be 
interpreted as proscribing vertical restraints which have the same adverse competitive 
impact as horizontal collusion, then the consignment exception as applied in General 
Electric is in sharp contrast with this precedent. And, inversely, if the consignment 
exception, along with the Colgate doctrine, stand for the proposition that the manufacturer 
may, under certain circumstances, have legitimate reasons for imposing minimum resale 
prices, then the per se treatment of RPM is rather unwarranted.
165
  
 That said, the consignment exception is consistent with the idea that the risk bearer 
is in a better position to determine its own profit-maximising price.
166
 Additionally, by 
fixing the agent’s mark-up, which in this way serves as a commission on sales made, the 
principal may be seeking to incentivise the dealer to increase its sales efforts in the face of 
any fluctuations in the retail market price relative to the wholesale price paid at the time of 
consignment.
167
 The lenient public policy towards commercial agency can also be 
explained in light of new institutional economics: Lianos sees agency as an organisational 
structure similar to a situation of hierarchy. The fact that the principal retains property 
rights over the contract goods makes it susceptible to possible post-contractual 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of its agents. Against this background, antitrust 
immunity is deemed necessary to encourage the supplier to incur the administrative costs 
of establishing the form of organisation that best serves its commercial interests.
168
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 As a general proposition, the economic notion of agency refers to an agreement 
whereby the principal delegates a specific task to a different party and, accordingly, it is 
considerably broader that the respective antitrust definition.
169
 In other words, a member of 
a distribution network is automatically classified as an agent in the above sense, regardless 
of whether it assumes financial or commercial risks of any degree. As has already been 
explained, it is in the context of such relationships that information asymmetry gives rise to 
agency problems which may expose the principal to post-contractual opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the agent. In the face of a possible conflict of interests, the principal 
is presented with two options; it can either adopt a monitoring mechanism, by entering into 
a form of hierarchical relationship with the agent,
170
 or align the parties’ interests by 
creating outcome-based agent incentives.
171
 An outcome-based contract, however, entails 
the transfer of risk to the agent, whose performance may be determined by a number of 
contingencies which are independent of its own efforts. Against this background, the 
greater the agent’s risk aversion, the greater the likelihood that it will demand a premium 
for bearing compensation risk and, in turn, the greater the costs incurred by the principal 
for the conclusion of an outcome-based contract.
172
 
 Naturally, both polar extremes may be prohibitively costly for a manufacturer. 
Hierarchical organization, on the one hand, although maximising control over distribution, 
requires a significant commitment of resources and exposes the manufacturer to an 
unfamiliar business environment, while considerably limiting its flexibility.
173
 At the same 
time, arm’s length transactions may give rise to the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.
174
 On the basis of this analysis, and contrary to Lianos’s assertion, Zhang175 
takes the view that commercial agency is a hybrid form of organisation, which essentially 
constitutes ‘a middle ground between vertical integration and outsourced distribution’.176 
 Zhang further justifies the lenient approach taken to commercial agency as 
reflecting the authorities’ lack of concern as to its effects on competition. While Zhang’s 
argument that agency agreements may have practically no contribution to the facilitation of 
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a downstream cartel is indeed convincing, as the manufacturer remains the residual control 
rights holder,
177
 her comparative analysis of the possible impact of RPM and commercial 
agency on the stabilisation of upstream cartels should rather be dismissed: 
Of course, if multiple competing manufacturers appoint the same agent and use that 
agent as a conduit for exchanging price information, this amounts to horizontal 
price fixing, in violation of antitrust law. In such a case, however, it is not the 
vertical restraint that makes the cartel possible – the manufacturers in question are 
able to fix prices on their own in the first place. Resale price maintenance might 
have the effect of facilitating such a cartel, though, as the manufacturers would not 
be able to easily fix retail prices in the absence of restraints imposed on the 
downstream retailers.
178
 
First of all, horizontal collusion is exactly that; horizontal. As will be argued in Chapter 6, 
whether the parties to a collusive arrangement implement a vertical restraint of any sort as 
a facilitating mechanism, the loss in allocative efficiency which will trigger the application 
of the antitrust laws will be caused by the horizontal coordination, not by the vertical 
restraint. Second, Zhang appears to be confusing the ability to collude with the ability to 
monitor compliance with the rules of the cartel. More specifically, whether upstream firms 
are indeed ‘able to fix prices on their own’ is an issue which has nothing to do with the 
vertical relationship, but with other factors such as the structure of the relevant market, the 
availability of sensitive information on prices and cost structures, or the degree of product 
differentiation, none of which is in any way affected by RPM. In other words, RPM may 
be designed to ensure compliance with the cartel, not to create it. There can be no 
misunderstanding that RPM may indeed facilitate the maintenance of the collusive 
equilibrium, but this does not entail, as Zhang appears to imply, that RPM is a necessary 
condition of successful cartelisation. The European Commission and Courts’ decision-
making practice is particularly instructive in that regard. In no cartel case brought by the 
Commission under Article 101 was there any evidence of a parallel implementation of 
price floors and, inversely, in no vertical price fixing case did the Commission rely on an 
individual RPM scheme in order to infer the existence of a cartel. If Zhang’s assertion was 
correct and collusion was indeed difficult in the absence of RPM, then one would expect to 
encounter not only at least some, but in fact an overwhelming number of cases combining 
horizontal and vertical price fixing. In light of the foregoing, the facilitation of the 
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exchange of sensitive information on prices through a common agent, which Zhang 
quickly dismisses as a purely horizontal matter – and rightly so – could in reality be 
described as greater threat from a welfare perspective, since it is effectively a constitutive 
element of a cartel.
179
             
 
 
4.4. RPM and Selective Distribution 
 
 The maintenance of price floors is not the only means whereby no-frills retailers 
may be prevented from taking a free ride on the promotional efforts of their full-service 
rivals. A manufacturer may insulate its distribution network from the activities of free 
riders by selecting its members on the basis of qualitative criteria and by prohibiting any 
sales to unauthorised dealers, namely to wholesalers and retailers which fail to satisfy the 
necessary requirements as specified by the manufacturer and dictated by the nature of the 
contract goods. Being a unilateral act, a non-dominant manufacturer’s refusal to deal with 
a specific distributor – any distributor and for whatever reason – falls outside the ambit of 
Article 101 TFEU. The manufacturer, however, cannot effectively prevent unauthorised 
dealers from carrying its products unless it ensures that they will not have access to 
alternative sources of supply. The fundamental characteristic of selective distribution 
therefore consists in the manufacturer’s right to allow the resale of its products only to 
approved dealers and end users. 
Article 101(1) TFEU is generally not applicable to purely qualitative selective 
distribution. In order for such a system to escape the prohibition of Article 101(1) three 
conditions must be met. First, selective distribution must be necessary in light of the nature 
of the products concerned, a requirement typically satisfied by distribution networks in ‘the 
sector covering the production of high quality and technically advanced consumer 
durables’.180 Second, the selection of the authorised distributors must be based on a set of 
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objective criteria of a qualitative nature, which are applicable to all potential dealers in a 
non discriminatory way. And third, these criteria must be proportional and not go beyond 
what is necessary for the effective distribution of the contract goods.
181
 In addition to these 
three conditions outlined in the Vertical Guidelines, the European Courts further require 
that the result sought by the distribution system be capable of enhancing competition, thus 
counterbalancing the restriction of competition inherent in selective distribution.
182
 
However, even where these requirements are not met, qualitative – as well as quantitative – 
selective distribution systems fall within the scope of the Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation insofar as the individual market shares of both the supplier and the buyer do not 
exceed 30 percent of the relevant markets.
183
  
The early case law of the CJEU on selective distribution established that intrabrand 
price competition may be curtailed where demand for the goods in question is contingent 
upon the provision of product-specific services or the preservation of their high-quality 
image. Lying at the very heart of selective distribution, the free rider argument and its 
‘quality certification’ variant have thus always been, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
integrated in the enforcement logic of Article 101 TFEU. In the landmark Metro case, the 
CJEU conceded that ‘although price competition is so important that it can never be 
eliminated it does not constitute the only effective form of competition or that to which 
absolute priority must in all circumstances be accorded’.184 Accordingly, the Court noted 
that the relative structural price rigidity observed in selective distribution networks does 
not amount to a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1), provided 
that the operation of similar systems in a given industry is not widespread.
185
 In AEG-
Telefunken, the Court of Justice further refined the concept of selective distribution:  
there are legitimate requirements, such as the maintenance of a specialist trade 
capable of providing specific services as regards high-quality and high-technology 
products, which may justify a reduction of price competition in favour of 
competition relating to factors other than price. Systems of selective distribution, in 
so far as they aim at the attainment of a legitimate goal capable of improving 
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competition in relation to factors other than price, therefore constitute an element of 
competition which is in conformity with Article [101](1).
186
  
 In light of this assumption, a manufacturer who has set up a selective distribution 
network does not need to prohibit discounted retail sales of its products. In fact, the 
manufacturer has selected its distributors on the basis of their ability to provide the 
necessary product-specific services, and upon the understanding that they will not engage 
in aggressive price competition with each other. As a substitute for unlawful RPM, the 
very nature of selective distribution guarantees that the goods concerned will be carried by 
full-service, full-price outlets. If a retailer operating within the framework of such a 
network starts undercutting systematically its rivals in order to expand its market share, the 
manufacturer may assume that the maverick retailer has been taking a free ride on the other 
members’ promotional efforts. Alternatively, it could be the case that it has adopted a 
different marketing strategy, having been transformed into a no-frills outlet whose 
reputation is not compatible with the offered goods. In any event, EU competition law 
recognises the manufacturer’s right to punish any deviation from the system’s operational 
framework by terminating the price-cutting retailer and excluding it from the network. Its 
authorisation to carry the contract goods having been withdrawn, the latter will 
consequently be unable to obtain supplies either from the manufacturer or from the 
remaining members of the network. Absent any additional clauses that raise antitrust 
concerns, courts and competition authorities would be expected to uphold the termination. 
 Put differently, there can be no misunderstanding that the price rigidity derives 
from the very purpose and nature of selective distribution, which is designed to restrict the 
availability of a given manufacturer’s products through a limited number of non-
differentiated retail outlets
187
 characterised by similar cost structures. Thus, in citing the 
pro-competitive effects of vertical restraints, the Vertical Guidelines acknowledge that 
selective distribution may provide a solution to the archetypical free rider problem,
188
 as 
well as prevent no-frills retailers from taking advantage of the quality certification 
associated with the endorsement of the product by reputable outlets.
189
 The Guidelines 
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further accept that selective distribution may be designed to remedy any positive or 
negative vertical externalities
190
 or to facilitate the attainment of economies of scale in 
distribution.
191
 Finally, this form of restricted dealing may contribute to the uniformity and 
quality standardisation of the distribution network.
192
  
 In light of the free rider rationale, therefore, vertical price fixing and selective 
distribution may be employed as alternative commercial methods in pursuit of the same 
objective, namely to ensure the provision of the necessary demand-stimulating services.
193
 
In AEG-Telefunken v Commission, the CJEU rejected AEG’s assertion that the protection 
of its selective distributors’ profit margin by means of RPM was indispensible for the 
viability of the specialist trade. The Court held instead that, by excluding from its 
distribution network all dealers who could not supply the requisite product-specific 
services to consumers, the manufacturer ‘had at its disposal all the means necessary to 
enable it to ensure the effective application of the system’.194 However, although ostensibly 
constituting interchangeable remedies to the free rider problem, RPM and selective 
distribution are nonetheless only imperfect substitutes. A manufacturer relying on 
qualitative selective distribution is likely to encounter two noteworthy problems that may 
undermine the system’s successful operation.  
 First of all, no-frills retailers may still have the possibility to purchase the contract 
goods from members of the distribution network. While the manufacturer has the ability 
contractually to prevent the latter from selling the products concerned to unauthorised 
outlets, ensuring the admitted dealers’ compliance with the agreed upon restriction is an 
entirely different issue. As the likelihood of sales to non-eligible dealers threatens 
selectivity with erosion and re-affirms the prospect of free riding, the manufacturer will 
have to incur the additional cost of policing the distribution network, which equals the cost 
of detecting and preventing any deviations.
195
 Under these circumstances, the manufacturer 
may decide that its interests are better served by RPM. Given that the detection of 
systematic price-cutting is likely to be less burdensome than the active supervision of the 
approved dealers’ conduct in the marketplace, the manufacturer may be inclined to adopt a 
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policy of minimum retail prices designed both as form of compensation to diligent dealers 
and as a monitoring mechanism.  
 The second problem derives from the nature of distribution agreements as long-
term contractual relations which are extremely unlikely to include terms and clauses that 
provide for all possible future contingencies, as this could be prohibitively costly. In other 
words, as the drafting of an enforceable contract explicitly specifying the requisite services 
is frequently not practicable, the manufacturer may not be able to go beyond a general 
outline of its preferences and expectations. As has been argued earlier in this chapter, in 
light of Professor Klein and Murphy’s insight, a fixed resale price could supplement a 
qualitative selective distribution system as a mechanism designed to enhance the self-
enforcing range of the selectivity clauses. This argument will be further developed in 
Chapter 6, where it will be argued that, under certain circumstances, and particularly where 
the retailer is required to undertake sunk relationship-specific investments, selectivity 
clauses and price floors are not alternative, but complementary restrictions.
196
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, and in light of the assumption
197
 that 
qualitative selective distribution constitutes ‘a hybrid form of organization, falling between 
a hierarchy and the market’,198 the compelling conclusion is that RPM designed to enhance 
the manufacturer’s control over its distribution system should also be approached as a form 
of network. In the first instance, the possible anti-competitive character of price floors is 
irrelevant; as a general proposition, there is nothing precluding a network from being 
considered as ‘undesirable from a public point of view’,199 thus warranting antitrust 
intervention.
200
  
Besides, even qualitative selective distribution is in itself not immune from antitrust 
criticism. For instance, being premised on the correlation between the necessity of specific 
pre-sales services and the ensuing increase in retail prices, Professor Comanor’s infra-
marginal consumer theory
201
 is equally applicable both to RPM and to selective 
distribution.
202
 Additionally, the industry-wide implementation of qualitative selective 
distribution networks may result in a reduction in interbrand competition. According to the 
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CJEU’s ruling in Metro II, where this reduction is not offset by a corresponding 
stimulation of non-price competition, selective distribution is likely to trigger the 
application of Article 101(1). Selective distribution may also fall within the scope of the 
prohibition where the cumulative effect of multiple similar network established in the same 
market is the prevention of other ‘forms of distribution based on a different type of 
competition policy’.203  
Last, and most certainly not least, selective distribution may have comparable 
effects in facilitating collusion both in the upstream and in the downstream market insofar 
as it restricts intrabrand price competition and reduces ‘the number of dimensions on 
which retailers compete’.204 On the other hand, as has been discussed already, RPM is not 
invariably detrimental to competition and, at the same time, may on certain occasions 
produce more far-reaching transactional efficiencies than selective distribution. 
It is important, however, to acknowledge that, subject to certain qualifications, 
RPM also has a place in the market-network-hierarchy continuum. This observation lies in 
the very heart of this thesis. Whether vertical price fixing is indeed intended to establish a 
situation of network can be determined on a case-by-case basis, in much the same way as 
qualitative selective distribution. The determining factor, in other words, should be the 
demand-stimulating effect of non-price competition or the prevalence of free rider 
concerns, having regard to the specific attributes of the goods.  Due to the presumptively 
greater anti-competitive potential of RPM, however, closer analysis of the welfare 
consequences of the scheme at hand is warranted. The Vertical Guidelines have already 
stressed the relevance of the nature of the products concerned in the context of a 
substantive assessment under Article 101(3) where the parties rely on the free rider 
argument to plead an efficiency defence.
205
 As will be argued in Chapter 6 below, it is 
unclear why the current analytical framework cannot be replaced by an intuitive 
proportionality test under Article 101(1).    
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4.5. RPM and Exclusive Territories  
 
 As has already been stated, RPM is currently the most stringently treated of all 
vertical restraints. A conclusive presumption of allocative inefficiency allows the 
substantive assessment of agreements fixing resale prices to be carried out only in the 
context of Article 101(3). At the same time, the recent Vertical Guidelines have adopted a 
more permissive approach to absolute territorial protection: by acknowledging the potential 
necessity of export bans to the attainment of a legitimate business purpose, the Guidelines 
leave the door open for the parties to plead an ancillarity defence and escape the 
prohibition altogether.  
Proponents of the Chicago school have on various occasions attacked this 
differentiated attitude towards RPM, on the one hand, and territorial exclusivity, on the 
other, asserting that it cannot be justified from an economic perspective. They argue that it 
is doubtful whether the distinction between vertical price and non-price restraints is 
anything but artificial:
206
 all restrictions of competition between dealers, even those which 
are territorial in scope, aim at influencing the level of prices in the downstream market. 
Vertical restraints are fundamentally pro-competitive when they are intended to incentivise 
the distributors to increase their sales efforts with respect to a certain manufacturer’s 
products. It goes without saying that no incentive could be more effective that a higher 
profit margin. Whether this profit margin is guaranteed directly, by means of fixed resale 
prices, or indirectly, through the elimination of intrabrand competition within a given 
geographical territory, is immaterial. Instead, the pattern of the distribution network – and, 
accordingly, the nature of the restraint – will depend on whether the products in question 
are likely to be sold more effectively in that territory through multiple outlets or through a 
single outlet, respectively.
207
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The same conclusion will be drawn if the problem of distinguishing between 
vertical price and non-price restraints is addressed in light of the free rider rationale. A free 
rider is, by definition, a price cutter. He is capable of offering discounted prices at the 
expense of his full-service rivals by taking advantage of their sales efforts, thus impeding 
the recoupment of their investments. Vertical market division, like RPM, is intended to 
remedy the free rider problem by preventing price cutting and, inversely, price cutting 
frustrates equally both types of intrabrand restrictions.
208
 It could therefore be argued that, 
by precluding the applicability of the ancillarity doctrine to vertical price fixing, the 
Commission draws an arbitrary line between two aspects of the same economic 
phenomenon.      
 Furthermore, the distinction between RPM and market division may be frustrated in 
practice by the commercial purpose pursued by the restraint. The case law of American 
courts categorically demonstrates that formalistic line drawing is unwarranted. In Eastern 
Scientific Co v Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc,
209
 a case decided in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Sylvania judgment, at a time when RPM was still treated as per se illegal, 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the agreement whereby an exclusive 
distributor undertook to sell the manufacturer's products out of its assigned area at no less 
than the stipulated price should be analysed under the rule of reason. The court held that 
the case at hand in essence involved a policy of territorial restriction enforced by price 
maintenance, and rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the price restrictions at issue 
required per se treatment. Although acknowledging that these restrictions were similar in 
form to an RPM agreement, the court pointed out that, to the extent that they were used to 
enforce the allocation of territories, they could not possibly have a greater anti-competitive 
effect than a pure policy of territorial restrictions.
210
 Thus, the court reached the conclusion 
that  
the resale price restriction in the present case produces the same anti-competitive 
effect as pure territorial restrictions but to a lesser degree. If the Supreme Court 
holds that pure territorial restrictions should be analyzed under the rule of reason, 
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we can see no reason based on substantive economic effect why a similar but less 
anti-competitive scheme should be treated differently.
211
  
 However, in an interesting article reviewed earlier in this thesis, Rey and Vergé, 
analysing the argument that vertical price fixing may facilitate horizontal collusion when 
manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers, dispute the 
Chicagoan rubric, noting that ‘RPM allows manufacturers to avoid interbrand competition 
even when, due to retailers’ differentiation strategies, meeting consumer demand makes it 
undesirable to grant exclusive territories and exclude some of the established retailers’.212 
The authors thus put forward an argument in favour of the more cautious treatment of price 
restraints, ostensibly challenging the view that RPM and territorial restrictions have similar 
effects to competition. However, and although the value of this insight cannot be 
overstated, the fact remains, as Rey and Vergé themselves concede, that  
it is not clear that RPM has a more negative impact on welfare than other vertical 
restraints that limit intrabrand competition. Instead, both price (e.g., RPM) and non-
price restraints (e.g., exclusive territories) may have positive or negative effects on 
welfare, depending on the context in which they are used. ... Overall, a comparison 
of the welfare effects of exclusive territories, RPM and exclusive dealing does not 
clearly justify a more lenient attitude towards non-price restrictions.
213
 
 As a starting point, it should be noted that, naturally, arguing that RPM and 
exclusive territories generally produce similar welfare consequences is as arbitrary as 
accepting in the abstract that all RPM schemes, on the one hand, and all territorial 
exclusivity clauses, on the other, are equally welfare-enhancing or equally welfare-
reducing. When a restraint is taken out of context, all one is presented with is a series of 
equally compelling analyses in support of one or the other normative point of view. 
 In fact, Patrick Rey himself, in an earlier article co-authored with Professor Stiglitz, 
demonstrated that under conditions of imperfect competition – arguably the most likely 
scenario in real-life markets, by contrast to the polar models of pure monopoly and perfect 
competition – exclusive territories may be exploited by manufacturers in an attempt to 
curtail interbrand competition, thus increasing the equilibrium price and, accordingly, their 
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profits.
214
 More specifically, Rey and Stiglitz argue that exclusive distribution systems may 
affect the manufacturer’s perception of demand elasticity: believing that it is facing a less 
elastic demand curve, a manufacturer which has conferred territorial exclusivity upon its 
retailers is therefore likely to compete less aggressively, in which case both wholesale and 
retail prices are likely to increase. As far as the implications of their study for antitrust 
policy are concerned, the authors suggest that all vertical restraints be subject to a 
rebuttable presumption of illegality.
215
 
 On the same intellectual basis, Motta takes the position that exclusive territories 
can produce strategic effects that cannot be replicated by means of price floors.
216
 This 
argument is premised on the fundamental assumption that retailers have access to valuable 
information which is not available to the manufacturer. As has already been seen, this 
informational asymmetry is the reason why problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection emerge. However, it also implies that, where a principal is unable to perform a 
specific task, it has the incentive to delegate the relevant decision-making powers to the 
agent. The fundamental difference between territorial exclusivity clauses and RPM is that, 
in the context of an exclusive distribution network, the decision-making power with regard 
to prices has been delegated to the retailer, who is simultaneously a territorial brand 
monopolist. In the case of an upstream duopoly, if this arrangement is observable by the 
competing manufacturer, the allocation of an exclusive territory will be interpreted as 
signalling the former’s intention to keep prices high and as an invitation to soften 
interbrand competition. Such an outcome cannot be replicated by RPM, simply because the 
retailer will be obliged to observe the prices stipulated by the upstream firm. 
 Of course, that is not to say that the argument for a less lenient approach to price 
restraints is not compelling. Even before Rey and Vergé, Jullien and Rey demonstrated that 
the fundamental contribution of RPM to facilitating tacit collusion in the upstream market 
consists in their ability to make retail prices less responsive to local shocks on demand or 
costs. By contrast, in the presence of similar local shocks, exclusive territories, as well as 
any other non-price restraints which do not eliminate the distributors’ freedom in 
determining their pricing policies, are less likely to eliminate retail price variability, thus 
making tacit collusion harder.
217
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 It is submitted that the case for a more consistent public policy towards vertical 
price and non-price restraints is indeed stronger with regard to their exclusionary effects, 
which appear to be directly comparable. In a recent article, Asker and Bar-Isaac 
demonstrate that a wide range of vertical restraints may be employed by an incumbent 
manufacturer in an attempt to prevent new entry in the upstream market.
218
 The idea 
supported by the authors is that an upstream monopolist has the incentive to restrict or 
eliminate intrabrand competition by means of various vertical practices, including RPM 
and the allocation of exclusive territories, which may be implemented as rent-sharing 
mechanisms designed to prevent retailers from accommodating new entrants. More 
specifically, the manufacturer may create the exclusionary equilibrium by setting a 
wholesale price equal to its marginal cost, while allowing the downstream firm to charge a 
monopoly price. In such a case, the retail price may be set at the monopoly level either by 
the price-maintaining manufacturer or by the retailer itself which, having been assigned 
with an exclusive territory, has the ability to act as a territorial brand monopolist.
219
 
Advocating the adoption of a common normative framework for both price and territorial 
restraints, the authors note that ‘[e]ven [post-Leegin], the judicial approach to evaluating 
the harm arising from these different restraints is, at best, unclear. The framework 
developed in this article suggests that, at least as far as concerns about exclusion are 
concerned, a more consolidated approach is both feasible and supported by economic 
theory’.220 
 As a concluding remark, it should be stressed, however, that the conclusions drawn 
by Rey and Vergé, and Jullien and Rey, although consistent with a generally more lenient 
public policy towards territorial restraints, they are nevertheless of exceptionally limited 
relevance to the application of the indispensability requirement of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
The reason is intuitive: exclusive territories, even assuming that they are indeed less 
restrictive, they cannot possibly be regarded as a reasonable alternative to price floors. 
Territorial exclusivity is so largely contingent upon the very nature of the goods concerned, 
that a manufacturer cannot be expected to be faced with a dilemma as to which of these 
types of restricted dealing to apply to its distribution network. It can be safely assumed 
that, while market division would be more appropriate for the distribution of expensive 
commodities, the sale of which through a geographically dense network of retailers would 
not be economically feasible, fixed resale prices could induce dealers to increase their sales 
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efforts with regard to relatively inexpensive goods, for the purchase of which consumers 
are not willing to incur higher search costs.
221
 Besides, it has to be reminded that one of the 
pro-competitive theories of RPM focuses on the ability of price floors to facilitate resale 
density, particularly with regard to a non-negligible category of consumer goods which are 
frequently bought on impulse.
222
 This theory is axiomatically not applicable to exclusive 
territories, which are employed exactly where the distribution of the contract goods is more 
efficient when undertaken by scarcely located outlets. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The concept of economic activity represents – more frequently than not – the result 
of active cooperation between more than one economic actors. As has already been seen 
earlier in this thesis, new institutional economics is in principle indifferent to the 
institutional framework within which such cooperation takes place, and acknowledges 
markets and hierarchies as alternative organisational structures, the use of which is to be 
interpreted through the lens of transaction cost economics. 
This assumption has far-reaching normative implications which extend to the field 
of antitrust. According to Lianos,
223
 reliance on new institutional economics may justify 
not only the exclusion of intra-enterprise conspiracy and commercial agency from the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, but also the applicability of the ancillary restraints doctrine 
to hybrid forms of organisation, such as franchising agreements and qualitative selective 
distribution. And while the legal approach to exclusive distribution under EU competition 
law is less straightforward, since the substantive assessment of the relevant clauses appears 
to be largely confined in the context of Article 101(3),
224
 it will be argued later
225
 that the 
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lenient treatment under the recent Vertical Guidelines of export bans designed to facilitate 
new entry
226
 can be explained on the basis of this analysis. 
Against this backdrop and in light of the foregoing, the blanket prohibition of price 
floors under EU competition law appears to be inconsistent not only with economic 
principles, but also with the general normative stance towards restrictions of intrabrand 
competition: a careful examination of the European Commission and Courts’ decision-
making practice reveals that antitrust immunity is typically conferred upon forms of 
restricted dealing designed to generate transactional efficiencies where the hierarchical 
organisation has been superseded by the market mechanism, and long-term contractual 
partnerships governed by relational norms have been entered into as a cost-effective 
alternative to complete vertical integration by ownership. This point will be further 
elaborated in Chapter 6 below, and will form the intellectual basis for the recommendation 
of a more consistent analytical framework for the substantive assessment of vertical price 
fixing under Article 101 TFEU.  
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Chapter 5 
The Public Policy towards Resale Price Maintenance in the EU and the 
US 
 
  
5.1. The Public Policy towards RPM in the EU 
 
It is established case law of the CJEU
1
 that clauses fixing minimum resale prices 
restrict competition by object.
2
 As a result, any agreements containing such clauses are 
conclusively presumed to fall within the ambit of Article 101(1). Even price fixing 
agreements between manufacturers and distributors with only limited market power may 
be caught by Article 101(1), since the 2014 De Minimis Notice excludes agreements 
‘containing any of the restrictions that are listed as hardcore restrictions in any current or 
future Commission block exemption regulation’ from the benefit of the safe harbour 
created by the market share thresholds provided in paragraph 8 thereof.
3
 In addition, 
Article 4(a) of Regulation 330/2010 expressly classifies the direct or indirect
4
 imposition 
of fixed or minimum resale prices as a hardcore restriction of competition. More 
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RPM can also be achieved through indirect means. Examples of the latter are an agreement fixing 
the distribution margin, fixing the maximum level of discount the distributor can grant from a 
prescribed price level, making the grant of rebates or reimbursement of promotional costs by the 
supplier subject to the observance of a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the 
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specifically, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation provides that ‘[t]he exemption ... 
shall not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in 
combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object: (a) the 
restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its sale price’. Any inclusion of such ‘black-
listed’ clauses means that not only the particular provisions, but the agreement as a whole 
shall be unable to benefit from the block exemption. 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s general hostility towards RPM schemes, 
undertakings may qualify for an exemption under Article 101(3), insofar as they are able to 
substantiate that the RPM scheme at hand may generate efficiencies,
5
 even though the 
attainment of such pro-competitive effects by means of hardcore restraints is presumed to 
be unlikely.
6
 Indeed, the Commission, in its 2010 Vertical Guidelines,
7
 expressly concedes 
for the first time that vertical price fixing may also give rise to considerable efficiencies. 
More specifically, the higher profit margin afforded to the distributor may be designed as 
an incentive for the provision of essential promotional services, particularly with regard to 
newly-launched products. Furthermore, RPM may be used in the context of a distribution 
system applying a uniform distribution format, such as franchising, for the purposes of a 
short term low price campaign the duration of which does not exceed six weeks. Finally, 
the Guidelines acknowledge that vertical price fixing may be employed as a solution to the 
free rider problem; they set, nevertheless, a fairly high standard of proof for parties wishing 
to demonstrate the existence of free rider considerations in the market concerned.
8
  
A critical and more detailed examination of the approach taken to RPM under EU 
competition law is the subject matter of a different chapter.
9
 The following two sections 
will present the most notable Commission decisions involving RPM agreements, as well as 
all judgments of the Court of Justice following references for a preliminary ruling 
concerning vertical price fixing.  
 
5.1.1. European Commission Decisions on RPM 
 As has already been argued, the recent Vertical Guidelines obscure, rather than 
clarify, the approach taken to RPM under EU competition law. The Guidelines, on the one 
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hand, acknowledge the possible efficiency-enhancing effects of RPM, but, on the other, 
they reiterate the traditional view that it constitutes a ‘hardcore’ restraint for the purposes 
of the application of Article 101(1). One would, therefore, reasonably assume that the 
second best way to understand the rationale behind the European Commission’s hostility 
towards vertical price fixing would be, at least in theory, the review of the relevant case 
law. In practice, nevertheless, things are not that simple. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, the Commission has dealt with a relatively limited number of vertical price 
fixing cases during these years, the last one being the Yamaha case, decided back in 
2003.
10
 And the examination of these cases generally reveals nothing more than the 
Commission’s strict adherence to the legal and economic principles already elaborated in 
the Vertical Guidelines. 
 As a preliminary remark it should be noted that, in most of these cases, the 
Commission launched an investigation following a notification by the parties under Article 
4(1) of Regulation 17/62 then in force.
11
 In the vast majority of the cases reviewed, the 
fixing of resale prices was not the sole object of the agreement under investigation, but 
instead it formed part of a broader restrictive arrangement, and was commonly imposed in 
the context of an exclusive or selective distribution network. In these cases, the removal of 
the RPM clause was a requirement in order for the agreement to receive the Commission’s 
clearance.
12
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 The RPM cases under review are distinguished in two categories, on the basis of 
the prevalence of vertical price fixing in a given industry. Classified under the heading 
‘individual’ RPM are agreements whereby a single manufacturer stipulates the resale price 
for its own products. The second category consists of ‘collective’ RPM agreements and 
involves cases of widespread use of RPM schemes by various competing manufacturers, 
commonly within the framework of an association of undertakings. As was shown in 
Chapter 1, the distinction between individual and collective RPM was fairly common in 
European antitrust literature of the first post-war years, and had been incorporated into at 
least two national competition law regimes.
13
 The individual/collective RPM dichotomy 
certainly is defensible. While an individual manufacturer’s decision to enter into RPM 
agreements with its dealers may be explained on efficiency grounds, it is likely that the 
industry-wide implementation of fixed retail prices is designed to increase price 
transparency, thus giving rise to collusive outcomes. Despite its sound logic, this 
distinction has never been endorsed in the context of Article 101 TFEU, and appears to 
have largely been rendered obsolete as far as national legal orders are concerned. 
 
5.1.1.1. Individual RPM Agreements 
  
5.1.1.1.1. The Interplay between RPM and Absolute Territorial Protection 
An interesting category of cases consists of those agreements whereby RPM was 
used as a means to support and reinforce absolute territorial protection. In Deutsche Philips 
GmbH,
14
 the Commission adopted for the first time a decision finding that an individual 
RPM agreement violated Article 101(1). The German subsidiary of Philips had failed to 
notify to the Commission an agreement fixing the retail prices of various products, 
irrespective of whether they had been purchased from German or foreign suppliers. 
Vertical price fixing was at the time legal in Germany, but the agreement also covered the 
goods sold to consumers in other European countries. Similarly, German retailers were 
obliged to comply with the fixed prices when reselling goods which had been re-imported 
from other countries into Germany. In view of its effects on price competition, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
See also the early Commission decision granting negative clearance in Omega [1970] OJ L242/22. 
13
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Commission held that the RPM agreement at issue amounted to restrictions on parallel 
imports: ‘[a]t any rate the competitive position at the retail stage – as regards the prices 
which were decisive for the consumer – would be the same as in the case of protection by 
means of export or reimport bans’.15  
 In Gerofabriek,
16
 the Commission rejected the application for a negative clearance 
regarding a network of agreements entered into between a Dutch manufacturer of stainless-
steel cutlery and its retailers in BENELUX. The agreements fixed the prices of the cutlery 
sold at the retail level and required the Dutch wholesalers to refrain from exporting the 
products without the manufacturer’s consent. According to the Commission, price fixing 
restricted the freedom of retailers to set their own prices by reference to their own costs 
and business strategy, thus limiting their ability to pass on to consumers any benefits.
17
 The 
Commission further held that, in the case at hand, RPM was likely to have the same effect 
as export bans: ‘[e]ven if the various export prohibitions were lifted, the system of retail 
prices imposed on dealers would be likely to influence trade between Member States by 
deflecting trade flows away from the channels which they would naturally have if prices 
were fixed freely’.18 Consequently, the clauses were found to be contrary to Article 101(1) 
and also unable to meet the requirements of Article 101(3). 
 In Hasselblad,
19
 the case involved an exclusive distribution network operated by 
Victor Hasselblad, a Swedish manufacturer and supplier of high-end photographic 
equipment with sales in virtually all EU Member States. Victor Hasselblad took steps to 
prevent its distributors from engaging in parallel imports and required them to provide one 
another with the price lists and terms of business (regarding rebates and bonuses) 
applicable in each Member State. Moreover, Hasselblad (GB), the exclusive distributor of 
Hasselblad equipment for the United Kingdom, established in turn a selective sales 
network, admission to which was conditional upon the signing of the standard Dealer 
Agreement. The Dealer Agreement contained inter alia clauses which prohibited exports, 
subjected advertisements to Hasselblad (GB)’s approval, and prohibited dealers from 
changing the geographical location of their premises. In the context of the implementation 
of the Dealer Agreement, Hasselblad (GB) would cease supplying certain price-cutting 
dealers and threatened that it would withdraw credit facilities from any dealers who did not 
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treat the prices quoted in the relevant retail price list as minimum resale prices. Hasselblad 
(GB) further terminated its agreement with Camera Care, a discount retailer of 
photographic equipment, and subsequently enforced a boycott against it in concert with the 
other authorised dealers.   
 The Commission held that the policy of market compartmentalisation implemented 
by Victor Hasselblad and its exclusive distributors amounted to a concerted practice within 
the meaning of Article 101(1).
20
 In this context, the exchange of price lists and information 
on the distributors’ discount policy between the latter and the manufacturer was found to 
constitute an ancillary mechanism designed to prevent or, at the very least, to discourage 
exports.
21
 Furthermore, regarding the selective distribution system operated in the UK, 
Hasselblad (GB)’s Dealer Agreement was found to fall within the scope of Article 101(1) 
to the extent that it provided the authorised dealers with territorial protection which, in 
practice, was supplemented with the imposition of minimum resale prices. The 
Commission noted that, in the context of the Dealer Agreement, retailers were restricted as 
to their freedom to determine their prices and that Hasselblad (GB) used the threat of 
termination in order to enforce adherence to the chosen price-level at the retail stage.
22
 In 
assessing the Dealer Agreement’s effect on trade between Member States, the Commission 
took the position that the export bans and the RPM clause were ‘closely interconnected’, 
since both aimed at the maintenance of the price differentials between the UK and the 
other Member States.
23
 The elimination of price competition between Hasselblad’s 
authorised UK-based dealers essentially created an artificial barrier to trade between the 
UK and the other Member States, by preventing them from seeking alternative, less costly 
sources of supply. Thus, according to the Commission, ‘the effects of Hasselblad (GB)’s 
resale price maintenance policy cannot be separated from the effects of the other 
infringements of Article [101](1)’.24          
 The Commission condemned a motor vehicle manufacturer for a number of 
restrictive clauses contained in its agreements with its European dealers in Mercedes-
Benz.
25
 More specifically, DaimlerChrysler was found to have imposed export bans on its 
German agents, by instructing them to refrain from selling vehicles from outside their 
territory. It further prevented its distributors in Germany and Spain from supplying leasing 
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companies in cases where no specific lessee was provided for by the agency agreements. 
Finally, the subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler in Belgium was found to have agreed with its 
dealers on the fixing of the resale prices in that country. Under the agreement, the dealers 
were not allowed to grant discounts of more than three percent, and test purchases were 
agreed to be carried out by an external agency, in order for the level of discounts to be 
controlled. The Commission held that the RPM agreement had as its object the restriction 
of competition.
26
 The agreement kept the prices for Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Belgium at 
artificially high levels and, at the same time, the Commission observed that a considerable 
number of new cars had been imported to Belgium from other Member States. This, 
according to the Commission, affected inter-state trade to an appreciable extent, since 
established case law of the CJEU had made it clear that ‘trade between Member States is 
affected not only where a measure restricts interState trade or compartmentalises markets, 
but also where an agreement leads to an increase, even a large one, in the volume of trade 
between Member States’.27 On appeal,28 the Commission’s finding that DaimlerChrysler 
and its Belgian dealers had engaged in price fixing in violation of Article 101(1) was 
confirmed, although the Commission decision was partially annulled on different grounds. 
 In Yamaha,
29
 a Japanese manufacturer of traditional and electronic musical 
instruments had established a selective distribution network in the majority of the Member 
States for the purposes of the distribution of its products in the EU. The agreements with 
several dealers imposed upon the latter direct and indirect export bans, including inter alia 
their obligation sell Yamaha musical instruments only to end users, thus preventing cross 
supplies within the selective distribution network, and to notify a subsidiary of Yamaha 
before exporting via the Internet. Additionally, the contracts entered into between Yamaha 
and its Dutch, Italian and Austrian distributors contained clauses which either fixed the 
level of permissible discounts or obliged them to observe the prices indicated in the price 
lists circulated by Yamaha and its subsidiaries. Furthermore, the manufacturer fixed 
directly the Austrian distributor’s profit margin, although subsequently stated that the 
clause was ‘not binding’. 
 The Commission held that these agreements fell within the ambit of Article 101(1) 
to the extent that they restricted the distributors’ ability to set their own prices freely. The 
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extent to which the relevant clauses had in fact been implemented was immaterial: the 
mere inclusion of the restrictive provisions in the contracts under investigation was likely 
to influence the distributors in the course of their business conduct by creating a ‘visual 
and psychological effect’.30 The inclusion of both export bans and vertical price fixing in 
the context of Yamaha’s selective distribution network was likely to have the combined 
effect of appreciably affecting trade between Member States. On the one hand, prohibition 
of parallel imports artificially reinforced different price levels between national markets.
31
 
Simultaneously, RPM could contribute to the compartmentalisation of the internal market 
‘by increasing imports from other Member States and by decreasing exports from Member 
States where resale price maintenance has been implemented’. According to the 
Commission, vertical price fixing had influenced the pattern of trade flows between the 
Member States.
32
 Both the vertical block exemption regulation and Article 101(3) were 
declared inapplicable and the Commission eventually imposed a relatively low fine of 
€2.56 million after Yamaha took the necessary steps to restructure its entire selective 
distribution network by removing the hardcore restrictions. 
 
5.1.1.1.2. The Spices Case – RPM as an Exclusionary Mechanism   
 The Spices case
33
 is unique in the sense that the vertical price fixing clauses under 
investigation were included in order to reinforce the manufacturer’s exclusive distribution 
network to the detriment of its competitors. Liebig was a producer of packaged spices for 
domestic consumption and was selling its products in Belgium primarily through the three 
largest chains of foodstores in the country, but also through a number of smaller 
distributors. By virtue of the distribution agreements concluded with the main Belgian 
distributors, the latter undertook to sell only Liebig spices apart from their own brands and 
agreed to sell the spices at the prices fixed by the manufacturer and to display them in 
special illuminated display units. This clause on the display method for Liebig spices was 
expected to be advantageous for Liebig because, as the Commission observed, impulse 
buying accounted for a large proportion of consumer purchases; it was therefore essential 
that spices be displayed at spots where they were more likely to catch the customer’s eye.34 
For the same reason, the dealers undertook to display their own branded spices in the 
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special units below Liebig products and to refrain from displaying the prices for Liebig 
spices where these were higher than those of their own brands. In return, in addition to 
fixing the resale prices for its products, Liebig also provided the foodstores with a 10 
percent rebate on total spice purchases and sales incentive premiums as a reward for a 
possible annual increase in sales. 
 The Commission objected to the high profit margin afforded to the Belgian 
distributors as a result of the aforementioned financial benefits; it also found that its 
purpose was to reward the large distributors for excluding Liebig’s rivals.35 Since both 
Liebig and the dealers possessed substantial market shares, the agreement was held to 
foreclose the downstream market for competing manufacturers of spices and was, thus, 
condemned under Article 101(1), not being able to benefit from Regulation 67/67 – the 
block exemption regulation then in force. Specifically with regard to RPM, the 
Commission pointed out that it enhanced the already restrictive effect of the agreement on 
interbrand competition, as it also restrained price competition between Liebig products.
36
 
The Commission, following a thorough appraisal of the foreclosure effects of the exclusive 
distribution agreement, merely limited itself to finding that the RPM clause contained in 
the agreement constituted ‘a restriction of competition which is not permitted by 
Regulation No. 67/67/EEC and therefore the application of this Regulation is excluded’.37 
 Liebig’s high market share aside, the Spices case involved an RPM scheme which 
could be consistent with an alternative pro-competitive justification recently suggested by 
Benjamin Klein.
38
 According to Klein, the standard free rider rationale is not applicable to 
all types of sales-specific services. Prominent display is a point-of-sale promotional service 
which, on the one hand, is not free-rideable, but may nonetheless contribute to the 
expansion of the manufacturer’s market share, particularly where the products concerned 
are more susceptible to impulse purchases.
39
 However, as Klein points out, retailers have 
an insufficient incentive to promote a given manufacturer's product, given that 
manufacturer-specific services, albeit capable of stimulating interbrand demand, have 
virtually no influence on consumers’ choice of retail outlet (‘inter-retailer demand’). 
Moreover, the net overall sales increase resulting from the provision of brand-specific 
point-of-sale services is likely to be both greater and more profitable for the manufacturer 
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than for multi-brand retailers. Consequently, RPM may be designed to remedy this 
‘incentive incompatibility’ between the manufacturer and its retailers by compensating the 
latter for their promotional efforts which, in the case of prominent display, consist in the 
use of their retailing assets.
40
          
  
5.1.1.1.3. RPM and the Indispensability Requirement of Article 101(3) 
The AEG-Telefunken case,
41
 in which the CJEU held that price floors were not 
indispensable for the maintenance of the specialist trade when implemented in the context 
of a selective distribution network has already been discussed earlier in this thesis.
42
 In 
Novalliance/Systemform,
43
 the Commission dealt with a complaint submitted by a French 
company active in the distribution of computer printing and post-handling systems alleging 
that Systemform, a German manufacturer of equipment for processing computer printouts, 
had violated EU competition law by imposing export bans on its dealers and thus 
partitioning the common market. In the course of the investigation the Commission 
discovered that the exclusive distribution agreements that Systemform had concluded with 
a number of dealers operating in various Member States also included clauses requiring the 
joint setting of the resale prices of the goods concerned. The Commission stressed that it 
was immaterial for the purposes of the application of Article 101(1) whether Systemform 
had taken any steps to enforce the RPM agreements or whether it had ever exercised any 
control in order to ensure that the fixed prices are being observed by the distributors. What 
was important was the very presence of the RPM clauses in the contracts, given their 
potential to ‘put pressure on Systemform’s distributors to align their pricing policy with the 
perceived wishes of Systemform’.44 In addition, the Commission rejected with a laconic 
statement the applicability of Article 101(3) to vertical price fixing: ‘[c]ontrol over the 
prices charged by a distributor is not related in any way to the possible benefits of an 
exclusive distribution contract, so the question of these restrictions being in any way 
indispensable does not arise’.45 
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5.1.1.1.4. ‘Brand Image’ as a Defence: Hennessy/Henkel and Nathan/Bricolux                         
 Perhaps the most interesting RPM case was Hennessy/Henkell,
46
 in the sense that it 
provides a clearer picture of the Commission’s argumentation against vertical price fixing. 
Hennessy was one of the largest French cognac producers and was marketing its products 
in a number of European countries through the operation of a dual distribution system. 
Hennessy cognac was distributed in the EU mostly by independent distributors, with the 
exception of three Member States where the products in question were marketed by 
subsidiaries of Hennessy. Hennessy entered into an exclusive distribution agreement for 
Germany with Henkell, by virtue of which the latter was guaranteed a specific profit 
margin for the German market. According to Hennessy itself, the purpose of the clause 
‘was to protect [the] distributor against parallel imports or infiltration’.47 Henkell was 
allowed to charge lower prices than those quoted in the relevant price list, but only 
temporarily and on the condition that Hennessy was notified without delay. Henkell was in 
fact the only one among Hennessy’s distributors to be provided with a fixed profit margin 
since, as the Commission observed, similar agreements between Hennessy and its 
distributors in other Member States did not restrict the latter’s freedom to set their own 
prices. 
 The Commission held that the RPM agreement between Hennessy and Henkell was 
caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, and was not eligible for an exemption either under 
Regulation 67/67/EEC (the relevant block exemption regulation then in force) or under 
Article 101(3). More specifically, the Commission rejected Hennessy’s argument that for 
luxury products, such as cognac, the fixing of resale prices was necessary in order for their 
brand image to be preserved; the luxury character of a product was not in itself, according 
to the Commission, a sufficient justification for an exemption under Article 101(3) to be 
granted.
48
 What was more interesting, however, was the Commission’s second argument in 
rejecting the indispensability of the restriction: ‘Hennessy’s competitors, the other cognac 
merchants ... have not taken measures to restrict the freedom of their sole distributors to fix 
their prices or to protect their territories, notwithstanding that some of those contracts 
concern the German market’.49 
                                                          
46
 [1980] OJ L383/11. 
47
 Ibid, para 8. 
48
 Ibid, para 32. 
49
 Ibid, para 33. 
198 
 
 The first point to be made about this case is that it is one of only two cases 
concerning (almost) exclusively an RPM agreement. In the vast majority of relevant cases, 
the Commission dealt with agreements which restricted competition in a number of 
different ways – more commonly by prohibiting parallel imports – among which was the 
fixing of resale prices. Secondly, it was the first time that the undertaking under 
investigation put forward a legitimate economic argument in defence of an RPM scheme. It 
has been argued that a high price is a necessary attribute of prestige products and it is in the 
manufacturer’s best interest to prevent any price-cutting by its retailers, as ‘greater 
affordability brings with it the implication of lessened exclusivity’.50 Finally, the 
Commission’s argument that RPM was not indispensable for the protection of the 
product’s luxury image in view of the fact that Hennessy was the only producer of cognac 
having fixed the resale price of its product implies at the same time – although 
unintentionally – that the RPM scheme at hand did not threaten to produce any ‘horizontal’ 
effects. Indeed, one of the Commission’s most frequently used arguments against RPM is 
that it can be employed with the aim of facilitating collusive conduct between competitors 
in either the upstream or the downstream market.
51
 In the case at hand this scenario was 
effectively ruled out, given that the implementation of vertical price fixing in the affected 
market was not extensive enough to raise any relevant concerns. It would therefore be 
reasonable to conclude that Hennessy fixed its distributor’s profit margin driven by a 
legitimate business purpose.       
 The protection of a product’s brand image was also the justification put forward by 
the parties to a network of RPM agreements in Nathan/Bricolux.
52
 Nathan, a producer of 
various materials for educational purposes also responsible for the distribution of its 
products in France, entered into agreements with its distributors in Italy, Sweden and the 
French-speaking part of Belgium which provided for both export bans and fixing of resale 
prices (both minimum and maximum). With regard to minimum RPM in particular, the 
distribution contracts with the Italian and Swedish dealers provided that the latter 
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undertook to ‘refrain from all commercial conduct (special offers, discounts, rebates, 
clearance sales, etc.) liable to damage the Nathan brand’.53  
 The Commission, although acknowledging that maximum price fixing is not 
necessarily restrictive of competition, held that, in this case, maximum and minimum RPM 
should be regarded as having the combined effect of fixing a specific – albeit broad – 
resale price level.
54
 According to the Commission, the provisions fixing a resale price level 
and conferring absolute territorial protection upon Nathan’s dealers ‘reinforce each 
other’.55 Specifically RPM restricted the dealers’ freedom to determine their own prices, 
which were eventually fixed at artificially high levels not corresponding to any market 
reality.
56
 The Commission finally rejected Nathan’s argument that the prohibition of 
discounts was necessary in order for its brand image to be protected, and made a statement 
which could be characterised as ambiguous, to say the least: it suggested that Nathan was 
still free ‘to set the prices it charges its distributors at a level it regards as adequate in 
relation to objective costs and the positioning it seeks for its products on the market’, since 
this alternative would be less restrictive of the distributors’ freedom.57 In other words, the 
Commission maintained that, in order for intrabrand competition to remain undistorted, 
suppliers who are conscious about their products’ brand image should act against their 
commercial interests and increase the prices at which they are selling their products to their 
distributors. The Commission thus seems to have disregarded the fact that price 
competition is equally important at all levels of the distribution chain; no rational 
manufacturer, unless enjoying a position of market power, would risk losing a distributor 
by not providing it with a satisfactory profit margin as an incentive to stock the goods in 
question. 
 
5.1.1.1.5. Infringement Decisions Annulled by the General Court: Volkswagen II and JCB      
 Volkswagen II
58
 was the first case where a fine imposed by the Commission for 
RPM was quashed by the General Court and, subsequently, by the CJEU. Volkswagen had 
been sending circulars to members of its distribution network in Germany urging them to 
refrain from selling the new Passat at prices below the recommended retail price. The 
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circulars reveal that the company’s main concern when encouraging price discipline 
among its dealers was the protection of its brand image. The Commission found that this 
practice constituted a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) 
TFEU. It rejected Volkswagen’s argument that, in spite of the circulars, several dealers 
continued to grant discounts. The Commission stated instead that this was not material for 
the purpose of the application of Article 101(1) to vertical price fixing. Since RPM is a 
‘black-listed’ clause, it is established case law that it suffices to show that the relevant 
measure ‘has the object of restricting competition. It is not necessary to show that it 
actually produces any such restriction’.59 Furthermore, the Commission held that the RPM 
scheme at hand hindered trade between Member States, since the level of price differences 
for Volkswagen cars was likely both to alter the flow of imports into Germany and to limit 
the exports from Germany – particularly regarding right-hand-drive vehicles sold to 
customers based in the United Kingdom. 
 The fine of €30.95 million imposed on Volkswagen was eventually annulled by the 
General Court, which held that the Commission failed adequately to establish the existence 
of a restrictive agreement between Volkswagen and its dealers.
60
 The fact that the 
distributors signed an, initially, lawful contract did not mean that they provided in advance 
their acquiescence to future requests by the manufacturer intended to influence them in the 
performance of the contract in a way that restricted competition.
61
 On appeal, the CJEU 
upheld the judgment of the General Court.
62
 
In the JCB case, the Commission dealt with agreements combining both vertical 
price fixing and export bans.
63
 JCB was a manufacturer of excavating, earthmoving and 
agricultural machinery and a vendor of relevant spare parts, and was marketing its products 
in several Member States both through subsidiaries and through independent dealers 
forming part of an exclusive distribution network. In addition to restricting parallel trade 
by preventing its distributors from selling JCB machines and spare parts outside their 
allotted territory, JCB was found to have engaged in vertical price fixing either by 
circulating retail price lists or by agreeing with its dealers on the application of uniform 
discounts. The Commission held, therefore, that the agreements under investigation 
infringed Article 101(1) and could not benefit from either the vertical block exemption 
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regulation or from Article 101(3). On appeal, however, the General Court annulled the 
Commission’s finding pertaining to RPM. The Court held that retail price lists, ‘although 
strongly indicative, were none the less not binding’; there was also nothing to indicate that 
JCB attempted to influence the pricing strategy of its dealers in a coercive way.
64
 It is 
submitted that, in JCB, the existence of coercion was dealt with by the General Court as a 
constitutive element of an Article 101(1) violation, at least as far as RPM is concerned.
65
 
This part of the Court’s decision was not challenged before the CJEU.66 
 
5.1.1.2. Collective RPM Agreements 
 This study has identified only three Commission decisions which concerned 
collective RPM schemes. In ASPA,
67
 the case involved a non-profit association of Belgian-
based producers and distributors of perfumes and toiletries, the Association Syndicale 
Belge de la Parfumerie (‘ASPA’). ASPA notified its Articles of Association and General 
Regulation to the Commission, and applied for a negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 
of the then applicable Regulation 17/62. Within the framework of the association, every 
manufacturer or importer was stipulating independently and individually the resale prices 
of its own products. Among the primary objectives of ASPA was to prevent any deviations 
from the fixed prices, as well as to ensure that these prices would be observed also by 
successive sellers. Furthermore, the rules of the association required all its members 
collectively to cease supplying any wholesalers or retailers that failed to comply with the 
obligations imposed on them, in particular: the obligation to obtain supplies exclusively 
from members of the association or from authorised dealers; the obligation to refrain from 
reselling the products to other wholesalers or retailers who have acted in breach of the 
regulation; and the obligation of retailers to sell the products in question only to end users 
and at the stipulated prices, and to hold back on any form of price-cutting behaviour, 
whether direct or indirect. 
 The Commission took the position that these clauses had the object or effect of 
appreciably restricting the possibilities for competition between branded goods imported in 
Belgium from other Member States.
68
 Moreover, the restriction on the dealers’ freedom to 
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obtain supplies of ASPA products for resale in Belgium exclusively through the official 
distribution channels was found to be capable of affecting inter-State trade by hindering 
imports within the internal market.
69
 The Commission accordingly held that the clauses in 
question were caught by Article 101(1), and were not eligible for an exemption under 
Article 101(3).
70
 The negative clearance was eventually granted following the removal of 
the contested provisions. 
 In VBBB/VBVB,
71
 a case noteworthy for the Commission’s detailed – albeit not 
unambiguous – examination of the Article 101(3) criteria, the agreement at issue had been 
entered into between two associations of publishers, importers, distributors of books, and 
booksellers established in the Netherlands and Belgium, respectively. In addition to 
establishing a collective exclusive dealing system, the agreement provided that Dutch-
language books could not be sold in these countries at a price below the retail price 
stipulated by the Dutch or Belgian publishers, while discounts could be permitted only to 
recognised booksellers and distributors. The Commission held that the collective RPM 
scheme had as its object and effect the restriction of competition and was, therefore, caught 
by Article 101(1).
72
 
 In assessing the eligibility of the agreement for an exemption pursuant to Article 
101(3), the Commission rejected the parties’ argument that the agreement improved the 
production and distribution of the goods concerned by enabling the subsidisation of less 
popular books, thus guaranteeing the availability of a wider range of titles on the market. 
According to the Commission, collective RPM was not a necessary prerequisite of cross-
subsidisation, since any relevant decisions could be taken individually and independently 
by each publisher.
73
 To the parties' contention that the agreement allowed a fair share of 
the benefits to be passed on to consumers in the form of an expanded range of titles and 
increased sales-specific services, the Commission replied respectively that, first, few 
publishers actually published both general-interest and less popular books and, second, that 
this system prevented consumers who did not wish to use the ancillary services from 
purchasing the books at lower prices.
74
 Moreover, the Commission took the position that 
the agreement’s cultural implications were irrelevant in the context of the indispensability 
criterion of Article 101(3), and noted that ‘it is not for undertakings or associations of 
                                                          
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid, para 9. 
71
 [1982] OJ L54/36. 
72
 Ibid, para 42. 
73
 Ibid, para 51. 
74
 Ibid, para 54. 
203 
 
undertakings to conclude agreements on cultural questions, which are principally a matter 
for government’.75 Finally, the Commission downplayed the importance of service 
competition between booksellers asserting that it is only ‘secondary’ to price competition, 
particularly where consumer demand for highly specialised products is limited.
76
 On 
appeal, the decision was upheld by the CJEU.
77
 
 The Commission adhered to this reasoning when delivering its decision in 
Publishers’ Association – Net Book Agreements,78 a similar case involving agreements 
entered into between publishers established in the United Kingdom, which concerned the 
application of uniform sales conditions, including the stipulation of the retail prices at 
which the books were to be sold. Interestingly, the UK Restrictive Practices Court had 
already upheld the RPM schemes at hand on two occasions, finding that they were not 
contrary to the public interest.
79
  
 
5.1.2. References for Preliminary Ruling Concerning RPM Agreements 
 In SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse,
80
 the CJEU was asked 
to deliver a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, regarding the compatibility with 
EU competition law of a selective distribution system for newspapers and periodicals. In 
particular, one of the questions concerned the distributor’s right to fix the resale prices of 
the products in question and to compel retailers to comply with the stipulated prices. The 
distribution agency, supported by the German government which submitted its 
observations, stressed that the fixing of retail prices in this case was necessary in view of 
the particularities of the market for the distribution of newspapers and periodicals. This 
market in particular presents three distinctive attributes: first, the relevant products have 
very limited shelf life and publishers are frequently obliged to take back any unsold copies; 
second, the elasticity of demand for the products is very limited, since, as a general 
proposition, every newspaper or periodical has its own body of customers; third, the 
fundamental right of the freedom of press and the relevant freedom to contribute to the 
formation of public opinion entail that the readers should be given access to a 
                                                          
75
 Ibid, para 60. 
76
 Ibid, para 62. 
77
 Joined cases 43/82 and 63/82, Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen, VBVB, and 
Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels, VBBB, v Commission [1984] ECR 19. 
78
 [1989] OJ L22/12. 
79
 Ibid, para 43; See Re Net Book Agreement [1962] 3 All ER 751. 
80
 Case 243/83, [1985] ECR 2015. 
204 
 
representative selection of all publications.
81
 The Court accepted these arguments, but first 
pointed out that, as a matter of law, agreements fixing the prices to be observed in 
contracts with third parties violate Article 101(1) TFEU; RPM clauses may escape this 
prohibition only provided that they qualify for an exemption under Article 101(3).
82
 
Therefore, when assessing the applicability of Article 101(3) to an agreement concerning 
the distribution of newspapers and periodicals, the Commission must examine whether ‘the 
fixing of the retail price by publishers constitutes the sole means of supporting the financial 
burden resulting from the taking back of unsold copies and if the latter practice constitutes 
the sole method by which a wide selection of newspapers and periodicals can be made 
available to readers’.83 
 In Louis Erauw-Jacquery SPRL v La Hesbignonne,
84
 the Court was asked whether 
Article 101(1) was applicable to an agreement granting a licence to propagate and sell 
certain varieties of cereal seed protected by plant breeders’ rights. Among the contested 
provisions was the obligation of the licensee not to sell any seeds below the minimum 
prices stipulated by the breeder. The breeder argued that the clause at issue concerned only 
sales in Belgium; Article 101(1) was therefore inapplicable, since the agreement could not 
affect trade between Member States. The CJEU first observed that the breeder had in fact 
entered into identical RPM agreements with all the growers of the protected varieties. The 
Court maintained that this network of agreements had ‘the same effect as a price system 
fixed by a horizontal agreement’ and, therefore, its object and effect was the restriction of 
competition.
85
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 The Court further pointed out the interaction between the clause imposing 
minimum resale prices and a provision preventing the grower from exporting seed for 
propagation. According to the CJEU, these two clauses could have the combined effect of 
affecting trade between Member States.
86
 In assessing whether the effect of an agreement 
on inter-state trade is appreciable, the national court should take into account the economic 
and legal context of the agreement in question and, more specifically, ‘whether it forms 
part of a cluster of similar agreements concluded between the breeder and other licensees, 
on the breeders market share in respect of the seed concerned and on the ability of the 
producers bound by those agreements to export that seed’.87 
 The following three judgments of the CJEU under Article 267 concern exclusive 
purchasing contracts entered into between producers of petroleum-based products and 
service station operators in Spain. The agreements at issue contained inter alia clauses 
fixing the retail prices at which the contract products were to be sold. In the CEEES case,
88
 
the first in this series of references for a preliminary ruling, the confederation of Spanish 
service station operators filed a complaint with the Spanish national competition authority, 
alleging that the contracts concluded between CEPSA and a number of retailers included 
provisions that restricted competition. The confederation’s complaint was dismissed by the 
competition authority and, subsequently, by the appellate courts, on the grounds that the 
agreement did not violate the relevant national competition rules. Eventually, the Tribunal 
Supremo stayed the proceedings before it and referred the case to the CJEU, asking 
whether the block exemption provided by Regulation 1984/83 to exclusive purchasing 
agreements was applicable in the case at hand, which involved contracts nominally 
classified as agency agreements. The Court first reiterated that, in order for the contested 
contracts to be considered as agreements for the purposes of Article 101(1), account should 
be taken of the financial and commercial risks assumed by the retailers with regard to the 
sale of fuel to third parties.
89
 If the national court were to find that, in light of the allocation 
of risks between the supplier and the service station operators, the latter constituted 
independent economic operators, then the contracts constituted agreements between 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 101. In that case, the CJEU held that the 
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provisions requiring the retailers to observe the resale prices stipulated by CEPSA would 
not be covered by the exemption provided by Regulation 1984/83.
90
            
 The contract at issue in the CEPSA case
91
 had been entered into between a supplier 
of petroleum products and a service station and concerned the ‘use of brand name and 
image, technical and commercial assistance and supply on a commission-agent basis’. The 
service station operator undertook inter alia to purchase exclusively from CEPSA various 
petroleum products for resale at the retail prices stipulated by the supplier. In a subsequent 
letter, CEPSA authorised the service station operators to lower the sale prices of the 
contract products without affecting the supplier’s receipts. Eventually, the service station 
operator brought an action for annulment of the exclusive purchasing agreement, alleging 
that it violated Article 101 TFEU due to the clause leaving the setting of the retail prices to 
the sole discretion of the supplier. The Court of First Instance annulled the agreement and, 
on appeal, the Provincial Court of Madrid submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU, asking whether the present agreement fell within the scope of Article 101(1) or 
whether it could benefit from the block exemption granted under Regulation 1984/83 to 
exclusive purchasing agreements. 
 In response, the Court pointed out that the fixing by the supplier of the retail price 
for petroleum products was not covered by the block exemption regulation.
92
 Nevertheless, 
account should be taken of the fact that CEPSA authorised the retailer to lower its prices 
without affecting the supplier’s receipts. In such a case, held the CJEU, it was for the 
national court to determine whether national law allows the unilateral amendment of the 
contested clause.
93
 Furthermore, the national court had to examine this authorisation in 
view of the economic and legal context in which the whole contract operated, and to 
ascertain that CEPSA made it ‘genuinely possible’ for the retailer to lower its prices.94 In 
other words, if the court established that the service station operator was not in reality 
indirectly required to charge fixed prices, but that instead it enjoyed the freedom to set its 
own prices, then the agreement at hand could benefit from the block exemption regulation. 
Finally, the CJEU stated that the issue whether a contract that was automatically void 
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under Article 101(2) TFEU could become valid following the amendment of the clause 
imposing a hardcore restriction was to be deal with under national contract law.
95
        
 In Pedro IV,
96
 an operator of a service station in Spain and a supplier of petroleum-
based products entered into four contracts providing for the building of a service station 
and the general terms of its operation. Under one of the contracts, the service station 
operator undertook to purchase all its requirements in fuel from the supplier, while the 
latter agreed to determine the price of the fuel supplied to the service station on the most 
advantageous terms agreed by it with other service stations in Barcelona. The parties 
further agreed that the retail price would never be higher than the average of the prices 
fixed by other suppliers; an appropriate distribution margin for the service station operator 
would then be added to that price, and the aggregated amount would constitute the 
recommended retail price for the fuel sold at the service station. 
 In assessing the compatibility of the agreement with Article 101(1), the CJEU held 
that, provided that the price was merely recommended – and not imposed – by the supplier, 
the method applied for its calculation would be immaterial. What was important was that 
the reseller maintained the freedom to determine its own retail prices.
97
 Moreover, it was 
for the national court to establish that it was genuinely possible for the retailer to reduce 
the recommended resale price. To this purpose, account must be taken of the overall 
agreement in its commercial and legal context, in order to ascertain that the recommended 
retail prices did not in reality constitute minimum or fixed prices.
98
 Interestingly, the Court 
further pointed out that, although RPM is expressly prohibited by Article 101(1)(a) TFEU,  
it causes that agreement to be caught by the prohibition set out in that provision 
only where all the other conditions for applying that provision are met, that is to 
say, that the object or effect of the agreement is perceptibly to restrict competition 
within the common market and that it is capable of affecting trade between 
Member States.
99
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5.2. The Treatment of RPM by the NCAs 
  
In its 2010 Vertical Guidelines the European Commission acknowledged for the 
first time that minimum RPM may give rise to considerable efficiencies. However, this 
development does not seem to signal a change in the Commission’s approach: vertical 
price fixing is still being classified as a restriction of competition by object under Article 
101(1) and as a hardcore restraint under Article 101(3). On the contrary, recently the CJEU 
in Pedro IV adopted a more relaxed approach, holding that a vertical price fixing 
agreement under investigation will be caught by Article 101(1) only insofar as all the 
conditions set out in that provision are met. 
Following a quick look at the Commission decisions on RPM, one could not help 
observing that the last relevant case was Yamaha, decided well over a decade ago. A 
logical, but superficial explanation would be that the Commission, having already accepted 
the efficiency justifications of vertical price fixing but hesitating to remove the practice 
from the object box, does not consider the prohibition of RPM an enforcement priority. It 
is submitted here that the reason for the Commission’s apparent indifference towards RPM 
is merely that, on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis, it relies on national competition 
authorities and courts to carry out lengthy and costly procedures which are simultaneously 
very likely to lead to false positive errors. 
Indeed, in the years following Yamaha and the enactment of Regulation 1/2003,
100
 
which has decentralised the application of EU competition law, there has been 
considerable enforcement activity by the national competition authorities (‘NCAs’) of the 
EU Member States. In Germany, anti-competitive agreements, both horizontal and vertical, 
are caught by §1 of the Act against Restraints of Competition (‘GWB’), a provision 
modelled on Article 101(1) TFEU. The German Federal Cartel Office (‘FCO’) has recently 
issued infringement decisions and imposed fines for vertical price fixing on a number of 
occasions. The price-maintaining manufacturers fined by the enforcement agency we 
active in the markets for: cosmetic products;
101
 high-quality power tools;
102
 computer 
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software;
103
 hearing aids;
104
 and electrical household appliances.
105
 It is noteworthy that the 
vast majority of these cases concerned RPM imposed in the context of a selective 
distribution system, implemented through the exercise of coercion on retailers to observe 
‘non-binding’ price recommendations. In two further cases, CIBA Vision106 and Bayer 
Vital,
107
 the FCO condemned the RPM schemes at issue taking into consideration their 
ability to facilitate horizontal collusion.
108
 More recently, however, the FCO adopted two 
separate infringement decisions against two mattress manufacturers who were found to 
have individually maintained minimum retail prices for their products. Despite the parallel 
implementation of price floors by the manufacturers, the agency conceded that there were 
no indications of anti-competitive horizontal collusion.
109
 
In France, the Autorité de la concurrence (formerly Conseil de la concurrence) has 
been actively enforcing national competition law and Article 101 TFEU post-
Modernisation. The stipulation of retail price floors by a manufacturer for the resale of its 
products is in violation of Article L410-2 of the French Commercial Code (code de 
commerce), which establishes the general principle that the prices of goods, products and 
services are freely determined by the competitive process. Vertical price fixing also falls 
within the scope of the more specific provision of Article of Article L420-1, which is the 
equivalent of Article 101(1) TFEU in the French legal order, catching collusive anti-
competitive practices. Interestingly, a natural person having taken action to impose 
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minimum resale prices is facing a fine of 15,000 euro, pursuant to Article L442-5 of the 
Commercial Code. 
The approach taken to RPM by the French authorities is particularly stringent, and 
it is frequently claimed that the legal status of the practice in France is that of ‘per se’ 
unlawfulness.
110
 In the Luxury Perfumes case, the then Conseil de concurrence adopted an 
infringement decision against 13 manufacturers of luxury perfumes for having entered into 
RPM agreements with three national chains of selective distribution. In defence of the 
agreements at issue, the parties noted that the stipulated price floors were designed to 
protect the luxury image of the contract. Although acknowledging that it was not qualified 
to indicate the price level necessary for the maintenance of a product’s exclusive character, 
the Conseil underlined the manufacturers’ obligation to respect the distributors’ freedom 
independently to determine their prices, and noted that ‘in this case, the unlawful practices 
allowed the undertakings involved in the vertical agreements to reap the profits associated 
with the existence of an integrated distribution network without assuming the costs, which 
are very important’.111 In the view of the Conseil, the limited degree of demand elasticity 
would allow both the manufacturer and the distributors to extract supra-competitive profits 
from brand-loyal consumers.
112
 The manufacturer could have a share in the distributors’ 
inflated profit margin simply by fixing its wholesale price.
113
 The only purpose of the RPM 
schemes was, according to the Conseil, to prevent price-cutting retailers from jeopardising 
the vertical collusion.
114
 
In Video Cassettes, the Conseil de concurrence defined the standard of proof 
required for the inference of vertical price fixing. First, there should be a discussion on 
retail prices in the context of the negotiations between the manufacturer and its dealers. 
Second, there should be indications that the retailers have observed the fixed resale prices 
so that the existence of an agreement can be substantiated. Third, the agreement should be 
supplemented by a monitoring mechanism designed to ensure the sustainability of the 
vertical collusion.
115
 The Conseil stressed the relevance of the upstream firms’ market 
power to the correlation between RPM and horizontal collusion: ‘[f]or example, if the 
manufacturer’s market share is 100% and if all distributors are involved in the agreement, 
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the potential effect of the practice is the same as that of an agreement between all the 
manufacturers’. Accordingly, in the case at hand, the Conseil relied on the dominant 
position held by Buena Vista Home Entertainment as an aggravating factor, since its 
conduct had the ability to influence the pattern of trade in the industry.
116
     
More recently, the French Competition Authority dealt with distribution 
agreements entered into by three leading pet food manufacturers setting minimum retail 
prices, establishing exclusivity clauses and restricting parallel trade. The RPM clauses had 
been negotiated directly between the manufacturers and the purchasing centres of retail 
chains. These centres purchased their products from wholesalers who got their supplies 
from the price-maintaining manufacturers. As a result, the wholesalers did not have the 
ability to determine their prices, as the rate negotiated nationally for shops of the same 
retail chain was applied in the same way by all wholesalers.
117
 Eventually, the Authority 
imposed fines in excess of 35 million euro. 
 
 
5.3. A Rule of Reason Standard for RPM – Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v 
PSKS, Inc 
The per se illegality of RPM was challenged, and eventually overruled, in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc.
118
 The defendant, Leegin, was a manufacturer 
and distributor of leather goods, some of which were marketed under the brand name 
‘Brighton’. The plaintiff, PSKS, was a retailer of women’s apparel in Texas that had been 
selling ‘Brighton’ products since 1995. In 1997, Leegin announced a new pricing policy, 
according to which retailers were required not to sell the said products at a price below that 
suggested by the manufacturer; otherwise, the latter would refuse to sell to any discounters. 
Accordingly, when Leegin discovered that PSKS was discounting, and after the retailer’s 
refusal to adhere to the suggested price, Leegin ceased supplying it with ‘Brighton’ goods. 
PSKS then sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and was awarded treble damages by 
the district court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, bound by the Dr. Miles 
precedent, upheld the decision.  
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However, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed, introducing the 
rule of reason as the standard to be applied in the appraisal of vertical price fixing. The 
Court overruled Dr Miles on the basis of the pro-competitive justifications of RPM as put 
forward by the economic literature, taking into consideration all the relevant arguments: 
the ‘free rider’ rationale, the facilitation of market entry for new firms, and the general 
stimulation of interbrand competition.
119
 As in Monsanto more than two decades earlier, 
the abolition of the per se ban was recommended by an amicus curiae brief filed by both 
US antitrust authorities, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
120
 
 
5.2.1. Majority Opinion  
Mr Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, started his analysis by 
pointing out that the rule of reason is by default the accepted standard applied in order to 
determine whether a given commercial practice restraints trade within the meaning of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
121
 By contrast, the application of the rule of per se illegality 
is generally limited to restraints which, on the basis of considerable experience, have been 
proven to be always or almost always anti-competitive; in other words, the per se rule is 
appropriate ‘only if courts can predict with confidence that [the restraint] would be 
invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason’.122  
Kennedy continued by rejecting the Court’s formalistic reliance on the ancient 
doctrine against restraints on alienation in the adjudication of Dr Miles: not only was the 
rule in contrast with the requirement that antitrust cases be based on ‘demonstrable 
economic effect’, established in Sylvania, but also, even under common law, it has 
typically been associated with the transfer of title in real property and not chattels.
123
 Then, 
Kennedy addressed the central issue in Dr Miles, namely the idea that vertical agreements 
between a manufacturer and its distributors produce effects comparable to those of a 
horizontal combination in the downstream market. In his opinion, contemporary antitrust 
principles are to be formulated ‘in accordance with the appreciated differences in economic 
effect between vertical and horizontal agreements, differences the Dr. Miles Court failed to 
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consider’.124 In that regard, Kennedy cited the various pro-competitive justifications for ‘a 
manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance’,125 and took the view that neither these nor 
the relevant empirical evidence support the application of the per se rule.   
The Court did not rule out the possibility that anti-competitive effects can result 
from such a practice.
126
 In particular, it acknowledged that historical examples, including 
the suspected druggists’ cartel at issue in Dr Miles, suggested that retailer collusion raised 
legitimate concerns. However, it stated that the per se rule should only be limited to the 
horizontal aspects of an upstream or downstream cartel, as the rule of reason would 
provide an adequate analytical framework for the appraisal of RPM implemented as a 
facilitating mechanism.
127
 However, the rule of per se illegality is only appropriate for 
restraints that always or almost always restrict competition, and the aforementioned 
justifications do not allow for such a conclusion to be drawn in the case of RPM.
128
 In 
rejecting the respondent’s argument, the majority further dismissed the relevance of the 
effect of price floors on retail prices: pricing effects are consistent with both pro- and anti-
competitive theories, and thus cannot be relied upon as indication ‘absent a further 
showing of anticompetitive conduct’.129  
In providing guidance to lower courts, Justice Kennedy drew attention to the anti-
competitive potential of price floors, and noted three factors that should be taken into 
consideration in the context of the substantive assessment of RPM schemes: first, the 
number of manufacturers that implement fixed resale prices; second, whether the price 
maintenance was decided independently by the manufacturer, or adopted at the behest of 
the retailers; and, finally, the degree of market power held by each of the parties to an 
RPM agreement.
130
 However, he also pointed out that, in view of the increased potential of 
RPM to cause competitive harm, courts should be diligent in applying the rule of reason to 
vertical price restraints, in order to prevent economic actors from implementing them for 
anti-competitive purposes.
131
 The majority then proceeded to the justification for its 
departure from stare decisis, which has been examined in detailed earlier in this thesis.
132
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5.2.2. Dissenting Opinion 
In a powerful opinion, Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of the four dissenting 
Justices, opposed the adoption of the rule of reason standard for RPM. In his view, antitrust 
law should be informed by economics but, as an administrative system in which courts 
bring their own administrative judgment to bear, it should not go beyond that to replicate 
economists’ views. Breyer did not dispute the pro-competitive potential of the practice; his 
main concern, however, was the lack of satisfactory evidence as to the frequency with 
which the alleged efficiency-enhancing effects of RPM are encountered in practice.
133
 The 
same, in his opinion, applied to the oft-cited free rider argument: even assuming that free 
riding may indeed occur sometimes, it would still be difficult for the court to identify 
whether the benefits arising from RPM outweigh any potential detriment to competition, or 
even to determine the source of the restraint.
134
  
Despite his scepticism, Breyer was not unequivocally for the preservation of the 
rigid per se treatment. Instead, he conceded that he ‘might agree that the per se rule should 
be slightly modified to allow an exception for the more easily identifiable and temporary 
condition of “new entry”’.135 However, he noted that the Dr Miles dictum constituted a 
well-established statutory precedent which could not be overruled in the absence of a 
substantial change in circumstances that would justify a change in policy: virtually none of 
the economic arguments put forward by the majority to justify its position was new, while 
in the course of the 20
th
 century both the structure of the American economy and the levels 
of concentration in important industries remained unaltered.
136
 In concluding, Justice 
Breyer pointed out that ‘[t]he only safe predictions to make about today’s decision are that 
it will likely raise the price of goods at retail and it will create considerable legal 
turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles’.137    
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5.2.3. The Aftermath of Leegin – The State Antitrust Laws 
Maryland was the first, and so far the only, State to introduce a ‘Leegin repealer’ in 
its legal order. The Maryland Antitrust Act,
138
 in §11-204(a)(1) thereof, generally 
proscribes contracts, combinations or conspiracies between two or more persons which 
‘unreasonably restrain trade or commerce’. In April 2009, Maryland’s legislature, in 
amending the Act, expressly outlawed RPM by clarifying that ‘a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer, wholesaler, or 
distributor may not sell a commodity or service’ also amounts to an unreasonable restraint 
of trade within the meaning of the prohibition.
139
 The State legislature’s initiative was in 
contrast with the general federal harmonisation tendencies of the state courts which, in the 
absence of the new provision, would be expected to integrate the US Supreme Court’s 
rationale into the antitrust laws of Maryland.
140
  
Following in Maryland’s footsteps, in 2012 the Pennsylvania State Senator 
introduced in the General Assembly a bill proposing the adoption of an antitrust statute 
which would proscribe minimum RPM.
141
 Eventually, however, the deliberations of the 
relevant committee did not bear fruit, and Pennsylvania remains to date the only US State 
without antitrust legislation.
142
 At the same time, RPM remains per se illegal in under 
California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act, and unenforceable – but not illegal – in 
New York.
143
  
In April 2013, the reaction of the Kansas legislature to the Leegin dictum was 
diametrically different, and consisted in the adoption of, also the first and only, statute 
reinstating the reasonableness standard established in Leegin. In its O’Brien judgment, 
decided in the aftermath of Leegin, the Supreme Court of Kansas explicitly rejected the 
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applicability of the rule of reason standard under the State antitrust statute.
144
 According to 
the Court, ‘federal precedents interpreting, construing, and applying federal statutes have 
little or no precedential weight when the task is interpretation and application of a clear 
and dissimilar Kansas statute’.145 The Court held accordingly that, under the laws of 
Kansas, vertical price fixing remained subject to the ‘simple, per se rule’.146 Perhaps 
inevitably, the O’Brien case encouraged a number of potential plaintiffs in RPM-related 
litigation to consider Kansas as a preferred destination in the context of forum shopping.
147
  
In response to the concerns expressed by various distinct industries affected by the 
decision, and perhaps also due to its possible over-inclusive implications that created 
uncertainty as to the enforceability and lawfulness of a broad range of standard clauses,
148
 
the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act
149
 was modified in a way that aligned State legislation 
with the developments in federal antitrust policy. Under the amended §50-163(b) of the 
Act, ‘the Kansas restraint of trade act shall be construed in harmony with ruling judicial 
interpretations of federal antitrust law by the United States supreme court’. The Act further 
confirms the legality of reasonable restraints of trade or commerce; a restriction of 
competition may qualify as ‘reasonable’ insofar as it is not found to ‘contravene public 
welfare’ following an assessment on the basis of all the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case.
150
  
 It is important to note that relevant actions were also taken at a federal level. In 
2007 and 2009, Senator Herb Kohl introduced a bill proposing the statutory re-introduction 
of the per se ban on RPM through the promulgation of the Discount Pricing Consumer 
Protection Act, the declared purpose of which was ‘to restore the rule that agreements 
between manufacturers and retailers, distributors, or wholesalers to set the minimum price 
below which the manufacturer’s product or service cannot be sold violates the Sherman 
Act’.151 The proposed Act would effectively amend Section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
inserting after the first sentence the following addition: ‘Any contract, combination, 
conspiracy or agreement setting a minimum price below which a product or service cannot 
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be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate this Act’.152 In Senator Kohl’s 
view, vertical price fixing would jeopardise the very existence of discount stores and 
online outlets, and would be responsible for an across-the-board increase in retail prices. 
The bill gained the support of no less that thirty-five State Attorneys General who, in a 
letter to Congress, underlined the disadvantages that the Leegin dictum could entail for 
consumers, and championed the adoption of the statute.
153
 That said, on both occasions the 
bill died in subcommittees. 
 
 
5.4. Critical Assessment of the Public Policy towards RPM in the EU and the US 
 
It is noteworthy that the present study has retrieved only three Commission 
decisions involving collective RPM agreements, two of which concerned the culturally 
sensitive market of book publishing. The vast majority of the cases examined earlier in this 
chapter dealt with individual RPM agreements, but – with very few exceptions – the 
parties refrained from invoking any credible efficiency-enhancing justifications. 
Furthermore, on no occasion did the Commission rely on individual RPM in order to infer 
the existence of a cartel in the market concerned. In fact, a quick look at the nature of some 
of the price-maintained goods involved in the Commission decisions – cars, high-end 
cameras, electronic appliances, perfumes, brandy – shows that the markets affected by the 
RPM schemes at issue were characterised by a high degree of product differentiation that 
would undermine any attempts for effective cartelisation. 
The foregoing review of cases decided by the European Commission, and the 
German and French competition authorities provides valuable empirical evidence 
regarding the prevalence and nature of RPM schemes in various industries. The most 
important conclusion to be drawn is that a substantial fraction of all relevant cases brought 
by the Commission and the German and French authorities involved price fixing schemes 
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implemented in the context of selective distribution systems.
154
 As has already been 
argued,
155
 the fact that selective distribution and RPM may be employed as 
interchangeable means for the stimulation of intrabrand non-price competition does not 
imply that they are perfect substitutes. Qualitative selective distribution constitutes a 
typical example of long-term relational contract and RPM may be employed with the 
purpose of enhancing its self-enforcement range in cases where the initial contractual 
arrangement cannot provide for all future contingencies. The fact that, in so many cases, 
manufacturers operating selective distribution networks coerced their dealers to observe 
the recommended retail prices can be interpreted as confirming the inadequacy of 
selectivity criteria in ensuring the centralisation of the manufacturer’s control over 
distribution, in accordance with the justification put forward by Professors Klein and 
Murphy.
156
 
The relatively frequent reinforcement of selectivity clauses with RPM is consistent 
with the special services argument, since, by assumption, products which are qualified for 
a selective distribution system by virtue of their nature warrant the supply of specific 
promotional services. At the same time, however, it is also consistent with empirical 
evidence from the other side of the Atlantic. Ippolito, based on a meta-analysis of 
empirical data from RPM cases brought before federal and state courts between 1976 and 
1982, observes that approximately 65 percent of all relevant lawsuits brought by private 
plaintiffs involved goods falling within the categories to which the special services 
argument is typically applicable: complex products, infrequently purchased, fashion goods 
or newly launched. The respective figure of government cases which could be explained by 
Telser’s theory was 68 percent.157   
It is also noteworthy that selective distribution agreements are typically applicable 
to products characterised by a certain level of technical complexity or distinguished by 
their luxury nature. Products falling within these categories present specific attributes 
which make horizontal collusion notoriously difficult: different cost structures, a great 
degree of product differentiation, limited elasticity of demand, and extensive consumer 
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brand loyalty. It is indicative that, in a number of cases, the simultaneous implementation 
of RPM policies by multiple competing manufacturers did not give rise to horizontal 
theories of harm. In Luxury Perfumes, the fact that no less than 13 manufacturers of high-
end cosmetic products maintained retail prices was not sufficient for the French 
Competition Authority to infer horizontal effects: the Conseil de concurrence noted that 
demand for the goods was particularly inelastic, so competition between the manufacturers 
was already weak even in the absence of RPM. Similarly, in Recticel and Metzeler, the 
FCO adopted infringement decisions against two mattress manufacturers, despite 
acknowledging the applicability of the special services argument and expressly dismissing 
the existence of upstream collusion. Finally, an investigation carried out by the former 
OFT in the mobility aids sector in the United Kingdom resulted in two manufacturers of 
mobility scooters being fined for imposing independently restrictions on online 
advertising, which are generally considered as a form of indirect vertical price fixing.
158
 
Once again, no evidence of horizontal collusion was submitted.          
Additionally, there was in fact no evidence that the RPM policies involved in the 
above cases were in any way imposed by downstream firms. Certainly, on various 
occasions, the coercion exercised by the manufacturer on discount retailers to adhere to the 
fixed price floors was a result of complaints by full-service, full-price outlets, but this fact 
is in itself insufficient to substantiate collusion in the downstream market. The reason is 
simple: diligent retailers are as interested in combating free riding as the manufacturer 
itself: it is them who will be forced to exit the market if the horizontal externality is not 
duly remedied. It is thus apparent that they may have had the incentive to foreclose price-
cutters, but this incentive is equally consistent with anti-competitive intent as with 
efficiency gains associated with the elimination of the free rider problem. But apart from 
these theoretical assumptions, the most important fact remains that in none of these cases 
did the enforcement agencies infer the existence of a dealer cartel. This finding is 
consistent with empirical studies from the other side of the Atlantic, according to which, as 
Scherer and Ross point out, ‘only a minority, and perhaps a small minority, of the 
adoptions for particular products came as a primary consequence of organized dealer 
pressures’.159 
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The above observations are in no way to be interpreted as suggesting that the 
enforcement agencies in the EU have not dealt with RPM schemes presenting 
demonstrable anti-competitive effects. Two cases decided by the FCO, CIBA Vision and 
Bayer Vital, raised specific horizontal collusion concerns. Furthermore, the European 
Commission’s Spices decision and the French Competition Authority’s judgment in Video 
Cassettes were obviously based on the price-maintaining manufacturers’ degree of market 
power, which allowed them to foreclose the upstream market and influence the pattern of 
trade in the affected industry, respectively. These cases can be understood as confirming 
the theories of harm associated with price floors.        
In the United States, the response of commentators, lawmakers and State Attorneys 
General to Leegin merely reflects the ambivalent effects of RPM. To date, two states, 
Maryland and California, have confirmed the per se illegality of vertical price fixing under 
the relevant state antitrust statutes, while New York has maintained the current hostile – 
but less stringent – approach to the practice. At the same time, in addition to Kansas, which 
has already enacted the first and so far only ‘Leegin reinstater’, all other states appear to be 
relying on federal harmonisation clauses thus endorsing the dicta of the US Supreme Court 
as guidance.
160
 The fact that three states have explicitly chosen to deviate from the Leegin 
dictum is certainly indicative of the controversy surrounding vertical price fixing, but does 
not by any means provide a basis for safe inferences as to what the optimal antitrust 
response to RPM should be. In reality, it would be much more surprising if all policy 
makers across the United States had slavishly endorsed the rule of reason standard 
overnight, turning their backs on a century-long precedent that had been an integral part of 
the American retail tradition for generations.        
As far as the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to RPM agreements is 
concerned, the body of relevant cases decided by lower courts in the post-Leegin world 
does not allow for specific conclusions to be drawn as to the analytical framework 
employed for the substantive assessment under the rule of reason standard or its 
effectiveness, for that matter. The lack of extensive antitrust adjudication of RPM cases 
leads to the compelling conclusion that Leegin has not had the effect of encouraging 
manufacturers to implement vertical price fixing policies.
161
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In PSKS v Leegin, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on remand rejected the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the RPM scheme at issue deprived consumers of intrabrand price 
competition, holding that the argument ‘ignores interbrand competition, which forces 
Brighton retailers to offer a combination of price and service that attracts consumers away 
from competing products’.162 Besides, in the court’s view ‘robust competition can exist 
even in the absence of price competition. Retailers may seek to attract customers with 
better service, more knowledgeable staff, more appealing stores, and other nonprice-
oriented strategies’.163 In addition, the court also dismissed the market definitions 
suggested by PSKS, Inc.
164
 The plaintiffs’ failure to define the relevant market affected by 
the agreement has also been the reason for the dismissal of their claims in other RPM cases 
brought in the aftermath of Leegin.
165
 In re Nine West Group Inc, the FTC, despite 
rejecting the manufacturer's argument that price floors stimulated demand for its products 
thus promoting interbrand competition, nonetheless relied on Leegin to modify an existing 
consent decree. The FTC justified the modification by noting the manufacturer’s ‘modest 
market share’, the absence of a dominant retailer, and the fact that the price floors were 
determined by the manufacturer itself, in an attempt to induce the supply of product-
specific services by its distributors. Having already concluded that the RPM agreement 
was ‘not likely to harm consumers at this time’, the FTC did not rule out the possible 
future anti-competitive effects of the policy. For that reason, it required Nine West to 
provide periodic reports on the impact of its RPM clauses on price and output.
166
  
There is, however, encouraging evidence that the adjudication of RPM cases is not 
based on a rule of reason that is tantamount to a ‘euphemism for nonliability’,167 according 
to the Judge Posner’s famous quote, but is instead able to provide a solid analytical 
framework under which RPM can be reliably appraised on the basis of its net competitive 
effects. In Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc v Mac Trucks, Inc, a lower court allowed the 
plaintiff’s action to proceed, noting that the latter had ‘presented sufficient evidence to 
allow a jury to conclude that the agreement ... produced anti-competitive effects’, in 
particular that the RPM policy was imposed as a result of dealer pressure, and could thus 
have been designed to facilitate dealer collusion.
168
 A similar position was taken in 
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McDonough v Toys ‘R’ Us, a motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that the price 
floors were imposed at the behest of a powerful brick-and-mortar retailer with the purpose 
of excluding online discounters.
169
 
As a general proposition, to date there have been no indications suggesting that the 
rule of reason standard does not provide a workable analytical framework for the 
substantive assessment of vertical price fixing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
However, the absence of a sufficiently large body of RPM litigation entails that the Leegin 
rule has yet to be refined. 
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Chapter 6 
Shaping a Workable Analytical Framework under Article 101 TFEU 
 
 
6.1. General 
 
 Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits ‘agreements between undertakings… which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market’. As in the case of the ban on RPM, the object/effect dichotomy under 
Article 101 seems to have been shaped independently of any pre-existing national antitrust 
traditions of the Member States. Unable to trace its origins in either the German and 
French antitrust laws or Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, Joliet underlines the analogy with 
the distinction between per se illegality and the rule of reason standard under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, stating that ‘[w]ithout asserting unequivocally that the origin of the test 
laid down by Article [101] is to be found in American antitrust law, I can at least point to 
the identity of standards’.1 
 Price fixing is cited in Article 101(1)(a) as an example of a restraint falling within 
the scope of the prohibition. The classification of RPM as a ‘by-object’ restriction was 
confirmed by the CJEU in SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse.
2
 
According to the Court, ‘provisions which fix the prices to be observed in contracts with 
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third parties constitute, of themselves, a restriction on competition within the meaning of 
Article [101](1)’.3 
Additionally, Article 4(a) of Regulation 330/2010 identifies ‘the restriction of the 
buyer's ability to determine its sale price’ as a hardcore restraint, and excludes any vertical 
agreements containing such a clause from the application of the block exemption. 
Paragraph 23 of the Vertical Guidelines clarifies that the terms ‘hardcore restrictions of 
competition’ and ‘restrictions of competition by object’ are used interchangeably, and 
implies that the relevant provisions are exempted from the general presumption of legality 
for vertical agreements, which is introduced by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 
and is conditional upon the market share of the supplier and the buyer. 
 Goyder is critical of the Commission’s use of ‘hardcore’ restraints as a synonym 
for ‘restrictions by object’ in the recent Vertical Guidelines. In stressing the conceptual 
differences between the two terms, she argues that ‘hardcore’ is merely a restraint which 
prevents an agreement from benefitting from a block exemption regulation. Since block 
exemptions are essentially the statutory means for the application of Article 101(3) to 
categories of agreements, the classification of a specific clause as ‘hardcore’ reflects 
nothing but the presumption that the agreement is not capable of satisfying the four 
requirements of Article 101(3) even where the market share thresholds for the application 
of the regulation are not exceeded. The concept of ‘hardcore’ restraint is therefore 
unrelated to Article 101(1) and does not introduce any presumption whatsoever pertaining 
to the compatibility of the agreement with Article 101(1) in the first place.
4
 On the other 
hand, ‘restrictions by object’ constitute, according to Goyder, ‘a category of agreements in 
respect of which a significantly lower burden of proof of infringement exists than for other 
agreements, and its boundaries are ultimately defined not by any Commission regulation ... 
but by the [CJEU]’.5 Indeed in Pierre Fabre, the Cour d’ Appel de Paris filed a reference 
for a preliminary ruling asking whether an outright ban on Internet sales in the context of a 
selective distribution system constitutes a ‘hardcore’ restriction of competition within the 
meaning of Article 101(1). The CJEU pointed out that, as there is no reference to the 
concept of ‘hardcore restraints’ neither in Article 101 TFEU nor in Regulation 2790/1999,6 
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the question at hand should be understood as seeking to ascertain whether the contested 
clause constitutes a restriction of competition ‘by object’.7   
The rationale behind the classification of a restraint in the ‘object’ and/or the 
‘hardcore’ box is based on presumptions which, whether conclusive (irrebuttable) or 
rebuttable, are used in various fields of law for the purposes of judicial economy. In light 
of the distinction between the two concepts as drawn by Goyder, the following paragraphs 
will analyse critically the Commission’s approach to RPM both as a ‘restriction by object’ 
and as a ‘hardcore’ restraint. But before that, the necessary first step is to examine the 
importance of presumptions in the enforcement of EU competition law. 
 
6.1.1. Presumptions in Article 101 Cases 
 Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that the burden of proving an infringement 
of Article 101 (or 102) TFEU is on the party or the authority alleging the infringement.  On 
the other hand, any undertakings seeking to benefit from an exemption under Article 
101(3) bear the burden of proving that their agreement satisfies the four requirements laid 
down in that paragraph. With regard to RPM cases in particular, paragraph 223 of the 
Vertical Guidelines states that  
Including RPM in an agreement gives rise to the presumption that the agreement 
restricts competition and thus falls within Article 101(1). It also gives rise to the 
presumption that the agreement is unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3), 
for which reason the block exemption does not apply. However, undertakings have 
the possibility to plead an efficiency defence under Article 101(3) in an individual 
case. It is incumbent on the parties to substantiate that likely efficiencies result 
from including RPM in their agreement and demonstrate that all the conditions of 
Article 101(3) are fulfilled.
8
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 The Guidelines thus confirm that the substantive assessment of RPM under Article 
101 is essentially based on a presumption of negative welfare consequences. As the burden 
of proof shifts from the authority, which seeks to establish that the alleged violation has 
been committed, to the parties, whose objective is to defend the lawfulness of their 
agreement, legal presumptions are a form of legal reasoning employed with the purpose of 
facilitating the fact-finder’s task. They constitute ‘inferences of fact that courts will 
recognize to exist when the facts necessary to give rise to the presumption have been 
proven to exist’.9 The adoption of legal presumptions may be necessary for reasons of 
public policy or procedural convenience or may simply be based on experience and the 
general understanding of an oft-recurring fact or conclusion as highly probable.
10
  
 Presumptions may be either rebuttable, in which case the relevant inference may be 
refuted should the other party manage to establish to the requisite evidentiary standard that 
it is not applicable to the case at hand, or conclusive (irrebuttable). Conclusive 
presumptions introduce inferences which cannot be rebutted, so any evidence to the 
contrary will not be accepted. As will be shown in the following analysis, there is a subtle 
but fundamental discrepancy in the treatment of vertical price fixing under paragraphs 1 
and 3 of Article 101. This discrepancy derives from the fact that presumptions of a 
different nature are applied in the context of each provision, on the basis of the different 
(foreseeable) welfare effects of RPM on allocative and productive efficiency, respectively. 
 
 
6.2. RPM as a Restriction of Competition by Object – Article 101(1) TFEU  
 
6.2.1. What Constitutes a Restriction by Object    
 In Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, the CJEU held that the 
conjunction ‘or’ in the language of Article 101(1) indicates that the two requirements are to 
be read disjunctively.
11
 It is thus first necessary to consider the precise purpose of the 
agreement, in the economic context in which it is to be applied. Where the object of the 
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agreement is not the restriction of competition, an appreciable restrictive effect needs to be 
shown in order for the agreement to be caught by the prohibition.
12
 This categorisation is 
of great significance because, once an agreement is found to have as its object the 
restriction of competition, there is no need for its effects to be considered.
13
   
 The Article 101(3) Guidelines define restrictions of competition by object as those 
which ‘by their very nature have the potential of restricting competition’.14 Experience has 
shown that such restrictions are so likely to have negative effects on the market and hinder 
the attainment of the objectives pursued under the Treaty, that they are presumed to fall 
within the scope of Article 101.
15
 The Commission thus seems to endorse the rationale 
behind the CJEU’s earlier ruling in Miller v Commission that the object requirement is to 
be interpreted as a presumption of necessary anti-competitive effect.
16
 Advocate General 
Trstenjak subsequently took this assumption one step further, by suggesting that the strong 
anti-competitive prospects of object restrictions necessitated the adoption of some sort of 
‘precautionary principle’, analogous to the criminal law concept of inchoate offences.17  
 It is often asserted that this presumption of necessary effect is a product of adequate 
experience with the competitive impact of a specific type of conduct. Of course, as Bailey 
correctly points out, it may occasionally be the case that this experience has not been 
acquired through the judicial practice of the Commission or the European Courts; 
empirical evidence from different jurisdictions, the US antitrust experience in particular, 
may also be used as a pointer.
18
 But under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the nature of the 
presumption which derives from the characterisation of an agreement as per se illegal is 
not disputed: the US Supreme Court has clarified that ‘there are certain agreements or 
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any 
                                                          
12
 Ibid, p 249. 
13
 See the Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) [now Article 101(3)] of the Treaty 
[2004] OJ C101/97 (hereinafter ‘Article 101(3) Guidelines), para 20; Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, 
Établissements Consten Sarl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 242 and, more 
recently, Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van beestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529, para 30. 
14
 Article 101(3) Guidelines, para 21. 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Case 19/77, Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 131, para 7: ‘by its very 
nature, a clause prohibiting exports constitutes a restriction on competition’; the definition of object 
restrictions as laid down in the 101(3) Guidelines effectively echoes the Court’s language. See also O Odudu, 
‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intent’ [2001] 26 EL Rev 60, 62-63.  
17
 Case C-209/07, The Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637 (BIDS), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 46; D Bailey, 
‘Restrictions of Competition by Object under Article 101 TFEU’ [2012] 49 CML Rev 559, 563-564. 
18
 Bailey further lists the insights of industrial organisation and the various policy priorities as two additional 
external factors which may contribute to the classification of a specific restraint in the ‘object box’, 
irrespective of the domestic judicial experience; D Bailey, supra n 17, 564-565. 
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redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal 
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse 
for their use’.19 In other words, the per se rule introduces a conclusive presumption, which 
‘permits categorical judgments with respect to certain business practices that have proved 
to be predominantly anti-competitive’.20 
 By contrast, the nature of the object requirement under Article 101(1) is rather 
obscure. In Société Technique Minière, Advocate General Roemer seemed to favour the 
application of a ‘rule of reason’ standard for the competitive assessment of all restrictive 
agreements; in his Opinion the AG maintained that  
it would be going too far to allow the least interference with competition to fall 
under the strict prohibition in Article [101](1), whether it arose from an agreement 
having that object or from an agreement which simply had that effect, and to grant 
exemptions for such infringements in the context of Article [101](3).
21
  
The Court agreed and expressly refused to read any conclusive presumptions of illegality 
in the language of the provision: ‘as Article [101](1) is based on an assessment of the 
effects of an agreement from two angles of economic evaluation, it cannot be interpreted as 
introducing any kind of advance judgment with regard to a category of agreements 
determined by their legal nature’. In Consten and Grundig, however, a case decided only a 
fortnight later, the CJEU adopted a stricter methodology and rejected the effects-based 
approach consistently suggested by AG Roemer.
22
 In endorsing the conclusive character of 
the presumption, the Court, after having established that the agreement under scrutiny 
aimed at the insulation of national markets, stressed that  
[n]o further considerations, whether of economic data… or of the corrections of the 
criteria upon which the Commission relied in its comparisons between the 
situations of the French and German markets, and no possible favourable effects of 
                                                          
19
 Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added). 
20
 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc v Pacific Stationery & Printing Co, 472 US 284, 289 (1985).  
21
 Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, Opinion of AG Roemer, p 
257 (emphasis added).   
22
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten Sarl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
[1966] ECR 299, Opinion of AG Roemer, p 358; the AG again opined that ‘it would be artificial to apply 
Article [101](1), on the basis of purely theoretical considerations, to situations which upon closer inspection 
would reveal no appreciable adverse effects on competition, in order then to grant exemption on the basis of 
Article [101](3)’.   
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the agreement in other respects, can in any way lead, in the face of the 
abovementioned restrictions, to a different solution under Article [101](1).
23
  
 In European Night Services, the General Court reiterated that the presumption of 
illegality of object restrictions cannot be refuted in the context of Article 101(1). 
According to the Court, agreements containing ‘obvious restrictions of competition’ may 
escape the prohibition only following a balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects 
under Article 101(3).
24
 Furthermore, in BIDS, the CJEU stressed that this presumption 
constitutes the essence of the object/effect dichotomy. Echoing the language used by the 
Commission in its 101(3) Guidelines, the Court stated that ‘[t]he distinction between 
“infringements by object” and “infringements by effect” arises from the fact that certain 
forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being 
injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition’.25   
These cases clearly demonstrate that the current position of the Commission and 
the Courts is that restrictions by object are conclusively presumed to be illegal for the 
purposes of Article 101(1).
26
 Odudu asserts that the substantive assessment of collusive 
agreements under Article 101(1) concentrates on the issue of allocative efficiency – or 
‘contrived scarcity of output’; he thus perceives the concept of ‘restriction of competition’ 
as essentially tantamount to allocative inefficiency.
27
 Allocative efficiency refers to the 
difference between the marginal cost of production and the price that consumers are 
willing to pay for an extra unit of output. It is only in perfectly competitive markets that 
allocative efficiency is achieved, for only under conditions of perfect competition is price 
equal to marginal cost.
28
 In light of these assumptions, it follows that RPM, being 
classified as an object restriction, is presumed to cause allocative inefficiency. Later in this 
chapter, it will be argued that this presumption is conclusive.  
                                                          
23
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten Sarl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
[1966] ECR 299, 343. 
24
 Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS) v 
Commission [1998] ECR II-1533, para 136.  
25
 Case C-209/07, The Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637, para 17. 
26
 Compare A Jones, ‘Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1)’ [2010] 6 
Eur Competition J 649, 660; Jones argues that there is no conclusive presumption against object restraints 
under Article 101 taken as a whole. She is, nevertheless, sceptical as to whether the possibility of rebutting 
the presumption is anything but theoretical; ibid, 663.  
27
 O Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford University Press 
2006), pp 102-103. 
28
 S Bishop and M Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement 
(3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010), pp 25-26. 
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This presumption of allocative inefficiency has two main implications for the 
antitrust treatment of RPM. First, an agreement fixing resale prices will not be subject to 
the appreciability test, which constitutes the quantitative criterion for the application of 
Article 101(1). Second, the only way for such an agreement to escape the prohibition is by 
qualifying for an exemption under Article 101(3).            
  
6.2.2. Appreciability  
In order for an agreement to be caught by Article 101(1), it is not sufficient that it 
has the object or effect of restricting competition; the restriction also needs to be 
appreciable. A general idea of what constitutes (or, more precisely, what does not 
constitute) an appreciable restriction of competition is given by the 2014 Commission 
Notice on agreements of minor importance.
29
 The Notice provides for specific market 
share thresholds below which an agreement is not likely to restrict competition perceptibly. 
Although the Notice covers in general agreements entered into both between competitors 
and between non-competitors, it expressly excludes, in paragraph 13 thereof, hardcore 
restraints from the de minimis rule. Unlike the preceding framework,
30
 however, the 
current Notice does not make specific reference to RPM as an excluded restraint.  
Nevertheless, this outright exclusion of hardcore restraints is, if anything, 
confusing, particularly in view of the CJEU’s judgement in Völk v Vervaecke.31 It was in 
that case that the Court introduced the de minimis doctrine as the standard for the 
assessment of an agreement’s restrictive effect and it applied it to an agreement containing 
a restriction typically classified as ‘hardcore’. More specifically, the exclusive dealing 
agreement at issue had been entered into between a manufacturer of washing machines and 
its distributor for Belgium and Luxembourg. Both parties held very small market shares 
(0.08% and 0.6% respectively) and the CJEU held that, although the agreement included a 
provision conferring absolute territorial protection upon the dealer, it escaped the 
prohibition of Article 101(1) in view of the weak position of the undertakings concerned. 
                                                          
29
 Communication from the Commission – Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(De Minimis Notice) [2014] OJ C291/1. In the Notice, the Commission states that an agreement does not 
appreciably restrict competition where: (a) it has been concluded between competitors the aggregate market 
share of whom does not exceed 10% of the relevant market, or (b) the parties to the agreement are non-
competitors, each of whom holds a market share not exceeding 15% of the relevant market; ibid, para 8.  
30
 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition 
under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community [now Article 101(1) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union] (de minimis) [2001] OJ C368/13, para 11(2)(a). 
31
 Case 5/69, Franz Völk v SPRL Ets J Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295. 
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As was seen earlier, in Pedro IV the CJEU, in the context of its response to a reference for 
a preliminary ruling regarding an RPM agreement, seemed to endorse and confirm its 
previous judgment in Völk: the court held that, in order for a vertical price fixing scheme to 
be caught by Article 101(1), all the conditions laid down in that provision must be met, 
including the requirement that ‘the object or effect of the agreement is perceptibly to 
restrict competition within the common market’.32 
The resulting uncertainty was eventually rectified in the recent Expedia case,
33
 
where the CJEU overruled its previous judgments in Völk and Pedro IV and adopted a 
position more consistent with the Commission’s de minimis Notice. The case concerned 
the creation of a joint venture by SNCF, the French State railway company, and Expedia, 
an internet-based tour operator, for the reservation and sale of train tickets over the 
Internet. The French competition authority found that the agreement constituted a 
restriction of competition by object and that, as such, was in breach of Article 101, and, 
accordingly, imposed fines on both parties. On appeal, the parties argued that their market 
shares had been overestimated, as in reality they were below the 10 percent threshold 
provided for by the de minimis Notice. The Cour de Cassation filed a reference for a 
preliminary ruling asking whether national competition authorities are bound by the Notice 
when applying Article 101(1) of the Treaty. In replying to the referral, the Court also dealt 
with the issue of appreciability of restrictions by object and put an end to the conflict 
between its previous case law and the Commission’s stricter approach by holding that ‘an 
agreement that may affect trade between Member States and that has an anti-competitive 
object constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, 
an appreciable restriction of competition’.34 By this statement, the Court thus seems to 
accept that restrictions by object are conclusively presumed to satisfy the appreciability 
requirement of Article 101(1) TFEU.
35
    
         
 
                                                          
32
 Case C-260/07, Pedro IV Servicios SL v Total España SA [2009] ECR I-2437, para 82 (emphasis added). 
For a brief presentation of the case, see supra ch 1. 
33
 Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc v Authorité de la Concurrence, decision of 13 December 2012 (not yet 
published). 
34
 Ibid, para 37. 
35
 A Ortega González, ‘Restrictions by Object and the Appreciability Test: The Expedia Case, a Surprising 
Judgment or a Simple Clarification?’ [2013] 34 ECLR 457, 465.  
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6.3. The ‘Ancillary Restraints’ Doctrine 
 
 It was seen earlier that in Addyston Pipe, Judge Taft, on the basis of a meticulous 
review of English court decisions, held that restraints on trade are illegal, unless they are 
found to be merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, as well as necessary 
for the protection of the parties’ commercial interests.36 According to Bork, the main 
contribution of Taft’s insightful analysis lies in the fact that it ‘offered the Sherman Act not 
content but form: a method of preserving socially valuable transactions by defining an 
exception to an otherwise inflexible prohibition of agreements eliminating competition, 
and a formula for confining the exception to the area of its reason for existence’.37 For the 
purposes of the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the ‘ancillary restraints’ 
doctrine allows restrictive clauses otherwise classified as per se illegal to be assessed on 
the basis of their reasonableness, taking into account their effects on the market and the 
subjective intention of the parties.
38
 The CJEU has endorsed the concept of ancillarity and 
applied the doctrine on various occasions, most notably in Remia
39
 and Pronuptia.
40
 In 
these cases, non-compete obligations imposed upon the transfer of two undertakings and a 
franchising system, respectively, were upheld as compatible with Article 101(1).   
The Commission deals with the issue of ancillary restraints in paragraphs 28-31 of 
the 101(3) Guidelines. According to the Guidelines, individual restrictive clauses may 
qualify as ancillary restraints and escape the prohibition provided that they are directly 
related and objectively necessary for the implementation of the main transaction, as well as 
proportionate to it.
41
 It has been argued that the ‘ancillary restraints’ doctrine is a means to 
‘eliminate the tension between prohibition and exception’.42 Indeed, both the General 
Court and, subsequently, the Commission have clarified that the requirement that an 
                                                          
36
 United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co et al, 85 Fed 271, 282 (6th Cir 1898). 
37
 RH Bork, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division’ (Part I) [1964-
1965] 74 Yale LJ 775, 801. 
38
 See eg RH Bork, ‘Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act’ [1959] 15 ABA Antitrust Section 211. 
Similarly, Odudu asserts that the subjective intention of the parties is sufficient to satisfy the object 
requirement of Article 101(1), and that ‘[c]ertain practices that restrict conduct, prima facie, show a 
subjective intention of restricting competition. However, it is open to the parties to rebut this presumption of 
subjective intention by showing a legitimate purpose’. Accordingly, he construes the ancillary restraints 
defence as ‘part of the object and not the effect consideration’; O Odudu, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object 
as Subjective Intention’ [2001] 26 EL Rev 60, 71-74. 
39
 Case 42/84, Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia NV v Commission [1985] ECR 2545.  
40
 Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353.  
41
 101(3) Guidelines, para 29. 
42
 G Hirsch, F Montag and FJ Säcker, Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure, 
Article-by-Article Commentary (Sweet & Maxwell 2007), p 614. 
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ancillary restraint be objectively necessary does not imply any balancing of pro- and anti-
competitive effects. The appraisal of any alleged efficiency gains may be carried out only 
in the context of Article 101(3).
43
 Although various commentators have suggested that the 
concept of ancillarity indicates that a quasi ‘rule of reason’ standard is applied under 
Article 101(1),
44
 this assumption was rejected categorically by the General Court in 
Métropole.
45
     
 In Pronuptia, in response to a reference for a preliminary ruling regarding the 
applicability of Article 101(1) to a franchise agreement, the CJEU upheld a number of 
restrictive clauses as essential for the protection of the franchisor’s know-how and the 
network’s reputation, but drew the line at export bans and RPM.46 Although eventually not 
endorsed by the Court, the opinion of Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat with 
regard to RPM is of particular interest. The Advocate General maintained that Article 
101(1) is concerned with the horizontal effects of vertical agreements, namely their effects 
on interbrand competition, and opined that RPM clauses should be regarded as compatible 
with Article 101(1), unless the franchisor enjoys a position of market power or unless the 
implementation of RPM schemes in a given industry is widespread.
47
      
The Commission, in the recent Vertical Guidelines, states that, in exceptional 
circumstances, even agreements which confer absolute territorial protection upon 
distributors by prohibiting both active and passive sales may escape the application of 
Article 101(1) altogether, where they are found to be objectively necessary for the 
implementation of the main operation, and limited in time.
48
 The approach taken to vertical 
price fixing is stricter: the Guidelines do not acknowledge the potential ancillarity of RPM 
clauses, and implicitly confirm that the substantive assessment of agreements fixing resale 
prices is only possible in the context of Article 101(3).
49
 The wording of para 225 is 
                                                          
43
 Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision (M6) v Commission [2001] ECR II-2459, para 107; 101(3) 
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[2003] ECR II-463, para 106. 
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 Case 161/84, supra n 40, para 23. 
47
 Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353, 
Opinion of AG VerLoren van Themaat, pp 369-370. 
48
 2010 Vertical Guidelines, paras 60-61.  
49
 Ibid, paras 60 and 223-225. 
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interesting: under specific circumstances,
50
 RPM may be considered as ‘helpful’ or 
‘necessary’, terms which undoubtedly imply subsidiarity. Unlike the Commission, the 
CJEU has envisaged that RPM may escape the prohibition altogether: in Pedro IV, the 
Court maintained that, in order for an agreement fixing retail prices to trigger the 
application of Article 101(1), all the conditions laid down in that provision must be met.
51
  
Despite the Commission and General Court’s assertions to the contrary, there is 
broad consensus among scholars that an inquiry into an agreement’s net effects, however 
limited, is nonetheless inherent in the concept of ancillary restraints.
52
 That said, Article 
101(1) does not specifically require the undertakings concerned to demonstrate a restrictive 
agreement’s welfare-enhancing potential; as Verouden points out: ‘For its part, the 
European “rule of reason” appears to be limited in scope, focusing primarily on the 
functioning of the producer’s distribution system (regulating intrabrand competition), 
rather than on competition in the market as such (promoting interbrand competition)’.53 
Faull and Nikpay accordingly take the position that, in order for the ancillarity defence to 
be applicable to a specific case, the main agreement must be shown to be either pro-
competitive or ‘at least neutral in competitive terms’.54 Green, based on the Court’s 
judgment in Pronuptia, reaches the same conclusion.
55
 Similarly, Nazzini argues that ‘the 
consumer welfare objective of Article [101] necessarily implies that ‘legitimate business 
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53
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[2003-2004] 71 Antitrust LJ 525, 540. 
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purpose’ under Article [101](1) … can have no other meaning than “welfare-enhancing” or 
“welfare-neutral”’.56   
Thus, the inapplicability of the ‘ancillary restraints’ doctrine to RPM clauses has 
far-reaching consequences. While a mere showing that an agreement is not harmful to 
competition is sufficient for it to escape Article 101(1), a substantive assessment under 
Article 101(3) presents the parties with a greater challenge: they are required to 
demonstrate that the agreement brings about substantial efficiency gains capable of 
outweighing any detrimental effects. In the words of the CJEU, the first condition for 
exemption under Article 101(3) requires the attainment of ‘appreciable objective 
advantages of such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages which [it causes] in 
the field of competition’.57 In light of the preceding analysis, it is submitted here that RPM 
is subject to such a strong presumption of illegality under Article 101 TFEU that could be 
described as ‘quasi conclusive’.                                    
 
 
6.4. RPM under Article 101(1): Allocative Efficiency Considerations 
 
6.4.1. Causation 
 Causation is a fundamental requirement of liability, both in tort and criminal law. 
On the basis of the ‘but-for test’ it must be shown that a certain loss or result, respectively, 
would not have occurred had it not been for the defendant’s conduct.58 The following 
paragraphs shall examine whether a causal link does in fact exist between RPM and a loss 
in allocative efficiency, and whether a conclusive presumption against the practice is 
warranted. 
 The relevance of causation to the substantive assessment of restrictions of 
competition under Article 101(3) has already been acknowledged. Parties seeking an 
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57
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[1966] ECR 299, 348 and, more recently, Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission 
[2006] ECR II-2969, para 247. 
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individual exemption on the basis of alleged efficiency gains are required to substantiate 
that there is a sufficient and direct causal link between the restrictive agreement and the 
claimed efficiencies.
59
 Furthermore, with regard to the third condition for exemption laid 
down in that provision, in order for the indispensability criterion to be met the parties need 
to establish that both the agreement itself and the individual restrictions are ‘reasonably 
necessary’ for the attainment of the efficiencies.60 Nicolaides asserts that the causal link 
‘must be demonstrated with a high degree of certainty’.61 
 In the recent Vertical Guidelines, the Commission takes the position that there is a 
direct causal relationship between RPM and price increase: ‘the immediate effect of RPM 
will be that all or certain distributors are prevented from lowering their sales price for that 
particular brand. In other words, the direct effect of RPM is a price increase’.62 As a 
preliminary remark, it should be noted that the hypothesis that RPM invariably exercises 
an upward pressure on prices, although certainly intuitive, is nonetheless not unambiguous. 
Where, for example, RPM is designed to compensate dealers for engaging in promotional 
activities which, otherwise, would have been undertaken by the manufacturer, the increase 
in retail margins will be offset by a respective reduction in wholesale prices. The 
presumption that these higher retail margins are always passed on to consumers in the form 
of higher prices is, therefore, unwarranted.
63
 But even assuming, for the purposes of the 
present discussion, that the Commission's insight is correct, it is an unfortunate 
oversimplification nonetheless.  
 By contrast to price fixing between competitors, any increase in prices resulting 
from pro-competitive, manufacturer-induced RPM does not reflect a respective restriction 
of output. What changes is in fact the composition of the offered good. In the absence of 
collusion in either the upstream or the downstream market, the fixed resale prices induce 
distributors to increase their sales efforts. It is thus wrong to assume that RPM results in 
higher prices for an already existing product. Instead, the integration of the distributor’s 
profit margin into the resale price corresponds to a new product altogether: a bundle 
consisting of the tangible good and any sales-specific services attached to it. Restricted in 
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their ability to determine the resale price, distributors will inevitably engage in non-price 
competition by providing additional services, up to the point where the marginal cost of 
distribution equals the fixed resale price, in which case their returns will not exceed the 
competitive level.
64
  
 A special category of products the nature of which frustrates the mainstream price 
theory and undermines the presumption that RPM produces inefficient outcomes is that of 
prestige goods. In the case of prestige goods, the high price is an essential attribute of the 
product itself: it contributes to the preservation of the product’s brand image and creates an 
air of exclusivity valued by consumers. Price-cutting, therefore, is not likely to stimulate 
demand. In fact, quite the opposite is possible: price competition may actually damage the 
product’s exclusive image and eventually lead to a reduction in sales volume.65 Ackert 
observes that 
[t]here is no net welfare loss when one pays an artificially high price for a prestige 
good. In fact, there is a welfare gain because it is conspicuous consumption, 
brought about by a high price that consumers desire… Even if there were such a 
thing as an inframarginal consumer of prestige goods, he would suffer no welfare 
loss by paying a high price because he wants to pay a high price.
66
  
 The following diagram (Figure 1)
67
 demonstrates that, where RPM is designed to 
invigorate demand for a certain manufacturer's products, the expected price increase will 
bring about a respective increase in output. More specifically, as the resale price is inflated 
from P to PRPM, the availability of pre-sales services valued by consumers stimulates 
demand for the products in question (from D to DRPM), causing in turn the manufacturer to 
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expand its output from O to ORPM. The greater profit margin allows the dealer to recoup 
any relationship-specific investments necessary for the provision of additional services, 
which entail the increased marginal cost MCRPM.   
 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the conclusive presumption of allocative 
inefficiency, which, as was demonstrated earlier, constitutes the theoretical foundation of 
the public policy towards RPM agreements under Article 101(1), is unwarranted as there 
appears to be no direct causal link between vertical price fixing and a loss in consumer 
welfare. For the sake of completeness, however, it must be noted at this point that this view 
is not unambiguous. Based on the evaluation of manufacturers’ share price responses to 
RPM antitrust challenges, Gilligan asserts that allocative distortions may sometimes be 
caused in both the upstream and the downstream markets where, as a result of marketing 
inertia, an RPM scheme initially designed to enhance productive efficiency outlives its 
purpose.
68
 
A further caveat merits mention here. The assumption that RPM may lead to an 
increase in output is valid only where the restraint is instigated by the manufacturer and 
aims at compensating distributors for increased sales efforts that stimulate consumer 
demand. A reduction in output levels, on the other hand, is likely where RPM is imposed 
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at the behest of a dominant retailer, or a group of retailers who collectively possess 
substantial monopsony power, in an attempt to foreclose the market to price-cutting 
rivals.
69
 
More recent empirical evidence, which came to light in the aftermath of the Leegin 
decision, suggests that in jurisdictions which are more favourable to RPM consumers are 
more likely to witness a net loss in their welfare, which takes the form of both price 
increases and output decreases. In line with the anti-competitive theories of RPM – yet 
without conclusively providing support for any of them in specific – MacKay and Smith 
observe changes in the prices and quantities of a significant number of products (8.4 
percent and 9.4 percent, respectively) as a result of Leegin, to the detriment of 
consumers.
70
 However, the relevant study is controversial and has been criticised for its 
‘methodological and substantive deficiencies’.71 
 
6.4.2. The Cartel Objection 
 Arguably the most frequently cited objection to RPM is its alleged ability to bolster 
collusion in either the upstream or the downstream market. It is submitted that the fixing of 
minimum retail prices may enable the members of a manufacturer or dealer cartel to 
monitor compliance with their arrangement by making a potential defector's price cutting 
activity readily visible. The Commission has endorsed the cartel theory in paragraph 224 of 
its Vertical Guidelines:  
Firstly, RPM may facilitate collusion between suppliers by enhancing price 
transparency on the market, thereby making it easier to detect whether a supplier 
deviates from the collusive equilibrium by cutting its price. RPM also undermines 
the incentive for the supplier to cut its price to itsdistributors, as the fixed resale 
price will prevent it from benefiting from expanded sales. Such a negative effect is 
particularly plausible where the market is prone to collusive outcomes, for instance 
if the manufacturers form a tight oligopoly, and a significant part of the market is 
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covered by RPM agreements. Second, by eliminating intra-brand price competition, 
RPM may also facilitate collusion between the buyers, that is, at the distribution 
level. Strong or well organised distributors may be able to force or convince one or 
more suppliers to fix their resale price above the competitive level and thereby help 
them to reach or stabilise a collusive equilibrium. The resulting loss of price 
competition seems especially problematic when the RPM is inspired by the buyers, 
whose collective horizontal interests can be expected to work out negatively for 
consumers. 
 The theoretical foundations of the cartel objection to RPM, however, are 
undermined by empirical evidence. Based on the examination of all reported RPM cases 
brought by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,
72
 Ornstein 
draws a number of important conclusions regarding the interplay between vertical price 
fixing and horizontal collusion:  
the majority of RPM cases do not involve a cartel; the vast majority of cartel cases 
do not involve RPM; manufacturer-RPM cartels are far more likely than retailer- or 
wholesaler-RPM cartels; products requiring RPM protection from free riding on 
special services are rarely cartelized; and retailer cartels with RPM are unlikely 
without legal restrictions on entry and legal RPM programs.
73
  
In a study published a few years later, Ippolito observes that only 13.1 percent of all RPM 
cases brought before federal and state courts between 1976 and 1982, either by the 
government or by private plaintiffs, also involved horizontal price fixing allegations.
74
 In 
light of this evidence, Ippolito notes that ‘noncollusive uses of RPM are far more common 
than collusive uses’.75 
 In any event, even assuming that the cartel objection is indeed plausible, it is 
nonetheless difficult to demonstrate the existence of a causal link, however subtle, between 
the vertical restraint and the loss in allocative efficiency, which would justify the 
application of Article 101(1) without an inquiry into the market context in which the 
agreement is implemented. There is, furthermore, no indication that the deterrent effect of 
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the public policy towards cartels in the EU would be in any way weakened were the 
Commission to relax its rigid approach to RPM. 
 
6.4.3. RPM as an Exclusionary Mechanism 
 In addition to the horizontal collusion theory, it has been demonstrated that, on 
certain occasions, retail price floors may result in the exclusion of rivals either in the 
upstream or in the downstream market. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes it is important 
that a clear distinction is drawn between manufacturer and dealer foreclosure brought 
about by RPM. 
 It has been argued that, in the upstream market, price floors may serve as a rent-
sharing mechanism, designed to reduce retailers’ incentives to accommodate new entry.76 
In that case, however, the foreclosure theory is subject to a very restrictive qualification: 
essentially, it is credible only in the presence of a monopolist manufacturer. The level of 
rents available to retailers is inversely related to the number of manufacturers and, 
accordingly, retailers will be less interested in sustaining the status quo in the upstream 
market the greater that number is. It follows that no safe policy implications can be based 
on the manufacturer foreclosure theory, for the simple reason that the application of Article 
101(1) to a relevant case should be primarily contingent upon a concrete market power 
inquiry and not on abstract theoretical speculations. Additionally, the relevant economic 
theories undermine the European Commission’s rationale, according to which exclusion is 
a potential outcome of RPM implemented by ‘a manufacturer with market power’:77 the 
likelihood of foreclosure diminishes as the structure of the relevant market moves away 
from the model of pure monopoly, and the requirement for the existence of market power 
in general appears to be theoretically unfounded and over-inclusive. 
 On the other hand, the retailer foreclosure theory is much more problematic in 
practice. This is because retailer foreclosure is consistent both with the welfare-enhancing 
and with the anti-competitive theories of RPM. For example, Telser’s free rider 
justification obviously entails that retailers unable to contribute to the promotion of a given 
manufacturer’s products will be necessarily left out of the distribution network. The special 
services argument necessarily implies exclusion, and full-service, full-price retailers are as 
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interested in combating free riding as the manufacturer itself. In other words, the mere fact 
that a price-cutter has been terminated at the behest of its rivals in no way suggests the 
existence of collusion in the downstream market, as lawful cooperation between retailers 
may be indistinguishable from anti-competitive coordination that would justify antitrust 
intervention. Professor Liebeler observes that ‘[t]he desire of the dealers to increase the 
efficiency of their distribution system will be manifested by behavior that will be in every 
respect identical to the behavior of dealers who desire to reduce competition among 
themselves in order to create or reinforce a dealer cartel’.78 
 The same logic applies to RPM in the e-marketplace. According to the Vertical 
Guidelines, ‘RPM may reduce dynamism and innovation at the distribution level. By 
preventing price competition between different distributors, RPM may prevent more 
efficient retailers from entering the market or acquiring sufficient scale with low prices’.79 
By restricting the ability of cost-effective outlets or distribution formats to pass on any cost 
advantages to end users in the form of lower retail prices, the purpose and effect of RPM is 
essentially to exclude Internet-only retailers from the distribution network. It is unclear, 
however, why the indirect exclusion of pure-play online retailers is more harmful to 
competition than their direct exclusion in the context of a selective distribution system: in 
addressing the manufacturer’s need to guarantee that its selective distribution system will 
not be compromised by the activities of online free riders, the Commission recognises the 
former’s right to require the online outlet to comply with certain quality standards, or even 
to prevent retailers who are not simultaneously active in conventional brick-and-mortar 
commerce from carrying its products.
80
  
 If seen through the lens of the free rider rationale, this exception, in combination 
with the manufacturer’s ability to restrict sales by its selective distributors to unauthorised 
dealers,
81
 is designed to ensure the effective operation of a watertight selective distribution 
network, a result which may be equally attained by means of RPM. In other words, insofar 
as the provision of pre-sales services is required for the effective promotion of the product 
in question, the exclusion of online-only outlets, whether effected by means of selectivity 
criteria or by RPM, constitutes an indirect means of right-channeling consumers towards 
the distribution format that best serves both their and the manufacturer’s interests. It is 
important to note that the exclusion of pure play Internet retailers from a selective 
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distribution network is likely to assert the structural price rigidity of selective distribution 
and have an effect on prices similar to that of RPM: marketing research shows that the 
prices of multi-channel retailers tend to be higher than those of distributors operating 
exclusively in the e-marketplace.
82
          
 
 
6.5. RPM under Article 101(1): The Contribution of New Institutional Economics 
 
 The preceding section analysed the public policy towards RPM on the basis of 
Odudu’s view that the application of Article 101(1) may be triggered by a showing that the 
restraint at hand has the potential to bring about negative welfare consequences, in the 
form of a loss in allocative efficiency. Professor Lianos, however, offers an alternative 
explanation for the bifurcation of Article 101.
83
 On the basis of new institutional 
economics, he asserts that the antitrust intervention is contingent upon the organisational 
setting in which the transaction takes place:  
If there is no reason for the parties to the transaction to adopt an organizational 
framework that will take the form of a hierarchy or a network (specific investments, 
reputation externalities, free riding) and the transaction takes place in the context of 
an impersonal or immediate exchange, as is the case in a spot market, Article [101 
TFEU] will intervene and will eventually prohibit these restrictive practices. The 
latter would not be considered a defensive strategic bahavior designed to protect 
investments from appropriability, thus maintaining ex ante incentives to incur the 
necessary investment costs, but would instead constitute an offensive strategic 
behavior that may harm consumers.
84
  
Accordingly, when determining the compatibility of a restrictive clause with Article 
101(1), the enforcement agencies should consider not only its effect on allocative 
efficiency, but also the organisational framework in which the transaction takes place. In 
Lianos’ view, restrictions necessary for the creation of a network form of organisation fall 
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outside the scope of the prohibition, insofar as they satisfy the proportionality requirement 
of the ancillary restraints doctrine.
85
 It is only where the restraint at issue is found to be 
unnecessary or disproportional to the objectives sought, following an intuitive balancing 
test, that the application of Article will be triggered, and the arrangement will be subjected 
to a full-blown substantive assessment under Article 101(3). 
While this argument is particularly strong in the case of franchising, the antitrust 
response to qualitative selective distribution is in reality much more complex and needs to 
be examined thoroughly. Professor Lianos asserts that the process of selecting the 
members of a qualitative selective distribution network ‘may show the existence of a 
relational contract’.86 However, selectivity criteria in and by themselves are in reality as 
consistent with relational contracting as with discrete market transactions, both from a 
legal and from an economic perspective. In order to represent genuine relational norms, 
and not only abstract frameworks, selective distribution systems need to involve 
relationship-specific investments in assets owned by the parties.
87
 
Additionally, while contract enforcement under the classical and neoclassical 
theories is entrusted on third parties (courts and arbiters, respectively),
88
 relational 
contracts ‘must be self-enforcing: the value of the future relationship must be sufficiently 
large that neither party wishes to renege’.89 In other words, the distinctive characteristic of 
relational contracts is their self-reliance in remedying ‘consequential disturbances’. 
According to Telser, self-enforcing agreements are those which remain in force as long as 
each of the parties ‘believes himself to be better off by continuing the agreement than he 
would be by ending it’. If one party acts in breach of its contractual obligations, the only 
recourse available to the other party is to terminate the contract; dispute resolution is not 
entrusted to third parties:
90
  
A party to a self-enforcing agreement calculates whether his gain from violating the 
agreement is greater or less than the loss of future net benefits that he would incur 
as a result of detection of his violation and the consequent termination of the 
agreement by the other party. If the violator gains more than he loses from the 
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violation, then he will violate the agreement. Hence both parties continue to adhere 
to an agreement if and only if each gains more from adherence to, than from 
violations of, its terms.
91
  
Nevertheless, a system of ‘unqualified’ selective distribution, does not address 
either of these issues. In the absence of relationship-specific investments, the qualitative 
criteria merely represent a general framework, which essentially does not go beyond an 
agreement on shelf space. At the same time, they are entirely ineffective in the absence of a 
self-enforcing mechanism: in case of ‘consequential disturbances’ the partners will have to 
rely on third parties (courts or arbitration) for the resolution of their disputes. In other 
words, the antitrust concept of selective distribution is in principle vulnerable to such 
‘consequential disturbances’ and thus fully consistent with traditional contract law theory. 
This description, however, does not correspond to a hybrid within the meaning of new 
institutional economics; instead, it represents a plain, autonomous market form of 
organisation, both from a legal and from an economic perspective.  
By assumption, a distribution outlet has already been established prior to the 
conclusion of the selective distribution agreement. The retailer, in other words, has already 
undertaken investments which, by definition, are not transaction-specific, since they have 
preceded its selection by the manufacturer.
92
 In reality, it is on the basis of these non-
idiosyncratic investments that the retailer is chosen to be part of the distribution network. 
Any required investments that are specific to a given transaction, and which would be 
more consistent with relational norms, are considered as quantitative. In the Grundig case, 
for example, the Commission found that clauses by virtue of which admission to the 
network was restricted to dealers prepared to make specific commitments in terms of sales 
effort and provide particular services went beyond ‘general technical and professional 
criteria’ and were thus found to fall within the scope of the prohibition.93 
The selection criteria which typically fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) are 
related to ‘the technical qualifications of the reseller and his staff and the suitability of his 
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trading premises’.94 The fact that selective distributors are not restricted in the ability to 
sell competing brands
95
 makes it all the more likely that the investments which are 
conditions for their admission to the distribution system will not be transaction-specific. 
Simply put, a reseller would be the same as technically qualified if it had not stocked the 
new high-definition television set by Manufacturer A, and its premises would be the same 
as suitable even in the absence of an agreement for the distribution of luxury perfume B: 
the investments that made the outlet eligible have already been made. Idiosyncratic 
investments are instead typically associated with the provision of product-specific 
promotional services, such as local advertising, additional training of personnel in line with 
the product’s specific features, or the design and implementation of a distribution ‘quick 
response’ system which will minimise the inventory that the retailer needs to have in stock, 
while at the same time limiting the possibility of stock-outs.
96
 These investments, however, 
do not generally fall within the selective criteria which are exempted from Article 101(1). 
In the context of selective distribution systems, such investments in physical and 
human assets are likely to be lower than those undertaken by franchisees. However, since 
they typically represent sunk costs which cannot be used for other activities – exactly 
because they are highly idiosyncratic – they may still give rise to ex post opportunistic 
behaviour and generate externalities.
97
 Typical observable components designed as 
contractual safeguards, such as sales targets, are likely to be identified as quantitative 
criteria, and, as such, they will fall within the scope of the prohibition, but may be covered 
by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation or benefit from an individual exemption 
under Article 101(3). However, such observable components are of limited significance if 
the retailer lacks the incentive to sustain the commercial relationship. On the other hand, 
specific incentive mechanisms, such as a guaranteed profit margin, which can create a 
quasi-rent stream, intended to enhance the agreement’s self-enforcing range will almost 
certainly be condemned under the EU competition rules. 
Or probably not: let us for a moment consider the applicability of the ancillary 
restraints defence to absolute territorial protection provided in order to facilitate new entry. 
This represents a typical relational contract, and the distributor’s obligation to undertake 
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sunk investments may very well be undermined by opportunistic behaviour. The distributor 
has few incentives to incur the necessary sunk costs in the absence of the guarantee that it 
will not be undercut by exclusive distributors established in other territories. Export bans 
will confer upon it the status of a territorial brand monopolist thus taking the form of a 
credible commitment: absolute territorial protection in this case will eliminate competing 
retailers’ ability to appropriate part of the returns generated by the favoured distributor’s 
promotional activities. Consequently the latter will accrue all the quasi-rents associated 
with the sale of the contract goods.     
Price floors, along with all other vertical restraints, can be employed with the 
purpose of economising on transaction costs, in this case the cost of monitoring. In that 
sense, RPM is not exactly an alternative to selectivity criteria: shirking, free riding, ex post 
opportunism, types of behaviour that Oliver Williamson generally identifies as ‘subgoal 
pursuit’, namely ‘efforts to promote local or individual goals to the possible detriment of 
global or system objectives’,98 are as likely to occur in the context of a qualitative selective 
distribution system as in open distribution. Selectivity clauses aside, it is still unclear why 
an approved distributor would have the incentive to engage in promotional activities of any 
kind with regard to a specific manufacturer’s products, in the absence of an ex ante 
incentive alignment mechanism. The selection of trading partners does facilitate 
monitoring by reducing the relevant transaction costs, but in itself is not sufficient to 
constrain opportunism. Every time members of a selective distribution network complain 
to the manufacturer about an approved dealer’s price cutting behaviour, enforcement 
agencies automatically assume that anti-competitive RPM is involved, designed to prevent 
selected distributors from taking advantage of possible cost efficiencies. However, nobody 
questions exactly how a retailer which forms part of a homogenous network of outlets with 
similar cost structures achieved that cost-effectiveness. Ex post opportunistic behaviour 
consisting in shirking on the required promotional activities could potentially provide a 
reasonable explanation. 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that understanding of selective distribution as 
a less restrictive alternative to RPM for the provision of the necessary promotional services 
is based on a series of assumptions of questionable validity: approved dealers do not shirk; 
they invariably have the incentive to undertake relationship-specific investments; free 
riding within the selective distribution network never occurs; and, more importantly, the 
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transaction costs incurred by the manufacturer for the monitoring of dealer compliance are 
trivial. The truth however is that the general selectivity criteria which are exempted from 
the application of Article 101(1) do not specifically address any of these issues. 
This argument is intuitive: selectivity criteria are designed to restrict distribution of 
a given product only by authorised dealers. Post-contractual opportunistic behaviour, 
however, by definition is conceivable only if committed by the parties to the transaction, 
not by outsiders. ‘Unqualified’ selective distribution does not adequately address this 
problem and thus remains susceptible to opportunism.  
Thus vertical price fixing and selective distribution – as defined under Article 101 
TFEU – are not perfect substitutes and, accordingly, the idea that either of them may be a 
less restrictive alternative misses the point. Selectivity clauses provide the framework; a 
guaranteed retail profit margin voluntarily implemented by the manufacturer may serve as 
an ex ante incentive alignment mechanism. Under certain circumstances, therefore, RPM 
and selective distribution are complementary, not alternative restraints. In the words of 
Oliver Williamson, RPM, like all types of vertical restraints, has ‘the purpose and effects 
of infusing order into a transaction where the interests of the system and the interests of the 
parts are otherwise in conflict’.99 Against this background, Williamson takes the view that 
the use of vertical restraints to effect credible commitments is warranted ‘in circumstances 
where market power is small, where simple market exchange ... would compromise the 
integrity of differentiated products, and where forward integration into distribution ... 
would be especially costly’.100 
The fact that selectivity clauses alone are neither sufficient to eliminate 
opportunism nor able to serve as incentive alignment mechanisms is reflected in the 
German law concept of lückenlösigkeit, or ‘imperviousness’ of a selective distribution 
system. Under German legislation on unfair competition, actions for an injunction or 
damages can be brought against unauthorised third parties which, nevertheless, sell 
products distributed through a selective distribution network. The imperviousness doctrine, 
which is a constituent element of selective distribution under German law, is premised on 
the idea that unauthorised dealers can obtain the goods concerned only by participating in a 
breach by an admitted distributor of its contractual obligations.
101
 The practical implication 
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of ‘imperviousness’ is that it constitutes proof by the manufacturer that it is taking steps to 
enforce the system by taking action against such of his partners as are in breach of contract 
or against third parties who obtain the goods from dealers in breach of their contractual 
obligations.       
 In addition to being compelling from an economic standpoint, Lianos’ insight also 
enjoys robust jurisprudential support, as has already been shown in Chapter 4.
102
 But under 
this interpretation, and in light of the preceding analysis, the outright prohibition of 
invariably all RPM schemes under Article 101(1) appears to be even less convincing. As 
has already been argued, price floors may be employed in the context of a long-term 
commercial relationship as a substitute, albeit imperfect, for full vertical integration. The 
main pro-competitive justifications for RPM concentrate on its contribution to the 
internalisation of vertical and horizontal externalities, the solution to the problem of double 
moral hazard or the assumption of specific investments for the penetration of a new market 
or the provision of demand-stimulating promotional services, even in the absence of 
specific free rider concerns. It is important to understand, however, that vertical price 
fixing and selective distribution do not constitute interchangeable restrictive practices for 
the establishment of a ‘network’, as understood in the context of new institutional 
economics. Even though both forms of restricted dealing are premised on the 
understanding that price competition is curtailed where demand for the products in 
question is contingent upon competition with respect to the supplied pre-sales services, 
they nonetheless do not serve the same purposes.          
The preceding analysis built on Lianos’ insight and the pro-competitive theories of 
the practice in order to demonstrate that a conclusive presumption against RPM under 
Article 101(1) is mistaken. The first paragraph of the bifurcated Article 101 provides the 
right framework for the appraisal of price floors. However, in view of the increased 
potential of RPM to bring about a loss in allocative efficiency, the antitrust response 
should remain cautious: it is submitted here, therefore, that the conclusive presumption of 
illegality should be replaced by a presumption which can be rebutted insofar as the parties 
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[101(3) TFEU] recognises that agreements which restrict competition between market participants 
result in particular in a reduction in production costs, and the reduction in production costs can 
contribute indirectly to consumer welfare. (emphasis in original, citations omitted). 
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demonstrate convincingly that – to quote Professor Lianos – the price floors were 
implemented as ‘a defensive strategic bahavior designed to protect investments from 
appropriability, thus maintaining ex ante incentives to incur the necessary investment 
costs’.103 Once the presumption of anti-competitive object has been rebutted, the 
Commission, court or national competition authority may subject the RPM scheme at issue 
to the intuitive proportionality test of Article 101(1), and proceed to a full-blown 
monetised analysis of its effects under Article 101(3) only if the restraint has failed to 
qualify as ‘ancillary’. Section 6.7 below will discuss whether EU competition law allows 
for the possibility of a presumption of anti-competitive object to be rebutted.    
 
 
6.6. RPM as a Hardcore Restraint – Article 101(3) TFEU 
  
 As has already been explained, the notion of ‘hardcore’ restraints may be 
understood only in the context of Article 101(3) and the Block Exemptions Regulations. 
The mere fact that an agreement is found to violate Article 101(1) does not necessarily 
entail an automatic declaration of illegality. Article 101(3) declares the prohibition 
inapplicable to agreements which, despite falling within the scope of Article 101(1), fulfil 
all four requirements laid down in that paragraph. In order to benefit from the exemption, a 
restrictive agreement must, therefore, contribute to the improvement of the production or 
distribution of the goods concerned, while any resulting benefits must be passed on to 
consumers (positive conditions). Furthermore, the imposed restraints must neither go 
beyond what is necessary for the attainment of any efficiencies, nor result in a substantial 
elimination of competition (negative conditions).  
In what could be described as the most notable difference between the two 
jurisdictions, at least with regard to the treatment of collusive agreements, EU competition 
law does not recognise the American concept of ‘per se’ illegal restraints. Instead, under 
Article 101 even the parties to an agreement that has as its object the restriction of 
competition are entitled to this second line of defence. The General Court in Matra 
Hachette held that ‘in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the 
                                                          
103
 See supra n 84, and accompanying text. 
251 
 
extent of its effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions 
laid down in Article [101](3) of the Treaty are satisfied’.104 The Commission, in its 101(3) 
Guidelines, endorses this principle, but further acknowledges that severe restrictions are 
unlikely to fulfil the four requirements.
105
  
 Odudu maintains that exemptions under Article 101(3) are conditional upon a 
‘productive efficiency enquiry’.106 Productive efficiency is achieved when the cost 
incurred for the production of a particular good or service is the lowest possible. Producers 
in perfectly competitive markets have an incentive to reduce their cost to the minimum in 
order to reap greater profits and, ultimately, in order to ensure their survival in the first 
place. Consequently, the optimal combination of resources will result in the maximisation 
of output.
107
 Hovenkamp observes that ‘[m]any acts that arguably violate the antitrust laws 
are mechanisms by which firms increase their productive efficiencies. These include 
mergers, vertical integration, exclusive dealing or tying arrangements and even certain 
agreements among competitors’.108 
 The productive efficiency test as a condition for exemption is clearly the subject 
matter of the first requirement laid down in Article 101(3), namely that the agreement in 
question ‘contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress’. The term ‘productive efficiency’ does not appear in the 
Commission’s 101(3) Guidelines. Instead, the Commission refers to ‘objective’ efficiency 
gains, which ‘stem from an integration of economic activities whereby undertakings 
combine their assets to achieve what they could not achieve as efficiently on their own or 
whereby they entrust another undertaking with tasks that can be performed more efficiently 
by that other undertaking’.109 The Guidelines further draw a distinction between cost 
efficiencies and efficiencies of a qualitative nature; the latter category concerns technical 
and technological advances in the form of new or improved products, which would have 
been impossible had it not been for the restrictive agreement.
110
 It is apparent that, in the 
                                                          
104
 Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-595, para 85.  
105
 101(3) Guidelines, para 46. 
106
 O Odudu, supra n 27, ch 6. 
107
 S Bishop and M Walker, supra n 28, p 25; RJ Van den Bergh and PD Camesasca, European Competition 
Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006), pp 29-30.  
108
 H Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (3rd edn, 
Thomson/West 2005), p 75. 
109
 101(3) Guidelines, para 60. 
110
 Ibid, paras 64-72.  
252 
 
context of the 101(3) Guidelines, the term ‘qualitative efficiencies’ is used by the 
Commission as equivalent to the concept of dynamic efficiency.
111
      
 Article 4 of Regulation 330/2010 excludes hardcore restraints from the benefit of 
the block exemption. This, according to the 2010 Vertical Guidelines, merely constitutes a 
presumption that an agreement containing any of the excluded clauses is unlikely to fulfil 
the conditions of Article 101(3).
112
 This presumption is, however, rebuttable: the parties 
are given the opportunity to demonstrate possible efficiency-enhancing effects in the 
context of an individual assessment.
113
 The Vertical Guidelines not only mention the 
possibility of pleading an efficiency defence in RPM cases, but further provide a list of 
examples of efficiency gains which could potentially satisfy the requirements of Article 
101(3).
114
 However, one cannot fail to notice that the methodology for the substantive 
assessment of hardcore restraints, as outlined in the Vertical Guidelines, is at least 
unorthodox:  
In case the undertakings substantiate that likely efficiencies result from including 
the hardcore restriction in the agreement and that in general all the conditions of 
Article 101(3) are fulfilled, this will require the Commission to effectively assess 
the likely negative impact on competition before making the ultimate assessment of 
whether the conditions of Article 101(3) are fulfilled.
115
  
The Guidelines thus essentially suggest that the parties to an agreement containing a black-
listed clause are required to demonstrate any efficiency gains before the Commission has 
confirmed whether the agreement is even likely to cause any competitive harm.  
At the same time, the hurdle facing the parties seems insurmountable: it is doubtful 
whether the presumption against hardcore restraints – and RPM in particular – under 
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Article 101(3) can be rebutted in practice.
116
 Even if the undertakings manage to 
substantiate the efficiency-enhancing effects of a vertical price fixing scheme, it is still 
very likely that they will stumble upon the indispensability criterion. The Commission, in 
para 79 of the 101(3) Guidelines, indeed envisages that black-listed clauses will normally 
fail the indispensability test. It has been argued accordingly that the application of Article 
101(3) to RPM agreements may be decisively undermined by a mere showing that any 
claimed efficiency gains may be achieved through other, less restrictive – but also less 
efficient – means.117 The main implication of this quasi-conclusive presumption is that it 
virtually precludes a substantive assessment of the welfare effects of RPM under Article 
101 in its entirety, making any relevant allegations purely speculative. 
 
 
6.7. Recommendations for a Workable Analytical Framework 
 
6.7.1. Rebuttable Presumptions and ‘By-Object’ Restrictions: The Case of RPM after 
Cartes Bancaires 
The recent judgment of the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires
118
 has been particularly 
enlightening in clarifying the notion of ‘by-object’ restrictions of competition within the 
meaning of Article 101(1). In favouring the strict interpretation of the concept, the Court of 
Justice took the position that the relevant conclusive presumption of anti-competitiveness 
is applicable only to restraints having prima facie adverse effects on the price, quantity and 
quality of the goods and services concerned. These forms of collusive behaviour 
essentially represent a well-defined class of restrictive agreements which reveal a sufficient 
degree of harm to the proper functioning of normal competition. In the Court’s view, these 
types of coordination may be regarded as being ‘by their very nature’ restrictive of 
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competition, in which case examination of their actual effects may be considered 
redundant.
119
  
In other words, Cartes Bancaires stands for the proposition that classification as 
restrictions of competition by object should be reserved only for specific types of collusive 
behaviour the effects of which on consumer welfare are so likely to be detrimental, that 
demonstration of any actual anti-competitive impact is redundant.
120
 Restraints so plainly 
anti-competitive that are lacking any credible efficiency-enhancing potential are commonly 
referred to as ‘naked’. Hovenkamp defines naked restraints as those which are ‘formed 
with the objectively intended purpose or likely effect of increasing price or decreasing 
output in the short run, with output measured by quantity or quality’.121 Such restraints are 
meaningful only where the parties’ aggregate market power allows them to affect industry-
wide output and price,
122
 and are presumed to reveal the ‘sufficient degree of harm’ 
required for the finding of a restriction of competition by object. 
The term ‘naked restraints’ is not encountered under EU competition law, whether 
in the Commission’s 101(3) Guidelines or in the European Courts’ judicial practice. That 
said, it is clearly analogous to the General Court’s conception of ‘obvious restrictions of 
competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of outlets’.123 Echoing a 
relevant understanding of by-object restraints as facially anti-competitive practices, 
Advocate General Wahl took the position that ‘[o]nly conduct whose harmful nature is 
proven and easily identifiable, in the light of experience and economics, should … be 
regarded as a restriction of competition by object’.124 It is only with regard to this type of 
conduct, in the Advocate General’s view, that the formalist orthodox approach is 
appropriate, and not in the case of agreements the effects of which are ambivalent or 
ancillary for the attainment of a legitimate business purpose.
125
 Ostensibly, therefore, the 
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Court re-affirmed the orthodox view, and conceded that a presumption of necessary effect 
is intrinsically associated with the notion of object.  
On various occasions, however, it is conceivable that the anti-competitive object of 
the agreement may not be as conspicuous as that of a naked horizontal price-fixing 
agreement. With that in mind, the Court has emphasised that, in order to determine 
whether the agreement under investigation has an anti-competitive object, account should 
be taken of factors that go beyond its mere terms, and may include an inquiry into the aims 
pursued by the agreement in light of the economic and legal context in which it operates.
126
 
In this regard, the Court has already conceded that the fact that an agreement pursues other 
legitimate objectives does not preclude a prima facie finding of restrictive object.
127
 In 
BIDS, the CJEU stressed that any alleged objective justifications may be considered only 
in the context of a substantive assessment under Article 101(3).
128
  
That said, the recent case law of the Court has established that it is open to the 
parties to a facially restrictive agreement to rebut the presumption of necessary effect by 
demonstrating that the restraint at hand is ‘objectively justified’. In Pierre Fabre, 
endorsing Advocate General Mazák’s point of view,129 the Court acknowledged that the 
existence of an objective justification could prevent a prima facie finding of anti-
competitive object.
130
 Accordingly, in Cartes Bancaires the CJEU took the position that, in 
determining whether the restriction at issue reveals a sufficient degree of harm, account 
should be taken of any legitimate objectives allegedly sought by the parties. Although 
reiterating that the mere fact that the agreement pursues a legitimate objective does not 
preclude a finding of anti-competitive object, the Court stressed that the restrictive object 
must nonetheless be substantiated.
131
 
This is not to say, however, that Cartes Bancaires is at odds with the Court’s 
judicial precedent. According to the CJEU, the presumption of competitive harm generated 
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by the relevant practices is supported by experience, defined by AG Wahl in his Opinion as 
‘what can traditionally be seen to follow from economic analysis, as confirmed by the 
competition authorities and supported, if necessary, by case-law’.132 In a number of cases, 
however, judicial experience may be inadequate, or even non-existent. This comes as no 
surprise; in the volatile environment of everyday commercial transactions, ‘[n]o two 
restraints are identical, and no two restraints are imposed within identical marketplace 
contexts’.133 Besides, experience is acquired inductively, and a presumption of competitive 
harm cannot be established in the abstract, but only following a reasonably thorough 
examination of an agreement’s likely effects.134 
The Court’s ruling in Cartes Bancaires stands for the proposition that the validity 
of any legitimate objectives pursued by the measures at issue is to be examined as part of 
an inquiry into the economic and legal context in which the coordination takes place. It is 
thus submitted here that Cartes Bancaires favours the implementation of an abridged 
effects analysis whereby any alleged objective justifications are considered on an ad hoc 
basis, ‘having regard, in particular, to the nature of the services at issue, as well as the real 
conditions of the functioning and structure of the markets’.135 Where, following the 
relevant analysis, the fact-finder fails to demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that the 
measures at hand have an anti-competitive object an elaborate examination of their actual 
or potential effects in the marketplace is appropriate.
136
 Advocate General Wahl, citing the 
Court’s earlier judgments in Pronuptia137 and Gøttrup-Klim,138 takes the view that failure 
adequately to establish the object of an agreement entails that ‘it will be necessary to 
examine the anticompetitive effects and, in this framework, to assess the necessity and the 
proportionality of the measures in question having regard to the objective pursued’.139 
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6.7.2. Truncated or ‘Quick-Look’ Rule of Reason under Section 1 of the Sherman Act  
 A similar abridged analysis is also applied in the context of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. In BMI, the defendant associations had organised systems of non-exclusive 
rights for the issuance of blanket licences to copyrighted musical compositions.
140
 These 
performance licences granted to the licensees the right to perform all of the compositions 
in the portfolio at fees negotiated by the associations, which would then be distributed 
among the members of each association on the basis of the frequency of the use of their 
music. Mr Justice White, delivering the opinion of the majority, rejected the literalist 
application of the antitrust laws to price fixing agreements, and noted that per se treatment 
should be reserved for those practices which are ‘“plainly anticompetitive” and very likely 
without “redeeming virtue”’.141 In the Court’s view, various types of cooperation among 
competitors, such as horizontal mergers or joint ventures, entail the restriction, or even 
elimination, of price competition. Nevertheless, they are not treated as per se illegal, and 
are frequently upheld, where they have the potential to bring about transactional 
efficiencies that demonstrably outweigh any competitive harm. The blanket licensing 
arrangement at issue fell within exactly that category: in light of the fact that it constituted 
‘an acceptable mechanism for at least a large part of the market for the performing rights to 
copyrighted musical compositions’, a thorough substantive assessment under the rule of 
reason would be more appropriate than an automatic declaration of illegality.
142
 In his 
dissenting opinion, Mr Justice Stevens did not object to the inapplicability of the per se 
standard to the arrangement at hand, but rather disagreed with the majority’s decision to 
remand the case.
143
 In his view, the blanket licence would flunk the rule of reason test 
because there were other, less restrictive marketing policies which could attain comparable 
results, such as the negotiation of music-performing rights on a per-composition or per-unit 
basis.
144
 
 In any event, both the majority and the dissenting opinions in BMI stand for the 
proposition that there is no bright line distinguishing per se illegality from the rule of 
reason standard, which form an analytical continuum employed for methodological 
purposes, given that ‘easy labels do not always supply ready answers’.145 This approach 
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was subsequently confirmed in NCAA
146
 and California Dental.
147
 In NCAA, in introducing 
the ‘quick-look’ or ‘truncated’ rule of reason analysis, the Supreme Court conceded that 
‘[p]er se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence 
justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct’.148 The plan at issue limited the number 
of games that any one college football team was allowed to televise. Despite effectively 
constituting a restriction of output, the Court decided that the agreement was to be assessed 
under the rule of reason, in light of the fact that horizontal cooperation of a certain degree 
between members was necessary if the product was to be made available at all. The Court, 
however, refused to engage in a more thorough analysis consisting in a market power 
inquiry: ‘[a]s a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a 
naked decision on price or output’.149  
 In California Dental, in requiring that a restriction on advertising imposed on the 
members of an association of dental societies be assessed on the basis of a fuller rule of 
reason analysis, the Supreme Court outlined the rationale behind the application of a more 
truncated analytical framework:  
there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to 
an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for 
more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, 
looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint. The object is to see 
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that 
a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from 
a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.
150
  
It follows that the quick-look rule of reason is appropriate where the arrangement at issue 
is prima facie detrimental to competition, but lack of adequate experience prevents the 
fact-finder from drawing safe inferences with regard to its lawfulness. It is therefore on the 
parties to plead an efficiency defence and, failure to substantiate any gains to the requisite 
legal standard will result in the agreement being condemned where it is found, on the basis 
of ‘a rudimentary understanding of economics’, to give rise to anti-competitive effects.151 
Thus, the application by Court of the quick-look approach in California Dental can be 
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interpreted as introducing a third, separate evidentiary rule rather than an abbreviated 
analysis merely intended to designate the combination at hand in the per se category or 
subject it to a full-blown rule of reason analysis.
152
   
 
6.7.3. Recommendations for a Workable Analytical Framework in RPM Cases 
The methodology favoured by the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires is more compatible 
with the ‘hybrid approach’ to ‘by-object’ restrictions described by King, which is the 
middle ground between the orthodox view of object as necessary effect and the more 
analytical approach applied in Société Technique Minière,
153
 rather than the formalistic 
concept of an ‘object box’, as suggested by Professor Whish.154 Besides, as Whish and 
Bailey themselves concede, the ‘object box’ may be an oversimplification, as its 
boundaries cannot be defined with sufficient precision.
155
 Where the effects of the 
agreement at issue are ambivalent and the lack of adequate experience prevents a 
conclusive inference of harmful object, the Court favours an abridged effects analysis 
concentrating on the content of the agreement’s provisions, the objectives pursued by it 
and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part. At this stage, in determining 
whether the agreement under examination restricts competition by object, the enforcement 
agencies – the European Commission, the national competition authorities and courts – 
should take into consideration any legitimate objectives put forward by the parties in an 
attempt to justify the restrictive clauses. Insofar as the fact-finder is convinced that the 
alleged objective justification is indeed plausible, a finding of anti-competitive object is 
automatically precluded. In such a case, the assessment of any actual or potential harmful 
consequences is only relevant to the effect requirement of Article 101(1). 
While the case law of the European Courts discussed above exclusively concerned 
agreements between competitors, the issues raised are of a methodological nature and thus 
there is nothing to preclude the applicability of this hybrid approach to vertical restraints, 
and RPM in particular. The purpose of this thesis is by all means not to advocate the 
unequivocal legality of RPM under Article 101 TFEU. Judge Posner’s argument that 
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purely vertical restraints should be per se legal is rather unwarranted.
156
 Striking a balance 
between two opposing conclusive presumptions is indeed the greatest challenge facing the 
lower courts post-Leegin: as Posner himself had admitted in an earlier article, in practice 
the rule of reason ‘is little more than a euphemism for nonliability’.157 But for all the pro-
competitive justifications, the effects of RPM remain ambivalent and require a thorough 
case-by-case analysis. 
The first step towards the erosion of the Commission’s formalism would be the 
formal distinction between individual and collective RPM. Only the latter should be 
subjected to a conclusive presumption of illegality under Article 101(1). This would be 
consistent with the horizontal theories of harm associated with RPM schemes implemented 
by multiple competing manufacturers in concentrated markets,
158
 or at the behest of a 
number of retailers collectively possessing substantial monopsony power.
159
 Even though 
few relevant cases have been reported,
160
 there are credible reasons to believe that 
associations of undertakings, which frequently bring together firms operating at different 
stages of the production and distribution chain, may operate as a vehicle for the collective 
enforcement of RPM policies with the purpose of facilitating collusion between their 
members. 
As far as individual RPM is concerned, the approach taken by the CJEU to ‘by-
object’ restrictions is clearly at odds with the Commission’s hesitation even to imply the 
possibility of an effects-based treatment of vertical price fixing, despite the fact that, as 
was seen in Chapter 1 above, the current analytical framework defined by the 2010 
Vertical Guidelines has been largely influenced by welfare economics, having reduced the 
contribution of non-economic, integrationist objectives to our understanding of the public 
policy towards vertical restraints in the EU. In a move that was in sharp contrast with 
established case law, the Commission, in its recent Vertical Guidelines, conceded that 
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export bans may escape the application of Article 101(1) where they are designed to 
facilitate new entry.
161
  
Although the outright removal of individual RPM from the ‘object box’ would 
probably not be advisable, as the anti-competitive potential of price floors necessitates a 
more cautious approach, a sound antitrust policy should at the very least provide parties to 
a vertical price fixing agreement with the opportunity to rebut the existing presumption of 
necessary effect. This presumption, associated with the classification of RPM as a 
restriction of competition by object, could be rebutted by a showing that the contested 
clause was ‘objectively justified’ by the manufacturer’s need to maximise control over 
distribution in cases of long-term contractual relationships, where horizontal externalities 
and moral hazard are likely to arise. Such an approach would be fully consistent with the 
CJEU’s recent judgement in Cartes Bancaires:  
The concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ can be applied only to certain 
types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of 
harm to competition that it may be found that there is no need to examine their 
effects, otherwise the Commission would be exempted from the obligation to prove 
the actual effects on the market of agreements which are in no way established to 
be, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal 
competition.
162
 
Following the successful showing of the existence of an objective justification, the 
Commission or national competition authority can proceed to a full-blown effects analysis. 
In the context of this analysis, the fact-finder will have to take into account factors such as 
the source of the restraint, the market power of the undertakings involved, and the levels of 
concentration in the affected market. In addition to these structural considerations, which 
may reveal a tendency towards horizontal collusion, the Commission should also 
investigate the nature of the products concerned and any free rider concerns arising in the 
industry. It is important at this point to stress the relevance of intertype competition. If 
online retailing is found to provide a credible alternative distribution format, having regard 
to the nature of the goods concerned, and given that Internet shoppers are more likely to be 
infra-marginal consumers who are sufficiently familiar with the specific attributes of a 
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 Vertical Guidelines, paras 60-61. See supra 5.4.3. 
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given product and thus place little or no value to any promotional services, it is possible 
that the net effect of the price floors will be anti-competitive.
163
 
It can generally be assumed that the case will be stronger for RPM agreements of 
limited duration imposed during the introductory period of expanding demand, since the 
sunk investments undertaken by distributors at that stage are expected to be higher, along 
with the need for a ‘defensive mechanism’. Also, consumer valuation of promotional 
services tends to decrease with the passage of time, as they are becoming for familiar with 
the specific attributes of the goods.
164
 It is interesting that even Mr Justice Breyer, in his 
powerful dissent in Leegin, conceded that he would be willing to consider an exception to 
the per se ban on price fixing ‘for the more easily identifiable and temporary condition of 
“new entry”’.165 
If the agreement at issue fails this effects-based test, then the parties have a leeway 
in the form of an efficiency defence under Article 101(3). Given that this thesis advocates 
against the removal of all types of RPM from the ‘object box’, there is also no reason why 
the ‘hardcore’ status of the practice should not be retained. It follows that any application 
for exemption may be appraised on an individual basis only. This effectively means that an 
RPM agreement which has already been found to infringe Article 101(1) is still likely to 
fail a substantive assessment under Article 101(3), in view of the indispensability 
requirement of that provision, given that it is always possible that its harmful competitive 
effects will be found to outweigh any alleged transactional efficiency gains.  
In principle, however, this last statement does not contradict my previous argument 
regarding the complementary use of selectivity criteria and price floors: it goes without 
saying that I do not dispute the relevance of the ‘less restrictive alternative’ test under 
Article 101(3). To be more precise, if the parties to an RPM agreement have not managed 
to rebut the presumption of anti-competitive object, in accordance with my proposal, this 
means that the transaction did not involve any idiosyncratic investments that needed 
protection from appropriation or an incentive alignment mechanism. In such a case there is 
no credible threat of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour and the arrangement is more 
consistent with the traditional conception of a discrete exchange in a spot market, rather 
than a long-term contractual partnership governed by relational norms. In the context of 
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 See WS Comanor, ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy’ 
[1984-1985] 98 Harv L Rev 983, discussed supra s 2.1.1. Note, ‘Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in 
Circumstance”: The Internet and Resale Price Maintenance’ [2007-2008] 121 Harv L Rev 1600, 1616-1617. 
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 See also Vertical Guidelines, para 108. 
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 551 US 877, 917-918. 
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weak organisational settings, where the manufacturer merely ‘rents’ shelf space without 
imposing any transaction-specific obligations on the retailer, selective distribution is 
indeed less restrictive than RPM, always assuming that the nature of the products in 
question merits selective distribution in the first place. 
If, on the other hand, the RPM policy is found to be caught by the prohibition 
because, despite having rebutted the presumption, it nonetheless failed the intuitive 
balancing test of Article 101(1), this implies that it has been found to be disproportionately 
detrimental to consumer welfare. Under these circumstances, the maintenance of the 
organisational form may be too cumbersome from a public policy perspective, so a less 
restrictive alternative may need to be sought.    
 
6.7.4. Benefits of the Suggested Approach 
The most significant advantage of the suggested approach is that it helps parties to 
a genuinely efficiency-enhancing RPM agreement to avoid the indispensability test of 
Article 101(3). The effects-based test carried out in the context of Article 101(1) does not 
involve a ‘less restrictive alternative’ requirement, which is inherently problematic in the 
first place. On the one hand, the suggested approach provides the parties with the 
opportunity to substantiate that their agreement has a net welfare-enhancing or at least 
welfare-neutral effect. Similarly, under the intuitive proportionality test of that provision, 
in order for a restraint to qualify as ancillary and escape the prohibition, it is sufficient that 
the parties substantiate that it is ‘directly related and necessary to the implementation of a 
main non-restrictive transaction and proportionate to it’.166 In this context, the existence of 
less restrictive alternatives to the restraint at hand is not examined, as the relevant 
requirements may be satisfied if the parties merely demonstrate that ‘without the restriction 
the main non-restrictive transaction would be difficult or impossible to implement’.167   
As has already been seen earlier in this thesis, other forms of restricted dealing are 
either not as effective as price floors in achieving the same efficiencies, or cannot even be 
regarded as alternatives in the first place. Selective distribution, for example, is in theory 
less restrictive, as it entails the reduction but not the elimination of intrabrand price 
competition, but at the same time it is not a perfect substitute for price floors, which can 
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produce more far-reaching efficiencies.
168
 It is indicative that in economic literature there 
are practically no studies in which even the staunchest critics of Leegin’s rule of reason 
seriously include selective distribution in the list a reliable less restrictive alternatives.
169
 
The allocation of exclusive territories, on the other hand, even assuming that it is less 
restrictive,
170
 is frequently not a practicable alternative. Territorial exclusivity is largely, if 
not exclusively, contingent upon the nature of the contract goods, and it is not even 
economically feasible for a broad category of relatively inexpensive consumer goods 
which are typically subject to impulse purchases. If the various types of vertical restraints 
were as easily and readily interchangeable as the European Commission and Courts appear 
to believe, the public policy towards RPM on the other side of the Atlantic would be 
exhausted in just a few paragraphs of an antitrust handbook, instead of giving rise to the 
most heated intellectual debate on antitrust issues of the previous century.
171
 According to 
a commentator:  
very few, if any, of the less restrictive alternatives identified by the Populists are 
equally effective as exclusive territories or resale price maintenance. Indeed, the 
assertion that less restrictive alternatives will produce the very same benefits as 
these restraints rests upon highly unrealistic assumptions – assumptions usually 
associated only with the perfect competition model.
172
  
The point advocated in this thesis is simple. Vertical price fixing has ambivalent 
effects, which depend largely on the economic and legal context in which it is 
implemented. It may be pro-competitive; it may be anti-competitive. The rule of an 
antitrust enforcement agency is to uphold the pro-competitive commercial practices and to 
condemn the restraints that have a pernicious effect of competition. In any event, however, 
and regardless of one’s understanding of the objectives of competition law, the role of 
antitrust is certainly not to transfer executive decision-making powers from an 
undertaking’s board of directors to Brussels and Luxembourg. Nobody other than the 
parties themselves is in a position to judge what is indispensable and what is not, and the 
fact-finder’s task is rather to examine whether what was deemed as indispensable 
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 For the relevant discussion, see supra ss 4.4 and 6.5. 
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 The only such paper which I have come across is JB Kirkwood, ‘Rethinking Antitrust Policy toward 
RPM’ [2010] 55 Antitrust Bull 423. 
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 This is another assumption that cannot be made in the abstract, in light of the economic evidence 
discussed earlier in this thesis; see supra s 4.5.  
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 See, eg, GM Struve, ‘The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process’ [1966-1967] 
80 Harv L Rev 1463, 1477-1478.  
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 AJ Meese, ‘Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation’ [1997-1998] 45 UCLA L 
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commercial conduct by the parties is in line with consumer welfare. As Mr Justice Holmes 
noted in his dissenting opinion in Dr Miles, ‘I think that at least it is safe to say that the 
most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own 
way, unless the ground for interference is very clear’.173 
Besides, it makes no normative sense to read a ‘less restrictive alternative’ test into 
Article 101(1), as the indispensability requirement is meaningful only in the context of a 
substantive assessment under Article 101(3). Indeed, an inquiry into alternative forms of 
restricted dealing is sound only provided that an anti-competitive object or effect has 
already been established. Within the analytical framework of Article 101(1), the ‘less 
restrictive alternative’ test in the case of welfare-enhancing or even welfare-neutral clauses 
– generally clauses that do not fall within the scope of the prohibition – would result in 
agreements being condemned simply on the ground that they fail to increase consumer 
surplus as effectively as others. But that would constitute unacceptable contra legem 
interpretation of the provision, which expressly outlaws only those arrangements that are 
found to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the internal market.    
The suggested approach has an additional advantage. While reducing the scope for 
false positives inevitably associated with a conclusive presumption of illegality, it also 
presents enforcement agencies and national courts with the opportunity to subject RPM 
agreements to a thorough substantive assessment, which would be impossible, were they to 
be covered by a block exemption. It is obvious that the normative effect of the Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation is to benefit agreements falling within its scope with a status 
of ‘per se legality’: insofar as the market share thresholds set out in Article 3(1) of 
Regulation 330/2010 are met and provided that no hardcore restrictions are included, the 
agreement effectively enjoys immunity from antitrust liability. Such a development, 
however, would be undesirable in the case of RPM. Removal of vertical price fixing from 
the category of black-listed clauses would limit considerably the scope for competitive 
appraisal of the actual and potential impact of the relevant schemes on the market. Despite 
all pro-competitive justifications suggested by economists, the effects of RPM remain 
highly ambivalent, and reliance on the parties to carry out the relevant self-assessment 
would rather be unwarranted. Against this background, the extension of the block 
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exemption to cover RPM would undermine severely the deterrent effect of the law, and 
should be dismissed as a policy consideration.
174
 
Finally, a third option, that of a system of prior notification should be automatically 
rejected for practical reasons. For the purposes of the application of Article 101 TFEU, a 
relevant system was in force under Regulation 17/62: Article 4(1) provided that the parties 
to agreements falling within the scope of Article 101(1) were required to notify them to the 
Commission in order to benefit from an individual exemption under Article 101(3). The 
requirement for prior notification was abolished by Regulation 1/2003, which established a 
system of ex post substantive assessment, primarily for reasons of administrative 
efficiency.
175
 A similar system of registration had been established in a number of national 
legal orders – such as Germany and the United Kingdom – prior to the promulgation of the 
Treaty of Rome, but was eventually abandoned.
176
 
The reason for the dismissal of this alternative is that it is based on the unrealistic 
assumption that parties will invariably have the incentive to notify an RPM scheme. As has 
been repeatedly stated in this thesis, vertical price fixing has ambivalent effects and may be 
applied both for efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing purposes. It is therefore 
almost certain that parties to a manifestly anti-competitive RPM agreement – for example, 
a network of collectively enforced price floors or RPM designed to result in market 
foreclosure – cannot be reasonably expected to make use of such a notification/registration 
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 An alternative proposal put forward by Reindl would involve the future re-categorisation of RPM within 
the context of the Block Exemption Regulation; see AP Reindl, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Article 101: 
Developing a More Sensible Analytical Approach’ [2009-2010] 33 Fordham Int’l LJ 1300, 1331-1333. More 
specifically, the argument runs, the removal of vertical price fixing from the category of hardcore restraints 
and its inclusion in the list of excluded restrictions outlined in Article 5 of the Regulation would open the 
door to an effects-based, case-by-case analysis.  
However, it is submitted here that the practical implications of such an approach are highly questionable. 
First of all, there is in principle nothing precluding a hardcore restraint from benefitting from an exemption 
under Article 101(3) on an individual basis; see Vertical Guidelines, paras 47 and 60-64. In this sense, the 
normative approach to both categories of presumptively anti-competitive restraints is in effect identical, at 
least as far as the contested clause itself is concerned. The essential difference between hardcore and 
excluded restrictions lies in their legal effects on the contractual relationship: while the existence of a 
hardcore restraint entails that the vertical agreement as a whole loses the benefit of the Block Exemption 
Regulation, excluded restrictions are severable and thus do not affect the application of the block exemption 
to the rest of the agreement; see Vertical Guidelines, paras 70-71. Although there is no doubt that the 
severability of excluded restrictions reflects the Commission’s view that they are relatively less suspicious, it 
does not nevertheless point to a perceived increased eligibility for a case-by-case substantive assessment, nor 
does it predetermine the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis under Article 101(3). That said, it must 
acknowledged that the symbolism of a possible re-categorisation of RPM under Article 5 and its impact both 
on enforcement agencies and on undertakings could be significant. With this in mind, Reindl’s assertion that 
it would encourage a ‘more honest assessment’ of price floors is not necessarily unfounded.      
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system. As has already been demonstrated by the application of a similar system under EU 
competition law, its operation would be disproportionately costly for all parties, and its 
deterrent effect practically negligible. 
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Conclusion               
 
 
1. Summary 
  
 In the aftermath of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin,1 which overruled 
the century-long per se ban on vertical price fixing, and the publication of the European 
Commission’s 2010 Vertical Guidelines, which retained the classification of the practice as 
a restriction of competition by object under Article 101(1) and a hardcore restraint under 
Article 101(3), there exists a notable difference in the approach taken to RPM under the 
laws of the world’s most mature antitrust jurisdictions. This difference is, of course, not 
absolute given that EU competition law does not recognise the concept of per se illegality: 
in principle, all types of restrictive agreements may benefit from an individual exemption 
under Article 101(3), insofar as the four requirements set out in that provision are 
satisfied.
2
 In the case of RPM, however, this is only a theoretical possibility, as in practice 
it remains subject to a quasi-conclusive presumption of illegality, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Commission recently acknowledged for the first time the efficiency-enhancing 
potential of price floors.
3
 
 The purpose of this thesis was to examine whether a convergence of the two 
regimes is indeed plausible, through the introduction in the current framework of Article 
101 TFEU of a more relaxed approach to vertical price fixing, influenced by Leegin’s rule 
of reason. As a starting point, it was demonstrated that the Commission, in its recent 
Vertical Guidelines, has shown its willingness to depart from the rigid adherence to the 
single market imperative, insofar as an agreement imposing export bans is limited in time 
and designed to facilitate new entry. Although RPM agreements have on many occasions 
been condemned inter alia on the basis of their ability to compartmentalise the internal 
market, the fact that price restraints have been singled out as the most harshly treated forms 
of restricted dealing may be understood primarily in light of economic, rather than 
integrationist considerations. Assuming, therefore, an agreement on the substantive 
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 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877 (2007). 
2
 Case T-17/93, Matra-Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-595, para 85. 
3
 Vertical Guidelines, para 225. 
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economics, it is submitted here that the pro-competitive justifications for vertical price 
fixing do not support the argument for a blanket prohibition, but instead favour a policy 
reform.  
This reform, however, needs to be moderate and cannot go beyond the adoption of 
a – genuinely – rebuttable presumption of illegality. The theories of harm associated with 
RPM, in particular, but not exclusively, the horizontal collusion objection are compelling 
and have been recently confirmed by the economic literature, as discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3. For these reasons, the outright removal of RPM from the lists of ‘by-object’ and 
‘hardcore’ restraints would be unwarranted. 
Building on insights from new institutional economics, it was argued that there is 
also a need for a more consistent approach to RPM and vertical mergers. In light of the 
principle of organisational neutrality, vertical integration is primarily to be understood as a 
paradigm, applicable both to hierarchical and to contractual relationships between 
economic units. It was also seen that vertical price fixing may serve as a substitute of full-
blown vertical integration and produce comparable transactional efficiencies: price floors 
may be used to create a quasi-rent stream which, through its appropriation by retailers, may 
enhance the self-enforcing range of long-term relational contracts, while serving as ex ante 
incentive alignment mechanism designed to induce the latter to undertake the necessary 
relationship-specific investments. Such investments are typically sunk, and may be 
subjected to post-contractual opportunism even in the context of a selective distribution 
network. 
Against this background, and on the basis of the assumption that the two 
paragraphs of the bifurcated Article 101 TFEU represent ‘the two dominant concepts of the 
limits of the firm’,4 it has been argued that Article 101(1) provides the correct normative 
framework for the substantive assessment of price floors. Only if the presumption of anti-
competitive object is not rebutted, or if it is rebutted but the agreement fails the intuitive 
proportionality test, is a full-blown, monetised cost-benefit analysis under Article 101(3) 
appropriate. 
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 I Lianos, ‘Commercial Agency Agreements, Vertical Restraints, and the Limits of Article 81(1) EC: 
Between Hierarchies and Networks’ [2007] 3 J Comp L & Econ 625, 671. 
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2. Limitations of this Study 
 
 The preceding analysis focused exclusively on stricto sensu RPM, or vertical price 
fixing, defined by Article 4(a) of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation as the 
‘restriction of the buyer’s ability to determine its sales price’. In that sense, it covers only 
agreements which are aimed, either directly or indirectly, at establishing a fixed or 
minimum price to be observed by the distributor. According to the Vertical Guidelines, 
examples of indirect RPM include:  
an agreement fixing the distribution margin, fixing the maximum level of discount 
the distributor can grant from a prescribed price level, making the grant of rebates 
or reimbursement of promotional costs by the supplier subject to the observance of 
a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the resale prices of 
competitors, threats, intimidation, warnings, penalties, delay or suspension of 
deliveries or contract terminations in relation to observance of a given price level. 
Direct or indirect means of achieving price fixing can be made more effective when 
combined with measures to identify price-cutting distributors, such as the 
implementation of a price monitoring system, or the obligation on retailers to report 
other members of the distribution network that deviate from the standard price 
level. Similarly, direct or indirect price fixing can be made more effective when 
combined with measures which may reduce the buyer's incentive to lower the 
resale price, such as the supplier printing a recommended resale price on the 
product or the supplier obliging the buyer to apply a most-favoured-customer 
clause.
5
 
As was seen in Chapter 3,
6
 policies imposing minimum advertised prices (‘MAP’), 
especially in the online context (Internet minimum advertised prices, ‘iMAP’), although 
not expressly mentioned in the Guidelines, should also be considered as tantamount to 
indirect price floors. By preventing retailers from advertising the contract goods below a 
specific price – or, in their most extreme form, by prohibiting price advertising altogether – 
such schemes have the effect of reducing the distributors’ incentive to engage in aggressive 
intrabrand price competition. It follows that MAP policies, whether in the offline or the 
online context, should be subjected to the same antitrust treatment as vertical price fixing. 
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 It has been acknowledged in this thesis that the emergence and expansion of e-
commerce has presented antitrust authorities with new challenges, inter alia in the field of 
vertical restraints. New types of restrictive clauses, specific to Internet retailing, such as 
dual pricing and retail most-favoured-nation clauses (‘retail MFN’), also referred to as 
across platform parity agreements (‘APPA’), are being implemented by undertakings for 
anti-competitive purposes and with the effect of restricting the competitive advantage of 
cost-effective online outlets. 
 Although raising challenging theoretical issues, and despite their comparable 
effects, these restraints do not constitute RPM, either directly or indirectly. Dual pricing, 
namely a requirement that the distributor pay a higher wholesale price for products 
intended to be sold online than for those which will be made available in brick-and-mortar 
outlets is already being treated under EU competition law as a territorial restraint. More 
specifically, the Vertical Guidelines indentify dual pricing as a form of indirect ban on 
passive sales and take the position that it constitutes a hardcore restraint unable to benefit 
from the block exemption.
7
 Although dual pricing does have the effect of reinforcing price 
rigidity in the e-marketplace, the question as to whether it should be classified as a price or 
a non-price restraint is probably an exercise in semantics, which falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
 As far as retail MFN is concerned, this practice, whereby a seller agrees with an 
online trade platform that the price charged on the latter will not exceed the prices charged 
on its competitors, should also not be considered as RPM despite their theoretically 
comparable effects. Retail MFN does not fall within the legal definition of vertical price 
fixing, insofar as in does not involve a relationship between a supplier (the manufacturer) 
and a buyer (the distributor). Also, from an economic perspective, the practice merits a 
separate welfare analysis in view of the fact that the manufacturer is not involved in the 
arrangement. The typical pro-competitive justification for RPM is that, when it is 
employed voluntarily by the manufacturer, it makes both itself and consumers better off. 
 Another limitation of this research is that it has not managed to discuss more than a 
handful of RPM cases from national competition authorities (‘NCAs’). Following the 
enactment of Regulation 1/2003, which decentralised the enforcement of EU competition 
law, on a number of occasions NCAs have applied the national competition laws, 
sometimes alongside Article 101 TFEU, to agreements fixing minimum resale prices. 
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However, language barriers, along with the fact that such an endeavour would require 
considerable expenditure of resources, have prevented me from undertaking a more 
thorough investigation into the enforcement activities of NCAs with regard to RPM. I 
sincerely hope though that a future expanded version of this thesis will include a wider 
range of decisions by NCAs, in addition to the few German and French cases reviewed in 
Chapter 5. 
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Appendix 
Resale Price Maintenance under National Antitrust Laws Prior to the 
Treaty of Rome 
 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Treaty of Rome, the legal orders of half of the 
founding states – Germany, France and the Netherlands – already contained some form of 
legislation aimed at the protection of the competitive order, whereas Belgium introduced 
an antitrust statute three years later, in 1960.
1
 As will be seen in the following paragraphs, 
the treatment of vertical price fixing by the various domestic legal orders was, at that time, 
anything but consistent, a finding which will be used to support the assumption that the 
severity towards RPM has been merely an import from American law.  
In addition to these four founding Member States, account will be taken of the 
approach to RPM under British and Swedish competition law. Given that the accession of 
the United Kingdom and Sweden did not occur until considerably later – in 1973 and 1995, 
respectively – it is obviously unlikely that their domestic legal traditions exercised any 
direct influence on the competition rules of the Treaty. Nonetheless, without the review of 
their relevant national laws this study would be incomplete. In view of the level of 
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 At the time of the enactment of the Treaty of Rome, the other two founding members of the European 
Economic Community, Luxembourg and Italy, had not yet passed any specific legislation pertaining to the 
protection of the competitive process and relied mostly on some relevant provisions of their respective Penal 
Codes.  
In Luxembourg, a general ban on resale price maintenance was introduced a few years later by Article 1 of 
the Grand Ducal Decree of 9 December 1965 (Règlement grand-ducal du 9 décembre 1965 portant 
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of these agreements, this was generally accepted by scholars – particularly where they involved branded 
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scope either i) of Article 1379 of the Italian Civil Code, which stipulates that restraints on  alienation are 
enforceable only with respect to the parties to the contract at hand, and only if they are limited in time and in 
accordance with the interests of one of the parties, or ii) of Article 2593, which requires that agreements 
restrictive of competition be in writing and provides that they are valid if they concern territorial restraints or 
restraints on certain activities, and their duration does not exceed five years. According to a third opinion, 
which was based on the general principles of Italian law, in order for RPM agreements to be upheld, they 
should not restrict the consumer’s freedom of choice, while being in accordance with the interests of one of 
the parties. On the relevant intellectual debate, see L Focsaneanu, ‘Les Prix Imposés dans la Communauté 
Economique Européenne’ [1967] 3 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 173, 206-209. 
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industrialisation of these countries, along with the existence of reasonably effective 
antitrust legislation in both jurisdictions during that period of time, the examination of their 
national laws could provide a broader picture of the trends in the treatment of RPM in post-
war Europe.         
 
1. Germany 
 It was seen in the previous paragraph that the adoption of decartelisation laws by 
the American, British and French Military Governments of the respective Zones of Control 
formed part of the reconstruction of the German economy, following the country’s defeat 
in World War II. In the context of these reforms, and on the basis of the US model, the 
legal framework for the prohibition of RPM was introduced in the German legal order. The 
occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany was eventually terminated on 5 
May 1955 by the Bonn Conventions, which were signed between the three powers and the 
German government and conferred full sovereignty upon the latter. Specifically with 
regard to the Allied Decartelisation Laws, it was agreed that they should remain in force 
until repealed or replaced by the German legislature.
2
 
 Deliberations regarding the drafting of a cartel law, its basic principles and 
ideological foundations, started as early as 1949 and culminated in the enactment of the 
Law against Restraints of Competition of 27 July 1957 (hereinafter ‘GWB’).3 The GWB 
became effective on 1 January 1958, the same day as the Treaty of Rome, and remains, as 
amended, the normative framework for the legal treatment of anti-competitive conduct in 
Germany to the present day. As originally enacted, the German law dealt with RPM in 
section 15, which declared void and unenforceable any agreements restricting a party’s 
freedom to determine its own prices or terms in contracts concluded with third parties.
4
 
Additionally, the law provided that the parties to such agreements were liable for the 
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 IE Schwarz, ‘Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany – A Comparative Study’ [1956-1957] 105 U Pa 
L Rev 617, 646-648. 
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 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [1957] 41 Bundesgesetzblatt I 1081, 1081-1103. For details on 
the negotiations between the German government and industry representatives, which ultimately resulted in 
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Prometheus (Oxford University Press 1998), pp 270-276. 
4
 Section 15 of the GWB provided that  
Verträge zwischen Unternehmen über Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen, die sich auf Märkte 
innerhalb des Geltungsbereichs dieses Gesetzes beziehen, sind nichtig, soweit sie einen 
Vertragsbeteiligten in der Freiheit der Gestaltung von Preisen oder Geschäftsbedingungen bei 
solchen Verträgen beschränken, die er mit Dritten über die gelieferten Waren, über andere Waren 
oder über gewerbliche Leistungen schließt.  
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damages suffered by another party (§35), and that they would also be subject to an 
administrative fine (§38).  
Section 16, however, introduced an important exception to this general rule: the 
invalidity would not extend to agreements fixing the resale prices of branded goods 
(Markenwaren) which were in price competition with similar goods of other manufacturers 
or dealers.
5
 The rationale behind this exception was the conventional wisdom that branded 
goods meet certain quality standards valued by consumers;
6
 a fixed resale price would thus 
serve as a guarantee for the product’s quality, while the demand would, in turn, induce the 
manufacturer to maintain the high standards of production. In addition, the provision 
reflects the emphasis on the protection of the competitive process in the upstream market 
and the idea that restraints of intrabrand competition are generally less harmful or that they 
can even generate considerable efficiencies.
7
 A second exemption concerned book 
publishers imposing the resale price of their products. Section 16(4) stipulated that, in 
order for RPM agreements concerning branded goods to become effective, they should be 
registered with the newly-established competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt 
(German Federal Cartel Office, hereinafter ‘FCO’). The authority was, nevertheless, given 
the power to invalidate an already registered RPM agreement where, at any point in the 
future, it established that the agreement in question ceased to fulfil the requirements of 
section 16, or was being implemented in an abusive way, or was able, either by itself or in 
combination with other restrictions of competition, to result in an increase in the price of 
the goods concerned, to prevent any price reductions or to restrict output, in a way not 
justified with regard to the general economic conditions (§17(1)). 
Furthermore, the GWB adopted a quite stringent approach to recommended resale 
prices. Section 38(2) outlawed any recommendations which would result in the violation, 
by means of uniform conduct, of any of the prohibitions laid down in the law.
8
 Price 
                                                          
5
 According to section 16(1),  
§15 gilt nicht, soweit  
1. ein Unternehmen die Abnehmer seiner Markenwaren, die mit gleichartigen Waren 
anderer Hersteller oder Händler in Preiswettbewerb stehen, oder 
2. ein Verlagsunternehmen die Abnehmer seiner Verlagserzeugnisse 
rechtlich oder wirtschaftlich bindet, bei der Weiterveräußerung bestimmte Preise zu vereinbaren 
oder ihren Abnehmer die gleiche Bindung bis zur Weiterveräußerung an den letzten Verbraucher 
aufzuerlegen.  
6
 Indeed, section 16(2) of the GWB defined ‘branded goods’ as those, the provision of which at a given or 
improved quality is guaranteed by the price-fixing manufacturer.  
7
 PD Schapiro, ‘The German Law against Restraints of Competition – Comparative and International 
Aspects, Part Two’ [1962] 62 Colum L Rev 201, 205. 
8
 According to the second sentence of section 38(2) of the GWB, ‘Wer Empfehlungen ausgesprochen hat, die 
eine Umgehung der in diesem Gesetz ausgesprochenen Verbote oder der von der Kartellbehörde auf Grund 
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recommendations also fell within the scope of this provision, but, according to a decision 
of the Federal Supreme Court, they could be exempted provided that they were not 
mandatory and fulfilled the requirements set out for the exemption of RPM agreements.
9
 
The FCO further opined that recommended prices should also be registered, without, 
however, this registration being a requirement for their validity.
10
  
Following a broad amendment of the GWB in 1965,
11
 para 6 of the modified 
section 16 authorised the Minister of Finance to issue a regulation regarding the 
establishment and administration of a register for vertical price fixing agreements 
(Preisbindungsregister), which would be kept by the FCO; the regulation was adopted at 
the beginning of the following year.
12
 Under the new regime, registration was required 
only for RPM agreements concerning branded goods; agreements covering publications 
were not subject to any such requirement. An additional interesting aspect of the 
amendment was that it introduced a legal presumption for the appraisal of the conditions 
justifying the withdrawal of the exemption for registered agreements under section 17(1). 
According to the modified text of the provision, it would be presumed that the 
requirements of section 17(1)(3) were met where a considerable number of sales below the 
fixed prices had been observed, or where the products in question were being made 
available partly subject to an RPM scheme and partly without or under a different brand 
name, at prices substantially lower than the fixed prices.  
In 1973, RPM was eventually outlawed by a new law amending the GWB.
13
 The 
scope of section 16 was substantially limited by the abolition of the exemption of branded 
goods, which would now fall within the ambit of the general prohibition of section 15. 
Under the modified GWB, however, the favourable treatment of RPM in the publishing 
sector was maintained. It has been estimated that, by the time of the second amendment of 
the GWB, the resale prices of more than 175,000 ‘selling units’ had been fixed by some 
750 firms.
14
 Naturally, the amendment also provided for the abolition of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
dieses Gesetzes erlassenen Verfügungen durch gleichförmiges Verhalten bewirkt haben, macht sich ebenfalls 
einer Ordnungswidrigkeit schuldig’. 
9
 See KE Markert, ‘The New German Antitrust Reform Law’ [1974] 19 Antitrust Bull 135, 149.  
10
 PW Heil and G Vorbrugg, ‘Anti-Trust Law in West Germany: Recent Developments in German and 
Common Market Regulation’ [1974] 8 Int’l L 349, 357. 
11
 Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen vom 15. September 1965 [1965] 53 
Bundesgesetzblatt I 1349, 1363-1364; for the consolidated version of the GWB, as amended, see [1966] 2 
Bundesgesetzblatt I 37, 37-59.     
12
 Verordnung über die Anlegung und Führung des Preisbindungsregisters vom 3. Januar 1966 [1966] 2 
Bundesgesetzblatt I 37, 59-60.  
13
 Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen vom 3. August 1973 
[1973] 64 Bundesgesetzblatt I 917, 917-929.  
14
 KE Markert, supra n 9, 149. 
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Preisbindungsregister.
15
 Moreover, para 1(12) of the amended section 38 maintained and 
expressly laid down the ban on resale price recommendations; but section 38(a)(1) 
exempted from the prohibition any non-binding price recommendations which were 
expected to be similar to the prices presumably charged by the majority of the dealers who 
were the addressees of these recommendations.                  
 
2. United Kingdom 
The validity and enforceability of RPM agreements was generally upheld by 
English courts until the enactment of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956.
16
 Prior to 
the passage of the Act, various committees had been appointed by the government with the 
task to examine the impact of RPM with regard to the public interest.
17
 The most 
prominent among them was the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance (also referred to 
as ‘the Lloyd Jacob Committee’ after its Chairman, Sir George H Lloyd Jacob). In an 
influential Report submitted in 1948, the Lloyd Jacob Committee stressed the detrimental 
effects of the collective administration of RPM schemes and suggested that the necessary 
‘steps be taken to render illegal the application of sanctions which extend beyond the 
remedies open to an individual producer for any breach of resale price maintenance 
conditions’.18    
In accordance with the recommendations of the Lloyd Jacob Committee, the 1956 
Act recognised the individual manufacturer’s freedom to maintain and enforce the price at 
which its products were to be sold,
19
 and drew a distinction between that and the collective 
enforcement of resale price conditions. By contrast to individual vertical price fixing 
agreements, which were enforceable even against subsequent purchasers who had notice of 
the RPM clause, collaboration among two or more competing manufacturers regarding the 
                                                          
15
 See Article 1(6) of the 1973 Law, amending sections 16 and 17 of the GWB. 
16
 Lord Wilberforce, A Campbell and N Elles, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies (2nd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966), pp 404-405. 
17
 The reports of the early committees were generally favourable for RPM, but were followed by a gradual 
shift towards a more hostile attitude; for an account of the most notable committees and their findings, see H 
Mercer, Constructing a Competitive Order: The Hidden History of British Antitrust Policies (Cambridge 
University Press 1995), pp 150-153.  
18
 Para 167 of the Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance, as quoted in Lord Wilberforce et 
al., supra n 16, pp 406-407.  
19
 S 25(1) of the 1956 Act provided that  
[w]here goods are sold by a supplier subject to a condition as to the price at which those goods may 
be resold, either generally or by or to a specified class or person, that condition may, subject to the 
provisions of this section, be enforced by the supplier against any person not party to the sale who 
subsequently acquires the goods with notice of the condition as if he had been party thereto. 
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enforcement of the fixed resale prices was declared unlawful under s. 24(1) of the Act.
20
 
Additionally, s. 24(2) prohibited any arrangements between dealers the purpose of which 
was to induce their suppliers to impose resale price conditions or to enforce the stipulated 
prices. It is clear from the relevant provisions that the British legislator’s primary concern 
with regard to RPM arrangements was not the resulting increase in prices, but the 
‘horizontal’ effects of the widespread use of vertical price fixing, namely the possibility 
that RPM might be used as a means to reinforce a cartel agreement in either the upstream 
or the downstream market. 
It should be stressed at this point that, under the 1956 Act, only collective 
agreements regarding the enforcement of RPM schemes were prohibited; not agreements 
between suppliers as to the maintenance of resale prices as such. In a Report published a 
year earlier, the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission – the authority 
entrusted under the 1948 Act with the duties to investigate and report on monopolies and 
collusive agreements
21
 – had stated:  
We express no views about the advantages or disadvantages of resale price 
maintenance itself, but we think that the disadvantages we have described arise to 
an important extent from the uniformity and rigidity of its application in many 
trades, and that this uniformity and rigidity result in the main from collective 
enforcement … We appreciate that some manufacturers may at times have good 
grounds for wishing to be able to check extreme forms of price competition among 
retailers in the distribution of their branded goods … We appreciate that 
distributors as well as manufacturers may be concerned at the possibility of marked 
and persistent loss-leader selling where resale prices are not effectively enforced. 
Whether or not changes in the law should be made to meet these difficulties must 
                                                          
20
 The text of s 24(1)(a) dealing with the collective enforcement of RPM read as follows:  
24. Prohibition of agreements for collective enforcement of conditions as to resale prices. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, it shall be unlawful for any two or more persons 
carrying on business in the United Kingdom as suppliers of any goods to make or carry out any 
agreement or arrangement by which they undertake –  
(a) to withhold supplies of goods for delivery in the United Kingdom from dealers (whether 
party to the agreement or arrangement or not) who resell or have resold goods in breach of 
any condition as to the price at which those goods may be resold; 
(b) to refuse to supply goods for delivery in the United Kingdom to such dealers except on 
terms and conditions which are less favourable than those applicable in the case of other 
dealers carrying on business in similar circumstances… 
or any agreement or arrangement authorising the recovery of penalties (however described) by or on 
behalf of the parties to the agreement from dealers who resell or have resold goods in breach of any 
such condition as is described in paragraph (a) of this subsection, or the conduct of any domestic 
proceedings in connection therewith. 
21
 Under s 28 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission would be replaced by the Monopolies Commission. 
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depend mainly on an assessment of the general effects of resale price maintenance 
… We are satisfied that collective enforcement arrangements of the kinds covered 
by our reference do not provide an answer which is consistent with the public 
interest.
22
 
Thus, collective agreements whereby suppliers merely undertook to enter into price 
maintenance schemes with their dealers, without agreeing on the steps to be taken for their 
enforcement, did not fall within the scope of s. 24(1). That said, such agreements were 
required to be registered with the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, pursuant to 
ss. 9 and 6(1)(a) of the 1956 Act. Following its registration, a restrictive agreement would 
be subject to a reasonableness inquiry by the Restrictive Practices Court; a registered 
collective RPM scheme could, therefore, be declared void (s. 20), unless the Court was 
satisfied that it fulfilled the conditions set out in s. 21.
23
       
The general prohibition on RPM was introduced into the British legal order by the 
Resale Prices Act 1964. The general leniency towards vertical price fixing had encouraged 
its widespread use to such an extent that, at the time of the promulgation of the Act, RPM 
in Britain reportedly accounted for ‘45 percent of consumer expenditure on goods’.24 The 
Resale Prices Act, in section 1(1) thereof, declared void ‘any term or condition of a 
contract for the sale of goods by a supplier to a dealer ... in so far as it purports to establish 
or provide for the establishment of minimum prices to be charged on the resale of the 
goods in the United Kingdom’. Interestingly, RPM, albeit unlawful under the Act, was not 
treated as a ‘hardcore’ restraint.  
According to section 5(2), an RPM agreement could escape the application of 
section 1(1), provided that it satisfied at least one of five conditions. These conditions for 
exemption were: (i) the quality of the goods available for sale, or the varieties of the goods 
so available, would be substantially reduced to the detriment of the public as consumers or 
users of those goods; or (ii) the number of establishments in which the goods are sold by 
retail would be substantially reduced to the detriment of the public as consumers or users; 
or (iii) the prices at which the goods are sold by retail would in general and in the long run 
be increased to the detriment of the public as such consumers or users; or (iv) the goods 
would be sold by retail under conditions likely to cause danger to health in consequence of 
                                                          
22
 Monopolies and Restrictive Prices Commission, Collective Discrimination: A Report on Exclusive 
Dealing, Collective Boycotts, Aggregated Rebates and Other Discriminatory Trade Practices, Cmd. 9504 
(1955), paras 237-238. 
23
 Lord Wilberforce et al., supra n 16, pp 408 and 414. 
24
 Notes, ‘Resale Prices Act, 1964’ [1964] 30 Arbitration 71. 
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their misuse by the public as such consumers or users; or (v) any necessary services 
actually provided in connection with or after the sale of goods by retail would cease to be 
so provided or would be substantially reduced to the detriment of the public as such 
consumers or users.   
It is interesting to note that the second and fifth conditions for exemption 
demonstrate beyond any doubt that the British legislator had already endorsed the ‘free 
rider rationale’ only four years after its formulation in Lester Telser’s seminal article ‘Why 
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’.25 According to s. 6 of the Act, agreements which 
sought to qualify for an exemption were subject to a registration requirement. Following 
their registration, the Registrar would make a reference to the Restrictive Practices Court, 
which was authorised under s. 5 to issue exemption orders. The Resale Prices Act, 1964, 
was amended by the Resale Prices Act 1976. The latter defined the legal framework for the 
treatment of RPM until March 2000, when the Competition Act 1998 entered into force. 
  
3. France 
 The foundations of the law against restrictive agreements in France were laid by 
Article 419 of the French Penal Code (Code Pénal) of 1810, drafted under the influence of 
the laissez faire ideology of the physiocratic school which was prevalent in the country in 
the years after the French Revolution. Article 419 provided for the criminal offence of 
coalition and penalised inter alia agreements concerning the sale at fixed prices, as well as 
the artificial increase or reduction in the price of goods ‘above or below the price which the 
natural and free course of competition would determine’.26 The language of the provision, 
which covered combinations between ‘the principal holders of the same kind of 
merchandise or commodity’, implied that the prohibition was not applicable to vertical 
agreements. The exclusion of vertical agreements from the scope of Article 419 was of no 
                                                          
25
 LG Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’ [1960] 3 JL & Econ 86. 
26
 According to the original text of Article 419, as in force prior to its first amendment in 1926,  
Tous ceux qui, par des faits faux ou calomnieux semés à dessein dans le public, par des suroffres 
faites aux prix que demandaient les vendeurs eux-mêmes, par réunions ou coalitions entre les 
principaux détenteurs d'une même marchandise ou denrée, tendant à ne la pas vendre, ou à ne la 
vendre qu'à un certain prix, ou qui par des voies ou moyens frauduleux quelconques auront opéré la 
hausse ou la baisse du prix des denrées ou marchandises ou des papiers et effets publics au-dessus 
ou au-dessous des prix qu'aurait déterminés la concurrence naturelle et libre du commerce, seront 
punis d'un emprisonnement d'un mois au moins, d'un an au plus, et d'une amende de cinq cents 
francs à dix mille francs. Les coupables pourront de plus être mis, par l'arrêt ou le jugement, sous la 
surveillance de la haute police pendant deux ans au moins et cinq ans au plus.  
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particular significance at the time of its enactment, as it was not until World War I that a 
general trend towards vertical integration was first observed in the French industry.
27
 
 Vertical restraints were eventually brought within the ambit of Article 419 
following its amendment in 1926.
28
 The second paragraph of the modified provision 
outlawed any type of action or attempt to effect, either directly or through an intermediary, 
an artificial increase or reduction in the price of commodities or merchandise or of public 
or private securities. At the same time, the requirement that the parties to the unlawful 
coalition hold the same kind of merchandise or commodity was abolished.
29
 Due to the 
strict interpretation of the provision, criminal prosecutions under Article 419 were 
infrequent and, occasionally, unsuccessful; that said, illegal combinations were generally 
declared void and unenforceable by civil courts.
30
 The enforcement of the prohibition was 
eventually brought to an end in the 1930s. In France, as in most other economies affected 
by the crisis, the impact of the Great Depression resulted in an increased degree of state 
intervention in the market mechanism. In response to the need for economic stabilisation, 
the government encouraged and, occasionally, imposed cartelisation in various industries. 
During World War II the systematic central planning of industrial production was further 
enhanced by the Vichy regime. This policy of interventionism was not abandoned after the 
restoration of the country’s sovereignty, as the state assumed the leading role in the 
struggle for economic restructuring. The return to economic stability was characterised by 
a wave of nationalisations in vital sectors of the economy and by the adoption of a system 
of extensive price control with the aim of preventing inflation.
31
  
 The legal framework for the control of prices was set out by Ordinance No. 45-
1483 (hereinafter ‘the Price Ordinance’), which was promulgated immediately after the 
                                                          
27
 See F Deák, ‘Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade in French Law – A Comparative Study’ 
[1935-1936] 21 Iowa L Rev 397, 418, fn 48 and accompanying text.  
28
 Loi du 3 décembre 1926 modifiant les articles 419, 420 et 421 du Code penal, JORF 4 décembre 1926. 
29
 The amended text ofArticle 419 read as follows: 
Tous ceux:  
1) qui, par des faits faux ou calomnieux semés sciemment dans le public, par des offres jetées sur le 
marché à dessein de troubler les cours, par des suroffres faites aux prix que demandaient les 
vendeurs eux-mêmes, par des voies ou moyens frauduleux quelconques; 
2) ou qui, en exerçant ou tentant d'exercer, soit individuellement, soit par réunion ou coalition, une 
action sur le marché dans le but de se procurer un gain qui ne serait pas le résultat du jeu naturel de 
l'offre et de la demande; 
Auront, directement ou par personne interposée, opéré ou tenté d'opérer la hausse ou la baisse 
artificielle du prix des denrées ou marchandises ou des effets publics ou privés,  
Seront punis … 
30
 For a detailed review of the enforcement of Article 419, see F Deák, supra n 27. 
31
 SA Riesenfeld, ‘The Legal Protection of Competition in France’ [1960] 48 Cal L Rev 574, 578-583; A 
Kuenzler and L Warlouzet, ‘National Traditions of Competition Law: A Belated Europeanization through 
Convergence?’ in K Klaus Patel and H Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), pp 95 and 99.   
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end of the war.
32
 As originally enacted, the Price Ordinance, in Article 37 thereof, provided 
inter alia for the prohibition of three types of restrictive agreements as ‘illicit pricing 
practices’ (pratiques de prix illicites). These blacklisted agreements, all of which were 
vertical in nature, were: refusals to supply and unjustified price discrimination (Article 
37(1)(a)); and tying clauses (Article 37(1)(c)). In 1952, the ban on price fixing was 
introduced in the Price Ordinance, in the context of one of its several amendments. Law 
No. 52-835
33
 inserted a third paragraph in Article 37, which declared unlawful all 
agreements entered into between multiple producers and/or distributors with the aim of 
fixing the minimum prices of goods and services. Only collective actions fell within the 
scope of the provision, but the type of association between the parties was irrelevant.
34
 The 
law further provided that exemption from the prohibition could be granted by ministerial 
decision. According to the second subparagraph of Article 37(3), the prohibition was not 
applicable to prices imposed by an individual manufacturer for the resale of its goods 
throughout the different stages of the distribution chain.
35
 
The lack of comprehensive anti-cartel legislation was – only partially – remedied 
the following year, by the promulgation of Decree No. 53-704.
36
 The 1953 Decree, more of 
a reaction to inflationary pressures rather than a response to efficiency-enhancing 
considerations, is regarded as the first French antitrust statute, although in essence it 
constituted a complement to the Price Ordinance.
37
 The cornerstone of the amendment was 
the general clause of Article 59 bis, which prohibited ‘all concerted actions, conventions, 
                                                          
32
 Ordonnance No. 45-1483 du 30 juin 1945 relative aux prix, JORF 8 juillet 1945, rectificatif JORF 21 
juillet et 8 septembre 1945. 
33
 Loi No. 52-835 du 18 juillet 1952 complétant l’article 37 de l’ordonnance 45-1483 du 30 juin 1945 relative 
aux prix, JOFR 19 juillet 1952. 
34
 J Mazard, ‘Prix Imposés et Prix d’Entente’ [1953] 16 Droit Social 129, 131-132. 
35
 The original text of Article 37(3), which would also be subsequently amended, read as follows:  
Est assimilé à la pratique des prix illicites le fait ... 
3. Par toute personne, et sauf dérogation autorisée par arrêté du ou des ministres competent, de 
conférer, maintenir ou imposer un caractère minimum aux prix des produits et des prestations de 
service, soit au moyen de tarifs ou barèmes professionnels, soit en vertu d’ ententes, quelle qu’en 
soit la nature ou la forme, intervenues entre producteurs, entre distributeurs, entre prestataires de 
services, ou entre les uns et les autres. 
Ces dispositions ne s’appliquent pas aux prix de marque qui feront l’objet d’une réglementation 
spéciale… 
The term ‘prix de marque’, as used in the context of subparagraph 2, was broad and did not refer exclusively 
to branded goods; see J Mazard, supra n 34, 131.   
36
 Décret No. 53-704 du 9 août 1953 relatif au maintien ou au rétablissement de la libre concurrence 
industrielle et commercial, JORF 10 août 1953. 
37
 F Jenny, ‘French Competition Policy in Perspective’ in WS Comanor et al (eds), Competition Policy in 
Europe and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions (Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990), p 148. 
For a discussion on the problem of unconstitutionality of the 1953 Decree, which led to its partial annulment 
by the Conseil d’Etat and its re-enactment (and amendment) by Decree No 58-545 of 24 June 1958, see EE 
Goldstein, ‘National and International Antitrust Policy in France: An Interview with M. Antoine Pinay, 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance’ [1958-1959] 37 Tex L Rev 188, 193.  
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express or tacit agreements, or coalitions, irrespective of their form and cause, which have 
as their object or potential effect the restriction of the full exercise of competition by 
preventing the reduction of costs or prices or by facilitating an artificial increase in prices’. 
These agreements were also declared as void as a matter of civil law. The prohibition was, 
however, not applicable to agreements concluded in accordance with a statutory provision 
or where the parties could demonstrate that the agreement contributed to the improvement 
or expansion of production or resulted in the development of the economic progress 
through rationalisation and specialisation (Article 59 ter). 
As far as the treatment of vertical restraints is concerned, the relevant legal 
framework was set by the more specific provision of Article 37, as amended by the 1953 
Decree. Particularly with regard to RPM, the amendments introduced by the Decree were 
substantial. Firstly, the prohibition of – what was now – Article 37(4) was extended to 
cover price fixing agreements entered into by an individual manufacturer or distributor, as 
well as by professional associations.
38
 The amendments further included the specification 
of the conditions for exemption from the general prohibition. According to the modified 
provision, exemptions could be granted, for a limited period of time only, in the case of 
RPM agreements having as their subject matter innovative goods or services, or products 
exploited under the exclusive rights of patent, licence or registered design, or requiring 
specifications such as guarantee of quality, or an initial advertising campaign.
39
 In a 
circular issued in 1960, the government set the practical framework for the appraisal of 
these requirements.
40
 Firstly, the circular clarified that the above list was non-exhaustive 
and that the parties to an RPM agreement could put forward any other reasons suitable to 
justify their request for exemption. It was further stressed that the derogation did not 
provide for the possibility of ‘block exemptions’: as it was meant to be granted in 
exceptional circumstances, a more generalised application of the exemption to agreements 
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 Circulaire du 31 mars 1960 relative à l’interdiction des pratiques commerciales restreignant la concurrence, 
JORF 2 avril 1960. 
39
 According to the amended provision of Article 37(4): 
Est assimilé à la pratique des prix illicites le fait ... 
4. Par toute personne de conférer, maintenir ou imposer un caractère minimum aux prix des produits 
des prestations et services ou des marges commerciales, soit au moyen de tarifs ou barèmes, soit en 
vertu d'ententes, quelle qu'en soit la nature ou la forme.  
Sont exclus de l’ application du paragraphe 4 ci-dessus les cas où les produits ou les services auront 
fait l’objet d’une dérogation accordée par arête conjoint du ministre chargé des affaires 
économiques, du ministre chargé du commerce et du ministre intéressé. Cette dérogation qui, en tout 
état de cause, doit être limitée dans le temps, peut être donnée notamment en fonction de la 
nouveauté du produit ou du service de l’exclusivité consécutive á un brevet d’invention, à une 
licence d’exploitation ou au dépôt d’un modèle, ou des exigences d’un cahier des charges 
comportant garantie de qualité et spécification du conditionnement, ou d’une campagne publicitaire 
de lancement ... 
40
 Circulaire du 31 mars 1960, supra n 38. 
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within a certain industry was precluded. In order for a vertical price fixing agreement to be 
considered eligible for the derogation, it should also not contribute to the parties enjoying 
an ‘unjustified advantage’ in the marketplace; in other words, it should neither result in 
‘excessive profits’ for the manufacturer nor afford the distributor with a profit margin 
which is disproportionately large with regard to the significance of its intervention. Finally, 
the firms concerned should demonstrate that the products in question were distributed 
through the least expensive channel and that, ultimately, the prices charged to consumers 
were the lowest possible. According to the circular, this condition implied that firms with a 
certain degree of market power could not, as a general proposition, benefit from the 
derogation. Factors such as brand image or the luxury character of the product, or the 
uncertainty related to the launching of a new product, were also to be taken into 
consideration. In practice, such derogations were granted on a number of occasions.
41
 
The 1953 Decree aimed solely at the prevention of artificial price increases by 
means of collusive agreements. A main downside of its formalistic application was that it 
failed to catch some types of combinations that had an indirect effect on prices.
42
 The other 
side of the coin was that an effects-based approach to restraints was precluded. In spite of 
any exemptions granted by the competent Ministers, the treatment of RPM effectively 
amounted to a ‘per se’ prohibition. The rationale behind the prohibition was the protection 
of large-scale retailers, which had already made their appearance since the early 1950s, 
against traditional dealers which used the threat of boycott with the aim of forcing 
manufacturers to maintain resale prices. The fight against inflation was once again at the 
epicentre of the French government’s economic policy, and the development of large 
discounters was falsely considered as an available remedy.
43
 At this point it should be 
noted that the illegality under Article 37(4) concerned only minimum resale prices, and not 
maximum or recommended prices, provided that the latter were not binding.
44
 A further 
point to be made is that French law provided manufacturers that wished to impose a 
minimum resale price for their products upon their distributors with a loophole, by not 
obliging them to disclose the reasons for terminating a certain dealer. Thus, the fact that 
downstream firms would bear the burden of establishing the unlawful basis for termination 
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 See eg SA Riesenfeld, ‘The Anti-Trust Laws of the Common Market Countries’ [1962] 56 Am Soc’y Int’l 
L Proc 27, 32; R Joliet, ‘Resale Price Maintenance under EEC Antitrust Law’ [1971] 16 Antitrust Bull 589, 
fn 2. 
42
 F Jenny and AP Weber, ‘French Antitrust Legislation: An Exercise in Futility?’ [1975] 20 Antitrust Bull 
597, 600-601. 
43
 For a discussion on the conditions that shaped the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints in France, see F 
Jenny, supra n 37, pp 154-156. 
44
 Circulaire du 31 mars 1960, supra n 38. 
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discouraged their price-cutting activities and, to some extent, prevented compliance with 
the law.
45
 Article 37(4) of the Price Ordinance, as amended by the 1953 Decree, remained 
the legal instrument for the treatment of vertical price fixing until the abrogation of the 
statute by Ordinance No. 86-1243, which maintained the same stringent approach to 
RPM.
46
                    
 
4. The Netherlands 
 Antitrust legislation was effectively introduced in the Netherlands by the Economic 
Competition Law of 1956,
47
 which entered into force two years later. The promulgation of 
the Economic Competition Law was a turning point in the Dutch government’s policy 
towards cartels, as it put an end to a period of outright encouragement of coordination 
between economic operators. The Business Agreements Act 
(Ondernemersovereenkomstenwet) of 1935 had been enacted with the aim of contributing 
to the recovery of the Dutch economy from the disastrous effects of the Depression, and 
contained provisions which, not only allowed restrictive agreements, but further conferred 
upon the state the power to force cartel membership. A similar approach was adopted by 
the Nazi-imposed Cartel Decree of 1941, which, additionally, provided for the mandatory 
registration of cartels.
48
 
 The Law of 1956 retained the cartel register, as well as the power of the 
government to impose participation in cartel agreements; this power, nevertheless, was 
now subject to very specific limitations. A significant innovation of the new law was that it 
gave the Minister of Economic Affairs the power to take action against any restrictive 
agreements which would be found to be contrary to the public interest, and to declare 
them, in whole or in part, non-binding.
49
 Vertical price fixing did not initially fall within 
the scope of the statute, but Article 10 thereof provided that, where the protection of the 
public interest necessitated it, a Royal Decree could be adopted, declaring the 
unenforceability of certain types of restrictive agreements.  
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By virtue of this clause, the ban on vertical price fixing was introduced for the first 
time in 1964, but it concerned exclusively collective RPM, namely agreements where ‘the 
supplier of the products is not free to determine prices independently of third parties’.50 
This legal framework proved to be rather ineffective, due to the large number of 
exemptions granted by ministerial decree in response to relevant requests by producers.
51
 
Later that year, the prohibition was extended to individual RPM agreements involving 
durable consumer goods such as radios, television sets, cars, cameras and household 
appliances. A general prohibition on all vertical price fixing schemes was eventually 
adopted in 1991, in the context of broader reforms in the Dutch antitrust policy. 
 
5. Belgium 
 Competition policy in Belgium was introduced by the Law against the Abuse of 
Economic Power of 1960,
52
 which, at the time of its enactment, was ‘by far the most 
general and indulgent’ among the national antitrust laws of the EU Member States.53 The 
central concept of the new statute was that of ‘abuse of economic power’ (abus de la 
puissance économique). Economic power was defined as the power possessed by any 
natural or legal persons, acting alone or in concert, which allows them to exercise 
preponderant influence on the supply of products or capital in the market, or on the price or 
quality of a specific product or service (Article 1). Article 2 further stated that, in order for 
an abuse to be established, the persons who enjoy economic power should ‘harm the public 
interest through practices which distort or restrict the normal course of competition or 
which impede either the economic freedom of producers, distributors or consumers, or the 
development of production or trade’.54 The Law further introduced a rather complex 
enforcement mechanism (Articles 3-17). 
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 The approach taken to RPM agreements, both collective and individual, under the 
1960 law was particularly lenient. Vertical price fixing schemes could, theoretically at 
least, fall within the scope of Articles 1 and 2 of the statute, as long as the requirements set 
out in these provisions were met. Besides, Article 2 expressly included the restriction of 
the distributor’s commercial freedom in the list of practices which might constitute an 
abuse of economic power if determined to be detrimental to the public interest. In practice, 
however, RPM agreements were generally upheld and enforced.
55
  
In 1964, Ministers Spinoy and De Clercq submitted for consultation to the Senate a 
draft bill which would have authorised the Minister of Economic Affairs to proscribe the 
imposition of minimum resale prices. The bill was eventually withdrawn as a result of the 
reaction of producers of branded goods to that provision.
56
 Given that exports accounted 
for a substantial proportion of the country’s gross domestic product, the government 
supported activities which would increase the Belgian companies’ competitiveness, 
occasionally by encouraging restrictive agreements which would have such an effect. This 
led a commentator to claim that ‘[t]he “public interest” is generally synonymous to the 
producer’s interest’.57 That said, on certain occasions, the Belgian government disregarded 
the Law of 1960 and favoured the application of the legislative decree of 22 January 1945 
concerning the repression of violations regarding national supply – probably because of the 
latter’s more expedient enforcement procedures. Article 1(2) of the legislative decree 
outlawed the maintenance of abnormally high prices, and the government relied on that 
provision in order to disallow a number of RPM agreements, most notably in the chemical 
and pharmaceutical industries.
58
                   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Article 1. La puissance économique, au sens de la présente loi, est le pouvoir que possède une 
personne physique ou morale agissant isolément ou un groupe de ces personnes agissant de concert 
d'exercer sur le territoire du Royaume, par des activités industrielles, commerciales, agricoles ou 
financières, une influence prépondérante sur l'approvisionnement du marché de marchandises ou de 
capitaux, sur le prix ou la qualité d'une marchandise ou d'un service déterminé. 
Article 2. Il y a abus, au sens de la présente loi, lorsqu'une ou plusieurs personnes, détentrices de 
puissance économique, portent atteinte à l'intérêt général par des pratiques qui faussent ou qui 
restreignent le jeu normal de la concurrence ou qui entravent soit la liberté économique des 
producteurs, des distributeurs ou des consommateurs, soit le développement de la production ou des 
échanges. 
55
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6. Sweden 
 The first post-war piece of legislation aimed at the protection of free competition in 
Sweden was promulgated in 1946.
59
 Its purpose was to limit the detrimental effects of 
cartels, firstly, by providing for the registration of restrictive agreements in a Cartel 
Register kept by the Monopoly Investigation Bureau, a newly-established agency within 
the National Board of Trade, and, secondly, through a monitoring system under which the 
Bureau was authorised to carry out special investigations and inquiries. The Act did not, 
however, confer upon the Bureau the power to impose fines on firms which had engaged in 
collusive conduct, nor to require the termination of cartel agreements.
60
 Although limited 
in scope, the legal framework under the Act of 1946 had a surprising deterrent effect: 
twelve years after the introduction of the Cartel Register, almost half of the notified 
restrictive agreements had been voluntarily terminated following their registration.
61
 
 A Report drafted in 1951 by the Committee of New Entry on the basis of evidence 
collected during investigations and data from the Cartel Register reflected the collusive 
tendencies in the Swedish industry and the ubiquity of vertical restraints. The fixing of 
minimum resale prices in particular was so widespread that, according to a commentator, 
‘it [was] probably in [the area of the distribution of products] that the use of explicit 
agreements to limit or even completely eliminate price competition went furthest’.62 
Vertical price fixing was largely imposed at the behest of powerful and organised retailers 
which threatened to boycott any manufacturers that would not comply. Additionally, price 
competition in the downstream market was further stifled by means of price lists circulated 
by retailers’ associations fixing the prices of products not covered by RPM schemes.63 The 
immediate result of these networks of vertical and horizontal price fixing agreements was 
an across-the-board increase in the prices of various goods.
64
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 It was on the basis of the aforementioned Report that the first effective Swedish 
antitrust statute was enacted in 1953.
65
 The 1953 Law Against Restraints of Competition 
contained a general provision according to which,  
[i]f a restraint of competition has a harmful effect within the country, the Market 
Court may ... adopt measures to prevent such an effect ... A harmful effect shall 
occur where, in a manner which is contrary to the public interest, the restraint of 
competition (1) unduly affects the formation of prices, (2) impairs efficiency in 
business, or (3) hinder or prevents the business activities of another.
66
  
It can be deduced from the language of this clause that the law introduced an effects-based 
approach to the legal treatment of competitive restraints: only where a restriction of 
competition was found to be detrimental to the society as a whole, by meeting one of the 
three criteria set out in the provision, would it fall within the ambit of the provision. With 
the exception of only two types of collusive behaviour, no restrictive conduct was subject 
to an outright prohibition. Furthermore, the law did not confer any specific coercive 
powers upon the authorities. The enforcement of the 1953 Law, initially entrusted to two 
institutions, the Competition Ombudsman and the Market Court, was based on the method 
of negotiations and on the voluntary cooperation of the companies concerned; it thus 
provided the latter with the opportunity to eliminate any harmful effects of their actions on 
the basis of guidance provided by the authorities.
67
   
In sharp contrast to this framework, under the 1953 Law RPM, along with collusive 
tendering, were the only two restrictive practices which were expressly prohibited and 
treated as ‘per se’ illegal, while they were also subject to criminal sanctions. RPM was in 
fact treated as an ordinary crime and was prosecuted in the regular criminal courts by the 
public prosecutor, following a recommendation by the Competition Ombudsman.
68
 The 
harsh treatment of vertical price fixing was, however, to an extent mitigated by a clause 
authorising exemptions from the prohibition where special reasons, such as a benefit to 
consumers or the public in general, were present.
69
 Such exemptions were granted in a 
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limited number of cases, most notably to RPM agreements in the retail markets for books 
and published music; the relevant petitions were approved for cultural reasons.
70
    
 The treatment of RPM as ‘per se’ illegal under the 1953 Law essentially precluded 
any analysis by the courts of its likely effects on a case-by-case basis and revealed the 
legislator’s distrust regarding its efficiency-enhancing potential. It is apparent that this 
approach was largely influenced by the findings of the Committee of New Entry, as 
outlined in its Report. More light on the rationale behind the prohibition was shed by the 
Minister of Commerce:  
The most serious disadvantage of the resale price maintenance system is that it 
deters rationalization and thus potential price reductions at the retail level. This is 
based primarily on the fact that in this system the sales price of a good is basically 
determined by the retail merchant with the highest costs. In distribution the 
incentive is lost which is provided by free price formation.
71
  
Thus, as Gerber notes, the severity of the Swedish law was dictated by the danger of 
elimination of intrabrand competition and the need to promote ‘efficiency and international 
competitiveness ... The government was concerned with the structure-preserving and thus 
inefficient effects of resale price maintenance’.72 The attitude towards RPM following the 
1982 legislative reform remained unaltered. 
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